/*
* socket.c -- socket library functions
*
- * Copyright 1998 by Eric S. Raymond.
+ * Copyright 1998, 2004 by Eric S. Raymond.
+ * Copyright 2004, 2013 by Matthias Andree.
+ *
* For license terms, see the file COPYING in this directory.
*/
#include <errno.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <ctype.h> /* isspace() */
-#ifdef HAVE_MEMORY_H
-#include <memory.h>
-#endif /* HAVE_MEMORY_H */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
-#ifndef HAVE_NET_SOCKET_H
#include <sys/socket.h>
-#else
-#include <net/socket.h>
-#endif
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H
#include <arpa/inet.h>
-#endif
#include <netdb.h>
-#if defined(STDC_HEADERS)
#include <stdlib.h>
-#endif
-#if defined(HAVE_UNISTD_H)
#include <unistd.h>
-#endif
-#if defined(HAVE_STDARG_H)
#include <stdarg.h>
-#else
-#include <varargs.h>
-#endif
-#if TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME
-# include <sys/time.h>
-# include <time.h>
-#else
-# if HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
-# include <sys/time.h>
-# else
-# include <time.h>
-# endif
-#endif
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <time.h>
#include "socket.h"
#include "fetchmail.h"
#include "getaddrinfo.h"
-#include "i18n.h"
+#include "gettext.h"
#include "sdump.h"
-/* Defines to allow BeOS and Cygwin to play nice... */
-#ifdef __BEOS__
-static char peeked;
-#define fm_close(a) closesocket(a)
-#define fm_write(a,b,c) send(a,b,c,0)
-#define fm_peek(a,b,c) recv(a,b,c,0)
-#define fm_read(a,b,c) recv(a,b,c,0)
-#else
-#define fm_close(a) close(a)
+/* Defines to allow Cygwin to play nice... */
+#define fm_close(a) close(a)
#define fm_write(a,b,c) write(a,b,c)
#define fm_peek(a,b,c) recv(a,b,c, MSG_PEEK)
+
#ifdef __CYGWIN__
#define fm_read(a,b,c) cygwin_read(a,b,c)
static ssize_t cygwin_read(int sock, void *buf, size_t count);
#else /* ! __CYGWIN__ */
#define fm_read(a,b,c) read(a,b,c)
#endif /* __CYGWIN__ */
-#endif
/* We need to define h_errno only if it is not already */
#ifndef h_errno
# endif
#endif /* ndef h_errno */
-#ifdef HAVE_SOCKETPAIR
+/* used by SSL_get_ex_new_index, SSL_set_ex_data, SSL_get_ex_data, to communicate
+ options and state with the verify callback */
+static int global_mydata_index = -2;
+
static char *const *parse_plugin(const char *plugin, const char *host, const char *service)
{
char **argvec;
argvec = (char **)malloc(s);
if (!argvec)
{
+ free(plugin_copy);
report(stderr, GT_("fetchmail: malloc failed\n"));
return NULL;
}
(void) close(fds[1]);
if ( (dup2(fds[0],0) == -1) || (dup2(fds[0],1) == -1) ) {
report(stderr, GT_("dup2 failed\n"));
- exit(1);
+ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
/* fds[0] is now connected to 0 and 1; close it */
(void) close(fds[0]);
if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
report(stderr, GT_("running %s (host %s service %s)\n"), plugin, host, service);
argvec = parse_plugin(plugin,host,service);
+ if (argvec == NULL)
+ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
execvp(*argvec, argvec);
report(stderr, GT_("execvp(%s) failed\n"), *argvec);
- exit(0);
+ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
break;
default: /* parent */
/* NOP */
(void) close(fds[0]);
return fds[1];
}
-#endif /* HAVE_SOCKETPAIR */
-
-#ifdef __UNUSED__
-int SockCheckOpen(int fd)
-/* poll given socket; is it selectable? */
-{
- fd_set r, w, e;
- int rt;
- struct timeval tv;
-
- for (;;)
- {
- FD_ZERO(&r); FD_ZERO(&w); FD_ZERO(&e);
- FD_SET(fd, &e);
-
- tv.tv_sec = 0; tv.tv_usec = 0;
- rt = select(fd+1, &r, &w, &e, &tv);
- if (rt == -1 && (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR))
- return 0;
- if (rt != -1)
- return 1;
- }
+/** Set socket to SO_KEEPALIVE. \return 0 for success. */
+int SockKeepalive(int sock) {
+ int keepalive = 1;
+ return setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &keepalive, sizeof keepalive);
}
-#endif /* __UNUSED__ */
int UnixOpen(const char *path)
{
return -1;
}
- /* Socket opened saved. Usefull if connect timeout
- * because it can be closed.
- */
- mailserver_socket_temp = sock;
-
- if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &ad, sizeof(ad)) < 0)
+ /* Socket opened saved. Useful if connect timeout
+ * because it can be closed.
+ */
+ mailserver_socket_temp = sock;
+
+ if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &ad, sizeof(ad)) < 0)
{
int olderr = errno;
fm_close(sock); /* don't use SockClose, no traffic yet */
errno = olderr;
sock = -1;
}
-
- /* No connect timeout, then no need to set mailserver_socket_temp */
- mailserver_socket_temp = -1;
+
+ /* No connect timeout, then no need to set mailserver_socket_temp */
+ mailserver_socket_temp = -1;
return sock;
}
int ord;
char errbuf[8192] = "";
-#ifdef HAVE_SOCKETPAIR
if (plugin)
return handle_plugin(host,service,plugin);
-#endif /* HAVE_SOCKETPAIR */
memset(&req, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
req.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
continue;
}
+ SockKeepalive(i);
+
/* Save socket descriptor.
* Used to close the socket after connect timeout. */
mailserver_socket_temp = i;
return i;
}
-
-#if defined(HAVE_STDARG_H)
int SockPrintf(int sock, const char* format, ...)
{
-#else
-int SockPrintf(sock,format,va_alist)
-int sock;
-char *format;
-va_dcl {
-#endif
-
va_list ap;
char buf[8192];
-#if defined(HAVE_STDARG_H)
va_start(ap, format) ;
-#else
- va_start(ap);
-#endif
vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), format, ap);
va_end(ap);
return SockWrite(sock, buf, strlen(buf));
-
}
#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
+#define OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN 1
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
+static void report_SSL_errors(FILE *stream)
+{
+ unsigned long err;
+
+ while (0ul != (err = ERR_get_error())) {
+ char *errstr = ERR_error_string(err, NULL);
+ report(stream, GT_("OpenSSL reported: %s\n"), errstr);
+ }
+}
+
+/* override ERR_print_errors_fp to our own implementation */
+#undef ERR_print_errors_fp
+#define ERR_print_errors_fp(stream) report_SSL_errors((stream))
+
static SSL_CTX *_ctx[FD_SETSIZE];
static SSL *_ssl_context[FD_SETSIZE];
if (--len < 1)
return(-1);
-#ifdef __BEOS__
- if (peeked != 0){
- (*bp) = peeked;
- bp++;
- len--;
- peeked = 0;
- }
-#endif
do {
/*
* The reason for these gymnastics is that we want two things:
/* OK... SSL_peek works a little different from MSG_PEEK
Problem is that SSL_peek can return 0 if there
is no data currently available. If, on the other
- hand, we loose the socket, we also get a zero, but
+ hand, we lose the socket, we also get a zero, but
the SSL_read then SEGFAULTS! To deal with this,
we'll check the error code any time we get a return
of zero from SSL_peek. If we have an error, we bail.
#endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
{
-#ifdef __BEOS__
- if ((n = fm_read(sock, bp, 1)) <= 0)
-#else
if ((n = fm_peek(sock, bp, len)) <= 0)
-#endif
return (-1);
if ((newline = (char *)memchr(bp, '\n', n)) != NULL)
n = newline - bp + 1;
-#ifndef __BEOS__
if ((n = fm_read(sock, bp, n)) == -1)
return(-1);
-#endif /* __BEOS__ */
}
bp += n;
len -= n;
if (n == -1)
return -1;
-#ifdef __BEOS__
- peeked = ch;
-#endif
return(ch);
}
#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
-static char *_ssl_server_cname = NULL;
-static int _check_fp;
-static char *_check_digest;
-static char *_server_label;
-static int _depth0ck;
-static int _firstrun;
-static int _prev_err;
-static int _verify_ok;
+struct ssl_callback_data {
+ char *ssl_server_cname;
+ char *check_digest;
+ char *server_label;
+ int check_fp;
+ int depth0ck;
+ int firstrun;
+ int prev_err;
+ int verify_ok;
+ int strict_mode;
+};
+
+typedef struct ssl_callback_data t_ssl_callback_data;
SSL *SSLGetContext( int sock )
{
return _ssl_context[sock];
}
-/** A picky certificate name check:
- * check if the pattern or string in s1 (from a certificate) matches the
- * hostname (in s2), returns true if matched.
- *
- * The only place where a wildcard is allowed is in the leftmost
- * position of p1. */
-static int name_match(const char *p1, const char *p2) {
- if (p1[0] == '*' && p1[1] == '.') {
- size_t l1, l2;
-
- ++p1;
- l1 = strlen(p1);
- l2 = strlen(p2);
- if (l2 > l1)
- p2 += l2 - l1;
- }
-
- return (0 == strcasecmp(p1, p2));
-}
-
/* ok_return (preverify_ok) is 1 if this stage of certificate verification
passed, or 0 if it failed. This callback lets us display informative
errors, and perform additional validation (e.g. CN matches) */
-static int SSL_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int strict )
+static int SSL_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
#define SSLverbose (((outlevel) >= O_DEBUG) || ((outlevel) >= O_VERBOSE && (depth) == 0))
char buf[257];
unsigned int dsz, esz;
X509_NAME *subj, *issuer;
char *tt;
+ t_ssl_callback_data *mydata;
+ SSL *ssl;
+ ssl = (SSL *)X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
+ mydata = (t_ssl_callback_data *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, global_mydata_index);
x509_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) {
if (depth == 0 && SSLverbose)
- report(stderr, GT_("Server certificate:\n"));
+ report(stdout, GT_("Server certificate:\n"));
else {
- if (_firstrun) {
- _firstrun = 0;
+ if (mydata->firstrun) {
+ mydata->firstrun = 0;
if (SSLverbose)
report(stdout, GT_("Certificate chain, from root to peer, starting at depth %d:\n"), depth);
} else {
}
if (depth == 0) { /* peer certificate */
- if (!_depth0ck) {
- _depth0ck = 1;
+ if (!mydata->depth0ck) {
+ mydata->depth0ck = 1;
}
if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subj, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
- if (_ssl_server_cname != NULL) {
+ if (mydata->ssl_server_cname != NULL) {
char *p1 = buf;
- char *p2 = _ssl_server_cname;
+ char *p2 = mydata->ssl_server_cname;
int matched = 0;
STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gens;
for (j = 0, r = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); j < r; ++j) {
const GENERAL_NAME *gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, j);
if (gn->type == GEN_DNS) {
- char *p1 = (char *)gn->d.ia5->data;
- char *p2 = _ssl_server_cname;
+ char *pp1 = (char *)gn->d.ia5->data;
+ char *pp2 = mydata->ssl_server_cname;
if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) {
- report(stdout, GT_("Subject Alternative Name: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(p1, (size_t)gn->d.ia5->length)));
+ report(stdout, GT_("Subject Alternative Name: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(pp1, (size_t)gn->d.ia5->length)));
xfree(tt);
}
/* Name contains embedded NUL characters, so we complain. This
* is likely a certificate spoofing attack. */
- if ((size_t)gn->d.ia5->length != strlen(p1)) {
+ if ((size_t)gn->d.ia5->length != strlen(pp1)) {
report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject Alternative Name contains NUL, aborting!\n"));
sk_GENERAL_NAME_free(gens);
return 0;
}
- if (name_match(p1, p2)) {
+ if (name_match(pp1, pp2)) {
matched = 1;
}
}
}
- sk_GENERAL_NAME_free(gens);
+ GENERAL_NAMES_free(gens);
}
if (name_match(p1, p2)) {
matched = 1;
}
if (!matched) {
- if (strict || SSLverbose) {
+ if (mydata->strict_mode || SSLverbose) {
report(stderr,
GT_("Server CommonName mismatch: %s != %s\n"),
- (tt = sdump(buf, i)), _ssl_server_cname );
+ (tt = sdump(buf, i)), mydata->ssl_server_cname);
xfree(tt);
}
ok_return = 0;
}
} else if (ok_return) {
report(stderr, GT_("Server name not set, could not verify certificate!\n"));
- if (strict) return (0);
+ if (mydata->strict_mode) return (0);
}
} else {
if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
report(stdout, GT_("Unknown Server CommonName\n"));
- if (ok_return && strict) {
+ if (ok_return && mydata->strict_mode) {
report(stderr, GT_("Server name not specified in certificate!\n"));
return (0);
}
}
/* Print the finger print. Note that on errors, we might print it more than once
* normally; we kluge around that by using a global variable. */
- if (_check_fp == 1) {
+ if (1 == mydata->check_fp) {
unsigned dp;
- _check_fp = -1;
+ mydata->check_fp = -1;
digest_tp = EVP_md5();
if (digest_tp == NULL) {
report(stderr, GT_("EVP_md5() failed!\n"));
tp += esz;
}
if (outlevel > O_NORMAL)
- report(stdout, GT_("%s key fingerprint: %s\n"), _server_label, text);
- if (_check_digest != NULL) {
- if (strcasecmp(text, _check_digest) == 0) {
+ report(stdout, GT_("%s certificate MD5 fingerprint: %s\n"), mydata->server_label, text);
+ if (mydata->check_digest != NULL) {
+ if (strcasecmp(text, mydata->check_digest) == 0) {
if (outlevel > O_NORMAL)
- report(stdout, GT_("%s fingerprints match.\n"), _server_label);
+ report(stdout, GT_("%s fingerprints match.\n"), mydata->server_label);
} else {
- report(stderr, GT_("%s fingerprints do not match!\n"), _server_label);
+ report(stderr, GT_("%s fingerprints do not match!\n"), mydata->server_label);
return (0);
}
} /* if (_check_digest != NULL) */
} /* if (_check_fp) */
} /* if (depth == 0 && !_depth0ck) */
- if (err != X509_V_OK && err != _prev_err && !(_check_fp != 0 && _check_digest && !strict)) {
- _prev_err = err;
-
+ if (err != X509_V_OK && err != mydata->prev_err && !(mydata->check_fp != 0 && mydata->check_digest && !mydata->strict_mode)) {
+ char *tmp;
+ int did_rep_err = 0;
+ mydata->prev_err = err;
+
report(stderr, GT_("Server certificate verification error: %s\n"), X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
/* We gave the error code, but maybe we can add some more details for debugging */
switch (err) {
+ /* actually we do not want to lump these together, but
+ * since OpenSSL flipped the meaning of these error
+ * codes in the past, and they do hardly make a
+ * practical difference because servers need not provide
+ * the root signing certificate, we don't bother telling
+ * users the difference:
+ */
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
X509_NAME_oneline(issuer, buf, sizeof(buf));
buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0';
- report(stderr, GT_("unknown issuer (first %d characters): %s\n"), (int)(sizeof(buf)-1), buf);
- report(stderr, GT_("This error usually happens when the server provides an incomplete certificate "
- "chain, which is nothing fetchmail could do anything about. For details, "
- "please see the README.SSL-SERVER document that comes with fetchmail.\n"));
- break;
+ report(stderr, GT_("Broken certification chain at: %s\n"), (tmp = sdump(buf, strlen(buf))));
+ xfree(tmp);
+ report(stderr, GT_( "This could mean that the server did not provide the intermediate CA's certificate(s), "
+ "which is nothing fetchmail could do anything about. For details, "
+ "please see the README.SSL-SERVER document that ships with fetchmail.\n"));
+ did_rep_err = 1;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
- case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
- X509_NAME_oneline(subj, buf, sizeof(buf));
- buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0';
- report(stderr, GT_("This means that the root signing certificate (issued for %s) is not in the "
- "trusted CA certificate locations, or that c_rehash needs to be run "
+ if (!did_rep_err) {
+ X509_NAME_oneline(issuer, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0';
+ report(stderr, GT_("Missing trust anchor certificate: %s\n"), (tmp = sdump(buf, strlen(buf))));
+ xfree(tmp);
+ }
+ report(stderr, GT_( "This could mean that the root CA's signing certificate is not in the "
+ "trusted CA certificate location, or that c_rehash needs to be run "
"on the certificate directory. For details, please "
- "see the documentation of --sslcertpath and --sslcertfile in the manual page.\n"), buf);
+ "see the documentation of --sslcertpath and --sslcertfile in the manual page.\n"));
break;
default:
break;
* If not in strict checking mode (--sslcertck), override this
* and pretend that verification had succeeded.
*/
- _verify_ok &= ok_return;
- if (!strict)
+ mydata->verify_ok &= ok_return;
+ if (!mydata->strict_mode)
ok_return = 1;
- return (ok_return);
-}
-
-static int SSL_nock_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx )
-{
- return SSL_verify_callback(ok_return, ctx, 0);
-}
-
-static int SSL_ck_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx )
-{
- return SSL_verify_callback(ok_return, ctx, 1);
+ return ok_return;
}
-
/* get commonName from certificate set in file.
* commonName is stored in buffer namebuffer, limited with namebufferlen
*/
struct stat randstat;
int i;
- SSL_load_error_strings();
- SSL_library_init();
- OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); /* see Debian Bug#576430 and manpage */
+ static int ssl_lib_init = 0;
+
+ if (!ssl_lib_init) {
+ SSL_load_error_strings();
+ SSL_library_init();
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); /* see Debian Bug#576430 and manpage */
+ ssl_lib_init = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (-2 == global_mydata_index) {
+ char tmp[] = "fetchmail SSL callback data";
+ global_mydata_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, tmp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (-1 == global_mydata_index) return PS_UNDEFINED;
+ }
if (stat("/dev/random", &randstat) &&
stat("/dev/urandom", &randstat)) {
/* Make sure a connection referring to an older context is not left */
_ssl_context[sock] = NULL;
if(myproto) {
- if(!strcasecmp("ssl2",myproto)) {
- _ctx[sock] = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv2_client_method());
- } else if(!strcasecmp("ssl3",myproto)) {
+ if(!strcasecmp("ssl3",myproto)) {
_ctx[sock] = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv3_client_method());
} else if(!strcasecmp("tls1",myproto)) {
_ctx[sock] = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_client_method());
} else if (!strcasecmp("ssl23",myproto)) {
myproto = NULL;
} else {
- fprintf(stderr,GT_("Invalid SSL protocol '%s' specified, using default (SSLv23).\n"), myproto);
+ report(stderr,GT_("Invalid SSL protocol '%s' specified, using default (SSLv23).\n"), myproto);
myproto = NULL;
}
}
return(-1);
}
- SSL_CTX_set_options(_ctx[sock], SSL_OP_ALL);
-
- if (certck) {
- SSL_CTX_set_verify(_ctx[sock], SSL_VERIFY_PEER, SSL_ck_verify_callback);
- } else {
- /* In this case, we do not fail if verification fails. However,
- * we provide the callback for output and possible fingerprint
- * checks. */
- SSL_CTX_set_verify(_ctx[sock], SSL_VERIFY_PEER, SSL_nock_verify_callback);
- }
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(_ctx[sock], (SSL_OP_ALL | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2) & ~SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS);
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(_ctx[sock], SSL_VERIFY_PEER, SSL_verify_callback);
/* Check which trusted X.509 CA certificate store(s) to load */
{
return(-1);
}
- /* This static is for the verify callback */
- _ssl_server_cname = servercname;
- _server_label = label;
- _check_fp = 1;
- _check_digest = fingerprint;
- _depth0ck = 0;
- _firstrun = 1;
- _verify_ok = 1;
- _prev_err = -1;
+ t_ssl_callback_data mydata;
+ memset(&mydata, 0, sizeof(mydata));
+
+ /* This data is for the verify callback */
+ mydata.ssl_server_cname = servercname;
+ mydata.server_label = label;
+ mydata.check_fp = 1;
+ mydata.check_digest = fingerprint;
+ mydata.depth0ck = 0;
+ mydata.firstrun = 1;
+ mydata.verify_ok = 1;
+ mydata.prev_err = -1;
+ mydata.strict_mode = certck;
if( mycert || mykey ) {
SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(_ssl_context[sock], mykey, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
}
+ SSL_set_ex_data(_ssl_context[sock], global_mydata_index, &mydata);
+
if (SSL_set_fd(_ssl_context[sock], sock) == 0
|| SSL_connect(_ssl_context[sock]) < 1) {
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
}
/* Paranoia: was the callback not called as we expected? */
- if (!_depth0ck) {
+ if (!mydata.depth0ck) {
report(stderr, GT_("Certificate/fingerprint verification was somehow skipped!\n"));
if (fingerprint != NULL || certck) {
}
if (!certck && !fingerprint &&
- (SSL_get_verify_result(_ssl_context[sock]) != X509_V_OK || !_verify_ok)) {
+ (SSL_get_verify_result(_ssl_context[sock]) != X509_V_OK || !mydata.verify_ok)) {
report(stderr, GT_("Warning: the connection is insecure, continuing anyways. (Better use --sslcertck!)\n"));
}
}
#endif
-#ifdef __UNUSED__
- /*
- * This hangs in RedHat 6.2 after fetchmail runs for a while a
- * FIN_WAIT2 comes up in netstat and fetchmail never returns from
- * the recv system call. (Reported from jtnews
- * <jtnews@bellatlantic.net>, Wed, 24 May 2000 21:26:02.)
- *
- * Half-close the connection first so the other end gets notified.
- *
- * This stops sends but allows receives (effectively, it sends a
- * TCP <FIN>). */
- if (shutdown(sock, 1) == 0) {
- char ch;
- /* If there is any data still waiting in the queue, discard it.
- * Call recv() until either it returns 0 (meaning we received a FIN)
- * or any error occurs. This makes sure all data sent by the other
- * side is acknowledged at the TCP level.
- */
- if (fm_peek(sock, &ch, 1) > 0)
- while (fm_read(sock, &ch, 1) > 0)
- continue;
- }
-#endif /* __UNUSED__ */
-
/* if there's an error closing at this point, not much we can do */
return(fm_close(sock)); /* this is guarded */
}
*/
static ssize_t cygwin_read(int sock, void *buf, size_t count)
{
- char *bp = buf;
+ char *bp = (char *)buf;
size_t n = 0;
if ((n = read(sock, bp, count)) == (size_t)-1)
return count;
}
#endif /* __CYGWIN__ */
-
-#ifdef MAIN
-/*
- * Use the chargen service to test input buffering directly.
- * You may have to uncomment the `chargen' service description in your
- * inetd.conf (and then SIGHUP inetd) for this to work. */
-main()
-{
- int sock = SockOpen("localhost", "chargen", NULL);
- char buf[80];
-
- while (SockRead(sock, buf, sizeof(buf)-1))
- SockWrite(1, buf, strlen(buf));
- SockClose(sock);
-}
-#endif /* MAIN */
-
-/* socket.c ends here */
projects / ~andy / fetchmail / blobdiff