X-Git-Url: http://pileus.org/git/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=socket.c;h=634b4760b87d0ffa106620e62a436967a50d1ea8;hb=2629c4511c68729d98acfd08637c1f00d3807f49;hp=51c1552913a36a1e523644881a4dfd9a7769b31f;hpb=4691082c9b0659476e919bd7a8a30ec1b5537a7c;p=~andy%2Ffetchmail diff --git a/socket.c b/socket.c index 51c15529..634b4760 100644 --- a/socket.c +++ b/socket.c @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ #include "fetchmail.h" #include "getaddrinfo.h" #include "i18n.h" +#include "sdump.h" /* Defines to allow BeOS and Cygwin to play nice... */ #ifdef __BEOS__ @@ -74,20 +75,15 @@ static ssize_t cygwin_read(int sock, void *buf, size_t count); /* We need to define h_errno only if it is not already */ #ifndef h_errno - -#ifdef HAVE_RES_SEARCH -/* some versions of FreeBSD should declare this but don't */ +# if !HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO extern int h_errno; -#else -/* pretend we have h_errno to avoid some #ifdef's later */ -static int h_errno; -#endif - +# endif #endif /* ndef h_errno */ #ifdef HAVE_SOCKETPAIR static char *const *parse_plugin(const char *plugin, const char *host, const char *service) -{ const char **argvec; +{ + char **argvec; const char *c, *p; char *cp, *plugin_copy; unsigned int plugin_copy_len; @@ -134,25 +130,25 @@ static char *const *parse_plugin(const char *plugin, const char *host, const cha } plugin_copy[plugin_copy_len] = 0; - argvec = (const char **)malloc(s); + argvec = (char **)malloc(s); if (!argvec) { report(stderr, GT_("fetchmail: malloc failed\n")); return NULL; } memset(argvec, 0, s); - for (c = p = plugin_copy, i = 0; *c; c++) - { if ((!isspace((unsigned char)*c)) && (c == p ? 1 : isspace((unsigned char)*p))) { - argvec[i] = c; + for (p = cp = plugin_copy, i = 0; *cp; cp++) + { if ((!isspace((unsigned char)*cp)) && (cp == p ? 1 : isspace((unsigned char)*p))) { + argvec[i] = cp; i++; } - p = c; + p = cp; } for (cp = plugin_copy; *cp; cp++) { if (isspace((unsigned char)*cp)) *cp = 0; } - return (char *const*)argvec; + return argvec; } static int handle_plugin(const char *host, @@ -183,7 +179,7 @@ static int handle_plugin(const char *host, (void) close(fds[1]); if ( (dup2(fds[0],0) == -1) || (dup2(fds[0],1) == -1) ) { report(stderr, GT_("dup2 failed\n")); - exit(1); + _exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } /* fds[0] is now connected to 0 and 1; close it */ (void) close(fds[0]); @@ -192,7 +188,7 @@ static int handle_plugin(const char *host, argvec = parse_plugin(plugin,host,service); execvp(*argvec, argvec); report(stderr, GT_("execvp(%s) failed\n"), *argvec); - exit(0); + _exit(EXIT_FAILURE); break; default: /* parent */ /* NOP */ @@ -204,29 +200,11 @@ static int handle_plugin(const char *host, } #endif /* HAVE_SOCKETPAIR */ -#ifdef __UNUSED__ - -int SockCheckOpen(int fd) -/* poll given socket; is it selectable? */ -{ - fd_set r, w, e; - int rt; - struct timeval tv; - - for (;;) - { - FD_ZERO(&r); FD_ZERO(&w); FD_ZERO(&e); - FD_SET(fd, &e); - - tv.tv_sec = 0; tv.tv_usec = 0; - rt = select(fd+1, &r, &w, &e, &tv); - if (rt == -1 && (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR)) - return 0; - if (rt != -1) - return 1; - } +/** Set socket to SO_KEEPALIVE. \return 0 for success. */ +int SockKeepalive(int sock) { + int keepalive = 1; + return setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &keepalive, sizeof keepalive); } -#endif /* __UNUSED__ */ int UnixOpen(const char *path) { @@ -243,12 +221,12 @@ int UnixOpen(const char *path) return -1; } - /* Socket opened saved. Usefull if connect timeout - * because it can be closed. - */ - mailserver_socket_temp = sock; - - if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &ad, sizeof(ad)) < 0) + /* Socket opened saved. Usefull if connect timeout + * because it can be closed. + */ + mailserver_socket_temp = sock; + + if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &ad, sizeof(ad)) < 0) { int olderr = errno; fm_close(sock); /* don't use SockClose, no traffic yet */ @@ -256,9 +234,9 @@ int UnixOpen(const char *path) errno = olderr; sock = -1; } - - /* No connect timeout, then no need to set mailserver_socket_temp */ - mailserver_socket_temp = -1; + + /* No connect timeout, then no need to set mailserver_socket_temp */ + mailserver_socket_temp = -1; return sock; } @@ -268,6 +246,8 @@ int SockOpen(const char *host, const char *service, { struct addrinfo *ai, req; int i, acterr = 0; + int ord; + char errbuf[8192] = ""; #ifdef HAVE_SOCKETPAIR if (plugin) @@ -276,6 +256,9 @@ int SockOpen(const char *host, const char *service, memset(&req, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo)); req.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; +#ifdef AI_ADDRCONFIG + req.ai_flags = AI_ADDRCONFIG; +#endif i = fm_getaddrinfo(host, service, &req, ai0); if (i) { @@ -286,10 +269,13 @@ int SockOpen(const char *host, const char *service, return -1; } + /* NOTE a Linux bug here - getaddrinfo will happily return 127.0.0.1 + * twice if no IPv6 is configured */ i = -1; - for (ai = *ai0; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { - char buf[80],pb[80]; - int gnie; + for (ord = 0, ai = *ai0; ai; ord++, ai = ai->ai_next) { + char buf[256]; /* hostname */ + char pb[256]; /* service name */ + int gnie; /* getnameinfo result code */ gnie = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, buf, sizeof(buf), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST); if (gnie) @@ -300,17 +286,22 @@ int SockOpen(const char *host, const char *service, if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) report_build(stdout, GT_("Trying to connect to %s/%s..."), buf, pb); - i = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, 0); + i = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (i < 0) { + int e = errno; /* mask EAFNOSUPPORT errors, they confuse users for * multihomed hosts */ if (errno != EAFNOSUPPORT) acterr = errno; if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) - report_complete(stdout, GT_("cannot create socket: %s\n"), strerror(errno)); + report_complete(stdout, GT_("cannot create socket: %s\n"), strerror(e)); + snprintf(errbuf+strlen(errbuf), sizeof(errbuf)-strlen(errbuf),\ + GT_("name %d: cannot create socket family %d type %d: %s\n"), ord, ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, strerror(e)); continue; } + SockKeepalive(i); + /* Save socket descriptor. * Used to close the socket after connect timeout. */ mailserver_socket_temp = i; @@ -324,8 +315,9 @@ int SockOpen(const char *host, const char *service, if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) report_complete(stdout, GT_("connection failed.\n")); - if (outlevel > O_SILENT) + if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) report(stderr, GT_("connection to %s:%s [%s/%s] failed: %s.\n"), host, service, buf, pb, strerror(e)); + snprintf(errbuf+strlen(errbuf), sizeof(errbuf)-strlen(errbuf), GT_("name %d: connection to %s:%s [%s/%s] failed: %s.\n"), ord, host, service, buf, pb, strerror(e)); fm_close(i); i = -1; continue; @@ -343,8 +335,10 @@ int SockOpen(const char *host, const char *service, fm_freeaddrinfo(*ai0); *ai0 = NULL; - if (i == -1) + if (i == -1) { + report(stderr, GT_("Connection errors for this poll:\n%s"), errbuf); errno = acterr; + } return i; } @@ -387,7 +381,7 @@ static SSL *_ssl_context[FD_SETSIZE]; static SSL *SSLGetContext( int ); #endif /* SSL_ENABLE */ -int SockWrite(int sock, char *buf, int len) +int SockWrite(int sock, const char *buf, int len) { int n, wrlen = 0; #ifdef SSL_ENABLE @@ -442,7 +436,7 @@ int SockRead(int sock, char *buf, int len) /* OK... SSL_peek works a little different from MSG_PEEK Problem is that SSL_peek can return 0 if there is no data currently available. If, on the other - hand, we loose the socket, we also get a zero, but + hand, we lose the socket, we also get a zero, but the SSL_read then SEGFAULTS! To deal with this, we'll check the error code any time we get a return of zero from SSL_peek. If we have an error, we bail. @@ -458,7 +452,7 @@ int SockRead(int sock, char *buf, int len) /* SSL_peek says no data... Does he mean no data or did the connection blow up? If we got an error then bail! */ - if( 0 != ( n = SSL_get_error(ssl, n) ) ) { + if (0 != SSL_get_error(ssl, n)) { return -1; } /* We didn't get an error so read at least one @@ -538,7 +532,7 @@ int SockPeek(int sock) /* SSL_peek says 0... Does that mean no data or did the connection blow up? If we got an error then bail! */ - if( 0 != ( n = SSL_get_error(ssl, n) ) ) { + if(0 != SSL_get_error(ssl, n)) { return -1; } @@ -570,7 +564,9 @@ static int _check_fp; static char *_check_digest; static char *_server_label; static int _depth0ck; +static int _firstrun; static int _prev_err; +static int _verify_ok; SSL *SSLGetContext( int sock ) { @@ -581,12 +577,12 @@ SSL *SSLGetContext( int sock ) return _ssl_context[sock]; } - /* ok_return (preverify_ok) is 1 if this stage of certificate verification passed, or 0 if it failed. This callback lets us display informative errors, and perform additional validation (e.g. CN matches) */ static int SSL_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int strict ) { +#define SSLverbose (((outlevel) >= O_DEBUG) || ((outlevel) >= O_VERBOSE && (depth) == 0)) char buf[257]; X509 *x509_cert; int err, depth, i; @@ -595,6 +591,7 @@ static int SSL_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int strict ) const EVP_MD *digest_tp; unsigned int dsz, esz; X509_NAME *subj, *issuer; + char *tt; x509_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx); err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); @@ -603,79 +600,108 @@ static int SSL_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int strict ) subj = X509_get_subject_name(x509_cert); issuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x509_cert); - if (depth == 0 && !_depth0ck) { - _depth0ck = 1; - - if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) { + if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) { + if (depth == 0 && SSLverbose) + report(stdout, GT_("Server certificate:\n")); + else { + if (_firstrun) { + _firstrun = 0; + if (SSLverbose) + report(stdout, GT_("Certificate chain, from root to peer, starting at depth %d:\n"), depth); + } else { + if (SSLverbose) + report(stdout, GT_("Certificate at depth %d:\n"), depth); + } + } + + if (SSLverbose) { if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(issuer, NID_organizationName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) { - report(stdout, GT_("Issuer Organization: %s\n"), buf); + report(stdout, GT_("Issuer Organization: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(buf, i))); + xfree(tt); if ((size_t)i >= sizeof(buf) - 1) report(stdout, GT_("Warning: Issuer Organization Name too long (possibly truncated).\n")); } else report(stdout, GT_("Unknown Organization\n")); if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(issuer, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) { - report(stdout, GT_("Issuer CommonName: %s\n"), buf); + report(stdout, GT_("Issuer CommonName: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(buf, i))); + xfree(tt); if ((size_t)i >= sizeof(buf) - 1) report(stdout, GT_("Warning: Issuer CommonName too long (possibly truncated).\n")); } else report(stdout, GT_("Unknown Issuer CommonName\n")); } + } + + if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subj, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) { + if (SSLverbose) { + report(stdout, GT_("Subject CommonName: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(buf, i))); + xfree(tt); + } + if ((size_t)i >= sizeof(buf) - 1) { + /* Possible truncation. In this case, this is a DNS name, so this + * is really bad. We do not tolerate this even in the non-strict case. */ + report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject CommonName too long!\n")); + return (0); + } + if ((size_t)i > strlen(buf)) { + /* Name contains embedded NUL characters, so we complain. This is likely + * a certificate spoofing attack. */ + report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject CommonName contains NUL, aborting!\n")); + return 0; + } + } + + if (depth == 0) { /* peer certificate */ + if (!_depth0ck) { + _depth0ck = 1; + } + if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subj, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) { - if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) - report(stdout, GT_("Server CommonName: %s\n"), buf); - if ((size_t)i >= sizeof(buf) - 1) { - /* Possible truncation. In this case, this is a DNS name, so this - * is really bad. We do not tolerate this even in the non-strict case. */ - report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject CommonName too long!\n")); - return (0); - } if (_ssl_server_cname != NULL) { char *p1 = buf; char *p2 = _ssl_server_cname; - int n; int matched = 0; STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gens; - + /* RFC 2595 section 2.4: find a matching name * first find a match among alternative names */ gens = (STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *)X509_get_ext_d2i(x509_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL); if (gens) { - int i, r; - for (i = 0, r = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i < r; ++i) { - const GENERAL_NAME *gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); + int j, r; + for (j = 0, r = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); j < r; ++j) { + const GENERAL_NAME *gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, j); if (gn->type == GEN_DNS) { - char *p1 = (char *)gn->d.ia5->data; - char *p2 = _ssl_server_cname; - if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) - report(stderr, "Subject Alternative Name: %s\n", p1); - if (*p1 == '*') { - ++p1; - n = strlen(p2) - strlen(p1); - if (n >= 0) - p2 += n; + char *pp1 = (char *)gn->d.ia5->data; + char *pp2 = _ssl_server_cname; + if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) { + report(stdout, GT_("Subject Alternative Name: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(pp1, (size_t)gn->d.ia5->length))); + xfree(tt); + } + /* Name contains embedded NUL characters, so we complain. This + * is likely a certificate spoofing attack. */ + if ((size_t)gn->d.ia5->length != strlen(pp1)) { + report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject Alternative Name contains NUL, aborting!\n")); + sk_GENERAL_NAME_free(gens); + return 0; } - if (0 == strcasecmp(p1, p2)) { - matched = 1; + if (name_match(pp1, pp2)) { + matched = 1; } } } sk_GENERAL_NAME_free(gens); } - if (*p1 == '*') { - ++p1; - n = strlen(p2) - strlen(p1); - if (n >= 0) - p2 += n; - } - if (0 == strcasecmp(p1, p2)) { - matched = 1; + if (name_match(p1, p2)) { + matched = 1; } if (!matched) { - report(stderr, - GT_("Server CommonName mismatch: %s != %s\n"), - buf, _ssl_server_cname ); - if (ok_return && strict) - return (0); + if (strict || SSLverbose) { + report(stderr, + GT_("Server CommonName mismatch: %s != %s\n"), + (tt = sdump(buf, i)), _ssl_server_cname ); + xfree(tt); + } + ok_return = 0; } } else if (ok_return) { report(stderr, GT_("Server name not set, could not verify certificate!\n")); @@ -730,13 +756,30 @@ static int SSL_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int strict ) if (err != X509_V_OK && err != _prev_err && !(_check_fp != 0 && _check_digest && !strict)) { _prev_err = err; - report(stderr, GT_("Server certificate verification error: %s\n"), X509_verify_cert_error_string(err)); - /* We gave the error code, but maybe we can add some more details for debugging */ + + report(stderr, GT_("Server certificate verification error: %s\n"), X509_verify_cert_error_string(err)); + /* We gave the error code, but maybe we can add some more details for debugging */ + switch (err) { case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: X509_NAME_oneline(issuer, buf, sizeof(buf)); buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0'; report(stderr, GT_("unknown issuer (first %d characters): %s\n"), (int)(sizeof(buf)-1), buf); + report(stderr, GT_("This error usually happens when the server provides an incomplete certificate " + "chain, which is nothing fetchmail could do anything about. For details, " + "please see the README.SSL-SERVER document that comes with fetchmail.\n")); + break; + case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: + case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: + case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: + X509_NAME_oneline(subj, buf, sizeof(buf)); + buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0'; + report(stderr, GT_("This means that the root signing certificate (issued for %s) is not in the " + "trusted CA certificate locations, or that c_rehash needs to be run " + "on the certificate directory. For details, please " + "see the documentation of --sslcertpath and --sslcertfile in the manual page.\n"), buf); + break; + default: break; } } @@ -744,6 +787,7 @@ static int SSL_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int strict ) * If not in strict checking mode (--sslcertck), override this * and pretend that verification had succeeded. */ + _verify_ok &= ok_return; if (!strict) ok_return = 1; return (ok_return); @@ -794,16 +838,18 @@ static const char *SSLCertGetCN(const char *mycert, * uses SSL *ssl global variable, which is currently defined * in this file */ -int SSLOpen(int sock, char *mycert, char *mykey, char *myproto, int certck, char *certpath, +int SSLOpen(int sock, char *mycert, char *mykey, const char *myproto, int certck, + char *cacertfile, char *certpath, char *fingerprint, char *servercname, char *label, char **remotename) { struct stat randstat; int i; + long sslopts = SSL_OP_ALL; SSL_load_error_strings(); - SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms(); /* synonym for SSL_library_init() */ - -#ifdef SSL_ENABLE + SSL_library_init(); + OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); /* see Debian Bug#576430 and manpage */ + if (stat("/dev/random", &randstat) && stat("/dev/urandom", &randstat)) { /* Neither /dev/random nor /dev/urandom are present, so add @@ -819,8 +865,6 @@ int SSLOpen(int sock, char *mycert, char *mykey, char *myproto, int certck, char RAND_add (buf, sizeof buf, 0.1); } } -#endif /* SSL_ENABLE */ - if( sock < 0 || (unsigned)sock > FD_SETSIZE ) { report(stderr, GT_("File descriptor out of range for SSL") ); @@ -831,7 +875,12 @@ int SSLOpen(int sock, char *mycert, char *mykey, char *myproto, int certck, char _ssl_context[sock] = NULL; if(myproto) { if(!strcasecmp("ssl2",myproto)) { +#if HAVE_DECL_SSLV2_CLIENT_METHOD + 0 > 0 _ctx[sock] = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv2_client_method()); +#else + report(stderr, GT_("Your operating system does not support SSLv2.\n")); + return -1; +#endif } else if(!strcasecmp("ssl3",myproto)) { _ctx[sock] = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv3_client_method()); } else if(!strcasecmp("tls1",myproto)) { @@ -851,19 +900,40 @@ int SSLOpen(int sock, char *mycert, char *mykey, char *myproto, int certck, char return(-1); } - SSL_CTX_set_options(_ctx[sock], SSL_OP_ALL); + { + char *tmp = getenv("FETCHMAIL_DISABLE_CBC_IV_COUNTERMEASURE"); + if (tmp == NULL || *tmp == '\0' || strspn(tmp, " \t") == strlen(tmp)) + sslopts &= ~ SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS; + } + + SSL_CTX_set_options(_ctx[sock], sslopts); if (certck) { SSL_CTX_set_verify(_ctx[sock], SSL_VERIFY_PEER, SSL_ck_verify_callback); } else { /* In this case, we do not fail if verification fails. However, - * we provide the callback for output and possible fingerprint checks. */ + * we provide the callback for output and possible fingerprint + * checks. */ SSL_CTX_set_verify(_ctx[sock], SSL_VERIFY_PEER, SSL_nock_verify_callback); } - if (certpath) - SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(_ctx[sock], NULL, certpath); - else - SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(_ctx[sock]); + + /* Check which trusted X.509 CA certificate store(s) to load */ + { + char *tmp; + int want_default_cacerts = 0; + + /* Load user locations if any is given */ + if (certpath || cacertfile) + SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(_ctx[sock], + cacertfile, certpath); + else + want_default_cacerts = 1; + + tmp = getenv("FETCHMAIL_INCLUDE_DEFAULT_X509_CA_CERTS"); + if (want_default_cacerts || (tmp && tmp[0])) { + SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(_ctx[sock]); + } + } _ssl_context[sock] = SSL_new(_ctx[sock]); @@ -880,6 +950,8 @@ int SSLOpen(int sock, char *mycert, char *mykey, char *myproto, int certck, char _check_fp = 1; _check_digest = fingerprint; _depth0ck = 0; + _firstrun = 1; + _verify_ok = 1; _prev_err = -1; if( mycert || mykey ) { @@ -930,6 +1002,11 @@ int SSLOpen(int sock, char *mycert, char *mykey, char *myproto, int certck, char } } + if (!certck && !fingerprint && + (SSL_get_verify_result(_ssl_context[sock]) != X509_V_OK || !_verify_ok)) { + report(stderr, GT_("Warning: the connection is insecure, continuing anyways. (Better use --sslcertck!)\n")); + } + return(0); } #endif @@ -948,30 +1025,6 @@ int SockClose(int sock) } #endif -#ifdef __UNUSED__ - /* - * This hangs in RedHat 6.2 after fetchmail runs for a while a - * FIN_WAIT2 comes up in netstat and fetchmail never returns from - * the recv system call. (Reported from jtnews - * , Wed, 24 May 2000 21:26:02.) - * - * Half-close the connection first so the other end gets notified. - * - * This stops sends but allows receives (effectively, it sends a - * TCP ). */ - if (shutdown(sock, 1) == 0) { - char ch; - /* If there is any data still waiting in the queue, discard it. - * Call recv() until either it returns 0 (meaning we received a FIN) - * or any error occurs. This makes sure all data sent by the other - * side is acknowledged at the TCP level. - */ - if (fm_peek(sock, &ch, 1) > 0) - while (fm_read(sock, &ch, 1) > 0) - continue; - } -#endif /* __UNUSED__ */ - /* if there's an error closing at this point, not much we can do */ return(fm_close(sock)); /* this is guarded */ } @@ -984,18 +1037,18 @@ int SockClose(int sock) */ static ssize_t cygwin_read(int sock, void *buf, size_t count) { - char *bp = buf; - int n = 0; + char *bp = (char *)buf; + size_t n = 0; - if ((n = read(sock, bp, count)) == -1) + if ((n = read(sock, bp, count)) == (size_t)-1) return(-1); if (n != count) { - int n2 = 0; + size_t n2 = 0; if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) report(stdout, GT_("Cygwin socket read retry\n")); n2 = read(sock, bp + n, count - n); - if (n2 == -1 || n + n2 != count) { + if (n2 == (size_t)-1 || n + n2 != count) { report(stderr, GT_("Cygwin socket read retry failed!\n")); return(-1); } @@ -1004,21 +1057,3 @@ static ssize_t cygwin_read(int sock, void *buf, size_t count) return count; } #endif /* __CYGWIN__ */ - -#ifdef MAIN -/* - * Use the chargen service to test input buffering directly. - * You may have to uncomment the `chargen' service description in your - * inetd.conf (and then SIGHUP inetd) for this to work. */ -main() -{ - int sock = SockOpen("localhost", "chargen", NULL); - char buf[80]; - - while (SockRead(sock, buf, sizeof(buf)-1)) - SockWrite(1, buf, strlen(buf)); - SockClose(sock); -} -#endif /* MAIN */ - -/* socket.c ends here */