.\" Load www macros to process .URL requests, this requires groff:
.mso www.tmac
.\"
-.TH fetchmail 1 "fetchmail 7.0.0-alpha1" "fetchmail" "fetchmail reference manual"
+.TH fetchmail 1 "fetchmail 7.0.0-alpha3" "fetchmail" "fetchmail reference manual"
.SH NAME
fetchmail \- fetch mail from a POP, IMAP, ETRN, or ODMR-capable server
has not been compiled in).
.IP POP3
Post Office Protocol 3
-.IP APOP
-Use POP3 with old-fashioned MD5-challenge authentication.
-Considered not resistant to man-in-the-middle attacks.
.IP KPOP
Use POP3 with Kerberos V5 authentication on port 1109.
.IP SDPS
(Keyword: sslproto)
.br
Forces an SSL/TLS protocol. Possible values are \fB''\fP,
-\&'\fBSSL23\fP' (note however that fetchmail, since v6.3.20, prohibits
-negotiation of SSLv2 -- it has been deprecated for 15 years and is
-insecure), \&'\fBSSL3\fP', and
+\&'\fBSSL2\fP' (not supported on all systems),
+\&'\fBSSL23\fP', (use of these two values is discouraged
+and should only be used as a last resort) \&'\fBSSL3\fP', and
\&'\fBTLS1\fP'. The default behaviour if this option is unset is: for
connections without \-\-ssl, use \&'\fBTLS1\fP' so that fetchmail will
opportunistically try STARTTLS negotiation with TLS1. You can configure
database.
\fBNote that APOP is no longer considered resistant against
-man-in-the-middle attacks.\fP
+man-in-the-middle attacks, and should not be used without a verified
+SSL/TLS connection.\fP
.SS RETR or TOP
\fBfetchmail\fP makes some efforts to make the server believe messages
had not been retrieved, by using the TOP command with a large number of
T}
proto[col] \-p \& T{
Specify protocol (case insensitive):
-POP3, IMAP, APOP, KPOP
+POP3, IMAP, KPOP
T}
local[domains] \& m T{
Specify domain(s) to be regarded as local
.sp
.nf
auto (or AUTO) (legacy, to be removed from future release)
+
pop3 (or POP3)
- sdps (or SDPS)
+ sdps (or SDPS) (a POP3 variant specific to Demon)
+ kpop (or KPOP) (a Kerberos-based variant)
+
imap (or IMAP)
- apop (or APOP)
- kpop (or KPOP)
.fi
.sp
.PP
-Legal authentication types are 'any', 'password',
-\&'kerberos_v5' and 'gssapi', 'cram\-md5', 'otp', 'msn'
-(only for POP3), 'ntlm', 'ssh', 'external' (only IMAP).
+Legal authentication types are 'any', 'password', 'apop' (only for
+POP3), \&'kerberos_v5' and 'gssapi', 'cram\-md5', 'otp', 'msn'
+(only for POP3), 'ntlm', 'ssh', 'external' (only for IMAP).
The 'password' type specifies
-authentication by normal transmission of a password (the password may be
-plain text or subject to protocol-specific encryption as in CRAM-MD5);
+authentication by normal transmission of a password;
\&'kerberos_v5' tells \fBfetchmail\fP to try to get a Kerberos ticket at the
start of each query instead, and send an arbitrary string as the
password; and 'gssapi' tells fetchmail to use GSSAPI authentication.
session ID (this elaborate logic is designed to handle the case of
multiple names per userid gracefully).
+.IP \fBFETCHMAIL_DISABLE_CBC_IV_COUNTERMEASURE\fP
+(since v6.3.22):
+If this environment variable is set and not empty, fetchmail will disable
+a countermeasure against an SSL CBC IV attack (by setting
+SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS). This is a security risk, but may be
+necessary for connecting to certain non-standards-conforming servers.
+See fetchmail's NEWS file and fetchmail-SA-2012-01.txt for details.
+Earlier fetchmail versions (v6.3.21 and older) used to disable this
+countermeasure, but v6.3.22 no longer does that as a safety precaution.
+
.IP \fBFETCHMAIL_INCLUDE_DEFAULT_X509_CA_CERTS\fP
(since v6.3.17):
If this environment variable is set and not empty, fetchmail will always load
Running \fBfetchmail\fP in foreground while a background fetchmail is
running will do whichever of these is appropriate to wake it up.
-.SH BUGS AND KNOWN PROBLEMS
+.SH BUGS, LIMITATIONS, AND KNOWN PROBLEMS
.PP
Please check the \fBNEWS\fP file that shipped with fetchmail for more
known bugs than those listed here.
only hurt when using UID-based \-\-keep setups, so the 6.3.X versions of
fetchmail won't be fixed.
.PP
+Fetchmail cannot handle configurations where you have multiple accounts
+that use the same server name and the same login. Any user@server
+combination must be unique.
+.PP
The assumptions that the DNS and in particular the checkalias options
make are not often sustainable. For instance, it has become uncommon for
an MX server to be a POP3 or IMAP server at the same time. Therefore the