2 * socket.c -- socket library functions
4 * Copyright 1998 by Eric S. Raymond.
5 * For license terms, see the file COPYING in this directory.
12 #include <ctype.h> /* isspace() */
15 #endif /* HAVE_MEMORY_H */
16 #include <sys/types.h>
18 #ifndef HAVE_NET_SOCKET_H
19 #include <sys/socket.h>
21 #include <net/socket.h>
24 #include <netinet/in.h>
25 #ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H
26 #include <arpa/inet.h>
29 #if defined(STDC_HEADERS)
32 #if defined(HAVE_UNISTD_H)
35 #if defined(HAVE_STDARG_H)
40 #if TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME
41 # include <sys/time.h>
45 # include <sys/time.h>
52 #include "fetchmail.h"
53 #include "getaddrinfo.h"
56 /* Defines to allow BeOS and Cygwin to play nice... */
59 #define fm_close(a) closesocket(a)
60 #define fm_write(a,b,c) send(a,b,c,0)
61 #define fm_peek(a,b,c) recv(a,b,c,0)
62 #define fm_read(a,b,c) recv(a,b,c,0)
64 #define fm_close(a) close(a)
65 #define fm_write(a,b,c) write(a,b,c)
66 #define fm_peek(a,b,c) recv(a,b,c, MSG_PEEK)
68 #define fm_read(a,b,c) cygwin_read(a,b,c)
69 static ssize_t cygwin_read(int sock, void *buf, size_t count);
70 #else /* ! __CYGWIN__ */
71 #define fm_read(a,b,c) read(a,b,c)
72 #endif /* __CYGWIN__ */
75 /* We need to define h_errno only if it is not already */
78 #ifdef HAVE_RES_SEARCH
79 /* some versions of FreeBSD should declare this but don't */
82 /* pretend we have h_errno to avoid some #ifdef's later */
86 #endif /* ndef h_errno */
88 #ifdef HAVE_SOCKETPAIR
89 static char *const *parse_plugin(const char *plugin, const char *host, const char *service)
90 { const char **argvec;
92 char *cp, *plugin_copy;
93 unsigned int plugin_copy_len;
94 unsigned int plugin_offset = 0, plugin_copy_offset = 0;
95 unsigned int i, s = 2 * sizeof(char*), host_count = 0, service_count = 0;
96 unsigned int plugin_len = strlen(plugin);
97 unsigned int host_len = strlen(host);
98 unsigned int service_len = strlen(service);
100 for (c = p = plugin; *c; c++)
101 { if (isspace((unsigned char)*c) && !isspace((unsigned char)*p))
103 if (*p == '%' && *c == 'h')
105 if (*p == '%' && *c == 'p')
110 plugin_copy_len = plugin_len + host_len * host_count + service_len * service_count;
111 plugin_copy = (char *)malloc(plugin_copy_len + 1);
114 report(stderr, GT_("fetchmail: malloc failed\n"));
118 while (plugin_copy_offset < plugin_copy_len)
119 { if ((plugin[plugin_offset] == '%') && (plugin[plugin_offset + 1] == 'h'))
120 { strcpy(plugin_copy + plugin_copy_offset, host);
122 plugin_copy_offset += host_len;
124 else if ((plugin[plugin_offset] == '%') && (plugin[plugin_offset + 1] == 'p'))
125 { strcpy(plugin_copy + plugin_copy_offset, service);
127 plugin_copy_offset += service_len;
130 { plugin_copy[plugin_copy_offset] = plugin[plugin_offset];
132 plugin_copy_offset++;
135 plugin_copy[plugin_copy_len] = 0;
137 argvec = (const char **)malloc(s);
140 report(stderr, GT_("fetchmail: malloc failed\n"));
143 memset(argvec, 0, s);
144 for (c = p = plugin_copy, i = 0; *c; c++)
145 { if ((!isspace((unsigned char)*c)) && (c == p ? 1 : isspace((unsigned char)*p))) {
151 for (cp = plugin_copy; *cp; cp++)
152 { if (isspace((unsigned char)*cp))
155 return (char *const*)argvec;
158 static int handle_plugin(const char *host,
159 const char *service, const char *plugin)
160 /* get a socket mediated through a given external command */
166 * The author of this code, Felix von Leitner <felix@convergence.de>, says:
167 * he chose socketpair() instead of pipe() because socketpair creates
168 * bidirectional sockets while allegedly some pipe() implementations don't.
170 if (socketpair(AF_UNIX,SOCK_STREAM,0,fds))
172 report(stderr, GT_("fetchmail: socketpair failed\n"));
178 report(stderr, GT_("fetchmail: fork failed\n"));
181 /* fds[1] is the parent's end; close it for proper EOF
183 (void) close(fds[1]);
184 if ( (dup2(fds[0],0) == -1) || (dup2(fds[0],1) == -1) ) {
185 report(stderr, GT_("dup2 failed\n"));
188 /* fds[0] is now connected to 0 and 1; close it */
189 (void) close(fds[0]);
190 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
191 report(stderr, GT_("running %s (host %s service %s)\n"), plugin, host, service);
192 argvec = parse_plugin(plugin,host,service);
193 execvp(*argvec, argvec);
194 report(stderr, GT_("execvp(%s) failed\n"), *argvec);
197 default: /* parent */
201 /* fds[0] is the child's end; close it for proper EOF detection */
202 (void) close(fds[0]);
205 #endif /* HAVE_SOCKETPAIR */
209 int SockCheckOpen(int fd)
210 /* poll given socket; is it selectable? */
218 FD_ZERO(&r); FD_ZERO(&w); FD_ZERO(&e);
221 tv.tv_sec = 0; tv.tv_usec = 0;
222 rt = select(fd+1, &r, &w, &e, &tv);
223 if (rt == -1 && (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR))
229 #endif /* __UNUSED__ */
231 int UnixOpen(const char *path)
234 struct sockaddr_un ad;
235 memset(&ad, 0, sizeof(ad));
236 ad.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
237 strncpy(ad.sun_path, path, sizeof(ad.sun_path)-1);
239 sock = socket( AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0 );
246 /* Socket opened saved. Usefull if connect timeout
247 * because it can be closed.
249 mailserver_socket_temp = sock;
251 if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &ad, sizeof(ad)) < 0)
254 fm_close(sock); /* don't use SockClose, no traffic yet */
260 /* No connect timeout, then no need to set mailserver_socket_temp */
261 mailserver_socket_temp = -1;
266 int SockOpen(const char *host, const char *service,
269 struct addrinfo *ai, *ai0, req;
272 #ifdef HAVE_SOCKETPAIR
274 return handle_plugin(host,service,plugin);
275 #endif /* HAVE_SOCKETPAIR */
276 memset(&req, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
277 req.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
279 i = getaddrinfo(host, service, &req, &ai0);
281 report(stderr, GT_("getaddrinfo(\"%s\",\"%s\") error: %s\n"),
282 host, service, gai_strerror(i));
283 if (i == EAI_SERVICE)
284 report(stderr, GT_("Try adding the --service option (see also FAQ item R12).\n"));
289 for (ai = ai0; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
290 i = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, 0);
294 /* Socket opened saved. Usefull if connect timeout
295 * because it can be closed.
297 mailserver_socket_temp = i;
299 if (connect(i, (struct sockaddr *) ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
305 /* No connect timeout, then no need to set mailserver_socket_temp */
306 mailserver_socket_temp = -1;
317 #if defined(HAVE_STDARG_H)
318 int SockPrintf(int sock, const char* format, ...)
321 int SockPrintf(sock,format,va_alist)
330 #if defined(HAVE_STDARG_H)
331 va_start(ap, format) ;
335 vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), format, ap);
337 return SockWrite(sock, buf, strlen(buf));
342 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
343 #include <openssl/err.h>
344 #include <openssl/pem.h>
345 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
346 #include <openssl/rand.h>
348 static SSL_CTX *_ctx = NULL;
349 static SSL *_ssl_context[FD_SETSIZE];
351 static SSL *SSLGetContext( int );
352 #endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
354 int SockWrite(int sock, char *buf, int len)
364 if( NULL != ( ssl = SSLGetContext( sock ) ) )
365 n = SSL_write(ssl, buf, len);
367 #endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
368 n = fm_write(sock, buf, len);
378 int SockRead(int sock, char *buf, int len)
380 char *newline, *bp = buf;
382 #ifdef FORCE_STUFFING
383 int maxavailable = 0;
401 * The reason for these gymnastics is that we want two things:
402 * (1) to read \n-terminated lines,
403 * (2) to return the true length of data read, even if the
404 * data coming in has embedded NULS.
407 if( NULL != ( ssl = SSLGetContext( sock ) ) ) {
409 /* OK... SSL_peek works a little different from MSG_PEEK
410 Problem is that SSL_peek can return 0 if there
411 is no data currently available. If, on the other
412 hand, we loose the socket, we also get a zero, but
413 the SSL_read then SEGFAULTS! To deal with this,
414 we'll check the error code any time we get a return
415 of zero from SSL_peek. If we have an error, we bail.
416 If we don't, we read one character in SSL_read and
417 loop. This should continue to work even if they
418 later change the behavior of SSL_peek
419 to "fix" this problem... :-( */
420 if ((n = SSL_peek(ssl, bp, len)) < 0) {
421 (void)SSL_get_error(ssl, n);
424 #ifdef FORCE_STUFFING
428 /* SSL_peek says no data... Does he mean no data
429 or did the connection blow up? If we got an error
431 if( 0 != ( n = SSL_get_error(ssl, n) ) ) {
434 /* We didn't get an error so read at least one
435 character at this point and loop */
437 /* Make sure newline start out NULL!
438 * We don't have a string to pass through
439 * the strchr at this point yet */
441 } else if ((newline = memchr(bp, '\n', n)) != NULL)
442 n = newline - bp + 1;
443 /* Matthias Andree: SSL_read can return 0, in that case
444 * we must cal SSL_get_error to figure if there was
445 * an error or just a "no data" condition */
446 if ((n = SSL_read(ssl, bp, n)) <= 0) {
447 if ((n = SSL_get_error(ssl, n))) {
451 /* Check for case where our single character turned out to
452 * be a newline... (It wasn't going to get caught by
453 * the strchr above if it came from the hack... ). */
454 if( NULL == newline && 1 == n && '\n' == *bp ) {
455 /* Got our newline - this will break
456 out of the loop now */
461 #endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
465 if ((n = fm_read(sock, bp, 1)) <= 0)
467 if ((n = fm_peek(sock, bp, len)) <= 0)
470 #ifdef FORCE_STUFFING
473 if ((newline = (char *)memchr(bp, '\n', n)) != NULL)
474 n = newline - bp + 1;
476 if ((n = fm_read(sock, bp, n)) == -1)
478 #endif /* __BEOS__ */
486 #ifdef FORCE_STUFFING /* too ugly to live -- besides, there's IMAP */
487 /* OK, very weird hack coming up here:
488 * When POP3 servers send us a message, they're supposed to
489 * terminate the message with a line containing only a dot. To protect
490 * against lines in the real message that might contain only a dot,
491 * they're supposed to preface any line that starts with a dot with
492 * an additional dot, which will be removed on the client side. That
493 * process, called byte-stuffing (and unstuffing) is really not the
494 * concern of this low-level routine, ordinarily, but there are some
495 * POP servers (and maybe IMAP servers too, who knows) that fail to
496 * do the byte-stuffing, and this routine is the best place to try to
497 * identify and fix that fault.
499 * Since the DOT line is supposed to come only at the end of a
500 * message, the implication is that right after we see it, the server
501 * is supposed to go back to waiting for the next command. There
502 * isn't supposed to be any more data to read after we see the dot.
503 * THEREFORE, if we see more data to be read after something that
504 * looks like the dot line, then probably the server is failing to
505 * do byte-stuffing. In that case, we'll byte-pack it for them so
506 * that the higher-level routines see things as hunky-dorey.
507 * This is not a perfect test or fix by any means (it has an
508 * obvious race condition, for one thing), but it should at least
509 * reduce the nastiness that ensues when people don't know how
510 * to write POP servers.
512 if ((maxavailable > (bp-buf)) &&
519 (buf[1] == '\n')))) {
521 memmove(buf+1, buf, (bp-buf)+1);
525 #endif /* FORCE_STUFFING */
529 int SockPeek(int sock)
530 /* peek at the next socket character without actually reading it */
539 if( NULL != ( ssl = SSLGetContext( sock ) ) ) {
540 n = SSL_peek(ssl, &ch, 1);
542 (void)SSL_get_error(ssl, n);
546 /* This code really needs to implement a "hold back"
547 * to simulate a functioning SSL_peek()... sigh...
548 * Has to be coordinated with the read code above.
549 * Next on the list todo... */
551 /* SSL_peek says 0... Does that mean no data
552 or did the connection blow up? If we got an error
554 if( 0 != ( n = SSL_get_error(ssl, n) ) ) {
558 /* Haven't seen this case actually occur, but...
559 if the problem in SockRead can occur, this should
560 be possible... Just not sure what to do here.
561 This should be a safe "punt" the "peek" but don't
562 "punt" the "session"... */
564 return 0; /* Give him a '\0' character */
568 #endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
569 n = fm_peek(sock, &ch, 1);
581 static char *_ssl_server_cname = NULL;
582 static int _check_fp;
583 static char *_check_digest;
584 static char *_server_label;
585 static int _depth0ck;
586 static int _prev_err;
588 SSL *SSLGetContext( int sock )
590 /* If SSLOpen has never initialized - just return NULL */
594 if( sock < 0 || sock > FD_SETSIZE )
596 return _ssl_context[sock];
600 /* ok_return (preverify_ok) is 1 if this stage of certificate verification
601 passed, or 0 if it failed. This callback lets us display informative
602 errors, and perform additional validation (e.g. CN matches) */
603 static int SSL_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int strict )
608 unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
609 char text[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 3 + 1], *tp, *te;
610 const EVP_MD *digest_tp;
611 unsigned int dsz, esz;
612 X509_NAME *subj, *issuer;
614 x509_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
615 err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
616 depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
618 subj = X509_get_subject_name(x509_cert);
619 issuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x509_cert);
621 if (depth == 0 && !_depth0ck) {
624 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) {
625 if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(issuer, NID_organizationName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
626 report(stdout, GT_("Issuer Organization: %s\n"), buf);
627 if ((size_t)i >= sizeof(buf) - 1)
628 report(stdout, GT_("Warning: Issuer Organization Name too long (possibly truncated).\n"));
630 report(stdout, GT_("Unknown Organization\n"));
631 if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(issuer, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
632 report(stdout, GT_("Issuer CommonName: %s\n"), buf);
633 if ((size_t)i >= sizeof(buf) - 1)
634 report(stdout, GT_("Warning: Issuer CommonName too long (possibly truncated).\n"));
636 report(stdout, GT_("Unknown Issuer CommonName\n"));
638 if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subj, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
639 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
640 report(stdout, GT_("Server CommonName: %s\n"), buf);
641 if ((size_t)i >= sizeof(buf) - 1) {
642 /* Possible truncation. In this case, this is a DNS name, so this
643 * is really bad. We do not tolerate this even in the non-strict case. */
644 report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject CommonName too long!\n"));
647 if (_ssl_server_cname != NULL) {
649 char *p2 = _ssl_server_cname;
652 STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gens;
654 /* RFC 2595 section 2.4: find a matching name
655 * first find a match among alternative names */
656 gens = X509_get_ext_d2i(x509_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
659 for (i = 0, r = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i < r; ++i) {
660 const GENERAL_NAME *gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
661 if (gn->type == GEN_DNS) {
662 char *p1 = (char *)gn->d.ia5->data;
663 char *p2 = _ssl_server_cname;
664 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
665 report(stderr, "Subject Alternative Name: %s\n", p1);
668 n = strlen(p2) - strlen(p1);
672 if (0 == strcasecmp(p1, p2)) {
677 sk_GENERAL_NAME_free(gens);
681 n = strlen(p2) - strlen(p1);
685 if (0 == strcasecmp(p1, p2)) {
690 GT_("Server CommonName mismatch: %s != %s\n"),
691 buf, _ssl_server_cname );
692 if (ok_return && strict)
695 } else if (ok_return) {
696 report(stderr, GT_("Server name not set, could not verify certificate!\n"));
697 if (strict) return (0);
700 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
701 report(stdout, GT_("Unknown Server CommonName\n"));
702 if (ok_return && strict) {
703 report(stderr, GT_("Server name not specified in certificate!\n"));
707 /* Print the finger print. Note that on errors, we might print it more than once
708 * normally; we kluge around that by using a global variable. */
713 digest_tp = EVP_md5();
714 if (digest_tp == NULL) {
715 report(stderr, GT_("EVP_md5() failed!\n"));
718 if (!X509_digest(x509_cert, digest_tp, digest, &dsz)) {
719 report(stderr, GT_("Out of memory!\n"));
723 te = text + sizeof(text);
724 for (dp = 0; dp < dsz; dp++) {
725 esz = snprintf(tp, te - tp, dp > 0 ? ":%02X" : "%02X", digest[dp]);
726 if (esz >= (size_t)(te - tp)) {
727 report(stderr, GT_("Digest text buffer too small!\n"));
732 if (outlevel > O_NORMAL)
733 report(stdout, GT_("%s key fingerprint: %s\n"), _server_label, text);
734 if (_check_digest != NULL) {
735 if (strcmp(text, _check_digest) == 0) {
736 if (outlevel > O_NORMAL)
737 report(stdout, GT_("%s fingerprints match.\n"), _server_label);
739 if (outlevel > O_SILENT)
740 report(stderr, GT_("%s fingerprints do not match!\n"), _server_label);
747 if (err != X509_V_OK && err != _prev_err) {
749 report(stderr, GT_("Server certificate verification error: %s\n"), X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
750 /* We gave the error code, but maybe we can add some more details for debugging */
752 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
753 X509_NAME_oneline(issuer, buf, sizeof(buf));
754 buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0';
755 report(stderr, GT_("unknown issuer (first %d characters): %s\n"), sizeof(buf)-1, buf);
760 * If not in strict checking mode (--sslcertck), override this
761 * and pretend that verification had succeeded.
768 static int SSL_nock_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx )
770 return SSL_verify_callback(ok_return, ctx, 0);
773 static int SSL_ck_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx )
775 return SSL_verify_callback(ok_return, ctx, 1);
778 /* performs initial SSL handshake over the connected socket
779 * uses SSL *ssl global variable, which is currently defined
782 int SSLOpen(int sock, char *mycert, char *mykey, char *myproto, int certck, char *certpath,
783 char *fingerprint, char *servercname, char *label)
785 struct stat randstat;
788 SSL_load_error_strings();
789 SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms();
792 if (stat("/dev/random", &randstat) &&
793 stat("/dev/urandom", &randstat)) {
794 /* Neither /dev/random nor /dev/urandom are present, so add
795 entropy to the SSL PRNG a hard way. */
796 for (i = 0; i < 10000 && ! RAND_status (); ++i) {
799 gettimeofday (&tv, 0);
800 buf[0] = tv.tv_usec & 0xF;
801 buf[2] = (tv.tv_usec & 0xF0) >> 4;
802 buf[3] = (tv.tv_usec & 0xF00) >> 8;
803 buf[1] = (tv.tv_usec & 0xF000) >> 12;
804 RAND_add (buf, sizeof buf, 0.1);
807 #endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
810 if( sock < 0 || sock > FD_SETSIZE ) {
811 report(stderr, GT_("File descriptor out of range for SSL") );
816 /* Be picky and make sure the memory is cleared */
817 memset( _ssl_context, 0, sizeof( _ssl_context ) );
819 if(!strcmp("ssl2",myproto)) {
820 _ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv2_client_method());
821 } else if(!strcmp("ssl3",myproto)) {
822 _ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv3_client_method());
823 } else if(!strcmp("tls1",myproto)) {
824 _ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_client_method());
825 } else if (!strcmp("ssl23",myproto)) {
828 fprintf(stderr,GT_("Invalid SSL protocol '%s' specified, using default (SSLv23).\n"), myproto);
833 _ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method());
836 ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
842 SSL_CTX_set_verify(_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, SSL_ck_verify_callback);
844 /* In this case, we do not fail if verification fails. However,
845 * we provide the callback for output and possible fingerprint checks. */
846 SSL_CTX_set_verify(_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, SSL_nock_verify_callback);
849 SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(_ctx, NULL, certpath);
851 SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(_ctx);
853 _ssl_context[sock] = SSL_new(_ctx);
855 if(_ssl_context[sock] == NULL) {
856 ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
860 /* This static is for the verify callback */
861 _ssl_server_cname = servercname;
862 _server_label = label;
864 _check_digest = fingerprint;
868 if( mycert || mykey ) {
870 /* Ok... He has a certificate file defined, so lets declare it. If
871 * he does NOT have a separate certificate and private key file then
872 * assume that it's a combined key and certificate file.
878 SSL_use_certificate_file(_ssl_context[sock], mycert, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
879 SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(_ssl_context[sock], mykey, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
882 SSL_set_fd(_ssl_context[sock], sock);
884 if(SSL_connect(_ssl_context[sock]) < 1) {
885 ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
889 /* Paranoia: was the callback not called as we expected? */
891 report(stderr, GT_("Certificate/fingerprint verification was somehow skipped!\n"));
893 if (fingerprint != NULL || certck) {
894 if( NULL != SSLGetContext( sock ) ) {
895 /* Clean up the SSL stack */
896 SSL_shutdown( _ssl_context[sock] );
897 SSL_free( _ssl_context[sock] );
898 _ssl_context[sock] = NULL;
908 int SockClose(int sock)
909 /* close a socket gracefully */
912 if( NULL != SSLGetContext( sock ) ) {
913 /* Clean up the SSL stack */
914 SSL_shutdown( _ssl_context[sock] );
915 SSL_free( _ssl_context[sock] );
916 _ssl_context[sock] = NULL;
922 * This hangs in RedHat 6.2 after fetchmail runs for a while a
923 * FIN_WAIT2 comes up in netstat and fetchmail never returns from
924 * the recv system call. (Reported from jtnews
925 * <jtnews@bellatlantic.net>, Wed, 24 May 2000 21:26:02.)
927 * Half-close the connection first so the other end gets notified.
929 * This stops sends but allows receives (effectively, it sends a
931 if (shutdown(sock, 1) == 0) {
933 /* If there is any data still waiting in the queue, discard it.
934 * Call recv() until either it returns 0 (meaning we received a FIN)
935 * or any error occurs. This makes sure all data sent by the other
936 * side is acknowledged at the TCP level.
938 if (fm_peek(sock, &ch, 1) > 0)
939 while (fm_read(sock, &ch, 1) > 0)
942 #endif /* __UNUSED__ */
944 /* if there's an error closing at this point, not much we can do */
945 return(fm_close(sock)); /* this is guarded */
950 * Workaround Microsoft Winsock recv/WSARecv(..., MSG_PEEK) bug.
951 * See http://sources.redhat.com/ml/cygwin/2001-08/msg00628.html
954 static ssize_t cygwin_read(int sock, void *buf, size_t count)
959 if ((n = read(sock, bp, count)) == -1)
964 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
965 report(stdout, GT_("Cygwin socket read retry\n"));
966 n2 = read(sock, bp + n, count - n);
967 if (n2 == -1 || n + n2 != count) {
968 report(stderr, GT_("Cygwin socket read retry failed!\n"));
975 #endif /* __CYGWIN__ */
979 * Use the chargen service to test input buffering directly.
980 * You may have to uncomment the `chargen' service description in your
981 * inetd.conf (and then SIGHUP inetd) for this to work. */
984 int sock = SockOpen("localhost", "chargen", NULL);
987 while (SockRead(sock, buf, sizeof(buf)-1))
988 SockWrite(1, buf, strlen(buf));
993 /* socket.c ends here */