X-Git-Url: http://pileus.org/git/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=pop3.c;h=f8796731286fa36daa3d476f8a2752fed17c77ec;hb=98cfcef26048bba06975e68a1aad05a8bac0d65d;hp=a994f992d1641151f874a9c0bc24f485e2bc15f0;hpb=dbb179567dd2e850e0e8327a823d21ee311db823;p=~andy%2Ffetchmail diff --git a/pop3.c b/pop3.c index a994f992..f8796731 100644 --- a/pop3.c +++ b/pop3.c @@ -262,12 +262,60 @@ static void set_peek_capable(struct query *ctl) peek_capable = !ctl->fetchall; } +static int do_apop(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting) +{ + char *start, *end; + + /* build MD5 digest from greeting timestamp + password */ + /* find start of timestamp */ + start = strchr(greeting, '<'); + if (!start) { + if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_APOP || outlevel >= O_DEBUG) { + report(ctl->server.authenticate == A_APOP ? stderr : stdout, + GT_("Required APOP timestamp not found in greeting\n")); + } + return PS_AUTHFAIL; + } + + /* find end of timestamp */ + end = strchr(start + 1, '>'); + + if (!end || end == start + 1) { + report(stderr, + GT_("Timestamp syntax error in greeting\n")); + return(PS_AUTHFAIL); + } else { + *++end = '\0'; + } + + /* SECURITY: 2007-03-17 + * Strictly validating the presented challenge for RFC-822 + * conformity (it must be a msg-id in terms of that standard) is + * supposed to make attacks against the MD5 implementation + * harder[1] + * + * [1] "Security vulnerability in APOP authentication", + * Gaëtan Leurent, fetchmail-devel, 2007-03-17 */ + if (!rfc822_valid_msgid((unsigned char *)start)) { + report(stderr, + GT_("Invalid APOP timestamp.\n")); + return PS_AUTHFAIL; + } + + /* copy timestamp and password into digestion buffer */ + char *msg = (char *)xmalloc((end-start+1) + strlen(ctl->password) + 1); + strcpy(msg,start); + strcat(msg,ctl->password); + strcpy((char *)ctl->digest, MD5Digest((unsigned char *)msg)); + free(msg); + + return gen_transact(sock, "APOP %s %s", ctl->remotename, (char *)ctl->digest); +} + static int pop3_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting) /* apply for connection authorization */ { int ok; - char *start,*end; - char *msg; #ifdef OPIE_ENABLE char *challenge; #endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */ @@ -314,9 +362,9 @@ static int pop3_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting) * * Matthias Andree */ - if (peek_capable && strstr(greeting, "Maillennium POP3/PROXY server")) { + if (peek_capable && strstr(greeting, "Maillennium POP3")) { if ((ctl->server.workarounds & WKA_TOP) == 0) { - report(stdout, GT_("Warning: \"Maillennium POP3/PROXY server\" found, using RETR command instead of TOP.\n")); + report(stdout, GT_("Warning: \"Maillennium POP3\" found, using RETR command instead of TOP.\n")); ctl->server.workarounds |= WKA_TOP; } peek_capable = 0; @@ -335,8 +383,12 @@ static int pop3_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting) ctl->server.sdps = TRUE; #endif /* SDPS_ENABLE */ + /* this is a leftover from the times 6.3.X and older when APOP was a + * "protocol" (P_APOP) rather than an authenticator (A_APOP), + * however, the switch is still useful because we can break; after + * an authenticator failed. */ switch (ctl->server.protocol) { - case P_POP3: + case P_POP3: #ifdef RPA_ENABLE /* XXX FIXME: AUTH probing (RFC1734) should become global */ /* CompuServe POP3 Servers as of 990730 want AUTH first for RPA */ @@ -517,31 +569,39 @@ static int pop3_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting) #endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */ #ifdef NTLM_ENABLE - /* MSN servers require the use of NTLM (MSN) authentication */ - if (!strcasecmp(ctl->server.pollname, "pop3.email.msn.com") || - ctl->server.authenticate == A_MSN) - return (do_pop3_ntlm(sock, ctl, 1) == 0) ? PS_SUCCESS : PS_AUTHFAIL; - if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_NTLM || (has_ntlm && ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY)) { - ok = do_pop3_ntlm(sock, ctl, 0); - if (ok == 0 || ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY) - break; - } + /* MSN servers require the use of NTLM (MSN) authentication */ + if (!strcasecmp(ctl->server.pollname, "pop3.email.msn.com") || + ctl->server.authenticate == A_MSN) + return (do_pop3_ntlm(sock, ctl, 1) == 0) ? PS_SUCCESS : PS_AUTHFAIL; + if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_NTLM || (has_ntlm && ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY)) { + ok = do_pop3_ntlm(sock, ctl, 0); + if (ok == 0 || ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY) + break; + } #else - if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_NTLM || ctl->server.authenticate == A_MSN) - { - report(stderr, - GT_("Required NTLM capability not compiled into fetchmail\n")); - } + if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_NTLM || ctl->server.authenticate == A_MSN) + { + report(stderr, + GT_("Required NTLM capability not compiled into fetchmail\n")); + } #endif - if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_CRAM_MD5 || - (has_cram && ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY)) + if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_CRAM_MD5 || + (has_cram && ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY)) { ok = do_cram_md5(sock, "AUTH", ctl, NULL); if (ok == PS_SUCCESS || ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY) break; } + if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_APOP + || ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY) + { + ok = do_apop(sock, ctl, greeting); + if (ok == PS_SUCCESS || ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY) + break; + } + /* ordinary validation, no one-time password or RPA */ if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "USER %s", ctl->remotename))) break; @@ -599,52 +659,6 @@ static int pop3_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting) shroud[0] = '\0'; break; - case P_APOP: - /* build MD5 digest from greeting timestamp + password */ - /* find start of timestamp */ - for (start = greeting; *start != 0 && *start != '<'; start++) - continue; - if (*start == 0) { - report(stderr, - GT_("Required APOP timestamp not found in greeting\n")); - return(PS_AUTHFAIL); - } - - /* find end of timestamp */ - for (end = start; *end != 0 && *end != '>'; end++) - continue; - if (*end == 0 || end == start + 1) { - report(stderr, - GT_("Timestamp syntax error in greeting\n")); - return(PS_AUTHFAIL); - } - else - *++end = '\0'; - - /* SECURITY: 2007-03-17 - * Strictly validating the presented challenge for RFC-822 - * conformity (it must be a msg-id in terms of that standard) is - * supposed to make attacks against the MD5 implementation - * harder[1] - * - * [1] "Security vulnerability in APOP authentication", - * Gaëtan Leurent, fetchmail-devel, 2007-03-17 */ - if (!rfc822_valid_msgid((unsigned char *)start)) { - report(stderr, - GT_("Invalid APOP timestamp.\n")); - return PS_AUTHFAIL; - } - - /* copy timestamp and password into digestion buffer */ - msg = (char *)xmalloc((end-start+1) + strlen(ctl->password) + 1); - strcpy(msg,start); - strcat(msg,ctl->password); - strcpy((char *)ctl->digest, MD5Digest((unsigned char *)msg)); - free(msg); - - ok = gen_transact(sock, "APOP %s %s", ctl->remotename, (char *)ctl->digest); - break; - default: report(stderr, GT_("Undefined protocol request in POP3_auth\n")); ok = PS_ERROR; @@ -672,22 +686,6 @@ static int pop3_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting) return(ok); } -/* Disable the sleep. Based on patch by Brian Candler 2004-04-19/2004-11-08, - * accepted by Matthias Andree. - * - * Rationale: the server must have locked the spool before returning +OK; - * this sleep just wastes time and hence, for modem and GSM CSD users, money. */ -#ifdef WANT_BOGUS - /* - * Empirical experience shows some server/OS combinations - * may need a brief pause even after any lockfiles on the - * server are released, to give the server time to finish - * copying back very large mailfolders from the temp-file... - * this is only ever an issue with extremely large mailboxes. - */ - sleep(3); /* to be _really_ safe, probably need sleep(5)! */ -#endif - /* we're approved */ return(PS_SUCCESS); }