(void) close(fds[1]);
if ( (dup2(fds[0],0) == -1) || (dup2(fds[0],1) == -1) ) {
report(stderr, GT_("dup2 failed\n"));
- exit(1);
+ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
/* fds[0] is now connected to 0 and 1; close it */
(void) close(fds[0]);
argvec = parse_plugin(plugin,host,service);
execvp(*argvec, argvec);
report(stderr, GT_("execvp(%s) failed\n"), *argvec);
- exit(0);
+ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
break;
default: /* parent */
/* NOP */
}
#endif /* HAVE_SOCKETPAIR */
-#ifdef __UNUSED__
-
-int SockCheckOpen(int fd)
-/* poll given socket; is it selectable? */
-{
- fd_set r, w, e;
- int rt;
- struct timeval tv;
-
- for (;;)
- {
- FD_ZERO(&r); FD_ZERO(&w); FD_ZERO(&e);
- FD_SET(fd, &e);
-
- tv.tv_sec = 0; tv.tv_usec = 0;
- rt = select(fd+1, &r, &w, &e, &tv);
- if (rt == -1 && (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR))
- return 0;
- if (rt != -1)
- return 1;
- }
+/** Set socket to SO_KEEPALIVE. \return 0 for success. */
+int SockKeepalive(int sock) {
+ int keepalive = 1;
+ return setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &keepalive, sizeof keepalive);
}
-#endif /* __UNUSED__ */
int UnixOpen(const char *path)
{
return -1;
}
- /* Socket opened saved. Usefull if connect timeout
- * because it can be closed.
- */
- mailserver_socket_temp = sock;
-
- if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &ad, sizeof(ad)) < 0)
+ /* Socket opened saved. Usefull if connect timeout
+ * because it can be closed.
+ */
+ mailserver_socket_temp = sock;
+
+ if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &ad, sizeof(ad)) < 0)
{
int olderr = errno;
fm_close(sock); /* don't use SockClose, no traffic yet */
errno = olderr;
sock = -1;
}
-
- /* No connect timeout, then no need to set mailserver_socket_temp */
- mailserver_socket_temp = -1;
+
+ /* No connect timeout, then no need to set mailserver_socket_temp */
+ mailserver_socket_temp = -1;
return sock;
}
{
struct addrinfo *ai, req;
int i, acterr = 0;
+ int ord;
+ char errbuf[8192] = "";
#ifdef HAVE_SOCKETPAIR
if (plugin)
return -1;
}
+ /* NOTE a Linux bug here - getaddrinfo will happily return 127.0.0.1
+ * twice if no IPv6 is configured */
i = -1;
- for (ai = *ai0; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
- char buf[80],pb[80];
- int gnie;
+ for (ord = 0, ai = *ai0; ai; ord++, ai = ai->ai_next) {
+ char buf[256]; /* hostname */
+ char pb[256]; /* service name */
+ int gnie; /* getnameinfo result code */
gnie = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, buf, sizeof(buf), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST);
if (gnie)
if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
report_build(stdout, GT_("Trying to connect to %s/%s..."), buf, pb);
- i = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, 0);
+ i = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
if (i < 0) {
+ int e = errno;
/* mask EAFNOSUPPORT errors, they confuse users for
* multihomed hosts */
if (errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
acterr = errno;
if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
- report_complete(stdout, GT_("cannot create socket: %s\n"), strerror(errno));
+ report_complete(stdout, GT_("cannot create socket: %s\n"), strerror(e));
+ snprintf(errbuf+strlen(errbuf), sizeof(errbuf)-strlen(errbuf),\
+ GT_("name %d: cannot create socket family %d type %d: %s\n"), ord, ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, strerror(e));
continue;
}
+ SockKeepalive(i);
+
/* Save socket descriptor.
* Used to close the socket after connect timeout. */
mailserver_socket_temp = i;
if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
report_complete(stdout, GT_("connection failed.\n"));
- if (outlevel > O_SILENT)
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
report(stderr, GT_("connection to %s:%s [%s/%s] failed: %s.\n"), host, service, buf, pb, strerror(e));
+ snprintf(errbuf+strlen(errbuf), sizeof(errbuf)-strlen(errbuf), GT_("name %d: connection to %s:%s [%s/%s] failed: %s.\n"), ord, host, service, buf, pb, strerror(e));
fm_close(i);
i = -1;
continue;
fm_freeaddrinfo(*ai0);
*ai0 = NULL;
- if (i == -1)
+ if (i == -1) {
+ report(stderr, GT_("Connection errors for this poll:\n%s"), errbuf);
errno = acterr;
+ }
return i;
}
/* OK... SSL_peek works a little different from MSG_PEEK
Problem is that SSL_peek can return 0 if there
is no data currently available. If, on the other
- hand, we loose the socket, we also get a zero, but
+ hand, we lose the socket, we also get a zero, but
the SSL_read then SEGFAULTS! To deal with this,
we'll check the error code any time we get a return
of zero from SSL_peek. If we have an error, we bail.
static char *_check_digest;
static char *_server_label;
static int _depth0ck;
+static int _firstrun;
static int _prev_err;
+static int _verify_ok;
SSL *SSLGetContext( int sock )
{
return _ssl_context[sock];
}
-
/* ok_return (preverify_ok) is 1 if this stage of certificate verification
passed, or 0 if it failed. This callback lets us display informative
errors, and perform additional validation (e.g. CN matches) */
static int SSL_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int strict )
{
+#define SSLverbose (((outlevel) >= O_DEBUG) || ((outlevel) >= O_VERBOSE && (depth) == 0))
char buf[257];
X509 *x509_cert;
int err, depth, i;
subj = X509_get_subject_name(x509_cert);
issuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x509_cert);
- if (depth == 0 && !_depth0ck) {
- _depth0ck = 1;
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) {
+ if (depth == 0 && SSLverbose)
+ report(stdout, GT_("Server certificate:\n"));
+ else {
+ if (_firstrun) {
+ _firstrun = 0;
+ if (SSLverbose)
+ report(stdout, GT_("Certificate chain, from root to peer, starting at depth %d:\n"), depth);
+ } else {
+ if (SSLverbose)
+ report(stdout, GT_("Certificate at depth %d:\n"), depth);
+ }
+ }
- if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) {
+ if (SSLverbose) {
if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(issuer, NID_organizationName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
report(stdout, GT_("Issuer Organization: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(buf, i)));
xfree(tt);
} else
report(stdout, GT_("Unknown Issuer CommonName\n"));
}
+ }
+
+ if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subj, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
+ if (SSLverbose) {
+ report(stdout, GT_("Subject CommonName: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(buf, i)));
+ xfree(tt);
+ }
+ if ((size_t)i >= sizeof(buf) - 1) {
+ /* Possible truncation. In this case, this is a DNS name, so this
+ * is really bad. We do not tolerate this even in the non-strict case. */
+ report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject CommonName too long!\n"));
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if ((size_t)i > strlen(buf)) {
+ /* Name contains embedded NUL characters, so we complain. This is likely
+ * a certificate spoofing attack. */
+ report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject CommonName contains NUL, aborting!\n"));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (depth == 0) { /* peer certificate */
+ if (!_depth0ck) {
+ _depth0ck = 1;
+ }
+
if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subj, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
- if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) {
- report(stdout, GT_("Server CommonName: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(buf, i)));
- xfree(tt);
- }
- if ((size_t)i >= sizeof(buf) - 1) {
- /* Possible truncation. In this case, this is a DNS name, so this
- * is really bad. We do not tolerate this even in the non-strict case. */
- report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject CommonName too long!\n"));
- return (0);
- }
- if ((size_t)i > strlen(buf)) {
- /* Name contains embedded NUL characters, so we complain. This is likely
- * a certificate spoofing attack. */
- report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject CommonName contains NUL, aborting!\n"));
- return 0;
- }
if (_ssl_server_cname != NULL) {
char *p1 = buf;
char *p2 = _ssl_server_cname;
- int n;
int matched = 0;
STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gens;
-
+
/* RFC 2595 section 2.4: find a matching name
* first find a match among alternative names */
gens = (STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *)X509_get_ext_d2i(x509_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
for (j = 0, r = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); j < r; ++j) {
const GENERAL_NAME *gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, j);
if (gn->type == GEN_DNS) {
- char *p1 = (char *)gn->d.ia5->data;
- char *p2 = _ssl_server_cname;
+ char *pp1 = (char *)gn->d.ia5->data;
+ char *pp2 = _ssl_server_cname;
if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) {
- report(stdout, GT_("Subject Alternative Name: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(p1, (size_t)gn->d.ia5->length)));
+ report(stdout, GT_("Subject Alternative Name: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(pp1, (size_t)gn->d.ia5->length)));
xfree(tt);
}
/* Name contains embedded NUL characters, so we complain. This
* is likely a certificate spoofing attack. */
- if ((size_t)gn->d.ia5->length != strlen(p1)) {
+ if ((size_t)gn->d.ia5->length != strlen(pp1)) {
report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject Alternative Name contains NUL, aborting!\n"));
sk_GENERAL_NAME_free(gens);
return 0;
}
- if (*p1 == '*') {
- ++p1;
- n = strlen(p2) - strlen(p1);
- if (n >= 0)
- p2 += n;
- }
- if (0 == strcasecmp(p1, p2)) {
- matched = 1;
+ if (name_match(pp1, pp2)) {
+ matched = 1;
}
}
}
sk_GENERAL_NAME_free(gens);
}
- if (*p1 == '*') {
- ++p1;
- n = strlen(p2) - strlen(p1);
- if (n >= 0)
- p2 += n;
- }
- if (0 == strcasecmp(p1, p2)) {
+ if (name_match(p1, p2)) {
matched = 1;
}
if (!matched) {
- report(stderr,
- GT_("Server CommonName mismatch: %s != %s\n"),
- (tt = sdump(buf, i)), _ssl_server_cname );
- xfree(tt);
- if (ok_return && strict)
- return (0);
+ if (strict || SSLverbose) {
+ report(stderr,
+ GT_("Server CommonName mismatch: %s != %s\n"),
+ (tt = sdump(buf, i)), _ssl_server_cname );
+ xfree(tt);
+ }
+ ok_return = 0;
}
} else if (ok_return) {
report(stderr, GT_("Server name not set, could not verify certificate!\n"));
if (err != X509_V_OK && err != _prev_err && !(_check_fp != 0 && _check_digest && !strict)) {
_prev_err = err;
- report(stderr, GT_("Server certificate verification error: %s\n"), X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
- /* We gave the error code, but maybe we can add some more details for debugging */
+
+ report(stderr, GT_("Server certificate verification error: %s\n"), X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
+ /* We gave the error code, but maybe we can add some more details for debugging */
+
switch (err) {
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
X509_NAME_oneline(issuer, buf, sizeof(buf));
buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0';
report(stderr, GT_("unknown issuer (first %d characters): %s\n"), (int)(sizeof(buf)-1), buf);
+ report(stderr, GT_("This error usually happens when the server provides an incomplete certificate "
+ "chain, which is nothing fetchmail could do anything about. For details, "
+ "please see the README.SSL-SERVER document that comes with fetchmail.\n"));
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
+ case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
+ X509_NAME_oneline(subj, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0';
+ report(stderr, GT_("This means that the root signing certificate (issued for %s) is not in the "
+ "trusted CA certificate locations, or that c_rehash needs to be run "
+ "on the certificate directory. For details, please "
+ "see the documentation of --sslcertpath and --sslcertfile in the manual page.\n"), buf);
+ break;
+ default:
break;
}
}
* If not in strict checking mode (--sslcertck), override this
* and pretend that verification had succeeded.
*/
+ _verify_ok &= ok_return;
if (!strict)
ok_return = 1;
return (ok_return);
* uses SSL *ssl global variable, which is currently defined
* in this file
*/
-int SSLOpen(int sock, char *mycert, char *mykey, const char *myproto, int certck, char *certpath,
+int SSLOpen(int sock, char *mycert, char *mykey, const char *myproto, int certck,
+ char *cacertfile, char *certpath,
char *fingerprint, char *servercname, char *label, char **remotename)
{
struct stat randstat;
int i;
+ long sslopts = SSL_OP_ALL;
SSL_load_error_strings();
SSL_library_init();
_ssl_context[sock] = NULL;
if(myproto) {
if(!strcasecmp("ssl2",myproto)) {
+#if HAVE_DECL_SSLV2_CLIENT_METHOD + 0 > 0
_ctx[sock] = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv2_client_method());
+#else
+ report(stderr, GT_("Your operating system does not support SSLv2.\n"));
+ return -1;
+#endif
} else if(!strcasecmp("ssl3",myproto)) {
_ctx[sock] = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv3_client_method());
} else if(!strcasecmp("tls1",myproto)) {
return(-1);
}
- SSL_CTX_set_options(_ctx[sock], SSL_OP_ALL);
+ {
+ char *tmp = getenv("FETCHMAIL_DISABLE_CBC_IV_COUNTERMEASURE");
+ if (tmp == NULL || *tmp == '\0' || strspn(tmp, " \t") == strlen(tmp))
+ sslopts &= ~ SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS;
+ }
+
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(_ctx[sock], sslopts);
if (certck) {
SSL_CTX_set_verify(_ctx[sock], SSL_VERIFY_PEER, SSL_ck_verify_callback);
} else {
/* In this case, we do not fail if verification fails. However,
- * we provide the callback for output and possible fingerprint checks. */
+ * we provide the callback for output and possible fingerprint
+ * checks. */
SSL_CTX_set_verify(_ctx[sock], SSL_VERIFY_PEER, SSL_nock_verify_callback);
}
- if (certpath)
- SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(_ctx[sock], NULL, certpath);
- else
- SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(_ctx[sock]);
+
+ /* Check which trusted X.509 CA certificate store(s) to load */
+ {
+ char *tmp;
+ int want_default_cacerts = 0;
+
+ /* Load user locations if any is given */
+ if (certpath || cacertfile)
+ SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(_ctx[sock],
+ cacertfile, certpath);
+ else
+ want_default_cacerts = 1;
+
+ tmp = getenv("FETCHMAIL_INCLUDE_DEFAULT_X509_CA_CERTS");
+ if (want_default_cacerts || (tmp && tmp[0])) {
+ SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(_ctx[sock]);
+ }
+ }
_ssl_context[sock] = SSL_new(_ctx[sock]);
_check_fp = 1;
_check_digest = fingerprint;
_depth0ck = 0;
+ _firstrun = 1;
+ _verify_ok = 1;
_prev_err = -1;
if( mycert || mykey ) {
}
}
+ if (!certck && !fingerprint &&
+ (SSL_get_verify_result(_ssl_context[sock]) != X509_V_OK || !_verify_ok)) {
+ report(stderr, GT_("Warning: the connection is insecure, continuing anyways. (Better use --sslcertck!)\n"));
+ }
+
return(0);
}
#endif
}
#endif
-#ifdef __UNUSED__
- /*
- * This hangs in RedHat 6.2 after fetchmail runs for a while a
- * FIN_WAIT2 comes up in netstat and fetchmail never returns from
- * the recv system call. (Reported from jtnews
- * <jtnews@bellatlantic.net>, Wed, 24 May 2000 21:26:02.)
- *
- * Half-close the connection first so the other end gets notified.
- *
- * This stops sends but allows receives (effectively, it sends a
- * TCP <FIN>). */
- if (shutdown(sock, 1) == 0) {
- char ch;
- /* If there is any data still waiting in the queue, discard it.
- * Call recv() until either it returns 0 (meaning we received a FIN)
- * or any error occurs. This makes sure all data sent by the other
- * side is acknowledged at the TCP level.
- */
- if (fm_peek(sock, &ch, 1) > 0)
- while (fm_read(sock, &ch, 1) > 0)
- continue;
- }
-#endif /* __UNUSED__ */
-
/* if there's an error closing at this point, not much we can do */
return(fm_close(sock)); /* this is guarded */
}
*/
static ssize_t cygwin_read(int sock, void *buf, size_t count)
{
- char *bp = buf;
- int n = 0;
+ char *bp = (char *)buf;
+ size_t n = 0;
- if ((n = read(sock, bp, count)) == -1)
+ if ((n = read(sock, bp, count)) == (size_t)-1)
return(-1);
if (n != count) {
- int n2 = 0;
+ size_t n2 = 0;
if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
report(stdout, GT_("Cygwin socket read retry\n"));
n2 = read(sock, bp + n, count - n);
- if (n2 == -1 || n + n2 != count) {
+ if (n2 == (size_t)-1 || n + n2 != count) {
report(stderr, GT_("Cygwin socket read retry failed!\n"));
return(-1);
}
return count;
}
#endif /* __CYGWIN__ */
-
-#ifdef MAIN
-/*
- * Use the chargen service to test input buffering directly.
- * You may have to uncomment the `chargen' service description in your
- * inetd.conf (and then SIGHUP inetd) for this to work. */
-main()
-{
- int sock = SockOpen("localhost", "chargen", NULL);
- char buf[80];
-
- while (SockRead(sock, buf, sizeof(buf)-1))
- SockWrite(1, buf, strlen(buf));
- SockClose(sock);
-}
-#endif /* MAIN */
-
-/* socket.c ends here */
projects / ~andy / fetchmail / blobdiff