X-Git-Url: http://pileus.org/git/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=socket.c;h=58a8e15e807e4258a717933b5603da522c08473f;hb=53293ee30678d3db753e51820cc554c0b2b1bd97;hp=e5c52104e159717320581b8a56b2b6505560cb66;hpb=566be2787e2e5dea4ed95f389fdceec6bb62f671;p=~andy%2Ffetchmail diff --git a/socket.c b/socket.c index e5c52104..58a8e15e 100644 --- a/socket.c +++ b/socket.c @@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ static char *const *parse_plugin(const char *plugin, const char *host, const cha argvec = (char **)malloc(s); if (!argvec) { + free(plugin_copy); report(stderr, GT_("fetchmail: malloc failed\n")); return NULL; } @@ -179,16 +180,18 @@ static int handle_plugin(const char *host, (void) close(fds[1]); if ( (dup2(fds[0],0) == -1) || (dup2(fds[0],1) == -1) ) { report(stderr, GT_("dup2 failed\n")); - exit(1); + _exit(EXIT_FAILURE); } /* fds[0] is now connected to 0 and 1; close it */ (void) close(fds[0]); if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) report(stderr, GT_("running %s (host %s service %s)\n"), plugin, host, service); argvec = parse_plugin(plugin,host,service); + if (argvec == NULL) + _exit(EXIT_FAILURE); execvp(*argvec, argvec); report(stderr, GT_("execvp(%s) failed\n"), *argvec); - exit(0); + _exit(EXIT_FAILURE); break; default: /* parent */ /* NOP */ @@ -200,29 +203,11 @@ static int handle_plugin(const char *host, } #endif /* HAVE_SOCKETPAIR */ -#ifdef __UNUSED__ - -int SockCheckOpen(int fd) -/* poll given socket; is it selectable? */ -{ - fd_set r, w, e; - int rt; - struct timeval tv; - - for (;;) - { - FD_ZERO(&r); FD_ZERO(&w); FD_ZERO(&e); - FD_SET(fd, &e); - - tv.tv_sec = 0; tv.tv_usec = 0; - rt = select(fd+1, &r, &w, &e, &tv); - if (rt == -1 && (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR)) - return 0; - if (rt != -1) - return 1; - } +/** Set socket to SO_KEEPALIVE. \return 0 for success. */ +int SockKeepalive(int sock) { + int keepalive = 1; + return setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &keepalive, sizeof keepalive); } -#endif /* __UNUSED__ */ int UnixOpen(const char *path) { @@ -239,12 +224,12 @@ int UnixOpen(const char *path) return -1; } - /* Socket opened saved. Usefull if connect timeout - * because it can be closed. - */ - mailserver_socket_temp = sock; - - if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &ad, sizeof(ad)) < 0) + /* Socket opened saved. Usefull if connect timeout + * because it can be closed. + */ + mailserver_socket_temp = sock; + + if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &ad, sizeof(ad)) < 0) { int olderr = errno; fm_close(sock); /* don't use SockClose, no traffic yet */ @@ -252,9 +237,9 @@ int UnixOpen(const char *path) errno = olderr; sock = -1; } - - /* No connect timeout, then no need to set mailserver_socket_temp */ - mailserver_socket_temp = -1; + + /* No connect timeout, then no need to set mailserver_socket_temp */ + mailserver_socket_temp = -1; return sock; } @@ -264,6 +249,8 @@ int SockOpen(const char *host, const char *service, { struct addrinfo *ai, req; int i, acterr = 0; + int ord; + char errbuf[8192] = ""; #ifdef HAVE_SOCKETPAIR if (plugin) @@ -285,10 +272,13 @@ int SockOpen(const char *host, const char *service, return -1; } + /* NOTE a Linux bug here - getaddrinfo will happily return 127.0.0.1 + * twice if no IPv6 is configured */ i = -1; - for (ai = *ai0; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { - char buf[80],pb[80]; - int gnie; + for (ord = 0, ai = *ai0; ai; ord++, ai = ai->ai_next) { + char buf[256]; /* hostname */ + char pb[256]; /* service name */ + int gnie; /* getnameinfo result code */ gnie = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, buf, sizeof(buf), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST); if (gnie) @@ -299,17 +289,22 @@ int SockOpen(const char *host, const char *service, if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) report_build(stdout, GT_("Trying to connect to %s/%s..."), buf, pb); - i = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, 0); + i = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (i < 0) { + int e = errno; /* mask EAFNOSUPPORT errors, they confuse users for * multihomed hosts */ if (errno != EAFNOSUPPORT) acterr = errno; if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) - report_complete(stdout, GT_("cannot create socket: %s\n"), strerror(errno)); + report_complete(stdout, GT_("cannot create socket: %s\n"), strerror(e)); + snprintf(errbuf+strlen(errbuf), sizeof(errbuf)-strlen(errbuf),\ + GT_("name %d: cannot create socket family %d type %d: %s\n"), ord, ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, strerror(e)); continue; } + SockKeepalive(i); + /* Save socket descriptor. * Used to close the socket after connect timeout. */ mailserver_socket_temp = i; @@ -323,8 +318,9 @@ int SockOpen(const char *host, const char *service, if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) report_complete(stdout, GT_("connection failed.\n")); - if (outlevel > O_SILENT) + if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) report(stderr, GT_("connection to %s:%s [%s/%s] failed: %s.\n"), host, service, buf, pb, strerror(e)); + snprintf(errbuf+strlen(errbuf), sizeof(errbuf)-strlen(errbuf), GT_("name %d: connection to %s:%s [%s/%s] failed: %s.\n"), ord, host, service, buf, pb, strerror(e)); fm_close(i); i = -1; continue; @@ -342,8 +338,10 @@ int SockOpen(const char *host, const char *service, fm_freeaddrinfo(*ai0); *ai0 = NULL; - if (i == -1) + if (i == -1) { + report(stderr, GT_("Connection errors for this poll:\n%s"), errbuf); errno = acterr; + } return i; } @@ -380,6 +378,20 @@ va_dcl { #include #include +static void report_SSL_errors(FILE *stream) +{ + unsigned long err; + + while (0ul != (err = ERR_get_error())) { + char *errstr = ERR_error_string(err, NULL); + report(stream, GT_("OpenSSL reported: %s\n"), errstr); + } +} + +/* override ERR_print_errors_fp to our own implementation */ +#undef ERR_print_errors_fp +#define ERR_print_errors_fp(stream) report_SSL_errors((stream)) + static SSL_CTX *_ctx[FD_SETSIZE]; static SSL *_ssl_context[FD_SETSIZE]; @@ -441,7 +453,7 @@ int SockRead(int sock, char *buf, int len) /* OK... SSL_peek works a little different from MSG_PEEK Problem is that SSL_peek can return 0 if there is no data currently available. If, on the other - hand, we loose the socket, we also get a zero, but + hand, we lose the socket, we also get a zero, but the SSL_read then SEGFAULTS! To deal with this, we'll check the error code any time we get a return of zero from SSL_peek. If we have an error, we bail. @@ -569,7 +581,9 @@ static int _check_fp; static char *_check_digest; static char *_server_label; static int _depth0ck; +static int _firstrun; static int _prev_err; +static int _verify_ok; SSL *SSLGetContext( int sock ) { @@ -580,12 +594,12 @@ SSL *SSLGetContext( int sock ) return _ssl_context[sock]; } - /* ok_return (preverify_ok) is 1 if this stage of certificate verification passed, or 0 if it failed. This callback lets us display informative errors, and perform additional validation (e.g. CN matches) */ static int SSL_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int strict ) { +#define SSLverbose (((outlevel) >= O_DEBUG) || ((outlevel) >= O_VERBOSE && (depth) == 0)) char buf[257]; X509 *x509_cert; int err, depth, i; @@ -603,10 +617,21 @@ static int SSL_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int strict ) subj = X509_get_subject_name(x509_cert); issuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x509_cert); - if (depth == 0 && !_depth0ck) { - _depth0ck = 1; + if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) { + if (depth == 0 && SSLverbose) + report(stdout, GT_("Server certificate:\n")); + else { + if (_firstrun) { + _firstrun = 0; + if (SSLverbose) + report(stdout, GT_("Certificate chain, from root to peer, starting at depth %d:\n"), depth); + } else { + if (SSLverbose) + report(stdout, GT_("Certificate at depth %d:\n"), depth); + } + } - if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) { + if (SSLverbose) { if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(issuer, NID_organizationName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) { report(stdout, GT_("Issuer Organization: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(buf, i))); xfree(tt); @@ -622,30 +647,39 @@ static int SSL_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int strict ) } else report(stdout, GT_("Unknown Issuer CommonName\n")); } + } + + if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subj, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) { + if (SSLverbose) { + report(stdout, GT_("Subject CommonName: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(buf, i))); + xfree(tt); + } + if ((size_t)i >= sizeof(buf) - 1) { + /* Possible truncation. In this case, this is a DNS name, so this + * is really bad. We do not tolerate this even in the non-strict case. */ + report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject CommonName too long!\n")); + return (0); + } + if ((size_t)i > strlen(buf)) { + /* Name contains embedded NUL characters, so we complain. This is likely + * a certificate spoofing attack. */ + report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject CommonName contains NUL, aborting!\n")); + return 0; + } + } + + if (depth == 0) { /* peer certificate */ + if (!_depth0ck) { + _depth0ck = 1; + } + if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subj, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) { - if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) { - report(stdout, GT_("Server CommonName: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(buf, i))); - xfree(tt); - } - if ((size_t)i >= sizeof(buf) - 1) { - /* Possible truncation. In this case, this is a DNS name, so this - * is really bad. We do not tolerate this even in the non-strict case. */ - report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject CommonName too long!\n")); - return (0); - } - if ((size_t)i > strlen(buf)) { - /* Name contains embedded NUL characters, so we complain. This is likely - * a certificate spoofing attack. */ - report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject CommonName contains NUL, aborting!\n")); - return 0; - } if (_ssl_server_cname != NULL) { char *p1 = buf; char *p2 = _ssl_server_cname; - int n; int matched = 0; STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gens; - + /* RFC 2595 section 2.4: find a matching name * first find a match among alternative names */ gens = (STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *)X509_get_ext_d2i(x509_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL); @@ -654,48 +688,37 @@ static int SSL_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int strict ) for (j = 0, r = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); j < r; ++j) { const GENERAL_NAME *gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, j); if (gn->type == GEN_DNS) { - char *p1 = (char *)gn->d.ia5->data; - char *p2 = _ssl_server_cname; + char *pp1 = (char *)gn->d.ia5->data; + char *pp2 = _ssl_server_cname; if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) { - report(stdout, GT_("Subject Alternative Name: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(p1, (size_t)gn->d.ia5->length))); + report(stdout, GT_("Subject Alternative Name: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(pp1, (size_t)gn->d.ia5->length))); xfree(tt); } /* Name contains embedded NUL characters, so we complain. This * is likely a certificate spoofing attack. */ - if ((size_t)gn->d.ia5->length != strlen(p1)) { + if ((size_t)gn->d.ia5->length != strlen(pp1)) { report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject Alternative Name contains NUL, aborting!\n")); sk_GENERAL_NAME_free(gens); return 0; } - if (*p1 == '*') { - ++p1; - n = strlen(p2) - strlen(p1); - if (n >= 0) - p2 += n; - } - if (0 == strcasecmp(p1, p2)) { - matched = 1; + if (name_match(pp1, pp2)) { + matched = 1; } } } - sk_GENERAL_NAME_free(gens); - } - if (*p1 == '*') { - ++p1; - n = strlen(p2) - strlen(p1); - if (n >= 0) - p2 += n; + GENERAL_NAMES_free(gens); } - if (0 == strcasecmp(p1, p2)) { + if (name_match(p1, p2)) { matched = 1; } if (!matched) { - report(stderr, - GT_("Server CommonName mismatch: %s != %s\n"), - (tt = sdump(buf, i)), _ssl_server_cname ); - xfree(tt); - if (ok_return && strict) - return (0); + if (strict || SSLverbose) { + report(stderr, + GT_("Server CommonName mismatch: %s != %s\n"), + (tt = sdump(buf, i)), _ssl_server_cname ); + xfree(tt); + } + ok_return = 0; } } else if (ok_return) { report(stderr, GT_("Server name not set, could not verify certificate!\n")); @@ -749,14 +772,46 @@ static int SSL_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int strict ) } /* if (depth == 0 && !_depth0ck) */ if (err != X509_V_OK && err != _prev_err && !(_check_fp != 0 && _check_digest && !strict)) { + char *tmp; + int did_rep_err = 0; _prev_err = err; - report(stderr, GT_("Server certificate verification error: %s\n"), X509_verify_cert_error_string(err)); - /* We gave the error code, but maybe we can add some more details for debugging */ + + report(stderr, GT_("Server certificate verification error: %s\n"), X509_verify_cert_error_string(err)); + /* We gave the error code, but maybe we can add some more details for debugging */ + switch (err) { + /* actually we do not want to lump these together, but + * since OpenSSL flipped the meaning of these error + * codes in the past, and they do hardly make a + * practical difference because servers need not provide + * the root signing certificate, we don't bother telling + * users the difference: + */ + case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: X509_NAME_oneline(issuer, buf, sizeof(buf)); buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0'; - report(stderr, GT_("unknown issuer (first %d characters): %s\n"), (int)(sizeof(buf)-1), buf); + report(stderr, GT_("Broken certification chain at: %s\n"), (tmp = sdump(buf, strlen(buf)))); + xfree(tmp); + report(stderr, GT_( "This could mean that the server did not provide the intermediate CA's certificate(s), " + "which is nothing fetchmail could do anything about. For details, " + "please see the README.SSL-SERVER document that ships with fetchmail.\n")); + did_rep_err = 1; + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: + case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: + if (!did_rep_err) { + X509_NAME_oneline(issuer, buf, sizeof(buf)); + buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0'; + report(stderr, GT_("Missing trust anchor certificate: %s\n"), (tmp = sdump(buf, strlen(buf)))); + xfree(tmp); + } + report(stderr, GT_( "This could mean that the root CA's signing certificate is not in the " + "trusted CA certificate location, or that c_rehash needs to be run " + "on the certificate directory. For details, please " + "see the documentation of --sslcertpath and --sslcertfile in the manual page.\n")); + break; + default: break; } } @@ -764,6 +819,7 @@ static int SSL_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int strict ) * If not in strict checking mode (--sslcertck), override this * and pretend that verification had succeeded. */ + _verify_ok &= ok_return; if (!strict) ok_return = 1; return (ok_return); @@ -814,11 +870,13 @@ static const char *SSLCertGetCN(const char *mycert, * uses SSL *ssl global variable, which is currently defined * in this file */ -int SSLOpen(int sock, char *mycert, char *mykey, const char *myproto, int certck, char *certpath, +int SSLOpen(int sock, char *mycert, char *mykey, const char *myproto, int certck, + char *cacertfile, char *certpath, char *fingerprint, char *servercname, char *label, char **remotename) { struct stat randstat; int i; + long sslopts = SSL_OP_ALL; SSL_load_error_strings(); SSL_library_init(); @@ -849,7 +907,12 @@ int SSLOpen(int sock, char *mycert, char *mykey, const char *myproto, int certck _ssl_context[sock] = NULL; if(myproto) { if(!strcasecmp("ssl2",myproto)) { +#if HAVE_DECL_SSLV2_CLIENT_METHOD + 0 > 0 _ctx[sock] = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv2_client_method()); +#else + report(stderr, GT_("Your operating system does not support SSLv2.\n")); + return -1; +#endif } else if(!strcasecmp("ssl3",myproto)) { _ctx[sock] = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv3_client_method()); } else if(!strcasecmp("tls1",myproto)) { @@ -857,7 +920,7 @@ int SSLOpen(int sock, char *mycert, char *mykey, const char *myproto, int certck } else if (!strcasecmp("ssl23",myproto)) { myproto = NULL; } else { - fprintf(stderr,GT_("Invalid SSL protocol '%s' specified, using default (SSLv23).\n"), myproto); + report(stderr,GT_("Invalid SSL protocol '%s' specified, using default (SSLv23).\n"), myproto); myproto = NULL; } } @@ -869,19 +932,40 @@ int SSLOpen(int sock, char *mycert, char *mykey, const char *myproto, int certck return(-1); } - SSL_CTX_set_options(_ctx[sock], SSL_OP_ALL); + { + char *tmp = getenv("FETCHMAIL_DISABLE_CBC_IV_COUNTERMEASURE"); + if (tmp == NULL || *tmp == '\0' || strspn(tmp, " \t") == strlen(tmp)) + sslopts &= ~ SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS; + } + + SSL_CTX_set_options(_ctx[sock], sslopts); if (certck) { SSL_CTX_set_verify(_ctx[sock], SSL_VERIFY_PEER, SSL_ck_verify_callback); } else { /* In this case, we do not fail if verification fails. However, - * we provide the callback for output and possible fingerprint checks. */ + * we provide the callback for output and possible fingerprint + * checks. */ SSL_CTX_set_verify(_ctx[sock], SSL_VERIFY_PEER, SSL_nock_verify_callback); } - if (certpath) - SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(_ctx[sock], NULL, certpath); - else - SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(_ctx[sock]); + + /* Check which trusted X.509 CA certificate store(s) to load */ + { + char *tmp; + int want_default_cacerts = 0; + + /* Load user locations if any is given */ + if (certpath || cacertfile) + SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(_ctx[sock], + cacertfile, certpath); + else + want_default_cacerts = 1; + + tmp = getenv("FETCHMAIL_INCLUDE_DEFAULT_X509_CA_CERTS"); + if (want_default_cacerts || (tmp && tmp[0])) { + SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(_ctx[sock]); + } + } _ssl_context[sock] = SSL_new(_ctx[sock]); @@ -898,6 +982,8 @@ int SSLOpen(int sock, char *mycert, char *mykey, const char *myproto, int certck _check_fp = 1; _check_digest = fingerprint; _depth0ck = 0; + _firstrun = 1; + _verify_ok = 1; _prev_err = -1; if( mycert || mykey ) { @@ -948,6 +1034,11 @@ int SSLOpen(int sock, char *mycert, char *mykey, const char *myproto, int certck } } + if (!certck && !fingerprint && + (SSL_get_verify_result(_ssl_context[sock]) != X509_V_OK || !_verify_ok)) { + report(stderr, GT_("Warning: the connection is insecure, continuing anyways. (Better use --sslcertck!)\n")); + } + return(0); } #endif @@ -966,30 +1057,6 @@ int SockClose(int sock) } #endif -#ifdef __UNUSED__ - /* - * This hangs in RedHat 6.2 after fetchmail runs for a while a - * FIN_WAIT2 comes up in netstat and fetchmail never returns from - * the recv system call. (Reported from jtnews - * , Wed, 24 May 2000 21:26:02.) - * - * Half-close the connection first so the other end gets notified. - * - * This stops sends but allows receives (effectively, it sends a - * TCP ). */ - if (shutdown(sock, 1) == 0) { - char ch; - /* If there is any data still waiting in the queue, discard it. - * Call recv() until either it returns 0 (meaning we received a FIN) - * or any error occurs. This makes sure all data sent by the other - * side is acknowledged at the TCP level. - */ - if (fm_peek(sock, &ch, 1) > 0) - while (fm_read(sock, &ch, 1) > 0) - continue; - } -#endif /* __UNUSED__ */ - /* if there's an error closing at this point, not much we can do */ return(fm_close(sock)); /* this is guarded */ } @@ -1002,18 +1069,18 @@ int SockClose(int sock) */ static ssize_t cygwin_read(int sock, void *buf, size_t count) { - char *bp = buf; - int n = 0; + char *bp = (char *)buf; + size_t n = 0; - if ((n = read(sock, bp, count)) == -1) + if ((n = read(sock, bp, count)) == (size_t)-1) return(-1); if (n != count) { - int n2 = 0; + size_t n2 = 0; if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) report(stdout, GT_("Cygwin socket read retry\n")); n2 = read(sock, bp + n, count - n); - if (n2 == -1 || n + n2 != count) { + if (n2 == (size_t)-1 || n + n2 != count) { report(stderr, GT_("Cygwin socket read retry failed!\n")); return(-1); } @@ -1022,21 +1089,3 @@ static ssize_t cygwin_read(int sock, void *buf, size_t count) return count; } #endif /* __CYGWIN__ */ - -#ifdef MAIN -/* - * Use the chargen service to test input buffering directly. - * You may have to uncomment the `chargen' service description in your - * inetd.conf (and then SIGHUP inetd) for this to work. */ -main() -{ - int sock = SockOpen("localhost", "chargen", NULL); - char buf[80]; - - while (SockRead(sock, buf, sizeof(buf)-1)) - SockWrite(1, buf, strlen(buf)); - SockClose(sock); -} -#endif /* MAIN */ - -/* socket.c ends here */