fix another typo, point one URL to CVE.

[~andy/fetchmail] / fetchmail-SA-2007-01.txt

diff --git a/fetchmail-SA-2007-01.txt b/fetchmail-SA-2007-01.txt
index 7c224f9344ef9f83c9a4b2fd263e3dad67ca818f..5a09c5b9011b170dddaf4ef8f5de3ba2f80833bf 100644 (file)
--- a/fetchmail-SA-2007-01.txt
+++ b/fetchmail-SA-2007-01.txt
@@ -1,9 +1,12 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
+Hash: SHA1
+
 fetchmail-SA-2007-01: APOP considered insecure
 
-Topics:                The POP3/APOP authentication, by itself, is considered broken.
+Topics:                APOP authentication insecure, fetchmail implementation lax
 
 Author:                Matthias Andree
-Version:       1.0
+Version:       1.1
 Announced:     2007-04-06
 Type:          password theft when under MITM attack
 Impact:                password disclosure possible
@@ -24,6 +27,7 @@ Corrected:    2007-03-18 fetchmail SVN
 ==================
 
 2007-04-06 1.0 first release
+2008-04-24 1.1 add --ssl to section 3. suggestion A below
 
 
 1. Background
@@ -44,9 +48,13 @@ control) files for fetchmail.
 The POP3 standard, currently RFC-1939, has specified an optional,
 MD5-based authentication scheme called "APOP".
 
-Fetchmail's POP3 client implementation however has happily accepted
-random garbage as a POP3 server's APOP challenge, rather than insisting
-that the APOP challenge conformed to RFC-822, as required by RFC-1939.
+APOP should no longer be considered secure.
+
+Additionally, fetchmail's POP3 client implementation has been validating
+the APOP challenge too lightly and accepted random garbage as a POP3
+server's APOP challenge, rather than insisting that the APOP challenge
+conformed to RFC-822, as required by RFC-1939.
+
 This made it easier than necessary for man-in-the-middle attackers to
 retrieve by several probing and guessing the first three characters of
 the APOP secret, bringing brute forcing the remaining characters well
@@ -60,7 +68,7 @@ Either of these is currently considered sufficient.
 
 A. Only use APOP on SSL or TLS secured connections with mandatory and thorough
    certificate validation, such as fetchmail --sslproto tls1 --sslcertck
-   or --sslproto ssl3 --sslcertck), or equivalent in the run control file.
+   or --ssl --sslproto ssl3 --sslcertck), or equivalent in the run control file.
 
 B. Avoid APOP and use stronger authenticators.
 
@@ -74,16 +82,32 @@ C. If you must continue to use APOP without SSL/TLS, then install
 A. Copyright, License and Warranty
 ==================================
 
-(C) Copyright 2007 by Matthias Andree, <matthias.andree@gmx.de>.
+(C) Copyright 2007, 2008 by Matthias Andree, <matthias.andree@gmx.de>.
 Some rights reserved.
 
-This work is licensed under the Creative Commons
-Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs German License. To view a copy of
-this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/de/
-or send a letter to Creative Commons; 559 Nathan Abbott Way;
-Stanford, California 94305; USA.
+This work is licensed under the
+Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivs 3.0 Germany License (CC BY-ND 3.0).
+
+To view a copy of this license, visit
+http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/de/deed.en
+or send a letter to:
+
+Creative Commons
+444 Castro Street
+Suite 900
+MOUNTAIN VIEW, CALIFORNIA 94041
+USA
+
 
 THIS WORK IS PROVIDED FREE OF CHARGE AND WITHOUT ANY WARRANTIES.
 Use the information herein at your own risk.
 
 END OF fetchmail-SA-2007-01.txt
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