SELinux: remove inode_has_perm_noadp

Both callers could better be using file_has_perm() to get better audit
results.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index c99027dc0b36f7c7033e21f493231b237df14a23..8417a6afaf30c6a82a499deddab24c68b5a52b77 100644 (file)
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1488,20 +1488,6 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
        return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp, flags);
 }
 
-static int inode_has_perm_noadp(const struct cred *cred,
-                               struct inode *inode,
-                               u32 perms,
-                               unsigned flags)
-{
-       struct common_audit_data ad;
-       struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
-
-       COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
-       ad.u.inode = inode;
-       ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
-       return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags);
-}
-
 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
    the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
    pathname if needed. */
@@ -2128,21 +2114,17 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
                spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
                if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
                        struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
-                       struct inode *inode;
 
                        /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
-                          Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
+                          Use path_has_perm on the tty path directly rather
                           than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
                           file may belong to another process and we are only
                           interested in the inode-based check here. */
                        file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
                                                struct tty_file_private, list);
                        file = file_priv->file;
-                       inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
-                       if (inode_has_perm_noadp(cred, inode,
-                                          FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, 0)) {
+                       if (path_has_perm(cred, &file->f_path, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
                                drop_tty = 1;
-                       }
                }
                spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
                tty_kref_put(tty);
@@ -3276,12 +3258,10 @@ static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
 static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
 {
        struct file_security_struct *fsec;
-       struct inode *inode;
        struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 
-       inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
        fsec = file->f_security;
-       isec = inode->i_security;
+       isec = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_security;
        /*
         * Save inode label and policy sequence number
         * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
@@ -3299,7 +3279,7 @@ static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
         * new inode label or new policy.
         * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
         */
-       return inode_has_perm_noadp(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), 0);
+       return path_has_perm(cred, &file->f_path, open_file_to_av(file));
 }
 
 /* task security operations */