#if defined(STDC_HEADERS)
#include <stdlib.h>
#endif
-
+#include <errno.h>
+
#include "fetchmail.h"
#include "socket.h"
#include "i18n.h"
-#if OPIE_ENABLE
+#ifdef OPIE_ENABLE
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
#include <opie.h>
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
-#ifndef strstr /* glibc-2.1 declares this as a macro */
-extern char *strstr(); /* needed on sysV68 R3V7.1. */
-#endif /* strstr */
+/* global variables: please reinitialize them explicitly for proper
+ * working in daemon mode */
+
+/* TODO: session variables to be initialized before server greeting */
+#ifdef OPIE_ENABLE
+static char lastok[POPBUFSIZE+1];
+#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
+/* session variables initialized in capa_probe() or pop3_getauth() */
+flag done_capa = FALSE;
+#if defined(GSSAPI)
+flag has_gssapi = FALSE;
+#endif /* defined(GSSAPI) */
+#if defined(KERBEROS_V4) || defined(KERBEROS_V5)
+flag has_kerberos = FALSE;
+#endif /* defined(KERBEROS_V4) || defined(KERBEROS_V5) */
+static flag has_cram = FALSE;
+#ifdef OPIE_ENABLE
+flag has_otp = FALSE;
+#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
+#ifdef NTLM_ENABLE
+flag has_ntlm = FALSE;
+#endif /* NTLM_ENABLE */
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
+static flag has_stls = FALSE;
+#endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
+
+/* mailbox variables initialized in pop3_getrange() */
static int last;
+
+/* mail variables initialized in pop3_fetch() */
#ifdef SDPS_ENABLE
char *sdps_envfrom;
char *sdps_envto;
#endif /* SDPS_ENABLE */
-#if OPIE_ENABLE
-static char lastok[POPBUFSIZE+1];
-#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
+#ifdef NTLM_ENABLE
+#include "ntlm.h"
+
+/*
+ * NTLM support by Grant Edwards.
+ *
+ * Handle MS-Exchange NTLM authentication method. This is the same
+ * as the NTLM auth used by Samba for SMB related services. We just
+ * encode the packets in base64 instead of sending them out via a
+ * network interface.
+ *
+ * Much source (ntlm.h, smb*.c smb*.h) was borrowed from Samba.
+ */
+
+static int do_pop3_ntlm(int sock, struct query *ctl,
+ int msn_instead /** if true, send AUTH MSN, else send AUTH NTLM */)
+{
+ char msgbuf[POPBUFSIZE+1];
+ int result;
+
+ gen_send(sock, msn_instead ? "AUTH MSN" : "AUTH NTLM");
+
+ if ((result = ntlm_helper(sock, ctl, "POP3")))
+ return result;
+
+ if ((result = gen_recv (sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
+ return result;
+
+ if (strstr (msgbuf, "OK"))
+ return PS_SUCCESS;
+ else
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+}
+#endif /* NTLM */
+
#define DOTLINE(s) (s[0] == '.' && (s[1]=='\r'||s[1]=='\n'||s[1]=='\0'))
else
return(PS_PROTOCOL);
- while (isalpha(*bufp))
+ while (isalpha((unsigned char)*bufp))
bufp++;
if (*bufp)
if (strcmp(buf,"+OK") == 0)
{
-#if OPIE_ENABLE
+#ifdef OPIE_ENABLE
strcpy(lastok, bufp);
#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
ok = 0;
else
ok = PS_PROTOCOL;
+#if POPBUFSIZE > MSGBUFSIZE
+#error "POPBUFSIZE must not be larger than MSGBUFSIZE"
+#endif
if (argbuf != NULL)
strcpy(argbuf,bufp);
}
return(ok);
}
+
+
+static int capa_probe(int sock)
+/* probe the capabilities of the remote server */
+{
+ int ok;
+
+ if (done_capa) {
+ return PS_SUCCESS;
+ }
+#if defined(GSSAPI)
+ has_gssapi = FALSE;
+#endif /* defined(GSSAPI) */
+#if defined(KERBEROS_V4) || defined(KERBEROS_V5)
+ has_kerberos = FALSE;
+#endif /* defined(KERBEROS_V4) || defined(KERBEROS_V5) */
+ has_cram = FALSE;
+#ifdef OPIE_ENABLE
+ has_otp = FALSE;
+#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
+#ifdef NTLM_ENABLE
+ has_ntlm = FALSE;
+#endif /* NTLM_ENABLE */
+
+ ok = gen_transact(sock, "CAPA");
+ if (ok == PS_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ char buffer[64];
+
+ /* determine what authentication methods we have available */
+ while ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer))) == 0)
+ {
+ if (DOTLINE(buffer))
+ break;
+
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
+ if (strstr(buffer, "STLS"))
+ has_stls = TRUE;
+#endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
+
+#if defined(GSSAPI)
+ if (strstr(buffer, "GSSAPI"))
+ has_gssapi = TRUE;
+#endif /* defined(GSSAPI) */
+
+#if defined(KERBEROS_V4)
+ if (strstr(buffer, "KERBEROS_V4"))
+ has_kerberos = TRUE;
+#endif /* defined(KERBEROS_V4) */
+
+#ifdef OPIE_ENABLE
+ if (strstr(buffer, "X-OTP"))
+ has_otp = TRUE;
+#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
+
+#ifdef NTLM_ENABLE
+ if (strstr(buffer, "NTLM"))
+ has_ntlm = TRUE;
+#endif /* NTLM_ENABLE */
+
+ if (strstr(buffer, "CRAM-MD5"))
+ has_cram = TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+ done_capa = TRUE;
+ return(ok);
+}
+
+static void set_peek_capable(struct query *ctl)
+{
+ /* we're peek-capable means that the use of TOP is enabled,
+ * see pop3_fetch for details - short story, we can use TOP if
+ * we have a means of reliably tracking which mail we need to
+ * refetch should the connection abort in the middle.
+ * fetchall forces RETR, as does keep without UIDL */
+ peek_capable = !ctl->fetchall && (!ctl->keep || ctl->server.uidl);
+}
+
static int pop3_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting)
/* apply for connection authorization */
{
int ok;
char *start,*end;
char *msg;
-#if OPIE_ENABLE
+#ifdef OPIE_ENABLE
char *challenge;
#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
+ flag connection_may_have_tls_errors = FALSE;
+#endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
+
+ done_capa = FALSE;
#if defined(GSSAPI)
- flag has_gssapi = FALSE;
+ has_gssapi = FALSE;
#endif /* defined(GSSAPI) */
#if defined(KERBEROS_V4) || defined(KERBEROS_V5)
- flag has_kerberos = FALSE;
+ has_kerberos = FALSE;
#endif /* defined(KERBEROS_V4) || defined(KERBEROS_V5) */
- flag has_cram = FALSE;
+ has_cram = FALSE;
#ifdef OPIE_ENABLE
- flag has_otp = FALSE;
+ has_otp = FALSE;
#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
- flag has_ssl = FALSE;
+ has_stls = FALSE;
#endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
+ /* Set this up before authentication quits early. */
+ set_peek_capable(ctl);
+
+ /* Hack: allow user to force RETR. */
+ if (peek_capable && getenv("FETCHMAIL_POP3_FORCE_RETR")) {
+ peek_capable = 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The "Maillennium POP3/PROXY server" deliberately truncates
+ * TOP replies after c. 64 or 80 kByte (we have varying reports), so
+ * disable TOP. Comcast once spewed marketing babble to the extent
+ * of protecting Outlook -- pretty overzealous to break a protocol
+ * for that that Microsoft could have read, too. Comcast aren't
+ * alone in using this software though.
+ * <http://lists.ccil.org/pipermail/fetchmail-friends/2004-April/008523.html>
+ * (Thanks to Ed Wilts for reminding me of that.)
+ *
+ * The warning is printed once per server, until fetchmail exits.
+ * It will be suppressed when --fetchall or other circumstances make
+ * us use RETR anyhow.
+ *
+ * Matthias Andree
+ */
+ if (peek_capable && strstr(greeting, "Maillennium POP3")) {
+ if ((ctl->server.workarounds & WKA_TOP) == 0) {
+ report(stdout, GT_("Warning: \"Maillennium POP3\" found, using RETR command instead of TOP.\n"));
+ ctl->server.workarounds |= WKA_TOP;
+ }
+ peek_capable = 0;
+ }
+ if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_SSH) {
+ return PS_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
#ifdef SDPS_ENABLE
/*
* This needs to catch both demon.co.uk and demon.net.
ctl->server.sdps = TRUE;
#endif /* SDPS_ENABLE */
- switch (ctl->server.protocol) {
+ switch (ctl->server.protocol) {
case P_POP3:
#ifdef RPA_ENABLE
+ /* XXX FIXME: AUTH probing (RFC1734) should become global */
/* CompuServe POP3 Servers as of 990730 want AUTH first for RPA */
if (strstr(ctl->remotename, "@compuserve.com"))
{
/*
* CAPA command may return a list including available
- * authentication mechanisms. if it doesn't, no harm done, we
- * just fall back to a plain login. Note that this code
- * latches the server's authentication type, so that in daemon mode
- * the CAPA check only needs to be done once at start of run.
+ * authentication mechanisms and STLS capability.
*
- * If CAPA fails, then force the authentication method to PASSORD
- * and repoll immediately.
+ * If it doesn't, no harm done, we just fall back to a plain
+ * login -- if the user allows it.
*
- * These authentication methods are blessed by RFC1734,
- * describing the POP3 AUTHentication command.
+ * Note that this code latches the server's authentication type,
+ * so that in daemon mode the CAPA check only needs to be done
+ * once at start of run.
+ *
+ * If CAPA fails, then force the authentication method to
+ * PASSWORD, switch off opportunistic and repoll immediately.
+ * If TLS is mandatory, fail up front.
*/
- if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY)
+ if ((ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY) ||
+ (ctl->server.authenticate == A_GSSAPI) ||
+ (ctl->server.authenticate == A_KERBEROS_V4) ||
+ (ctl->server.authenticate == A_KERBEROS_V5) ||
+ (ctl->server.authenticate == A_OTP) ||
+ (ctl->server.authenticate == A_CRAM_MD5) ||
+ maybe_tls(ctl))
{
- ok = gen_transact(sock, "CAPA");
- if (ok == PS_SUCCESS)
- {
- char buffer[64];
-
- /* determine what authentication methods we have available */
- while ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer))) == 0)
+ if ((ok = capa_probe(sock)) != PS_SUCCESS)
+ /* we are in STAGE_GETAUTH => failure is PS_AUTHFAIL! */
+ if (ok == PS_AUTHFAIL ||
+ /* Some servers directly close the socket. However, if we
+ * have already authenticated before, then a previous CAPA
+ * must have succeeded. In that case, treat this as a
+ * genuine socket error and do not change the auth method.
+ */
+ (ok == PS_SOCKET && !ctl->wehaveauthed))
{
- if (DOTLINE(buffer))
- break;
#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
- if (strstr(buffer, "STLS"))
- has_ssl = TRUE;
-#endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
-#if defined(GSSAPI)
- if (strstr(buffer, "GSSAPI"))
- has_gssapi = TRUE;
-#endif /* defined(GSSAPI) */
-#if defined(KERBEROS_V4)
- if (strstr(buffer, "KERBEROS_V4"))
- has_kerberos = TRUE;
-#endif /* defined(KERBEROS_V4) */
-#ifdef OPIE_ENABLE
- if (strstr(buffer, "X-OTP"))
- has_otp = TRUE;
-#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
- if (strstr(buffer, "CRAM-MD5"))
- has_cram = TRUE;
+ if (must_tls(ctl)) {
+ /* fail with mandatory STLS without repoll */
+ report(stderr, GT_("TLS is mandatory for this session, but server refused CAPA command.\n"));
+ report(stderr, GT_("The CAPA command is however necessary for TLS.\n"));
+ return ok;
+ } else if (maybe_tls(ctl)) {
+ /* defeat opportunistic STLS */
+ xfree(ctl->sslproto);
+ ctl->sslproto = xstrdup("");
+ }
+#endif
+ /* If strong authentication was opportunistic, retry without, else fail. */
+ switch (ctl->server.authenticate) {
+ case A_ANY:
+ ctl->server.authenticate = A_PASSWORD;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case A_PASSWORD: /* this should only happen with TLS enabled */
+ return PS_REPOLL;
+ default:
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ }
}
- }
- /* we are in STAGE_GETAUTH! */
- else if (ok == PS_AUTHFAIL ||
- /* Some servers directly close the socket. However, if we
- * have already authenticated before, then a previous CAPA
- * must have succeeded. In that case, treat this as a
- * genuine socket error and do not change the auth method.
- */
- (ok == PS_SOCKET && !ctl->wehaveauthed))
- {
- ctl->server.authenticate = A_PASSWORD;
- /* repoll immediately */
- ok = PS_REPOLL;
- break;
- }
}
#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
- if (has_ssl && !ctl->use_ssl &&
-#if INET6_ENABLE
- ctl->server.service && (strcmp(ctl->server.service, "pop3s"))
-#else /* INET6_ENABLE */
- ctl->server.port != 995
-#endif /* INET6_ENABLE */
- )
- {
- char *realhost;
-
- realhost = ctl->server.via ? ctl->server.via : ctl->server.pollname; gen_transact(sock, "STLS");
- if (SSLOpen(sock,ctl->sslcert,ctl->sslkey,ctl->sslproto,ctl->sslcertck, ctl->sslcertpath,ctl->sslfingerprint,realhost,ctl->server.pollname) == -1)
- {
- report(stderr,
- GT_("SSL connection failed.\n"));
- return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
- }
- }
+ if (maybe_tls(ctl)) {
+ char *commonname;
+
+ commonname = ctl->server.pollname;
+ if (ctl->server.via)
+ commonname = ctl->server.via;
+ if (ctl->sslcommonname)
+ commonname = ctl->sslcommonname;
+
+ if (has_stls
+ || must_tls(ctl)) /* if TLS is mandatory, ignore capabilities */
+ {
+ /* Use "tls1" rather than ctl->sslproto because tls1 is the only
+ * protocol that will work with STARTTLS. Don't need to worry
+ * whether TLS is mandatory or opportunistic unless SSLOpen() fails
+ * (see below). */
+ if (gen_transact(sock, "STLS") == PS_SUCCESS
+ && (set_timeout(mytimeout), SSLOpen(sock, ctl->sslcert, ctl->sslkey, "tls1", ctl->sslcertck,
+ ctl->sslcertfile, ctl->sslcertpath, ctl->sslfingerprint, commonname,
+ ctl->server.pollname, &ctl->remotename)) != -1)
+ {
+ /*
+ * RFC 2595 says this:
+ *
+ * "Once TLS has been started, the client MUST discard cached
+ * information about server capabilities and SHOULD re-issue the
+ * CAPABILITY command. This is necessary to protect against
+ * man-in-the-middle attacks which alter the capabilities list prior
+ * to STARTTLS. The server MAY advertise different capabilities
+ * after STARTTLS."
+ *
+ * Now that we're confident in our TLS connection we can
+ * guarantee a secure capability re-probe.
+ */
+ set_timeout(0);
+ done_capa = FALSE;
+ ok = capa_probe(sock);
+ if (ok != PS_SUCCESS) {
+ return ok;
+ }
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
+ {
+ report(stdout, GT_("%s: upgrade to TLS succeeded.\n"), commonname);
+ }
+ } else if (must_tls(ctl)) {
+ /* Config required TLS but we couldn't guarantee it, so we must
+ * stop. */
+ set_timeout(0);
+ report(stderr, GT_("%s: upgrade to TLS failed.\n"), commonname);
+ return PS_SOCKET;
+ } else {
+ /* We don't know whether the connection is usable, and there's
+ * no command we can reasonably issue to test it (NOOP isn't
+ * allowed til post-authentication), so leave it in an unknown
+ * state, mark it as such, and check more carefully if things
+ * go wrong when we try to authenticate. */
+ set_timeout(0);
+ connection_may_have_tls_errors = TRUE;
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
+ {
+ report(stdout, GT_("%s: opportunistic upgrade to TLS failed, trying to continue.\n"), commonname);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ } /* maybe_tls() */
#endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
/*
* rather than doing SASL.
*/
if (has_kerberos &&
-#if INET6_ENABLE
ctl->server.service && (strcmp(ctl->server.service, KPOP_PORT)!=0)
-#else /* INET6_ENABLE */
- ctl->server.port != KPOP_PORT
-#endif /* INET6_ENABLE */
&& (ctl->server.authenticate == A_KERBEROS_V4
|| ctl->server.authenticate == A_KERBEROS_V5
|| ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY))
#if defined(GSSAPI)
if (has_gssapi &&
(ctl->server.authenticate == A_GSSAPI ||
- ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY))
+ (ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY
+ && check_gss_creds("pop", ctl->server.truename) == PS_SUCCESS)))
{
- ok = do_gssauth(sock,"AUTH",ctl->server.truename,ctl->remotename);
+ ok = do_gssauth(sock,"AUTH","pop",ctl->server.truename,ctl->remotename);
if (ok == PS_SUCCESS || ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY)
break;
}
}
#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
- if (has_cram &&
- (ctl->server.authenticate == A_CRAM_MD5 ||
- ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY))
+#ifdef NTLM_ENABLE
+ /* MSN servers require the use of NTLM (MSN) authentication */
+ if (!strcasecmp(ctl->server.pollname, "pop3.email.msn.com") ||
+ ctl->server.authenticate == A_MSN)
+ return (do_pop3_ntlm(sock, ctl, 1) == 0) ? PS_SUCCESS : PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_NTLM || (has_ntlm && ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY)) {
+ ok = do_pop3_ntlm(sock, ctl, 0);
+ if (ok == 0 || ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY)
+ break;
+ }
+#else
+ if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_NTLM || ctl->server.authenticate == A_MSN)
+ {
+ report(stderr,
+ GT_("Required NTLM capability not compiled into fetchmail\n"));
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_CRAM_MD5 ||
+ (has_cram && ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY))
{
ok = do_cram_md5(sock, "AUTH", ctl, NULL);
if (ok == PS_SUCCESS || ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY)
}
/* ordinary validation, no one-time password or RPA */
- gen_transact(sock, "USER %s", ctl->remotename);
- strcpy(shroud, ctl->password);
- ok = gen_transact(sock, "PASS %s", ctl->password);
+ if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "USER %s", ctl->remotename)))
+ break;
+
+#ifdef OPIE_ENABLE
+ /* see RFC1938: A One-Time Password System */
+ if ((challenge = strstr(lastok, "otp-"))) {
+ char response[OPIE_RESPONSE_MAX+1];
+ int i;
+ char *n = xstrdup("");
+
+ i = opiegenerator(challenge, !strcmp(ctl->password, "opie") ? n : ctl->password, response);
+ free(n);
+ if ((i == -2) && !run.poll_interval) {
+ char secret[OPIE_SECRET_MAX+1];
+ fprintf(stderr, GT_("Secret pass phrase: "));
+ if (opiereadpass(secret, sizeof(secret), 0))
+ i = opiegenerator(challenge, secret, response);
+ memset(secret, 0, sizeof(secret));
+ };
+
+ if (i) {
+ ok = PS_ERROR;
+ break;
+ };
+
+ ok = gen_transact(sock, "PASS %s", response);
+ break;
+ }
+#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
+
+ /* KPOP uses out-of-band authentication and does not check what
+ * we send here, so send some random fixed string, to avoid
+ * users switching *to* KPOP accidentally revealing their
+ * password */
+ if ((ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY
+ || ctl->server.authenticate == A_KERBEROS_V4
+ || ctl->server.authenticate == A_KERBEROS_V5)
+ && (ctl->server.service != NULL
+ && strcmp(ctl->server.service, KPOP_PORT) == 0))
+ {
+ ok = gen_transact(sock, "PASS krb_ticket");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* check if we are actually allowed to send the password */
+ if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY
+ || ctl->server.authenticate == A_PASSWORD) {
+ strlcpy(shroud, ctl->password, sizeof(shroud));
+ ok = gen_transact(sock, "PASS %s", ctl->password);
+ } else {
+ report(stderr, GT_("We've run out of allowed authenticators and cannot continue.\n"));
+ ok = PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ }
+ memset(shroud, 0x55, sizeof(shroud));
shroud[0] = '\0';
break;
else
*++end = '\0';
+ /* SECURITY: 2007-03-17
+ * Strictly validating the presented challenge for RFC-822
+ * conformity (it must be a msg-id in terms of that standard) is
+ * supposed to make attacks against the MD5 implementation
+ * harder[1]
+ *
+ * [1] "Security vulnerability in APOP authentication",
+ * Gaëtan Leurent, fetchmail-devel, 2007-03-17 */
+ if (!rfc822_valid_msgid((unsigned char *)start)) {
+ report(stderr,
+ GT_("Invalid APOP timestamp.\n"));
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ }
+
/* copy timestamp and password into digestion buffer */
- xalloca(msg, char *, (end-start+1) + strlen(ctl->password) + 1);
+ msg = (char *)xmalloc((end-start+1) + strlen(ctl->password) + 1);
strcpy(msg,start);
strcat(msg,ctl->password);
+ strcpy((char *)ctl->digest, MD5Digest((unsigned char *)msg));
+ free(msg);
- strcpy(ctl->digest, MD5Digest((unsigned char *)msg));
-
- ok = gen_transact(sock, "APOP %s %s", ctl->remotename, ctl->digest);
+ ok = gen_transact(sock, "APOP %s %s", ctl->remotename, (char *)ctl->digest);
break;
case P_RPOP:
- if ((ok = gen_transact(sock,"USER %s", ctl->remotename)) == 0)
+ if ((ok = gen_transact(sock,"USER %s", ctl->remotename)) == 0) {
+ strlcpy(shroud, ctl->password, sizeof(shroud));
ok = gen_transact(sock, "RPOP %s", ctl->password);
+ memset(shroud, 0x55, sizeof(shroud));
+ shroud[0] = '\0';
+ }
break;
default:
ok = PS_ERROR;
}
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
+ /* this is for servers which claim to support TLS, but actually
+ * don't! */
+ if (connection_may_have_tls_errors
+ && (ok == PS_SOCKET || ok == PS_PROTOCOL))
+ {
+ xfree(ctl->sslproto);
+ ctl->sslproto = xstrdup("");
+ /* repoll immediately without TLS */
+ ok = PS_REPOLL;
+ }
+#endif
+
if (ok != 0)
{
/* maybe we detected a lock-busy condition? */
return(ok);
}
+/* Disable the sleep. Based on patch by Brian Candler 2004-04-19/2004-11-08,
+ * accepted by Matthias Andree.
+ *
+ * Rationale: the server must have locked the spool before returning +OK;
+ * this sleep just wastes time and hence, for modem and GSM CSD users, money. */
+#ifdef WANT_BOGUS
/*
* Empirical experience shows some server/OS combinations
* may need a brief pause even after any lockfiles on the
* this is only ever an issue with extremely large mailboxes.
*/
sleep(3); /* to be _really_ safe, probably need sleep(5)! */
-
- /* we're peek-capable if use of TOP is enabled */
- peek_capable = !(ctl->fetchall || ctl->keep);
+#endif
/* we're approved */
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
-static int pop3_gettopid( int sock, int num , char *id)
+/* cut off C string at first POSIX space */
+static void trim(char *s) {
+ s += strcspn(s, POSIX_space);
+ s[0] = '\0';
+}
+
+/* XXX FIXME: using the Message-ID is unsafe, some messages (spam,
+ * broken messages) do not have Message-ID headers, and messages without
+ * those appear to break this code and cause fetchmail (at least version
+ * 6.2.3) to not delete such messages properly after retrieval.
+ * See Sourceforge Bug #780933.
+ *
+ * The other problem is that the TOP command itself is optional, too... */
+static int pop3_gettopid(int sock, int num , char *id, size_t idsize)
{
int ok;
int got_it;
char buf [POPBUFSIZE+1];
- sprintf( buf, "TOP %d 1", num );
- if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, buf )) != 0)
- return ok;
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "TOP %d 1", num);
+ if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "%s", buf)) != 0)
+ return ok;
got_it = 0;
- while ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))) == 0)
+ while (gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) == 0)
{
if (DOTLINE(buf))
break;
- if ( ! got_it && ! strncasecmp("Message-Id:", buf, 11 )) {
+ if (!got_it && 0 == strncasecmp("Message-Id:", buf, 11)) {
+ char *p = buf + 11;
got_it = 1;
- /* prevent stack overflows */
- buf[IDLEN+12] = 0;
- sscanf( buf+12, "%s", id);
+ p += strspn(p, POSIX_space);
+ strlcpy(id, p, idsize);
+ trim(id);
}
}
+ /* XXX FIXME: do not return success here if no Message-ID header was
+ * found. */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Parse the UID response (leading +OK must have been
+ * stripped off) in buf, store the number in gotnum, and store the ID
+ * into the caller-provided buffer "id" of size "idsize".
+ * Returns PS_SUCCESS or PS_PROTOCOL for failure. */
+static int parseuid(const char *buf, unsigned long *gotnum, char *id, size_t idsize)
+{
+ const char *i;
+ char *j;
+
+ /* skip leading blanks ourselves */
+ i = buf;
+ i += strspn(i, POSIX_space);
+ errno = 0;
+ *gotnum = strtoul(i, &j, 10);
+ if (j == i || !*j || errno || NULL == strchr(POSIX_space, *j)) {
+ report(stderr, GT_("Cannot handle UIDL response from upstream server.\n"));
+ return PS_PROTOCOL;
+ }
+ j += strspn(j, POSIX_space);
+ strlcpy(id, j, idsize);
+ trim(id);
+ return PS_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/** request UIDL for single message \a num and stuff the result into the
+ * buffer \a id which can hold \a idsize bytes */
+static int pop3_getuidl(int sock, int num, char *id /** output */, size_t idsize)
+{
+ int ok;
+ char buf [POPBUFSIZE+1];
+ unsigned long gotnum;
+
+ gen_send(sock, "UIDL %d", num);
+ if ((ok = pop3_ok(sock, buf)) != 0)
+ return(ok);
+ if ((ok = parseuid(buf, &gotnum, id, idsize)))
+ return ok;
+ if (gotnum != (unsigned long)num) {
+ report(stderr, GT_("Server responded with UID for wrong message.\n"));
+ return PS_PROTOCOL;
+ }
+ return(PS_SUCCESS);
+}
+
+static int pop3_fastuidl( int sock, struct query *ctl, unsigned int count, int *newp)
+{
+ int ok;
+ unsigned int first_nr, last_nr, try_nr;
+ char id [IDLEN+1];
+ struct idlist *savep = NULL; /** pointer to cache save_str result, speeds up saves */
+
+ first_nr = 0;
+ last_nr = count + 1;
+ while (first_nr < last_nr - 1)
+ {
+ struct idlist *newl;
+
+ try_nr = (first_nr + last_nr) / 2;
+ if ((ok = pop3_getuidl(sock, try_nr, id, sizeof(id))) != 0)
+ return ok;
+ if ((newl = str_in_list(&ctl->oldsaved, id, FALSE)))
+ {
+ flag mark = newl->val.status.mark;
+ if (mark == UID_DELETED || mark == UID_EXPUNGED)
+ {
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
+ report(stderr, GT_("id=%s (num=%u) was deleted, but is still present!\n"), id, try_nr);
+ /* just mark it as seen now! */
+ newl->val.status.mark = mark = UID_SEEN;
+ }
+
+ /* narrow the search region! */
+ if (mark == UID_UNSEEN)
+ {
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, GT_("%u is unseen\n"), try_nr);
+ last_nr = try_nr;
+ }
+ else
+ first_nr = try_nr;
+
+ /* save the number */
+ newl->val.status.num = try_nr;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, GT_("%u is unseen\n"), try_nr);
+ last_nr = try_nr;
+
+ /* save it */
+ savep = save_str(savep ? &savep : &ctl->oldsaved, id, UID_UNSEEN);
+ savep->val.status.num = try_nr;
+ }
+ }
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG && last_nr <= count)
+ report(stdout, GT_("%u is first unseen\n"), last_nr);
+
+ /* update last! */
+ *newp = count - first_nr;
+ last = first_nr;
return 0;
}
static int pop3_slowuidl( int sock, struct query *ctl, int *countp, int *newp)
{
+ /* XXX FIXME: this code is severely broken. A Cc:d mailing list
+ * message will arrive twice with the same Message-ID, so this
+ * slowuidl code will break. Same goes for messages without
+ * Message-ID headers at all. This code would best be removed. */
/* This approach tries to get the message headers from the
* remote hosts and compares the message-id to the already known
* ones:
int first_nr, list_len, try_id, try_nr, add_id;
int num;
char id [IDLEN+1];
-
- if( (ok = pop3_gettopid( sock, 1, id )) != 0 )
+
+ if ((ok = pop3_gettopid(sock, 1, id, sizeof(id))) != 0)
return ok;
-
+
if( ( first_nr = str_nr_in_list(&ctl->oldsaved, id) ) == -1 ) {
/* the first message is unknown -> all messages are new */
*newp = *countp;
try_id = list_len - first_nr; /* -1 + 1 */
if( try_id > 1 ) {
if( try_id <= *countp ) {
- if( (ok = pop3_gettopid( sock, try_id, id )) != 0 )
+ if ((ok = pop3_gettopid(sock, try_id, id, sizeof(id))) != 0)
return ok;
try_nr = str_nr_last_in_list(&ctl->oldsaved, id);
} else
try_id += add_id;
- if( (ok = pop3_gettopid( sock, try_id, id )) != 0 )
+ if ((ok = pop3_gettopid(sock, try_id, id, sizeof(id))) != 0)
return ok;
try_nr = str_nr_in_list(&ctl->oldsaved, id);
}
/* the first try_id messages are known -> copy them to the newsaved list */
for( num = first_nr; num < list_len; num++ )
{
- struct idlist *new = save_str(&ctl->newsaved,
+ struct idlist *newl = save_str(&ctl->newsaved,
str_from_nr_list(&ctl->oldsaved, num),
UID_UNSEEN);
- new->val.status.num = num - first_nr + 1;
+ newl->val.status.num = num - first_nr + 1;
}
if( nolinear ) {
int ok;
char buf [POPBUFSIZE+1];
+ (void)folder;
/* Ensure that the new list is properly empty */
ctl->newsaved = (struct idlist *)NULL;
/* get the total message count */
gen_send(sock, "STAT");
ok = pop3_ok(sock, buf);
- if (ok == 0)
- sscanf(buf,"%d %d", countp, bytes);
- else
+ if (ok == 0) {
+ int asgn;
+
+ asgn = sscanf(buf,"%d %d", countp, bytes);
+ if (asgn != 2)
+ return PS_PROTOCOL;
+ } else
return(ok);
/*
- * Newer, RFC-1725-conformant POP servers may not have the LAST command.
- * We work as hard as possible to hide this ugliness, but it makes
+ * Newer, RFC-1725/1939-conformant POP servers may not have the LAST
+ * command. We work as hard as possible to hide this, but it makes
* counting new messages intrinsically quadratic in the worst case.
*/
last = 0;
*newp = -1;
- if (*countp > 0 && !ctl->fetchall)
+ /* if there are messages, and UIDL is desired, use UIDL
+ * also use UIDL if fetchall is unset */
+ if (*countp > 0 && (!ctl->fetchall || ctl->server.uidl))
{
+ int fastuidl;
char id [IDLEN+1];
+ /* should we do fast uidl this time? */
+ fastuidl = ctl->fastuidl;
+ if (*countp > 7 && /* linear search is better if there are few mails! */
+ !ctl->fetchall && /* with fetchall, all uids are required */
+ !ctl->flush && /* with flush, it is safer to disable fastuidl */
+ NUM_NONZERO (fastuidl))
+ {
+ if (fastuidl == 1)
+ dofastuidl = 1;
+ else
+ dofastuidl = ctl->fastuidlcount != 0;
+ }
+ else
+ dofastuidl = 0;
+
if (!ctl->server.uidl) {
gen_send(sock, "LAST");
ok = pop3_ok(sock, buf);
} else
ok = 1;
+
if (ok == 0)
{
+ /* scan LAST reply */
if (sscanf(buf, "%d", &last) == 0)
{
report(stderr, GT_("protocol error\n"));
}
*newp = (*countp - last);
}
- else
- {
+ else
+ {
+ /* do UIDL */
+ if (dofastuidl)
+ return(pop3_fastuidl( sock, ctl, *countp, newp));
/* grab the mailbox's UID list */
- if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "UIDL")) != 0)
+ if (gen_transact(sock, "UIDL") != 0)
{
/* don't worry, yet! do it the slow way */
- if((ok = pop3_slowuidl( sock, ctl, countp, newp))!=0)
+ if (pop3_slowuidl(sock, ctl, countp, newp))
{
report(stderr, GT_("protocol error while fetching UIDLs\n"));
return(PS_ERROR);
}
else
{
- int num;
+ /* UIDL worked - parse reply */
+ unsigned long unum;
+ struct idlist *newl = NULL;
*newp = 0;
- while ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))) == 0)
+ while (gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) == PS_SUCCESS)
{
- if (DOTLINE(buf))
- break;
- else if (sscanf(buf, "%d %s", &num, id) == 2)
- {
- struct idlist *new;
-
- new = save_str(&ctl->newsaved, id, UID_UNSEEN);
- new->val.status.num = num;
+ if (DOTLINE(buf))
+ break;
- if (str_in_list(&ctl->oldsaved, id, FALSE)) {
- new->val.status.mark = UID_SEEN;
- str_set_mark(&ctl->oldsaved, id, UID_SEEN);
+ if (parseuid(buf, &unum, id, sizeof(id)) == PS_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ struct idlist *old;
+
+ newl = save_str(newl ? &newl : &ctl->newsaved, id, UID_UNSEEN);
+ newl->val.status.num = unum;
+
+ if ((old = str_in_list(&ctl->oldsaved, id, FALSE)))
+ {
+ flag mark = old->val.status.mark;
+ if (mark == UID_DELETED || mark == UID_EXPUNGED)
+ {
+ /* XXX FIXME: switch 3 occurrences from
+ * (int)unum or (unsigned int)unum to
+ * remove the cast and use %lu - not now
+ * though, time for new release */
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
+ report(stderr, GT_("id=%s (num=%d) was deleted, but is still present!\n"), id, (int)unum);
+ /* just mark it as seen now! */
+ old->val.status.mark = mark = UID_SEEN;
+ }
+ newl->val.status.mark = mark;
+ if (mark == UID_UNSEEN)
+ {
+ (*newp)++;
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, GT_("%u is unseen\n"), (unsigned int)unum);
+ }
}
else
+ {
(*newp)++;
- }
- }
- }
- }
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, GT_("%u is unseen\n"), (unsigned int)unum);
+ /* add it to oldsaved also! In case, we do not
+ * swap the lists (say, due to socket error),
+ * the same mail will not be downloaded again.
+ */
+ old = save_str(&ctl->oldsaved, id, UID_UNSEEN);
+ }
+ /* save the number */
+ old->val.status.num = unum;
+ } else
+ return PS_ERROR;
+ } /* multi-line loop for UIDL reply */
+ } /* UIDL parser */
+ } /* do UIDL */
}
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
+static int pop3_getpartialsizes(int sock, int first, int last, int *sizes)
+/* capture the size of message #first */
+{
+ int ok = 0, i, num;
+ char buf [POPBUFSIZE+1];
+ unsigned int size;
+
+ for (i = first; i <= last; i++) {
+ gen_send(sock, "LIST %d", i);
+ if ((ok = pop3_ok(sock, buf)) != 0)
+ return(ok);
+ if (sscanf(buf, "%d %u", &num, &size) == 2) {
+ if (num == i)
+ sizes[i - first] = size;
+ else
+ /* warn about possible attempt to induce buffer overrun
+ *
+ * we expect server reply message number and requested
+ * message number to match */
+ report(stderr, "Warning: ignoring bogus data for message sizes returned by server.\n");
+ }
+ }
+ return(ok);
+}
+
static int pop3_getsizes(int sock, int count, int *sizes)
/* capture the sizes of all messages */
{
if (DOTLINE(buf))
break;
else if (sscanf(buf, "%u %u", &num, &size) == 2) {
- if (num > 0 && num <= count)
+ if (num > 0 && num <= (unsigned)count)
sizes[num - 1] = size;
else
/* warn about possible attempt to induce buffer overrun */
static int pop3_is_old(int sock, struct query *ctl, int num)
/* is the given message old? */
{
+ struct idlist *newl;
if (!ctl->oldsaved)
return (num <= last);
+ else if (dofastuidl)
+ {
+ char id [IDLEN+1];
+
+ if (num <= last)
+ return(TRUE);
+
+ /* in fast uidl, we manipulate the old list only! */
+
+ if ((newl = id_find(&ctl->oldsaved, num)))
+ {
+ /* we already have the id! */
+ return(newl->val.status.mark != UID_UNSEEN);
+ }
+
+ /* get the uidl first! */
+ if (pop3_getuidl(sock, num, id, sizeof(id)) != PS_SUCCESS)
+ return(TRUE);
+
+ if ((newl = str_in_list(&ctl->oldsaved, id, FALSE))) {
+ /* we already have the id! */
+ newl->val.status.num = num;
+ return(newl->val.status.mark != UID_UNSEEN);
+ }
+
+ /* save it */
+ newl = save_str(&ctl->oldsaved, id, UID_UNSEEN);
+ newl->val.status.num = num;
+ return(FALSE);
+ }
else
- return (str_in_list(&ctl->oldsaved,
- str_find(&ctl->newsaved, num), FALSE));
+ return ((newl = id_find(&ctl->newsaved, num)) != NULL &&
+ newl->val.status.mark != UID_UNSEEN);
}
#ifdef UNUSED
#ifdef SDPS_ENABLE
/*
- * See http://www.demon.net/services/mail/sdps-tech.html
+ * See http://www.demon.net/helpdesk/producthelp/mail/sdps-tech.html/
* for a description of what we're parsing here.
+ * -- updated 2006-02-22
*/
if (ctl->server.sdps)
{
switch (linecount) {
case 4:
/* No need to wrap envelope from address */
- sdps_envfrom = xmalloc(strlen(buf)+1);
+ /* FIXME: some parts of fetchmail don't handle null
+ * envelope senders, so use <> to mark null sender
+ * as a workaround. */
+ if (strspn(buf, " \t") == strlen(buf))
+ strcpy(buf, "<>");
+ sdps_envfrom = (char *)xmalloc(strlen(buf)+1);
strcpy(sdps_envfrom,buf);
break;
case 5:
/* Wrap address with To: <> so nxtaddr() likes it */
- sdps_envto = xmalloc(strlen(buf)+7);
+ sdps_envto = (char *)xmalloc(strlen(buf)+7);
sprintf(sdps_envto,"To: <%s>",buf);
break;
}
} while
(!(buf[0] == '.' && (buf[1] == '\r' || buf[1] == '\n' || buf[1] == '\0')));
}
+#else
+ (void)ctl;
#endif /* SDPS_ENABLE */
/*
* In that case, marking the seen flag is the only way to prevent the
* message from being re-fetched on subsequent runs.
*
- * Also use RETR if fetchall is on. This gives us a workaround
- * for servers like usa.net's that bungle TOP. It's pretty
- * harmless because fetchall guarantees that any message dropped
- * by an interrupted RETR will be picked up on the next poll of the
- * site.
+ * Also use RETR (that means no TOP, no peek) if fetchall is on.
+ * This gives us a workaround for servers like usa.net's that bungle
+ * TOP. It's pretty harmless because fetchall guarantees that any
+ * message dropped by an interrupted RETR will be picked up on the
+ * next poll of the site.
*
* We take advantage here of the fact that, according to all the
* POP RFCs, "if the number of lines requested by the POP3 client
* The line count passed (99999999) is the maximum value CompuServe will
* accept; it's much lower than the natural value 2147483646 (the maximum
* twos-complement signed 32-bit integer minus 1) */
- if (ctl->keep || ctl->fetchall)
+ if (!peek_capable)
gen_send(sock, "RETR %d", number);
else
gen_send(sock, "TOP %d 99999999", number);
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
+static void mark_uid_seen(struct query *ctl, int number)
+/* Tell the UID code we've seen this. */
+{
+ struct idlist *sdp;
+
+ if ((sdp = id_find(&ctl->newsaved, number)))
+ sdp->val.status.mark = UID_SEEN;
+ /* mark it as seen in oldsaved also! In case, we do not swap the lists
+ * (say, due to socket error), the same mail will not be downloaded
+ * again.
+ */
+ if ((sdp = id_find(&ctl->oldsaved, number)))
+ sdp->val.status.mark = UID_SEEN;
+}
+
static int pop3_delete(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
/* delete a given message */
{
+ int ok;
+ mark_uid_seen(ctl, number);
/* actually, mark for deletion -- doesn't happen until QUIT time */
- return(gen_transact(sock, "DELE %d", number));
+ ok = gen_transact(sock, "DELE %d", number);
+ if (ok != PS_SUCCESS)
+ return(ok);
+ delete_str(dofastuidl ? &ctl->oldsaved : &ctl->newsaved, number);
+ return(PS_SUCCESS);
+}
+
+static int pop3_mark_seen(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
+/* mark a given message as seen */
+{
+ (void)sock;
+ mark_uid_seen(ctl, number);
+ return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
static int pop3_logout(int sock, struct query *ctl)
if (!ok)
expunge_uids(ctl);
- if (ctl->lastid)
- {
- free(ctl->lastid);
- ctl->lastid = NULL;
- }
-
return(ok);
}
-const static struct method pop3 =
+static const struct method pop3 =
{
"POP3", /* Post Office Protocol v3 */
-#if INET6_ENABLE
- "pop3", /* standard POP3 port */
- "pop3s", /* ssl POP3 port */
-#else /* INET6_ENABLE */
- 110, /* standard POP3 port */
- 995, /* ssl POP3 port */
-#endif /* INET6_ENABLE */
+ "pop3", /* port for plain and TLS POP3 */
+ "pop3s", /* port for SSL POP3 */
FALSE, /* this is not a tagged protocol */
TRUE, /* this uses a message delimiter */
pop3_ok, /* parse command response */
pop3_getauth, /* get authorization */
pop3_getrange, /* query range of messages */
pop3_getsizes, /* we can get a list of sizes */
+ pop3_getpartialsizes, /* we can get the size of 1 mail */
pop3_is_old, /* how do we tell a message is old? */
pop3_fetch, /* request given message */
NULL, /* no way to fetch body alone */
NULL, /* no message trailer */
pop3_delete, /* how to delete a message */
+ pop3_mark_seen, /* how to mark a message as seen */
+ NULL, /* no action at end of mailbox */
pop3_logout, /* log out, we're done */
FALSE, /* no, we can't re-poll */
};
{
#ifndef MBOX
if (ctl->mailboxes->id) {
- fprintf(stderr,GT_("Option --remote is not supported with POP3\n"));
+ fprintf(stderr,GT_("Option --folder is not supported with POP3\n"));
return(PS_SYNTAX);
}
#endif /* MBOX */
- peek_capable = !ctl->fetchall;
+
return(do_protocol(ctl, &pop3));
}
#endif /* POP3_ENABLE */
projects / ~andy / fetchmail / blobdiff