/*
* socket.c -- socket library functions
*
- * Copyright 1998 by Eric S. Raymond.
+ * Copyright 1998, 2004 by Eric S. Raymond.
+ * Copyright 2004, 2013 by Matthias Andree.
+ *
* For license terms, see the file COPYING in this directory.
*/
# endif
#endif /* ndef h_errno */
+/* used by SSL_get_ex_new_index, SSL_set_ex_data, SSL_get_ex_data, to communicate
+ options and state with the verify callback */
+static int global_mydata_index = -2;
+
static char *const *parse_plugin(const char *plugin, const char *host, const char *service)
{
char **argvec;
#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
-static char *_ssl_server_cname = NULL;
-static int _check_fp;
-static char *_check_digest;
-static char *_server_label;
-static int _depth0ck;
-static int _firstrun;
-static int _prev_err;
-static int _verify_ok;
+struct ssl_callback_data {
+ char *ssl_server_cname;
+ char *check_digest;
+ char *server_label;
+ int check_fp;
+ int depth0ck;
+ int firstrun;
+ int prev_err;
+ int verify_ok;
+ int strict_mode;
+};
+
+typedef struct ssl_callback_data t_ssl_callback_data;
SSL *SSLGetContext( int sock )
{
/* ok_return (preverify_ok) is 1 if this stage of certificate verification
passed, or 0 if it failed. This callback lets us display informative
errors, and perform additional validation (e.g. CN matches) */
-static int SSL_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int strict )
+static int SSL_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
#define SSLverbose (((outlevel) >= O_DEBUG) || ((outlevel) >= O_VERBOSE && (depth) == 0))
char buf[257];
unsigned int dsz, esz;
X509_NAME *subj, *issuer;
char *tt;
+ t_ssl_callback_data *mydata;
+ SSL *ssl;
+ ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
+ mydata = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, global_mydata_index);
x509_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
if (depth == 0 && SSLverbose)
report(stdout, GT_("Server certificate:\n"));
else {
- if (_firstrun) {
- _firstrun = 0;
+ if (mydata->firstrun) {
+ mydata->firstrun = 0;
if (SSLverbose)
report(stdout, GT_("Certificate chain, from root to peer, starting at depth %d:\n"), depth);
} else {
}
if (depth == 0) { /* peer certificate */
- if (!_depth0ck) {
- _depth0ck = 1;
+ if (!mydata->depth0ck) {
+ mydata->depth0ck = 1;
}
if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subj, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
- if (_ssl_server_cname != NULL) {
+ if (mydata->ssl_server_cname != NULL) {
char *p1 = buf;
- char *p2 = _ssl_server_cname;
+ char *p2 = mydata->ssl_server_cname;
int matched = 0;
STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gens;
const GENERAL_NAME *gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, j);
if (gn->type == GEN_DNS) {
char *pp1 = (char *)gn->d.ia5->data;
- char *pp2 = _ssl_server_cname;
+ char *pp2 = mydata->ssl_server_cname;
if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) {
report(stdout, GT_("Subject Alternative Name: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(pp1, (size_t)gn->d.ia5->length)));
xfree(tt);
matched = 1;
}
if (!matched) {
- if (strict || SSLverbose) {
+ if (mydata->strict_mode || SSLverbose) {
report(stderr,
GT_("Server CommonName mismatch: %s != %s\n"),
- (tt = sdump(buf, i)), _ssl_server_cname );
+ (tt = sdump(buf, i)), mydata->ssl_server_cname);
xfree(tt);
}
ok_return = 0;
}
} else if (ok_return) {
report(stderr, GT_("Server name not set, could not verify certificate!\n"));
- if (strict) return (0);
+ if (mydata->strict_mode) return (0);
}
} else {
if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
report(stdout, GT_("Unknown Server CommonName\n"));
- if (ok_return && strict) {
+ if (ok_return && mydata->strict_mode) {
report(stderr, GT_("Server name not specified in certificate!\n"));
return (0);
}
}
/* Print the finger print. Note that on errors, we might print it more than once
* normally; we kluge around that by using a global variable. */
- if (_check_fp == 1) {
+ if (1 == mydata->check_fp) {
unsigned dp;
- _check_fp = -1;
+ mydata->check_fp = -1;
digest_tp = EVP_md5();
if (digest_tp == NULL) {
report(stderr, GT_("EVP_md5() failed!\n"));
tp += esz;
}
if (outlevel > O_NORMAL)
- report(stdout, GT_("%s key fingerprint: %s\n"), _server_label, text);
- if (_check_digest != NULL) {
- if (strcasecmp(text, _check_digest) == 0) {
+ report(stdout, GT_("%s certificate MD5 fingerprint: %s\n"), mydata->server_label, text);
+ if (mydata->check_digest != NULL) {
+ if (strcasecmp(text, mydata->check_digest) == 0) {
if (outlevel > O_NORMAL)
- report(stdout, GT_("%s fingerprints match.\n"), _server_label);
+ report(stdout, GT_("%s fingerprints match.\n"), mydata->server_label);
} else {
- report(stderr, GT_("%s fingerprints do not match!\n"), _server_label);
+ report(stderr, GT_("%s fingerprints do not match!\n"), mydata->server_label);
return (0);
}
} /* if (_check_digest != NULL) */
} /* if (_check_fp) */
} /* if (depth == 0 && !_depth0ck) */
- if (err != X509_V_OK && err != _prev_err && !(_check_fp != 0 && _check_digest && !strict)) {
+ if (err != X509_V_OK && err != mydata->prev_err && !(mydata->check_fp != 0 && mydata->check_digest && !mydata->strict_mode)) {
char *tmp;
int did_rep_err = 0;
- _prev_err = err;
+ mydata->prev_err = err;
report(stderr, GT_("Server certificate verification error: %s\n"), X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
/* We gave the error code, but maybe we can add some more details for debugging */
* If not in strict checking mode (--sslcertck), override this
* and pretend that verification had succeeded.
*/
- _verify_ok &= ok_return;
- if (!strict)
+ mydata->verify_ok &= ok_return;
+ if (!mydata->strict_mode)
ok_return = 1;
- return (ok_return);
-}
-
-static int SSL_nock_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx )
-{
- return SSL_verify_callback(ok_return, ctx, 0);
-}
-
-static int SSL_ck_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx )
-{
- return SSL_verify_callback(ok_return, ctx, 1);
+ return ok_return;
}
-
/* get commonName from certificate set in file.
* commonName is stored in buffer namebuffer, limited with namebufferlen
*/
struct stat randstat;
int i;
- SSL_load_error_strings();
- SSL_library_init();
- OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); /* see Debian Bug#576430 and manpage */
+ static int ssl_lib_init = 0;
+
+ if (!ssl_lib_init) {
+ SSL_load_error_strings();
+ SSL_library_init();
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); /* see Debian Bug#576430 and manpage */
+ ssl_lib_init = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (-2 == global_mydata_index) {
+ global_mydata_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, "fetchmail SSL callback data", NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (-1 == global_mydata_index) return PS_UNDEFINED;
+ }
if (stat("/dev/random", &randstat) &&
stat("/dev/urandom", &randstat)) {
}
SSL_CTX_set_options(_ctx[sock], (SSL_OP_ALL | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2) & ~SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS);
-
- if (certck) {
- SSL_CTX_set_verify(_ctx[sock], SSL_VERIFY_PEER, SSL_ck_verify_callback);
- } else {
- /* In this case, we do not fail if verification fails. However,
- * we provide the callback for output and possible fingerprint
- * checks. */
- SSL_CTX_set_verify(_ctx[sock], SSL_VERIFY_PEER, SSL_nock_verify_callback);
- }
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(_ctx[sock], SSL_VERIFY_PEER, SSL_verify_callback);
/* Check which trusted X.509 CA certificate store(s) to load */
{
return(-1);
}
- /* This static is for the verify callback */
- _ssl_server_cname = servercname;
- _server_label = label;
- _check_fp = 1;
- _check_digest = fingerprint;
- _depth0ck = 0;
- _firstrun = 1;
- _verify_ok = 1;
- _prev_err = -1;
+ t_ssl_callback_data mydata;
+ memset(&mydata, 0, sizeof(mydata));
+
+ /* This data is for the verify callback */
+ mydata.ssl_server_cname = servercname;
+ mydata.server_label = label;
+ mydata.check_fp = 1;
+ mydata.check_digest = fingerprint;
+ mydata.depth0ck = 0;
+ mydata.firstrun = 1;
+ mydata.verify_ok = 1;
+ mydata.prev_err = -1;
+ mydata.strict_mode = certck;
if( mycert || mykey ) {
SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(_ssl_context[sock], mykey, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
}
+ SSL_set_ex_data(_ssl_context[sock], global_mydata_index, &mydata);
+
if (SSL_set_fd(_ssl_context[sock], sock) == 0
|| SSL_connect(_ssl_context[sock]) < 1) {
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
}
/* Paranoia: was the callback not called as we expected? */
- if (!_depth0ck) {
+ if (!mydata.depth0ck) {
report(stderr, GT_("Certificate/fingerprint verification was somehow skipped!\n"));
if (fingerprint != NULL || certck) {
}
if (!certck && !fingerprint &&
- (SSL_get_verify_result(_ssl_context[sock]) != X509_V_OK || !_verify_ok)) {
+ (SSL_get_verify_result(_ssl_context[sock]) != X509_V_OK || !mydata.verify_ok)) {
report(stderr, GT_("Warning: the connection is insecure, continuing anyways. (Better use --sslcertck!)\n"));
}
projects / ~andy / fetchmail / commitdiff