peek_capable = !ctl->fetchall;
}
+static int do_apop(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting)
+{
+ char *start, *end;
+
+ /* build MD5 digest from greeting timestamp + password */
+ /* find start of timestamp */
+ start = strchr(greeting, '<');
+ if (!start) {
+ if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_APOP || outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
+ report(ctl->server.authenticate == A_APOP ? stderr : stdout,
+ GT_("Required APOP timestamp not found in greeting\n"));
+ }
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ }
+
+ /* find end of timestamp */
+ end = strchr(start + 1, '>');
+
+ if (!end || end == start + 1) {
+ report(stderr,
+ GT_("Timestamp syntax error in greeting\n"));
+ return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
+ } else {
+ *++end = '\0';
+ }
+
+ /* SECURITY: 2007-03-17
+ * Strictly validating the presented challenge for RFC-822
+ * conformity (it must be a msg-id in terms of that standard) is
+ * supposed to make attacks against the MD5 implementation
+ * harder[1]
+ *
+ * [1] "Security vulnerability in APOP authentication",
+ * Gaëtan Leurent, fetchmail-devel, 2007-03-17 */
+ if (!rfc822_valid_msgid((unsigned char *)start)) {
+ report(stderr,
+ GT_("Invalid APOP timestamp.\n"));
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ }
+
+ /* copy timestamp and password into digestion buffer */
+ char *msg = (char *)xmalloc((end-start+1) + strlen(ctl->password) + 1);
+ strcpy(msg,start);
+ strcat(msg,ctl->password);
+ strcpy((char *)ctl->digest, MD5Digest((unsigned char *)msg));
+ free(msg);
+
+ return gen_transact(sock, "APOP %s %s", ctl->remotename, (char *)ctl->digest);
+}
+
static int pop3_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting)
/* apply for connection authorization */
{
int ok;
- char *start,*end;
- char *msg;
#ifdef OPIE_ENABLE
char *challenge;
#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
*
* Matthias Andree
*/
- if (peek_capable && strstr(greeting, "Maillennium POP3/PROXY server")) {
+ if (peek_capable && strstr(greeting, "Maillennium POP3")) {
if ((ctl->server.workarounds & WKA_TOP) == 0) {
- report(stdout, GT_("Warning: \"Maillennium POP3/PROXY server\" found, using RETR command instead of TOP.\n"));
+ report(stdout, GT_("Warning: \"Maillennium POP3\" found, using RETR command instead of TOP.\n"));
ctl->server.workarounds |= WKA_TOP;
}
peek_capable = 0;
ctl->server.sdps = TRUE;
#endif /* SDPS_ENABLE */
+ /* this is a leftover from the times 6.3.X and older when APOP was a
+ * "protocol" (P_APOP) rather than an authenticator (A_APOP),
+ * however, the switch is still useful because we can break; after
+ * an authenticator failed. */
switch (ctl->server.protocol) {
- case P_POP3:
+ case P_POP3:
#ifdef RPA_ENABLE
/* XXX FIXME: AUTH probing (RFC1734) should become global */
/* CompuServe POP3 Servers as of 990730 want AUTH first for RPA */
#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
#ifdef NTLM_ENABLE
- /* MSN servers require the use of NTLM (MSN) authentication */
- if (!strcasecmp(ctl->server.pollname, "pop3.email.msn.com") ||
- ctl->server.authenticate == A_MSN)
- return (do_pop3_ntlm(sock, ctl, 1) == 0) ? PS_SUCCESS : PS_AUTHFAIL;
- if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_NTLM || (has_ntlm && ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY)) {
- ok = do_pop3_ntlm(sock, ctl, 0);
- if (ok == 0 || ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY)
- break;
- }
+ /* MSN servers require the use of NTLM (MSN) authentication */
+ if (!strcasecmp(ctl->server.pollname, "pop3.email.msn.com") ||
+ ctl->server.authenticate == A_MSN)
+ return (do_pop3_ntlm(sock, ctl, 1) == 0) ? PS_SUCCESS : PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_NTLM || (has_ntlm && ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY)) {
+ ok = do_pop3_ntlm(sock, ctl, 0);
+ if (ok == 0 || ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY)
+ break;
+ }
#else
- if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_NTLM || ctl->server.authenticate == A_MSN)
- {
- report(stderr,
- GT_("Required NTLM capability not compiled into fetchmail\n"));
- }
+ if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_NTLM || ctl->server.authenticate == A_MSN)
+ {
+ report(stderr,
+ GT_("Required NTLM capability not compiled into fetchmail\n"));
+ }
#endif
- if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_CRAM_MD5 ||
- (has_cram && ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY))
+ if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_CRAM_MD5 ||
+ (has_cram && ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY))
{
ok = do_cram_md5(sock, "AUTH", ctl, NULL);
if (ok == PS_SUCCESS || ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY)
break;
}
+ if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_APOP
+ || ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY)
+ {
+ ok = do_apop(sock, ctl, greeting);
+ if (ok == PS_SUCCESS || ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY)
+ break;
+ }
+
/* ordinary validation, no one-time password or RPA */
if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "USER %s", ctl->remotename)))
break;
shroud[0] = '\0';
break;
- case P_APOP:
- /* build MD5 digest from greeting timestamp + password */
- /* find start of timestamp */
- for (start = greeting; *start != 0 && *start != '<'; start++)
- continue;
- if (*start == 0) {
- report(stderr,
- GT_("Required APOP timestamp not found in greeting\n"));
- return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
- }
-
- /* find end of timestamp */
- for (end = start; *end != 0 && *end != '>'; end++)
- continue;
- if (*end == 0 || end == start + 1) {
- report(stderr,
- GT_("Timestamp syntax error in greeting\n"));
- return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
- }
- else
- *++end = '\0';
-
- /* SECURITY: 2007-03-17
- * Strictly validating the presented challenge for RFC-822
- * conformity (it must be a msg-id in terms of that standard) is
- * supposed to make attacks against the MD5 implementation
- * harder[1]
- *
- * [1] "Security vulnerability in APOP authentication",
- * Gaëtan Leurent, fetchmail-devel, 2007-03-17 */
- if (!rfc822_valid_msgid((unsigned char *)start)) {
- report(stderr,
- GT_("Invalid APOP timestamp.\n"));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
-
- /* copy timestamp and password into digestion buffer */
- msg = (char *)xmalloc((end-start+1) + strlen(ctl->password) + 1);
- strcpy(msg,start);
- strcat(msg,ctl->password);
- strcpy((char *)ctl->digest, MD5Digest((unsigned char *)msg));
- free(msg);
-
- ok = gen_transact(sock, "APOP %s %s", ctl->remotename, (char *)ctl->digest);
- break;
-
default:
report(stderr, GT_("Undefined protocol request in POP3_auth\n"));
ok = PS_ERROR;
projects / ~andy / fetchmail / blobdiff