2 * socket.c -- socket library functions
4 * Copyright 1998 by Eric S. Raymond.
5 * For license terms, see the file COPYING in this directory.
12 #include <ctype.h> /* isspace() */
13 #include <sys/types.h>
15 #include <sys/socket.h>
17 #include <netinet/in.h>
18 #include <arpa/inet.h>
27 #include "fetchmail.h"
28 #include "getaddrinfo.h"
32 /* Defines to allow Cygwin to play nice... */
33 #define fm_close(a) close(a)
34 #define fm_write(a,b,c) write(a,b,c)
35 #define fm_peek(a,b,c) recv(a,b,c, MSG_PEEK)
38 #define fm_read(a,b,c) cygwin_read(a,b,c)
39 static ssize_t cygwin_read(int sock, void *buf, size_t count);
40 #else /* ! __CYGWIN__ */
41 #define fm_read(a,b,c) read(a,b,c)
42 #endif /* __CYGWIN__ */
44 /* We need to define h_errno only if it is not already */
46 # if !HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO
49 #endif /* ndef h_errno */
51 static char *const *parse_plugin(const char *plugin, const char *host, const char *service)
55 char *cp, *plugin_copy;
56 unsigned int plugin_copy_len;
57 unsigned int plugin_offset = 0, plugin_copy_offset = 0;
58 unsigned int i, s = 2 * sizeof(char*), host_count = 0, service_count = 0;
59 unsigned int plugin_len = strlen(plugin);
60 unsigned int host_len = strlen(host);
61 unsigned int service_len = strlen(service);
63 for (c = p = plugin; *c; c++)
64 { if (isspace((unsigned char)*c) && !isspace((unsigned char)*p))
66 if (*p == '%' && *c == 'h')
68 if (*p == '%' && *c == 'p')
73 plugin_copy_len = plugin_len + host_len * host_count + service_len * service_count;
74 plugin_copy = (char *)malloc(plugin_copy_len + 1);
77 report(stderr, GT_("fetchmail: malloc failed\n"));
81 while (plugin_copy_offset < plugin_copy_len)
82 { if ((plugin[plugin_offset] == '%') && (plugin[plugin_offset + 1] == 'h'))
83 { strcpy(plugin_copy + plugin_copy_offset, host);
85 plugin_copy_offset += host_len;
87 else if ((plugin[plugin_offset] == '%') && (plugin[plugin_offset + 1] == 'p'))
88 { strcpy(plugin_copy + plugin_copy_offset, service);
90 plugin_copy_offset += service_len;
93 { plugin_copy[plugin_copy_offset] = plugin[plugin_offset];
98 plugin_copy[plugin_copy_len] = 0;
100 argvec = (char **)malloc(s);
103 report(stderr, GT_("fetchmail: malloc failed\n"));
107 memset(argvec, 0, s);
108 for (p = cp = plugin_copy, i = 0; *cp; cp++)
109 { if ((!isspace((unsigned char)*cp)) && (cp == p ? 1 : isspace((unsigned char)*p))) {
115 for (cp = plugin_copy; *cp; cp++)
116 { if (isspace((unsigned char)*cp))
122 static int handle_plugin(const char *host,
123 const char *service, const char *plugin)
124 /* get a socket mediated through a given external command */
130 * The author of this code, Felix von Leitner <felix@convergence.de>, says:
131 * he chose socketpair() instead of pipe() because socketpair creates
132 * bidirectional sockets while allegedly some pipe() implementations don't.
134 if (socketpair(AF_UNIX,SOCK_STREAM,0,fds))
136 report(stderr, GT_("fetchmail: socketpair failed\n"));
142 report(stderr, GT_("fetchmail: fork failed\n"));
145 /* fds[1] is the parent's end; close it for proper EOF
147 (void) close(fds[1]);
148 if ( (dup2(fds[0],0) == -1) || (dup2(fds[0],1) == -1) ) {
149 report(stderr, GT_("dup2 failed\n"));
152 /* fds[0] is now connected to 0 and 1; close it */
153 (void) close(fds[0]);
154 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
155 report(stderr, GT_("running %s (host %s service %s)\n"), plugin, host, service);
156 argvec = parse_plugin(plugin,host,service);
157 execvp(*argvec, argvec);
158 report(stderr, GT_("execvp(%s) failed\n"), *argvec);
161 default: /* parent */
165 /* fds[0] is the child's end; close it for proper EOF detection */
166 (void) close(fds[0]);
170 /** Set socket to SO_KEEPALIVE. \return 0 for success. */
171 int SockKeepalive(int sock) {
173 return setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &keepalive, sizeof keepalive);
176 int UnixOpen(const char *path)
179 struct sockaddr_un ad;
180 memset(&ad, 0, sizeof(ad));
181 ad.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
182 strncpy(ad.sun_path, path, sizeof(ad.sun_path)-1);
184 sock = socket( AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0 );
191 /* Socket opened saved. Useful if connect timeout
192 * because it can be closed.
194 mailserver_socket_temp = sock;
196 if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &ad, sizeof(ad)) < 0)
199 fm_close(sock); /* don't use SockClose, no traffic yet */
205 /* No connect timeout, then no need to set mailserver_socket_temp */
206 mailserver_socket_temp = -1;
211 int SockOpen(const char *host, const char *service,
212 const char *plugin, struct addrinfo **ai0)
214 struct addrinfo *ai, req;
217 char errbuf[8192] = "";
220 return handle_plugin(host,service,plugin);
222 memset(&req, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
223 req.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
225 req.ai_flags = AI_ADDRCONFIG;
228 i = fm_getaddrinfo(host, service, &req, ai0);
230 report(stderr, GT_("getaddrinfo(\"%s\",\"%s\") error: %s\n"),
231 host, service, gai_strerror(i));
232 if (i == EAI_SERVICE)
233 report(stderr, GT_("Try adding the --service option (see also FAQ item R12).\n"));
237 /* NOTE a Linux bug here - getaddrinfo will happily return 127.0.0.1
238 * twice if no IPv6 is configured */
240 for (ord = 0, ai = *ai0; ai; ord++, ai = ai->ai_next) {
241 char buf[256]; /* hostname */
242 char pb[256]; /* service name */
243 int gnie; /* getnameinfo result code */
245 gnie = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, buf, sizeof(buf), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST);
247 snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), GT_("unknown (%s)"), gai_strerror(gnie));
248 gnie = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, NULL, 0, pb, sizeof(pb), NI_NUMERICSERV);
250 snprintf(pb, sizeof(pb), GT_("unknown (%s)"), gai_strerror(gnie));
252 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
253 report_build(stdout, GT_("Trying to connect to %s/%s..."), buf, pb);
254 i = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
257 /* mask EAFNOSUPPORT errors, they confuse users for
258 * multihomed hosts */
259 if (errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
261 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
262 report_complete(stdout, GT_("cannot create socket: %s\n"), strerror(e));
263 snprintf(errbuf+strlen(errbuf), sizeof(errbuf)-strlen(errbuf),\
264 GT_("name %d: cannot create socket family %d type %d: %s\n"), ord, ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, strerror(e));
270 /* Save socket descriptor.
271 * Used to close the socket after connect timeout. */
272 mailserver_socket_temp = i;
274 if (connect(i, (struct sockaddr *) ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
277 /* additionally, suppress IPv4 network unreach errors */
278 if (e != EAFNOSUPPORT)
281 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
282 report_complete(stdout, GT_("connection failed.\n"));
283 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
284 report(stderr, GT_("connection to %s:%s [%s/%s] failed: %s.\n"), host, service, buf, pb, strerror(e));
285 snprintf(errbuf+strlen(errbuf), sizeof(errbuf)-strlen(errbuf), GT_("name %d: connection to %s:%s [%s/%s] failed: %s.\n"), ord, host, service, buf, pb, strerror(e));
290 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
291 report_complete(stdout, GT_("connected.\n"));
294 /* No connect timeout, then no need to set mailserver_socket_temp */
295 mailserver_socket_temp = -1;
300 fm_freeaddrinfo(*ai0);
304 report(stderr, GT_("Connection errors for this poll:\n%s"), errbuf);
311 int SockPrintf(int sock, const char* format, ...)
316 va_start(ap, format) ;
317 vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), format, ap);
319 return SockWrite(sock, buf, strlen(buf));
323 #define OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN 1
324 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
325 #include <openssl/err.h>
326 #include <openssl/pem.h>
327 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
328 #include <openssl/rand.h>
330 static SSL_CTX *_ctx[FD_SETSIZE];
331 static SSL *_ssl_context[FD_SETSIZE];
333 static SSL *SSLGetContext( int );
334 #endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
336 int SockWrite(int sock, const char *buf, int len)
346 if( NULL != ( ssl = SSLGetContext( sock ) ) )
347 n = SSL_write(ssl, buf, len);
349 #endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
350 n = fm_write(sock, buf, len);
360 int SockRead(int sock, char *buf, int len)
362 char *newline, *bp = buf;
372 * The reason for these gymnastics is that we want two things:
373 * (1) to read \n-terminated lines,
374 * (2) to return the true length of data read, even if the
375 * data coming in has embedded NULS.
378 if( NULL != ( ssl = SSLGetContext( sock ) ) ) {
380 /* OK... SSL_peek works a little different from MSG_PEEK
381 Problem is that SSL_peek can return 0 if there
382 is no data currently available. If, on the other
383 hand, we lose the socket, we also get a zero, but
384 the SSL_read then SEGFAULTS! To deal with this,
385 we'll check the error code any time we get a return
386 of zero from SSL_peek. If we have an error, we bail.
387 If we don't, we read one character in SSL_read and
388 loop. This should continue to work even if they
389 later change the behavior of SSL_peek
390 to "fix" this problem... :-( */
391 if ((n = SSL_peek(ssl, bp, len)) < 0) {
392 (void)SSL_get_error(ssl, n);
396 /* SSL_peek says no data... Does he mean no data
397 or did the connection blow up? If we got an error
399 if (0 != SSL_get_error(ssl, n)) {
402 /* We didn't get an error so read at least one
403 character at this point and loop */
405 /* Make sure newline start out NULL!
406 * We don't have a string to pass through
407 * the strchr at this point yet */
409 } else if ((newline = (char *)memchr(bp, '\n', n)) != NULL)
410 n = newline - bp + 1;
411 /* Matthias Andree: SSL_read can return 0, in that case
412 * we must call SSL_get_error to figure if there was
413 * an error or just a "no data" condition */
414 if ((n = SSL_read(ssl, bp, n)) <= 0) {
415 if ((n = SSL_get_error(ssl, n))) {
419 /* Check for case where our single character turned out to
420 * be a newline... (It wasn't going to get caught by
421 * the strchr above if it came from the hack... ). */
422 if( NULL == newline && 1 == n && '\n' == *bp ) {
423 /* Got our newline - this will break
424 out of the loop now */
429 #endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
432 if ((n = fm_peek(sock, bp, len)) <= 0)
434 if ((newline = (char *)memchr(bp, '\n', n)) != NULL)
435 n = newline - bp + 1;
436 if ((n = fm_read(sock, bp, n)) == -1)
448 int SockPeek(int sock)
449 /* peek at the next socket character without actually reading it */
458 if( NULL != ( ssl = SSLGetContext( sock ) ) ) {
459 n = SSL_peek(ssl, &ch, 1);
461 (void)SSL_get_error(ssl, n);
465 /* This code really needs to implement a "hold back"
466 * to simulate a functioning SSL_peek()... sigh...
467 * Has to be coordinated with the read code above.
468 * Next on the list todo... */
470 /* SSL_peek says 0... Does that mean no data
471 or did the connection blow up? If we got an error
473 if(0 != SSL_get_error(ssl, n)) {
477 /* Haven't seen this case actually occur, but...
478 if the problem in SockRead can occur, this should
479 be possible... Just not sure what to do here.
480 This should be a safe "punt" the "peek" but don't
481 "punt" the "session"... */
483 return 0; /* Give him a '\0' character */
487 #endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
488 n = fm_peek(sock, &ch, 1);
497 static char *_ssl_server_cname = NULL;
498 static int _check_fp;
499 static char *_check_digest;
500 static char *_server_label;
501 static int _depth0ck;
502 static int _firstrun;
503 static int _prev_err;
504 static int _verify_ok;
506 SSL *SSLGetContext( int sock )
508 if( sock < 0 || (unsigned)sock > FD_SETSIZE )
510 if( _ctx[sock] == NULL )
512 return _ssl_context[sock];
515 /* ok_return (preverify_ok) is 1 if this stage of certificate verification
516 passed, or 0 if it failed. This callback lets us display informative
517 errors, and perform additional validation (e.g. CN matches) */
518 static int SSL_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int strict )
520 #define SSLverbose (((outlevel) >= O_DEBUG) || ((outlevel) >= O_VERBOSE && (depth) == 0))
524 unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
525 char text[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 3 + 1], *tp, *te;
526 const EVP_MD *digest_tp;
527 unsigned int dsz, esz;
528 X509_NAME *subj, *issuer;
531 x509_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
532 err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
533 depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
535 subj = X509_get_subject_name(x509_cert);
536 issuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x509_cert);
538 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) {
539 if (depth == 0 && SSLverbose)
540 report(stdout, GT_("Server certificate:\n"));
545 report(stdout, GT_("Certificate chain, from root to peer, starting at depth %d:\n"), depth);
548 report(stdout, GT_("Certificate at depth %d:\n"), depth);
553 if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(issuer, NID_organizationName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
554 report(stdout, GT_("Issuer Organization: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(buf, i)));
556 if ((size_t)i >= sizeof(buf) - 1)
557 report(stdout, GT_("Warning: Issuer Organization Name too long (possibly truncated).\n"));
559 report(stdout, GT_("Unknown Organization\n"));
560 if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(issuer, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
561 report(stdout, GT_("Issuer CommonName: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(buf, i)));
563 if ((size_t)i >= sizeof(buf) - 1)
564 report(stdout, GT_("Warning: Issuer CommonName too long (possibly truncated).\n"));
566 report(stdout, GT_("Unknown Issuer CommonName\n"));
570 if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subj, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
572 report(stdout, GT_("Subject CommonName: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(buf, i)));
575 if ((size_t)i >= sizeof(buf) - 1) {
576 /* Possible truncation. In this case, this is a DNS name, so this
577 * is really bad. We do not tolerate this even in the non-strict case. */
578 report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject CommonName too long!\n"));
581 if ((size_t)i > strlen(buf)) {
582 /* Name contains embedded NUL characters, so we complain. This is likely
583 * a certificate spoofing attack. */
584 report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject CommonName contains NUL, aborting!\n"));
589 if (depth == 0) { /* peer certificate */
594 if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subj, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
595 if (_ssl_server_cname != NULL) {
597 char *p2 = _ssl_server_cname;
599 STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gens;
601 /* RFC 2595 section 2.4: find a matching name
602 * first find a match among alternative names */
603 gens = (STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *)X509_get_ext_d2i(x509_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
606 for (j = 0, r = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); j < r; ++j) {
607 const GENERAL_NAME *gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, j);
608 if (gn->type == GEN_DNS) {
609 char *pp1 = (char *)gn->d.ia5->data;
610 char *pp2 = _ssl_server_cname;
611 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) {
612 report(stdout, GT_("Subject Alternative Name: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(pp1, (size_t)gn->d.ia5->length)));
615 /* Name contains embedded NUL characters, so we complain. This
616 * is likely a certificate spoofing attack. */
617 if ((size_t)gn->d.ia5->length != strlen(pp1)) {
618 report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject Alternative Name contains NUL, aborting!\n"));
619 sk_GENERAL_NAME_free(gens);
622 if (name_match(pp1, pp2)) {
627 sk_GENERAL_NAME_free(gens);
629 if (name_match(p1, p2)) {
633 if (strict || SSLverbose) {
635 GT_("Server CommonName mismatch: %s != %s\n"),
636 (tt = sdump(buf, i)), _ssl_server_cname );
641 } else if (ok_return) {
642 report(stderr, GT_("Server name not set, could not verify certificate!\n"));
643 if (strict) return (0);
646 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
647 report(stdout, GT_("Unknown Server CommonName\n"));
648 if (ok_return && strict) {
649 report(stderr, GT_("Server name not specified in certificate!\n"));
653 /* Print the finger print. Note that on errors, we might print it more than once
654 * normally; we kluge around that by using a global variable. */
655 if (_check_fp == 1) {
659 digest_tp = EVP_md5();
660 if (digest_tp == NULL) {
661 report(stderr, GT_("EVP_md5() failed!\n"));
664 if (!X509_digest(x509_cert, digest_tp, digest, &dsz)) {
665 report(stderr, GT_("Out of memory!\n"));
669 te = text + sizeof(text);
670 for (dp = 0; dp < dsz; dp++) {
671 esz = snprintf(tp, te - tp, dp > 0 ? ":%02X" : "%02X", digest[dp]);
672 if (esz >= (size_t)(te - tp)) {
673 report(stderr, GT_("Digest text buffer too small!\n"));
678 if (outlevel > O_NORMAL)
679 report(stdout, GT_("%s key fingerprint: %s\n"), _server_label, text);
680 if (_check_digest != NULL) {
681 if (strcasecmp(text, _check_digest) == 0) {
682 if (outlevel > O_NORMAL)
683 report(stdout, GT_("%s fingerprints match.\n"), _server_label);
685 report(stderr, GT_("%s fingerprints do not match!\n"), _server_label);
688 } /* if (_check_digest != NULL) */
689 } /* if (_check_fp) */
690 } /* if (depth == 0 && !_depth0ck) */
692 if (err != X509_V_OK && err != _prev_err && !(_check_fp != 0 && _check_digest && !strict)) {
695 report(stderr, GT_("Server certificate verification error: %s\n"), X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
696 /* We gave the error code, but maybe we can add some more details for debugging */
699 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
700 X509_NAME_oneline(issuer, buf, sizeof(buf));
701 buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0';
702 report(stderr, GT_("unknown issuer (first %d characters): %s\n"), (int)(sizeof(buf)-1), buf);
703 report(stderr, GT_("This error usually happens when the server provides an incomplete certificate "
704 "chain, which is nothing fetchmail could do anything about. For details, "
705 "please see the README.SSL-SERVER document that comes with fetchmail.\n"));
707 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
708 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
709 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
710 X509_NAME_oneline(subj, buf, sizeof(buf));
711 buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0';
712 report(stderr, GT_("This means that the root signing certificate (issued for %s) is not in the "
713 "trusted CA certificate locations, or that c_rehash needs to be run "
714 "on the certificate directory. For details, please "
715 "see the documentation of --sslcertpath and --sslcertfile in the manual page.\n"), buf);
722 * If not in strict checking mode (--sslcertck), override this
723 * and pretend that verification had succeeded.
725 _verify_ok &= ok_return;
731 static int SSL_nock_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx )
733 return SSL_verify_callback(ok_return, ctx, 0);
736 static int SSL_ck_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx )
738 return SSL_verify_callback(ok_return, ctx, 1);
742 /* get commonName from certificate set in file.
743 * commonName is stored in buffer namebuffer, limited with namebufferlen
745 static const char *SSLCertGetCN(const char *mycert,
746 char *namebuffer, size_t namebufferlen)
748 const char *ret = NULL;
750 X509 *x509_cert = NULL;
751 X509_NAME *certname = NULL;
753 if (namebuffer && namebufferlen > 0) {
754 namebuffer[0] = 0x00;
755 certBio = BIO_new_file(mycert,"r");
757 x509_cert = PEM_read_bio_X509(certBio,NULL,NULL,NULL);
761 certname = X509_get_subject_name(x509_cert);
763 X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(certname, NID_commonName,
764 namebuffer, namebufferlen) > 0)
766 X509_free(x509_cert);
772 /* performs initial SSL handshake over the connected socket
773 * uses SSL *ssl global variable, which is currently defined
776 int SSLOpen(int sock, char *mycert, char *mykey, const char *myproto, int certck,
777 char *cacertfile, char *certpath,
778 char *fingerprint, char *servercname, char *label, char **remotename)
780 struct stat randstat;
783 SSL_load_error_strings();
785 OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); /* see Debian Bug#576430 and manpage */
787 if (stat("/dev/random", &randstat) &&
788 stat("/dev/urandom", &randstat)) {
789 /* Neither /dev/random nor /dev/urandom are present, so add
790 entropy to the SSL PRNG a hard way. */
791 for (i = 0; i < 10000 && ! RAND_status (); ++i) {
794 gettimeofday (&tv, 0);
795 buf[0] = tv.tv_usec & 0xF;
796 buf[2] = (tv.tv_usec & 0xF0) >> 4;
797 buf[3] = (tv.tv_usec & 0xF00) >> 8;
798 buf[1] = (tv.tv_usec & 0xF000) >> 12;
799 RAND_add (buf, sizeof buf, 0.1);
803 if( sock < 0 || (unsigned)sock > FD_SETSIZE ) {
804 report(stderr, GT_("File descriptor out of range for SSL") );
808 /* Make sure a connection referring to an older context is not left */
809 _ssl_context[sock] = NULL;
811 if(!strcasecmp("ssl3",myproto)) {
812 _ctx[sock] = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv3_client_method());
813 } else if(!strcasecmp("tls1",myproto)) {
814 _ctx[sock] = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_client_method());
815 } else if (!strcasecmp("ssl23",myproto)) {
818 fprintf(stderr,GT_("Invalid SSL protocol '%s' specified, using default (SSL23).\n"), myproto);
823 _ctx[sock] = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method());
825 if(_ctx[sock] == NULL) {
826 ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
830 SSL_CTX_set_options(_ctx[sock], (SSL_OP_ALL | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2) & ~SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS);
833 SSL_CTX_set_verify(_ctx[sock], SSL_VERIFY_PEER, SSL_ck_verify_callback);
835 /* In this case, we do not fail if verification fails. However,
836 * we provide the callback for output and possible fingerprint
838 SSL_CTX_set_verify(_ctx[sock], SSL_VERIFY_PEER, SSL_nock_verify_callback);
841 /* Check which trusted X.509 CA certificate store(s) to load */
844 int want_default_cacerts = 0;
846 /* Load user locations if any is given */
847 if (certpath || cacertfile)
848 SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(_ctx[sock],
849 cacertfile, certpath);
851 want_default_cacerts = 1;
853 tmp = getenv("FETCHMAIL_INCLUDE_DEFAULT_X509_CA_CERTS");
854 if (want_default_cacerts || (tmp && tmp[0])) {
855 SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(_ctx[sock]);
859 _ssl_context[sock] = SSL_new(_ctx[sock]);
861 if(_ssl_context[sock] == NULL) {
862 ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
863 SSL_CTX_free(_ctx[sock]);
868 /* This static is for the verify callback */
869 _ssl_server_cname = servercname;
870 _server_label = label;
872 _check_digest = fingerprint;
878 if( mycert || mykey ) {
880 /* Ok... He has a certificate file defined, so lets declare it. If
881 * he does NOT have a separate certificate and private key file then
882 * assume that it's a combined key and certificate file.
891 if ((!*remotename || !**remotename) && SSLCertGetCN(mycert, buffer, sizeof(buffer))) {
893 *remotename = xstrdup(buffer);
895 SSL_use_certificate_file(_ssl_context[sock], mycert, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
896 SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(_ssl_context[sock], mykey, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
899 if (SSL_set_fd(_ssl_context[sock], sock) == 0
900 || SSL_connect(_ssl_context[sock]) < 1) {
901 ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
902 SSL_free( _ssl_context[sock] );
903 _ssl_context[sock] = NULL;
904 SSL_CTX_free(_ctx[sock]);
909 /* Paranoia: was the callback not called as we expected? */
911 report(stderr, GT_("Certificate/fingerprint verification was somehow skipped!\n"));
913 if (fingerprint != NULL || certck) {
914 if( NULL != SSLGetContext( sock ) ) {
915 /* Clean up the SSL stack */
916 SSL_shutdown( _ssl_context[sock] );
917 SSL_free( _ssl_context[sock] );
918 _ssl_context[sock] = NULL;
919 SSL_CTX_free(_ctx[sock]);
926 if (!certck && !fingerprint &&
927 (SSL_get_verify_result(_ssl_context[sock]) != X509_V_OK || !_verify_ok)) {
928 report(stderr, GT_("Warning: the connection is insecure, continuing anyways. (Better use --sslcertck!)\n"));
935 int SockClose(int sock)
936 /* close a socket gracefully */
939 if( NULL != SSLGetContext( sock ) ) {
940 /* Clean up the SSL stack */
941 SSL_shutdown( _ssl_context[sock] );
942 SSL_free( _ssl_context[sock] );
943 _ssl_context[sock] = NULL;
944 SSL_CTX_free(_ctx[sock]);
949 /* if there's an error closing at this point, not much we can do */
950 return(fm_close(sock)); /* this is guarded */
955 * Workaround Microsoft Winsock recv/WSARecv(..., MSG_PEEK) bug.
956 * See http://sources.redhat.com/ml/cygwin/2001-08/msg00628.html
959 static ssize_t cygwin_read(int sock, void *buf, size_t count)
961 char *bp = (char *)buf;
964 if ((n = read(sock, bp, count)) == (size_t)-1)
969 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
970 report(stdout, GT_("Cygwin socket read retry\n"));
971 n2 = read(sock, bp + n, count - n);
972 if (n2 == (size_t)-1 || n + n2 != count) {
973 report(stderr, GT_("Cygwin socket read retry failed!\n"));
980 #endif /* __CYGWIN__ */