Merge branch 'legacy_63'

[~andy/fetchmail] / fetchmail-SA-2006-02.txt

diff --git a/fetchmail-SA-2006-02.txt b/fetchmail-SA-2006-02.txt
index 1704512f6cde34d8752fc80aee7b026afc7e0e99..199489478d0c3e5569f4ab29151fb0812cda683f 100644 (file)
--- a/fetchmail-SA-2006-02.txt
+++ b/fetchmail-SA-2006-02.txt
@@ -1,10 +1,13 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
+Hash: SHA1
+
 fetchmail-SA-2006-02: TLS enforcement problem/MITM attack/password exposure
 
 Topics:                fetchmail cannot enforce TLS
 
 Author:                Matthias Andree
-Version:       XXX
-Announced:     2006-11-XX
+Version:       1.1
+Announced:     2007-01-04
 Type:          secret information disclosure
 Impact:                fetchmail can expose cleartext password over unsecure link
                fetchmail may not detect man in the middle attacks
@@ -17,8 +20,9 @@ Project URL:  http://fetchmail.berlios.de/
 Affects:       fetchmail releases <= 6.3.5
                fetchmail release candidates 6.3.6-rc1, -rc2, -rc3
 
-Not affected:  fetchmail release candidate 6.3.6-rc4
+Not affected:  fetchmail release candidates 6.3.6-rc4, -rc5
                fetchmail release 6.3.6
+               fetchmail release 6.3.7
 
 Corrected:     2006-11-26 fetchmail 6.3.6-rc4
 
@@ -29,6 +33,8 @@ Corrected:    2006-11-26 fetchmail 6.3.6-rc4
 2006-11-16     v0.01 internal review draft
 2006-11-26     v0.02 revise failure cases, workaround, add acknowledgments
 2006-11-27     v0.03 add more vulnerabilities
+2007-01-04     v1.0  ready for release
+2007-02-18     v1.1  mention 6.3.7 that fixes two regressions
 
 
 1. Background
@@ -60,7 +66,8 @@ V3. POP3 fetches could completely ignore all TLS options whether
     available or not because it didn't reliably issue CAPA before
     checking for STLS support - but CAPA is a requisite for STLS.
     Whether or not CAPAbilities were probed, depended on the "auth"
-    option.
+    option. (Fetchmail only tried CAPA if the auth option was not set at
+    all, was set to gssapi, kerberos, kerberos_v4, otp, or cram-md5.)
 
 V4. POP3 could fall back to using plain text passwords, even if strong
     authentication had been configured.
@@ -85,7 +92,13 @@ or equivalent in the run control file.  This encrypts the whole session.
 4. Solution
 ===========
 
-Download and install fetchmail 6.3.6 or a newer stable release from
+  The earlier recommendation to install 6.3.6 is hereby updated, since
+  version 6.3.6 introduced two new regressions fixed in 6.3.7: one broke
+  KPOP altogether and one broke the automatic POP3 retries without TLS
+  if a server advertised TLS but then closed the connection and TLS
+  wasn't enforced.
+
+Download and install fetchmail 6.3.7 or a newer stable release from
 fetchmail's project site at
 <http://developer.berlios.de/project/showfiles.php?group_id=1824>.
 
@@ -100,16 +113,32 @@ them right.
 A. Copyright, License and Warranty
 ==================================
 
-(C) Copyright 2006 by Matthias Andree, <matthias.andree@gmx.de>.
+(C) Copyright 2007 by Matthias Andree, <matthias.andree@gmx.de>.
 Some rights reserved.
 
-This work is licensed under the Creative Commons
-Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs German License. To view a copy of
-this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/de/
-or send a letter to Creative Commons; 559 Nathan Abbott Way;
-Stanford, California 94305; USA.
+This work is licensed under the
+Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivs 3.0 Germany License (CC BY-ND 3.0).
+
+To view a copy of this license, visit
+http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/de/deed.en
+or send a letter to:
+
+Creative Commons
+444 Castro Street
+Suite 900
+MOUNTAIN VIEW, CALIFORNIA 94041
+USA
+
 
 THIS WORK IS PROVIDED FREE OF CHARGE AND WITHOUT ANY WARRANTIES.
 Use the information herein at your own risk.
 
 END OF fetchmail-SA-2006-02.txt
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