2 * socket.c -- socket library functions
4 * Copyright 1998 by Eric S. Raymond.
5 * For license terms, see the file COPYING in this directory.
12 #include <ctype.h> /* isspace() */
13 #include <sys/types.h>
15 #include <sys/socket.h>
17 #include <netinet/in.h>
18 #include <arpa/inet.h>
27 #include "fetchmail.h"
28 #include "getaddrinfo.h"
32 /* Defines to allow Cygwin to play nice... */
33 #define fm_close(a) close(a)
34 #define fm_write(a,b,c) write(a,b,c)
35 #define fm_peek(a,b,c) recv(a,b,c, MSG_PEEK)
38 #define fm_read(a,b,c) cygwin_read(a,b,c)
39 static ssize_t cygwin_read(int sock, void *buf, size_t count);
40 #else /* ! __CYGWIN__ */
41 #define fm_read(a,b,c) read(a,b,c)
42 #endif /* __CYGWIN__ */
44 /* We need to define h_errno only if it is not already */
46 # if !HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO
49 #endif /* ndef h_errno */
51 #ifdef HAVE_SOCKETPAIR
52 static char *const *parse_plugin(const char *plugin, const char *host, const char *service)
56 char *cp, *plugin_copy;
57 unsigned int plugin_copy_len;
58 unsigned int plugin_offset = 0, plugin_copy_offset = 0;
59 unsigned int i, s = 2 * sizeof(char*), host_count = 0, service_count = 0;
60 unsigned int plugin_len = strlen(plugin);
61 unsigned int host_len = strlen(host);
62 unsigned int service_len = strlen(service);
64 for (c = p = plugin; *c; c++)
65 { if (isspace((unsigned char)*c) && !isspace((unsigned char)*p))
67 if (*p == '%' && *c == 'h')
69 if (*p == '%' && *c == 'p')
74 plugin_copy_len = plugin_len + host_len * host_count + service_len * service_count;
75 plugin_copy = (char *)malloc(plugin_copy_len + 1);
78 report(stderr, GT_("fetchmail: malloc failed\n"));
82 while (plugin_copy_offset < plugin_copy_len)
83 { if ((plugin[plugin_offset] == '%') && (plugin[plugin_offset + 1] == 'h'))
84 { strcpy(plugin_copy + plugin_copy_offset, host);
86 plugin_copy_offset += host_len;
88 else if ((plugin[plugin_offset] == '%') && (plugin[plugin_offset + 1] == 'p'))
89 { strcpy(plugin_copy + plugin_copy_offset, service);
91 plugin_copy_offset += service_len;
94 { plugin_copy[plugin_copy_offset] = plugin[plugin_offset];
99 plugin_copy[plugin_copy_len] = 0;
101 argvec = (char **)malloc(s);
104 report(stderr, GT_("fetchmail: malloc failed\n"));
107 memset(argvec, 0, s);
108 for (p = cp = plugin_copy, i = 0; *cp; cp++)
109 { if ((!isspace((unsigned char)*cp)) && (cp == p ? 1 : isspace((unsigned char)*p))) {
115 for (cp = plugin_copy; *cp; cp++)
116 { if (isspace((unsigned char)*cp))
122 static int handle_plugin(const char *host,
123 const char *service, const char *plugin)
124 /* get a socket mediated through a given external command */
130 * The author of this code, Felix von Leitner <felix@convergence.de>, says:
131 * he chose socketpair() instead of pipe() because socketpair creates
132 * bidirectional sockets while allegedly some pipe() implementations don't.
134 if (socketpair(AF_UNIX,SOCK_STREAM,0,fds))
136 report(stderr, GT_("fetchmail: socketpair failed\n"));
142 report(stderr, GT_("fetchmail: fork failed\n"));
145 /* fds[1] is the parent's end; close it for proper EOF
147 (void) close(fds[1]);
148 if ( (dup2(fds[0],0) == -1) || (dup2(fds[0],1) == -1) ) {
149 report(stderr, GT_("dup2 failed\n"));
152 /* fds[0] is now connected to 0 and 1; close it */
153 (void) close(fds[0]);
154 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
155 report(stderr, GT_("running %s (host %s service %s)\n"), plugin, host, service);
156 argvec = parse_plugin(plugin,host,service);
157 execvp(*argvec, argvec);
158 report(stderr, GT_("execvp(%s) failed\n"), *argvec);
161 default: /* parent */
165 /* fds[0] is the child's end; close it for proper EOF detection */
166 (void) close(fds[0]);
169 #endif /* HAVE_SOCKETPAIR */
173 int SockCheckOpen(int fd)
174 /* poll given socket; is it selectable? */
182 FD_ZERO(&r); FD_ZERO(&w); FD_ZERO(&e);
185 tv.tv_sec = 0; tv.tv_usec = 0;
186 rt = select(fd+1, &r, &w, &e, &tv);
187 if (rt == -1 && (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR))
193 #endif /* __UNUSED__ */
195 int UnixOpen(const char *path)
198 struct sockaddr_un ad;
199 memset(&ad, 0, sizeof(ad));
200 ad.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
201 strncpy(ad.sun_path, path, sizeof(ad.sun_path)-1);
203 sock = socket( AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0 );
210 /* Socket opened saved. Usefull if connect timeout
211 * because it can be closed.
213 mailserver_socket_temp = sock;
215 if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &ad, sizeof(ad)) < 0)
218 fm_close(sock); /* don't use SockClose, no traffic yet */
224 /* No connect timeout, then no need to set mailserver_socket_temp */
225 mailserver_socket_temp = -1;
230 int SockOpen(const char *host, const char *service,
231 const char *plugin, struct addrinfo **ai0)
233 struct addrinfo *ai, req;
236 char errbuf[8192] = "";
238 #ifdef HAVE_SOCKETPAIR
240 return handle_plugin(host,service,plugin);
241 #endif /* HAVE_SOCKETPAIR */
243 memset(&req, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
244 req.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
246 req.ai_flags = AI_ADDRCONFIG;
249 i = fm_getaddrinfo(host, service, &req, ai0);
251 report(stderr, GT_("getaddrinfo(\"%s\",\"%s\") error: %s\n"),
252 host, service, gai_strerror(i));
253 if (i == EAI_SERVICE)
254 report(stderr, GT_("Try adding the --service option (see also FAQ item R12).\n"));
258 /* NOTE a Linux bug here - getaddrinfo will happily return 127.0.0.1
259 * twice if no IPv6 is configured */
261 for (ord = 0, ai = *ai0; ai; ord++, ai = ai->ai_next) {
262 char buf[256]; /* hostname */
263 char pb[256]; /* service name */
264 int gnie; /* getnameinfo result code */
266 gnie = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, buf, sizeof(buf), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST);
268 snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), GT_("unknown (%s)"), gai_strerror(gnie));
269 gnie = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, NULL, 0, pb, sizeof(pb), NI_NUMERICSERV);
271 snprintf(pb, sizeof(pb), GT_("unknown (%s)"), gai_strerror(gnie));
273 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
274 report_build(stdout, GT_("Trying to connect to %s/%s..."), buf, pb);
275 i = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
278 /* mask EAFNOSUPPORT errors, they confuse users for
279 * multihomed hosts */
280 if (errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
282 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
283 report_complete(stdout, GT_("cannot create socket: %s\n"), strerror(e));
284 snprintf(errbuf+strlen(errbuf), sizeof(errbuf)-strlen(errbuf),\
285 GT_("name %d: cannot create socket family %d type %d: %s\n"), ord, ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, strerror(e));
289 /* Save socket descriptor.
290 * Used to close the socket after connect timeout. */
291 mailserver_socket_temp = i;
293 if (connect(i, (struct sockaddr *) ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
296 /* additionally, suppress IPv4 network unreach errors */
297 if (e != EAFNOSUPPORT)
300 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
301 report_complete(stdout, GT_("connection failed.\n"));
302 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
303 report(stderr, GT_("connection to %s:%s [%s/%s] failed: %s.\n"), host, service, buf, pb, strerror(e));
304 snprintf(errbuf+strlen(errbuf), sizeof(errbuf)-strlen(errbuf), GT_("name %d: connection to %s:%s [%s/%s] failed: %s.\n"), ord, host, service, buf, pb, strerror(e));
309 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
310 report_complete(stdout, GT_("connected.\n"));
313 /* No connect timeout, then no need to set mailserver_socket_temp */
314 mailserver_socket_temp = -1;
319 fm_freeaddrinfo(*ai0);
323 report(stderr, GT_("Connection errors for this poll:\n%s"), errbuf);
331 int SockPrintf(int sock, const char* format, ...)
336 va_start(ap, format) ;
337 vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), format, ap);
339 return SockWrite(sock, buf, strlen(buf));
343 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
344 #include <openssl/err.h>
345 #include <openssl/pem.h>
346 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
347 #include <openssl/rand.h>
349 static SSL_CTX *_ctx[FD_SETSIZE];
350 static SSL *_ssl_context[FD_SETSIZE];
352 static SSL *SSLGetContext( int );
353 #endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
355 int SockWrite(int sock, const char *buf, int len)
365 if( NULL != ( ssl = SSLGetContext( sock ) ) )
366 n = SSL_write(ssl, buf, len);
368 #endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
369 n = fm_write(sock, buf, len);
379 int SockRead(int sock, char *buf, int len)
381 char *newline, *bp = buf;
391 * The reason for these gymnastics is that we want two things:
392 * (1) to read \n-terminated lines,
393 * (2) to return the true length of data read, even if the
394 * data coming in has embedded NULS.
397 if( NULL != ( ssl = SSLGetContext( sock ) ) ) {
399 /* OK... SSL_peek works a little different from MSG_PEEK
400 Problem is that SSL_peek can return 0 if there
401 is no data currently available. If, on the other
402 hand, we loose the socket, we also get a zero, but
403 the SSL_read then SEGFAULTS! To deal with this,
404 we'll check the error code any time we get a return
405 of zero from SSL_peek. If we have an error, we bail.
406 If we don't, we read one character in SSL_read and
407 loop. This should continue to work even if they
408 later change the behavior of SSL_peek
409 to "fix" this problem... :-( */
410 if ((n = SSL_peek(ssl, bp, len)) < 0) {
411 (void)SSL_get_error(ssl, n);
415 /* SSL_peek says no data... Does he mean no data
416 or did the connection blow up? If we got an error
418 if (0 != SSL_get_error(ssl, n)) {
421 /* We didn't get an error so read at least one
422 character at this point and loop */
424 /* Make sure newline start out NULL!
425 * We don't have a string to pass through
426 * the strchr at this point yet */
428 } else if ((newline = (char *)memchr(bp, '\n', n)) != NULL)
429 n = newline - bp + 1;
430 /* Matthias Andree: SSL_read can return 0, in that case
431 * we must call SSL_get_error to figure if there was
432 * an error or just a "no data" condition */
433 if ((n = SSL_read(ssl, bp, n)) <= 0) {
434 if ((n = SSL_get_error(ssl, n))) {
438 /* Check for case where our single character turned out to
439 * be a newline... (It wasn't going to get caught by
440 * the strchr above if it came from the hack... ). */
441 if( NULL == newline && 1 == n && '\n' == *bp ) {
442 /* Got our newline - this will break
443 out of the loop now */
448 #endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
451 if ((n = fm_peek(sock, bp, len)) <= 0)
453 if ((newline = (char *)memchr(bp, '\n', n)) != NULL)
454 n = newline - bp + 1;
455 if ((n = fm_read(sock, bp, n)) == -1)
467 int SockPeek(int sock)
468 /* peek at the next socket character without actually reading it */
477 if( NULL != ( ssl = SSLGetContext( sock ) ) ) {
478 n = SSL_peek(ssl, &ch, 1);
480 (void)SSL_get_error(ssl, n);
484 /* This code really needs to implement a "hold back"
485 * to simulate a functioning SSL_peek()... sigh...
486 * Has to be coordinated with the read code above.
487 * Next on the list todo... */
489 /* SSL_peek says 0... Does that mean no data
490 or did the connection blow up? If we got an error
492 if(0 != SSL_get_error(ssl, n)) {
496 /* Haven't seen this case actually occur, but...
497 if the problem in SockRead can occur, this should
498 be possible... Just not sure what to do here.
499 This should be a safe "punt" the "peek" but don't
500 "punt" the "session"... */
502 return 0; /* Give him a '\0' character */
506 #endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
507 n = fm_peek(sock, &ch, 1);
516 static char *_ssl_server_cname = NULL;
517 static int _check_fp;
518 static char *_check_digest;
519 static char *_server_label;
520 static int _depth0ck;
521 static int _firstrun;
522 static int _prev_err;
523 static int _verify_ok;
525 SSL *SSLGetContext( int sock )
527 if( sock < 0 || (unsigned)sock > FD_SETSIZE )
529 if( _ctx[sock] == NULL )
531 return _ssl_context[sock];
534 /* ok_return (preverify_ok) is 1 if this stage of certificate verification
535 passed, or 0 if it failed. This callback lets us display informative
536 errors, and perform additional validation (e.g. CN matches) */
537 static int SSL_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int strict )
539 #define SSLverbose (((outlevel) >= O_DEBUG) || ((outlevel) >= O_VERBOSE && (depth) == 0))
543 unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
544 char text[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 3 + 1], *tp, *te;
545 const EVP_MD *digest_tp;
546 unsigned int dsz, esz;
547 X509_NAME *subj, *issuer;
550 x509_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
551 err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
552 depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
554 subj = X509_get_subject_name(x509_cert);
555 issuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x509_cert);
557 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) {
558 if (depth == 0 && SSLverbose)
559 report(stderr, GT_("Server certificate:\n"));
564 report(stdout, GT_("Certificate chain, from root to peer, starting at depth %d:\n"), depth);
567 report(stdout, GT_("Certificate at depth %d:\n"), depth);
572 if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(issuer, NID_organizationName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
573 report(stdout, GT_("Issuer Organization: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(buf, i)));
575 if ((size_t)i >= sizeof(buf) - 1)
576 report(stdout, GT_("Warning: Issuer Organization Name too long (possibly truncated).\n"));
578 report(stdout, GT_("Unknown Organization\n"));
579 if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(issuer, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
580 report(stdout, GT_("Issuer CommonName: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(buf, i)));
582 if ((size_t)i >= sizeof(buf) - 1)
583 report(stdout, GT_("Warning: Issuer CommonName too long (possibly truncated).\n"));
585 report(stdout, GT_("Unknown Issuer CommonName\n"));
589 if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subj, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
591 report(stdout, GT_("Subject CommonName: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(buf, i)));
594 if ((size_t)i >= sizeof(buf) - 1) {
595 /* Possible truncation. In this case, this is a DNS name, so this
596 * is really bad. We do not tolerate this even in the non-strict case. */
597 report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject CommonName too long!\n"));
600 if ((size_t)i > strlen(buf)) {
601 /* Name contains embedded NUL characters, so we complain. This is likely
602 * a certificate spoofing attack. */
603 report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject CommonName contains NUL, aborting!\n"));
608 if (depth == 0) { /* peer certificate */
613 if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subj, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
614 if (_ssl_server_cname != NULL) {
616 char *p2 = _ssl_server_cname;
618 STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gens;
620 /* RFC 2595 section 2.4: find a matching name
621 * first find a match among alternative names */
622 gens = (STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *)X509_get_ext_d2i(x509_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
625 for (j = 0, r = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); j < r; ++j) {
626 const GENERAL_NAME *gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, j);
627 if (gn->type == GEN_DNS) {
628 char *pp1 = (char *)gn->d.ia5->data;
629 char *pp2 = _ssl_server_cname;
630 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) {
631 report(stdout, GT_("Subject Alternative Name: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(pp1, (size_t)gn->d.ia5->length)));
634 /* Name contains embedded NUL characters, so we complain. This
635 * is likely a certificate spoofing attack. */
636 if ((size_t)gn->d.ia5->length != strlen(pp1)) {
637 report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject Alternative Name contains NUL, aborting!\n"));
638 sk_GENERAL_NAME_free(gens);
641 if (name_match(pp1, pp2)) {
646 sk_GENERAL_NAME_free(gens);
648 if (name_match(p1, p2)) {
652 if (strict || SSLverbose) {
654 GT_("Server CommonName mismatch: %s != %s\n"),
655 (tt = sdump(buf, i)), _ssl_server_cname );
660 } else if (ok_return) {
661 report(stderr, GT_("Server name not set, could not verify certificate!\n"));
662 if (strict) return (0);
665 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
666 report(stdout, GT_("Unknown Server CommonName\n"));
667 if (ok_return && strict) {
668 report(stderr, GT_("Server name not specified in certificate!\n"));
672 /* Print the finger print. Note that on errors, we might print it more than once
673 * normally; we kluge around that by using a global variable. */
674 if (_check_fp == 1) {
678 digest_tp = EVP_md5();
679 if (digest_tp == NULL) {
680 report(stderr, GT_("EVP_md5() failed!\n"));
683 if (!X509_digest(x509_cert, digest_tp, digest, &dsz)) {
684 report(stderr, GT_("Out of memory!\n"));
688 te = text + sizeof(text);
689 for (dp = 0; dp < dsz; dp++) {
690 esz = snprintf(tp, te - tp, dp > 0 ? ":%02X" : "%02X", digest[dp]);
691 if (esz >= (size_t)(te - tp)) {
692 report(stderr, GT_("Digest text buffer too small!\n"));
697 if (outlevel > O_NORMAL)
698 report(stdout, GT_("%s key fingerprint: %s\n"), _server_label, text);
699 if (_check_digest != NULL) {
700 if (strcasecmp(text, _check_digest) == 0) {
701 if (outlevel > O_NORMAL)
702 report(stdout, GT_("%s fingerprints match.\n"), _server_label);
704 report(stderr, GT_("%s fingerprints do not match!\n"), _server_label);
707 } /* if (_check_digest != NULL) */
708 } /* if (_check_fp) */
709 } /* if (depth == 0 && !_depth0ck) */
711 if (err != X509_V_OK && err != _prev_err && !(_check_fp != 0 && _check_digest && !strict)) {
714 report(stderr, GT_("Server certificate verification error: %s\n"), X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
715 /* We gave the error code, but maybe we can add some more details for debugging */
718 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
719 X509_NAME_oneline(issuer, buf, sizeof(buf));
720 buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0';
721 report(stderr, GT_("unknown issuer (first %d characters): %s\n"), (int)(sizeof(buf)-1), buf);
722 report(stderr, GT_("This error usually happens when the server provides an incomplete certificate "
723 "chain, which is nothing fetchmail could do anything about. For details, "
724 "please see the README.SSL-SERVER document that comes with fetchmail.\n"));
726 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
727 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
728 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
729 X509_NAME_oneline(subj, buf, sizeof(buf));
730 buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0';
731 report(stderr, GT_("This means that the root signing certificate (issued for %s) is not in the "
732 "trusted CA certificate locations, or that c_rehash needs to be run "
733 "on the certificate directory. For details, please "
734 "see the documentation of --sslcertpath and --sslcertfile in the manual page.\n"), buf);
741 * If not in strict checking mode (--sslcertck), override this
742 * and pretend that verification had succeeded.
744 _verify_ok &= ok_return;
750 static int SSL_nock_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx )
752 return SSL_verify_callback(ok_return, ctx, 0);
755 static int SSL_ck_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx )
757 return SSL_verify_callback(ok_return, ctx, 1);
761 /* get commonName from certificate set in file.
762 * commonName is stored in buffer namebuffer, limited with namebufferlen
764 static const char *SSLCertGetCN(const char *mycert,
765 char *namebuffer, size_t namebufferlen)
767 const char *ret = NULL;
769 X509 *x509_cert = NULL;
770 X509_NAME *certname = NULL;
772 if (namebuffer && namebufferlen > 0) {
773 namebuffer[0] = 0x00;
774 certBio = BIO_new_file(mycert,"r");
776 x509_cert = PEM_read_bio_X509(certBio,NULL,NULL,NULL);
780 certname = X509_get_subject_name(x509_cert);
782 X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(certname, NID_commonName,
783 namebuffer, namebufferlen) > 0)
785 X509_free(x509_cert);
791 /* performs initial SSL handshake over the connected socket
792 * uses SSL *ssl global variable, which is currently defined
795 int SSLOpen(int sock, char *mycert, char *mykey, const char *myproto, int certck,
796 char *cacertfile, char *certpath,
797 char *fingerprint, char *servercname, char *label, char **remotename)
799 struct stat randstat;
802 SSL_load_error_strings();
804 OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); /* see Debian Bug#576430 and manpage */
806 if (stat("/dev/random", &randstat) &&
807 stat("/dev/urandom", &randstat)) {
808 /* Neither /dev/random nor /dev/urandom are present, so add
809 entropy to the SSL PRNG a hard way. */
810 for (i = 0; i < 10000 && ! RAND_status (); ++i) {
813 gettimeofday (&tv, 0);
814 buf[0] = tv.tv_usec & 0xF;
815 buf[2] = (tv.tv_usec & 0xF0) >> 4;
816 buf[3] = (tv.tv_usec & 0xF00) >> 8;
817 buf[1] = (tv.tv_usec & 0xF000) >> 12;
818 RAND_add (buf, sizeof buf, 0.1);
822 if( sock < 0 || (unsigned)sock > FD_SETSIZE ) {
823 report(stderr, GT_("File descriptor out of range for SSL") );
827 /* Make sure a connection referring to an older context is not left */
828 _ssl_context[sock] = NULL;
830 if(!strcasecmp("ssl2",myproto)) {
831 _ctx[sock] = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv2_client_method());
832 } else if(!strcasecmp("ssl3",myproto)) {
833 _ctx[sock] = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv3_client_method());
834 } else if(!strcasecmp("tls1",myproto)) {
835 _ctx[sock] = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_client_method());
836 } else if (!strcasecmp("ssl23",myproto)) {
839 fprintf(stderr,GT_("Invalid SSL protocol '%s' specified, using default (SSLv23).\n"), myproto);
844 _ctx[sock] = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method());
846 if(_ctx[sock] == NULL) {
847 ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
851 SSL_CTX_set_options(_ctx[sock], SSL_OP_ALL);
854 SSL_CTX_set_verify(_ctx[sock], SSL_VERIFY_PEER, SSL_ck_verify_callback);
856 /* In this case, we do not fail if verification fails. However,
857 * we provide the callback for output and possible fingerprint
859 SSL_CTX_set_verify(_ctx[sock], SSL_VERIFY_PEER, SSL_nock_verify_callback);
862 /* Check which trusted X.509 CA certificate store(s) to load */
865 int want_default_cacerts = 0;
867 /* Load user locations if any is given */
868 if (certpath || cacertfile)
869 SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(_ctx[sock],
870 cacertfile, certpath);
872 want_default_cacerts = 1;
874 tmp = getenv("FETCHMAIL_INCLUDE_DEFAULT_X509_CA_CERTS");
875 if (want_default_cacerts || (tmp && tmp[0])) {
876 SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(_ctx[sock]);
880 _ssl_context[sock] = SSL_new(_ctx[sock]);
882 if(_ssl_context[sock] == NULL) {
883 ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
884 SSL_CTX_free(_ctx[sock]);
889 /* This static is for the verify callback */
890 _ssl_server_cname = servercname;
891 _server_label = label;
893 _check_digest = fingerprint;
899 if( mycert || mykey ) {
901 /* Ok... He has a certificate file defined, so lets declare it. If
902 * he does NOT have a separate certificate and private key file then
903 * assume that it's a combined key and certificate file.
912 if ((!*remotename || !**remotename) && SSLCertGetCN(mycert, buffer, sizeof(buffer))) {
914 *remotename = xstrdup(buffer);
916 SSL_use_certificate_file(_ssl_context[sock], mycert, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
917 SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(_ssl_context[sock], mykey, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
920 if (SSL_set_fd(_ssl_context[sock], sock) == 0
921 || SSL_connect(_ssl_context[sock]) < 1) {
922 ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
923 SSL_free( _ssl_context[sock] );
924 _ssl_context[sock] = NULL;
925 SSL_CTX_free(_ctx[sock]);
930 /* Paranoia: was the callback not called as we expected? */
932 report(stderr, GT_("Certificate/fingerprint verification was somehow skipped!\n"));
934 if (fingerprint != NULL || certck) {
935 if( NULL != SSLGetContext( sock ) ) {
936 /* Clean up the SSL stack */
937 SSL_shutdown( _ssl_context[sock] );
938 SSL_free( _ssl_context[sock] );
939 _ssl_context[sock] = NULL;
940 SSL_CTX_free(_ctx[sock]);
947 if (!certck && !fingerprint &&
948 (SSL_get_verify_result(_ssl_context[sock]) != X509_V_OK || !_verify_ok)) {
949 report(stderr, GT_("Warning: the connection is insecure, continuing anyways. (Better use --sslcertck!)\n"));
956 int SockClose(int sock)
957 /* close a socket gracefully */
960 if( NULL != SSLGetContext( sock ) ) {
961 /* Clean up the SSL stack */
962 SSL_shutdown( _ssl_context[sock] );
963 SSL_free( _ssl_context[sock] );
964 _ssl_context[sock] = NULL;
965 SSL_CTX_free(_ctx[sock]);
972 * This hangs in RedHat 6.2 after fetchmail runs for a while a
973 * FIN_WAIT2 comes up in netstat and fetchmail never returns from
974 * the recv system call. (Reported from jtnews
975 * <jtnews@bellatlantic.net>, Wed, 24 May 2000 21:26:02.)
977 * Half-close the connection first so the other end gets notified.
979 * This stops sends but allows receives (effectively, it sends a
981 if (shutdown(sock, 1) == 0) {
983 /* If there is any data still waiting in the queue, discard it.
984 * Call recv() until either it returns 0 (meaning we received a FIN)
985 * or any error occurs. This makes sure all data sent by the other
986 * side is acknowledged at the TCP level.
988 if (fm_peek(sock, &ch, 1) > 0)
989 while (fm_read(sock, &ch, 1) > 0)
992 #endif /* __UNUSED__ */
994 /* if there's an error closing at this point, not much we can do */
995 return(fm_close(sock)); /* this is guarded */
1000 * Workaround Microsoft Winsock recv/WSARecv(..., MSG_PEEK) bug.
1001 * See http://sources.redhat.com/ml/cygwin/2001-08/msg00628.html
1004 static ssize_t cygwin_read(int sock, void *buf, size_t count)
1009 if ((n = read(sock, bp, count)) == (size_t)-1)
1014 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
1015 report(stdout, GT_("Cygwin socket read retry\n"));
1016 n2 = read(sock, bp + n, count - n);
1017 if (n2 == (size_t)-1 || n + n2 != count) {
1018 report(stderr, GT_("Cygwin socket read retry failed!\n"));
1025 #endif /* __CYGWIN__ */
1029 * Use the chargen service to test input buffering directly.
1030 * You may have to uncomment the `chargen' service description in your
1031 * inetd.conf (and then SIGHUP inetd) for this to work. */
1034 int sock = SockOpen("localhost", "chargen", NULL);
1037 while (SockRead(sock, buf, sizeof(buf)-1))
1038 SockWrite(1, buf, strlen(buf));
1043 /* socket.c ends here */