#include "i18n.h"
#ifdef OPIE_ENABLE
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
#include <opie.h>
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
/* global variables: please reinitialize them explicitly for proper
#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
/* session variables initialized in capa_probe() or pop3_getauth() */
+flag done_capa = FALSE;
#if defined(GSSAPI)
flag has_gssapi = FALSE;
#endif /* defined(GSSAPI) */
#ifdef OPIE_ENABLE
flag has_otp = FALSE;
#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
+#ifdef NTLM_ENABLE
+flag has_ntlm = FALSE;
+#endif /* NTLM_ENABLE */
#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
-static flag has_ssl = FALSE;
+static flag has_stls = FALSE;
#endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
/* mailbox variables initialized in pop3_getrange() */
static int do_pop3_ntlm(int sock, struct query *ctl,
int msn_instead /** if true, send AUTH MSN, else send AUTH NTLM */)
{
- tSmbNtlmAuthRequest request;
- tSmbNtlmAuthChallenge challenge;
- tSmbNtlmAuthResponse response;
+ char msgbuf[POPBUFSIZE+1];
+ int result;
- char msgbuf[2048];
- int result,len;
-
gen_send(sock, msn_instead ? "AUTH MSN" : "AUTH NTLM");
- if ((result = gen_recv(sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
- return result;
-
- if (msgbuf[0] != '+')
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
-
- buildSmbNtlmAuthRequest(&request,ctl->remotename,NULL);
-
- if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
- dumpSmbNtlmAuthRequest(stdout, &request);
-
- memset(msgbuf,0,sizeof msgbuf);
- to64frombits (msgbuf, (unsigned char*)&request, SmbLength(&request));
-
- if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
- report(stdout, "POP3> %s\n", msgbuf);
-
- strcat(msgbuf,"\r\n");
- SockWrite (sock, msgbuf, strlen (msgbuf));
-
- if ((gen_recv(sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
+ if ((result = ntlm_helper(sock, ctl, "POP3")))
return result;
-
- len = from64tobits ((unsigned char*)&challenge, msgbuf, sizeof(msgbuf));
-
- if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
- dumpSmbNtlmAuthChallenge(stdout, &challenge);
-
- buildSmbNtlmAuthResponse(&challenge, &response,ctl->remotename,ctl->password);
-
- if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
- dumpSmbNtlmAuthResponse(stdout, &response);
-
- memset(msgbuf,0,sizeof msgbuf);
- to64frombits (msgbuf, (unsigned char*)&response, SmbLength(&response));
-
- if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
- report(stdout, "POP3> %s\n", msgbuf);
-
- strcat(msgbuf,"\r\n");
- SockWrite (sock, msgbuf, strlen (msgbuf));
-
+
if ((result = gen_recv (sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
return result;
-
+
if (strstr (msgbuf, "OK"))
return PS_SUCCESS;
else
{
int ok;
+ if (done_capa) {
+ return PS_SUCCESS;
+ }
#if defined(GSSAPI)
has_gssapi = FALSE;
#endif /* defined(GSSAPI) */
#ifdef OPIE_ENABLE
has_otp = FALSE;
#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
+#ifdef NTLM_ENABLE
+ has_ntlm = FALSE;
+#endif /* NTLM_ENABLE */
ok = gen_transact(sock, "CAPA");
if (ok == PS_SUCCESS)
{
if (DOTLINE(buffer))
break;
+
#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
if (strstr(buffer, "STLS"))
- has_ssl = TRUE;
+ has_stls = TRUE;
#endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
+
#if defined(GSSAPI)
if (strstr(buffer, "GSSAPI"))
has_gssapi = TRUE;
#endif /* defined(GSSAPI) */
+
#if defined(KERBEROS_V4)
if (strstr(buffer, "KERBEROS_V4"))
has_kerberos = TRUE;
#endif /* defined(KERBEROS_V4) */
+
#ifdef OPIE_ENABLE
if (strstr(buffer, "X-OTP"))
has_otp = TRUE;
#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
+
+#ifdef NTLM_ENABLE
+ if (strstr(buffer, "NTLM"))
+ has_ntlm = TRUE;
+#endif /* NTLM_ENABLE */
+
if (strstr(buffer, "CRAM-MD5"))
has_cram = TRUE;
}
}
+ done_capa = TRUE;
return(ok);
}
char *challenge;
#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
- flag did_stls = FALSE;
+ flag connection_may_have_tls_errors = FALSE;
#endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
+ done_capa = FALSE;
#if defined(GSSAPI)
has_gssapi = FALSE;
#endif /* defined(GSSAPI) */
has_otp = FALSE;
#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
- has_ssl = FALSE;
+ has_stls = FALSE;
#endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
/* Set this up before authentication quits early. */
set_peek_capable(ctl);
+
+ /* Hack: allow user to force RETR. */
+ if (peek_capable && getenv("FETCHMAIL_POP3_FORCE_RETR")) {
+ peek_capable = 0;
+ }
+
/*
* The "Maillennium POP3/PROXY server" deliberately truncates
* TOP replies after c. 64 or 80 kByte (we have varying reports), so
*
* Matthias Andree
*/
- if (peek_capable && strstr(greeting, "Maillennium POP3/PROXY server")) {
+ if (peek_capable && strstr(greeting, "Maillennium POP3")) {
if ((ctl->server.workarounds & WKA_TOP) == 0) {
- report(stdout, GT_("Warning: \"Maillennium POP3/PROXY server\" found, using RETR command instead of TOP.\n"));
+ report(stdout, GT_("Warning: \"Maillennium POP3\" found, using RETR command instead of TOP.\n"));
ctl->server.workarounds |= WKA_TOP;
}
peek_capable = 0;
ctl->server.sdps = TRUE;
#endif /* SDPS_ENABLE */
-#ifdef NTLM_ENABLE
- /* MSN servers require the use of NTLM (MSN) authentication */
- if (!strcasecmp(ctl->server.pollname, "pop3.email.msn.com") ||
- ctl->server.authenticate == A_MSN)
- return (do_pop3_ntlm(sock, ctl, 1) == 0) ? PS_SUCCESS : PS_AUTHFAIL;
- if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_NTLM)
- return (do_pop3_ntlm(sock, ctl, 0) == 0) ? PS_SUCCESS : PS_AUTHFAIL;
-#else
- if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_NTLM || ctl->server.authenticate == A_MSN)
- {
- report(stderr,
- GT_("Required NTLM capability not compiled into fetchmail\n"));
- }
-#endif
-
- switch (ctl->server.protocol) {
+ switch (ctl->server.protocol) {
case P_POP3:
#ifdef RPA_ENABLE
/* XXX FIXME: AUTH probing (RFC1734) should become global */
/*
* CAPA command may return a list including available
- * authentication mechanisms. if it doesn't, no harm done, we
- * just fall back to a plain login. Note that this code
- * latches the server's authentication type, so that in daemon mode
- * the CAPA check only needs to be done once at start of run.
+ * authentication mechanisms and STLS capability.
*
- * If CAPA fails, then force the authentication method to PASSORD
- * and repoll immediately.
+ * If it doesn't, no harm done, we just fall back to a plain
+ * login -- if the user allows it.
*
- * These authentication methods are blessed by RFC1734,
- * describing the POP3 AUTHentication command.
+ * Note that this code latches the server's authentication type,
+ * so that in daemon mode the CAPA check only needs to be done
+ * once at start of run.
+ *
+ * If CAPA fails, then force the authentication method to
+ * PASSWORD, switch off opportunistic and repoll immediately.
+ * If TLS is mandatory, fail up front.
*/
if ((ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY) ||
- (ctl->server.authenticate == A_GSSAPI) ||
- (ctl->server.authenticate == A_KERBEROS_V4) ||
- (ctl->server.authenticate == A_OTP) ||
- (ctl->server.authenticate == A_CRAM_MD5))
+ (ctl->server.authenticate == A_GSSAPI) ||
+ (ctl->server.authenticate == A_KERBEROS_V4) ||
+ (ctl->server.authenticate == A_KERBEROS_V5) ||
+ (ctl->server.authenticate == A_OTP) ||
+ (ctl->server.authenticate == A_CRAM_MD5) ||
+ maybe_tls(ctl))
{
if ((ok = capa_probe(sock)) != PS_SUCCESS)
- /* we are in STAGE_GETAUTH! */
+ /* we are in STAGE_GETAUTH => failure is PS_AUTHFAIL! */
if (ok == PS_AUTHFAIL ||
/* Some servers directly close the socket. However, if we
* have already authenticated before, then a previous CAPA
*/
(ok == PS_SOCKET && !ctl->wehaveauthed))
{
- ctl->server.authenticate = A_PASSWORD;
- /* repoll immediately */
- ok = PS_REPOLL;
- break;
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
+ if (must_tls(ctl)) {
+ /* fail with mandatory STLS without repoll */
+ report(stderr, GT_("TLS is mandatory for this session, but server refused CAPA command.\n"));
+ report(stderr, GT_("The CAPA command is however necessary for TLS.\n"));
+ return ok;
+ } else if (maybe_tls(ctl)) {
+ /* defeat opportunistic STLS */
+ xfree(ctl->sslproto);
+ ctl->sslproto = xstrdup("");
+ }
+#endif
+ /* If strong authentication was opportunistic, retry without, else fail. */
+ switch (ctl->server.authenticate) {
+ case A_ANY:
+ ctl->server.authenticate = A_PASSWORD;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case A_PASSWORD: /* this should only happen with TLS enabled */
+ return PS_REPOLL;
+ default:
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ }
}
}
#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
- if (has_ssl
- && !ctl->use_ssl
- && (!ctl->sslproto || !strcmp(ctl->sslproto,"tls1")))
- {
- char *realhost;
+ if (maybe_tls(ctl)) {
+ char *commonname;
- realhost = ctl->server.via ? ctl->server.via : ctl->server.pollname;
- ok = gen_transact(sock, "STLS");
+ commonname = ctl->server.pollname;
+ if (ctl->server.via)
+ commonname = ctl->server.via;
+ if (ctl->sslcommonname)
+ commonname = ctl->sslcommonname;
- /* We use "tls1" instead of ctl->sslproto, as we want STLS,
- * not other SSL protocols
- */
- if (ok == PS_SUCCESS &&
- SSLOpen(sock,ctl->sslcert,ctl->sslkey,"tls1",ctl->sslcertck, ctl->sslcertpath,ctl->sslfingerprint,realhost,ctl->server.pollname) == -1)
+ if (has_stls
+ || must_tls(ctl)) /* if TLS is mandatory, ignore capabilities */
{
- if (!ctl->sslproto && !ctl->wehaveauthed)
+ /* Use "tls1" rather than ctl->sslproto because tls1 is the only
+ * protocol that will work with STARTTLS. Don't need to worry
+ * whether TLS is mandatory or opportunistic unless SSLOpen() fails
+ * (see below). */
+ if (gen_transact(sock, "STLS") == PS_SUCCESS
+ && (set_timeout(mytimeout), SSLOpen(sock, ctl->sslcert, ctl->sslkey, "tls1", ctl->sslcertck,
+ ctl->sslcertfile, ctl->sslcertpath, ctl->sslfingerprint, commonname,
+ ctl->server.pollname, &ctl->remotename)) != -1)
{
- ctl->sslproto = xstrdup("");
- /* repoll immediately */
- return(PS_REPOLL);
+ /*
+ * RFC 2595 says this:
+ *
+ * "Once TLS has been started, the client MUST discard cached
+ * information about server capabilities and SHOULD re-issue the
+ * CAPABILITY command. This is necessary to protect against
+ * man-in-the-middle attacks which alter the capabilities list prior
+ * to STARTTLS. The server MAY advertise different capabilities
+ * after STARTTLS."
+ *
+ * Now that we're confident in our TLS connection we can
+ * guarantee a secure capability re-probe.
+ */
+ set_timeout(0);
+ done_capa = FALSE;
+ ok = capa_probe(sock);
+ if (ok != PS_SUCCESS) {
+ return ok;
+ }
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
+ {
+ report(stdout, GT_("%s: upgrade to TLS succeeded.\n"), commonname);
+ }
+ } else if (must_tls(ctl)) {
+ /* Config required TLS but we couldn't guarantee it, so we must
+ * stop. */
+ set_timeout(0);
+ report(stderr, GT_("%s: upgrade to TLS failed.\n"), commonname);
+ return PS_SOCKET;
+ } else {
+ /* We don't know whether the connection is usable, and there's
+ * no command we can reasonably issue to test it (NOOP isn't
+ * allowed til post-authentication), so leave it in an unknown
+ * state, mark it as such, and check more carefully if things
+ * go wrong when we try to authenticate. */
+ set_timeout(0);
+ connection_may_have_tls_errors = TRUE;
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
+ {
+ report(stdout, GT_("%s: opportunistic upgrade to TLS failed, trying to continue.\n"), commonname);
+ }
}
- report(stderr,
- GT_("SSL connection failed.\n"));
- return PS_SOCKET;
- }
- did_stls = TRUE;
-
- /*
- * RFC 2595 says this:
- *
- * "Once TLS has been started, the client MUST discard cached
- * information about server capabilities and SHOULD re-issue the
- * CAPABILITY command. This is necessary to protect against
- * man-in-the-middle attacks which alter the capabilities list prior
- * to STARTTLS. The server MAY advertise different capabilities
- * after STARTTLS."
- */
- capa_probe(sock);
- }
+ }
+ } /* maybe_tls() */
#endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
/*
#if defined(GSSAPI)
if (has_gssapi &&
(ctl->server.authenticate == A_GSSAPI ||
- ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY))
+ (ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY
+ && check_gss_creds("pop", ctl->server.truename) == PS_SUCCESS)))
{
ok = do_gssauth(sock,"AUTH","pop",ctl->server.truename,ctl->remotename);
if (ok == PS_SUCCESS || ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY)
}
#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
- if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_CRAM_MD5 ||
+#ifdef NTLM_ENABLE
+ /* MSN servers require the use of NTLM (MSN) authentication */
+ if (!strcasecmp(ctl->server.pollname, "pop3.email.msn.com") ||
+ ctl->server.authenticate == A_MSN)
+ return (do_pop3_ntlm(sock, ctl, 1) == 0) ? PS_SUCCESS : PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_NTLM || (has_ntlm && ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY)) {
+ ok = do_pop3_ntlm(sock, ctl, 0);
+ if (ok == 0 || ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY)
+ break;
+ }
+#else
+ if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_NTLM || ctl->server.authenticate == A_MSN)
+ {
+ report(stderr,
+ GT_("Required NTLM capability not compiled into fetchmail\n"));
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_CRAM_MD5 ||
(has_cram && ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY))
{
ok = do_cram_md5(sock, "AUTH", ctl, NULL);
if ((challenge = strstr(lastok, "otp-"))) {
char response[OPIE_RESPONSE_MAX+1];
int i;
+ char *n = xstrdup("");
- i = opiegenerator(challenge, !strcmp(ctl->password, "opie") ? "" : ctl->password, response);
+ i = opiegenerator(challenge, !strcmp(ctl->password, "opie") ? n : ctl->password, response);
+ free(n);
if ((i == -2) && !run.poll_interval) {
char secret[OPIE_SECRET_MAX+1];
fprintf(stderr, GT_("Secret pass phrase: "));
}
#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
- strlcpy(shroud, ctl->password, sizeof(shroud));
- ok = gen_transact(sock, "PASS %s", ctl->password);
- shroud[0] = '\0';
-#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
- /* this is for servers which claim to support TLS, but actually
- * don't! */
- if (did_stls && ok == PS_SOCKET && !ctl->sslproto && !ctl->wehaveauthed)
+ /* KPOP uses out-of-band authentication and does not check what
+ * we send here, so send some random fixed string, to avoid
+ * users switching *to* KPOP accidentally revealing their
+ * password */
+ if ((ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY
+ || ctl->server.authenticate == A_KERBEROS_V4
+ || ctl->server.authenticate == A_KERBEROS_V5)
+ && (ctl->server.service != NULL
+ && strcmp(ctl->server.service, KPOP_PORT) == 0))
{
- ctl->sslproto = xstrdup("");
- /* repoll immediately */
- ok = PS_REPOLL;
+ ok = gen_transact(sock, "PASS krb_ticket");
+ break;
}
-#endif
+
+ /* check if we are actually allowed to send the password */
+ if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY
+ || ctl->server.authenticate == A_PASSWORD) {
+ strlcpy(shroud, ctl->password, sizeof(shroud));
+ ok = gen_transact(sock, "PASS %s", ctl->password);
+ } else {
+ report(stderr, GT_("We've run out of allowed authenticators and cannot continue.\n"));
+ ok = PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ }
+ memset(shroud, 0x55, sizeof(shroud));
+ shroud[0] = '\0';
break;
case P_APOP:
else
*++end = '\0';
+ /* SECURITY: 2007-03-17
+ * Strictly validating the presented challenge for RFC-822
+ * conformity (it must be a msg-id in terms of that standard) is
+ * supposed to make attacks against the MD5 implementation
+ * harder[1]
+ *
+ * [1] "Security vulnerability in APOP authentication",
+ * Gaëtan Leurent, fetchmail-devel, 2007-03-17 */
+ if (!rfc822_valid_msgid((unsigned char *)start)) {
+ report(stderr,
+ GT_("Invalid APOP timestamp.\n"));
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ }
+
/* copy timestamp and password into digestion buffer */
- msg = xmalloc((end-start+1) + strlen(ctl->password) + 1);
+ msg = (char *)xmalloc((end-start+1) + strlen(ctl->password) + 1);
strcpy(msg,start);
strcat(msg,ctl->password);
- strcpy(ctl->digest, MD5Digest((unsigned char *)msg));
+ strcpy((char *)ctl->digest, MD5Digest((unsigned char *)msg));
free(msg);
- ok = gen_transact(sock, "APOP %s %s", ctl->remotename, ctl->digest);
+ ok = gen_transact(sock, "APOP %s %s", ctl->remotename, (char *)ctl->digest);
break;
case P_RPOP:
- if ((ok = gen_transact(sock,"USER %s", ctl->remotename)) == 0)
+ if ((ok = gen_transact(sock,"USER %s", ctl->remotename)) == 0) {
+ strlcpy(shroud, ctl->password, sizeof(shroud));
ok = gen_transact(sock, "RPOP %s", ctl->password);
+ memset(shroud, 0x55, sizeof(shroud));
+ shroud[0] = '\0';
+ }
break;
default:
ok = PS_ERROR;
}
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
+ /* this is for servers which claim to support TLS, but actually
+ * don't! */
+ if (connection_may_have_tls_errors
+ && (ok == PS_SOCKET || ok == PS_PROTOCOL))
+ {
+ xfree(ctl->sslproto);
+ ctl->sslproto = xstrdup("");
+ /* repoll immediately without TLS */
+ ok = PS_REPOLL;
+ }
+#endif
+
if (ok != 0)
{
/* maybe we detected a lock-busy condition? */
s[0] = '\0';
}
+/* XXX FIXME: using the Message-ID is unsafe, some messages (spam,
+ * broken messages) do not have Message-ID headers, and messages without
+ * those appear to break this code and cause fetchmail (at least version
+ * 6.2.3) to not delete such messages properly after retrieval.
+ * See Sourceforge Bug #780933.
+ *
+ * The other problem is that the TOP command itself is optional, too... */
static int pop3_gettopid(int sock, int num , char *id, size_t idsize)
{
int ok;
int got_it;
char buf [POPBUFSIZE+1];
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "TOP %d 1", num);
- if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, buf )) != 0)
+ if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "%s", buf)) != 0)
return ok;
got_it = 0;
- while ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))) == 0)
+ while (gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) == 0)
{
if (DOTLINE(buf))
break;
trim(id);
}
}
+ /* XXX FIXME: do not return success here if no Message-ID header was
+ * found. */
return 0;
}
return(ok);
if ((ok = parseuid(buf, &gotnum, id, idsize)))
return ok;
- if (gotnum != num) {
+ if (gotnum != (unsigned long)num) {
report(stderr, GT_("Server responded with UID for wrong message.\n"));
return PS_PROTOCOL;
}
int ok;
unsigned int first_nr, last_nr, try_nr;
char id [IDLEN+1];
+ struct idlist *savep = NULL; /** pointer to cache save_str result, speeds up saves */
first_nr = 0;
last_nr = count + 1;
if (mark == UID_DELETED || mark == UID_EXPUNGED)
{
if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
- report(stderr, GT_("id=%s (num=%d) was deleted, but is still present!\n"), id, try_nr);
+ report(stderr, GT_("id=%s (num=%u) was deleted, but is still present!\n"), id, try_nr);
/* just mark it as seen now! */
newl->val.status.mark = mark = UID_SEEN;
}
last_nr = try_nr;
/* save it */
- newl = save_str(&ctl->oldsaved, id, UID_UNSEEN);
- newl->val.status.num = try_nr;
+ savep = save_str(savep ? &savep : &ctl->oldsaved, id, UID_UNSEEN);
+ savep->val.status.num = try_nr;
}
}
if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG && last_nr <= count)
static int pop3_slowuidl( int sock, struct query *ctl, int *countp, int *newp)
{
+ /* XXX FIXME: this code is severely broken. A Cc:d mailing list
+ * message will arrive twice with the same Message-ID, so this
+ * slowuidl code will break. Same goes for messages without
+ * Message-ID headers at all. This code would best be removed. */
/* This approach tries to get the message headers from the
* remote hosts and compares the message-id to the already known
* ones:
int ok;
char buf [POPBUFSIZE+1];
+ (void)folder;
/* Ensure that the new list is properly empty */
ctl->newsaved = (struct idlist *)NULL;
/* get the total message count */
gen_send(sock, "STAT");
ok = pop3_ok(sock, buf);
- if (ok == 0)
- sscanf(buf,"%d %d", countp, bytes);
- else
+ if (ok == 0) {
+ int asgn;
+
+ asgn = sscanf(buf,"%d %d", countp, bytes);
+ if (asgn != 2)
+ return PS_PROTOCOL;
+ } else
return(ok);
/*
- * Newer, RFC-1725/1939-conformant POP servers may not have the LAST command.
- * We work as hard as possible to hide this, but it makes
+ * Newer, RFC-1725/1939-conformant POP servers may not have the LAST
+ * command. We work as hard as possible to hide this, but it makes
* counting new messages intrinsically quadratic in the worst case.
*/
last = 0;
if (dofastuidl)
return(pop3_fastuidl( sock, ctl, *countp, newp));
/* grab the mailbox's UID list */
- if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "UIDL")) != 0)
+ if (gen_transact(sock, "UIDL") != 0)
{
/* don't worry, yet! do it the slow way */
- if ((ok = pop3_slowuidl(sock, ctl, countp, newp)))
+ if (pop3_slowuidl(sock, ctl, countp, newp))
{
report(stderr, GT_("protocol error while fetching UIDLs\n"));
return(PS_ERROR);
{
/* UIDL worked - parse reply */
unsigned long unum;
+ struct idlist *newl = NULL;
*newp = 0;
- while ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))) == PS_SUCCESS)
+ while (gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) == PS_SUCCESS)
{
if (DOTLINE(buf))
break;
if (parseuid(buf, &unum, id, sizeof(id)) == PS_SUCCESS)
{
- struct idlist *old, *newl;
+ struct idlist *old;
- newl = save_str(&ctl->newsaved, id, UID_UNSEEN);
+ newl = save_str(newl ? &newl : &ctl->newsaved, id, UID_UNSEEN);
newl->val.status.num = unum;
if ((old = str_in_list(&ctl->oldsaved, id, FALSE)))
* the same mail will not be downloaded again.
*/
old = save_str(&ctl->oldsaved, id, UID_UNSEEN);
- old->val.status.num = unum;
}
+ /* save the number */
+ old->val.status.num = unum;
} else
return PS_ERROR;
} /* multi-line loop for UIDL reply */
static int pop3_getpartialsizes(int sock, int first, int last, int *sizes)
/* capture the size of message #first */
{
- int ok = 0, i;
+ int ok = 0, i, num;
char buf [POPBUFSIZE+1];
- unsigned int num, size;
+ unsigned int size;
for (i = first; i <= last; i++) {
gen_send(sock, "LIST %d", i);
if ((ok = pop3_ok(sock, buf)) != 0)
return(ok);
- if (sscanf(buf, "%u %u", &num, &size) == 2) {
+ if (sscanf(buf, "%d %u", &num, &size) == 2) {
if (num == i)
sizes[i - first] = size;
else
if (DOTLINE(buf))
break;
else if (sscanf(buf, "%u %u", &num, &size) == 2) {
- if (num > 0 && num <= count)
+ if (num > 0 && num <= (unsigned)count)
sizes[num - 1] = size;
else
/* warn about possible attempt to induce buffer overrun */
* as a workaround. */
if (strspn(buf, " \t") == strlen(buf))
strcpy(buf, "<>");
- sdps_envfrom = xmalloc(strlen(buf)+1);
+ sdps_envfrom = (char *)xmalloc(strlen(buf)+1);
strcpy(sdps_envfrom,buf);
break;
case 5:
/* Wrap address with To: <> so nxtaddr() likes it */
- sdps_envto = xmalloc(strlen(buf)+7);
+ sdps_envto = (char *)xmalloc(strlen(buf)+7);
sprintf(sdps_envto,"To: <%s>",buf);
break;
}
} while
(!(buf[0] == '.' && (buf[1] == '\r' || buf[1] == '\n' || buf[1] == '\0')));
}
+#else
+ (void)ctl;
#endif /* SDPS_ENABLE */
/*
static int pop3_mark_seen(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
/* mark a given message as seen */
{
+ (void)sock;
mark_uid_seen(ctl, number);
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
static const struct method pop3 =
{
"POP3", /* Post Office Protocol v3 */
- "pop3", /* standard POP3 port */
- "pop3s", /* ssl POP3 port */
+ "pop3", /* port for plain and TLS POP3 */
+ "pop3s", /* port for SSL POP3 */
FALSE, /* this is not a tagged protocol */
TRUE, /* this uses a message delimiter */
pop3_ok, /* parse command response */
projects / ~andy / fetchmail / blobdiff