X-Git-Url: http://pileus.org/git/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=pop3.c;h=5549dc9ac5a56ff41e3efbbb7bbb6a61e581cd99;hb=7f6138ffd4935043382ce5f867ee9e177e0a9787;hp=fd5b130459e5526c870e5c603139ad21962821ea;hpb=c1e2f371ae74f580893a54342431301ec6cf2725;p=~andy%2Ffetchmail diff --git a/pop3.c b/pop3.c index fd5b1304..5549dc9a 100644 --- a/pop3.c +++ b/pop3.c @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ static char lastok[POPBUFSIZE+1]; #endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */ /* session variables initialized in capa_probe() or pop3_getauth() */ +flag done_capa = FALSE; #if defined(GSSAPI) flag has_gssapi = FALSE; #endif /* defined(GSSAPI) */ @@ -51,8 +52,11 @@ static flag has_cram = FALSE; #ifdef OPIE_ENABLE flag has_otp = FALSE; #endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */ +#ifdef NTLM_ENABLE +flag has_ntlm = FALSE; +#endif /* NTLM_ENABLE */ #ifdef SSL_ENABLE -static flag has_ssl = FALSE; +static flag has_stls = FALSE; #endif /* SSL_ENABLE */ /* mailbox variables initialized in pop3_getrange() */ @@ -81,60 +85,17 @@ char *sdps_envto; static int do_pop3_ntlm(int sock, struct query *ctl, int msn_instead /** if true, send AUTH MSN, else send AUTH NTLM */) { - tSmbNtlmAuthRequest request; - tSmbNtlmAuthChallenge challenge; - tSmbNtlmAuthResponse response; + char msgbuf[POPBUFSIZE+1]; + int result; - char msgbuf[2048]; - int result,len; - gen_send(sock, msn_instead ? "AUTH MSN" : "AUTH NTLM"); - if ((result = gen_recv(sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf))) - return result; - - if (msgbuf[0] != '+') - return PS_AUTHFAIL; - - buildSmbNtlmAuthRequest(&request,ctl->remotename,NULL); - - if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) - dumpSmbNtlmAuthRequest(stdout, &request); - - memset(msgbuf,0,sizeof msgbuf); - to64frombits (msgbuf, &request, SmbLength(&request)); - - if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) - report(stdout, "POP3> %s\n", msgbuf); - - strcat(msgbuf,"\r\n"); - SockWrite (sock, msgbuf, strlen (msgbuf)); - - if ((gen_recv(sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf))) + if ((result = ntlm_helper(sock, ctl, "POP3"))) return result; - - len = from64tobits (&challenge, msgbuf, sizeof(msgbuf)); - - if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) - dumpSmbNtlmAuthChallenge(stdout, &challenge); - - buildSmbNtlmAuthResponse(&challenge, &response,ctl->remotename,ctl->password); - - if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) - dumpSmbNtlmAuthResponse(stdout, &response); - - memset(msgbuf,0,sizeof msgbuf); - to64frombits (msgbuf, &response, SmbLength(&response)); - - if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) - report(stdout, "POP3> %s\n", msgbuf); - - strcat(msgbuf,"\r\n"); - SockWrite (sock, msgbuf, strlen (msgbuf)); - + if ((result = gen_recv (sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf))) return result; - + if (strstr (msgbuf, "OK")) return PS_SUCCESS; else @@ -238,6 +199,9 @@ static int capa_probe(int sock) { int ok; + if (done_capa) { + return PS_SUCCESS; + } #if defined(GSSAPI) has_gssapi = FALSE; #endif /* defined(GSSAPI) */ @@ -248,6 +212,9 @@ static int capa_probe(int sock) #ifdef OPIE_ENABLE has_otp = FALSE; #endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */ +#ifdef NTLM_ENABLE + has_ntlm = FALSE; +#endif /* NTLM_ENABLE */ ok = gen_transact(sock, "CAPA"); if (ok == PS_SUCCESS) @@ -259,26 +226,37 @@ static int capa_probe(int sock) { if (DOTLINE(buffer)) break; + #ifdef SSL_ENABLE if (strstr(buffer, "STLS")) - has_ssl = TRUE; + has_stls = TRUE; #endif /* SSL_ENABLE */ + #if defined(GSSAPI) if (strstr(buffer, "GSSAPI")) has_gssapi = TRUE; #endif /* defined(GSSAPI) */ + #if defined(KERBEROS_V4) if (strstr(buffer, "KERBEROS_V4")) has_kerberos = TRUE; #endif /* defined(KERBEROS_V4) */ + #ifdef OPIE_ENABLE if (strstr(buffer, "X-OTP")) has_otp = TRUE; #endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */ + +#ifdef NTLM_ENABLE + if (strstr(buffer, "NTLM")) + has_ntlm = TRUE; +#endif /* NTLM_ENABLE */ + if (strstr(buffer, "CRAM-MD5")) has_cram = TRUE; } } + done_capa = TRUE; return(ok); } @@ -302,9 +280,10 @@ static int pop3_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting) char *challenge; #endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */ #ifdef SSL_ENABLE - flag did_stls = FALSE; + flag connection_may_have_tls_errors = FALSE; #endif /* SSL_ENABLE */ + done_capa = FALSE; #if defined(GSSAPI) has_gssapi = FALSE; #endif /* defined(GSSAPI) */ @@ -316,11 +295,17 @@ static int pop3_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting) has_otp = FALSE; #endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */ #ifdef SSL_ENABLE - has_ssl = FALSE; + has_stls = FALSE; #endif /* SSL_ENABLE */ /* Set this up before authentication quits early. */ set_peek_capable(ctl); + + /* Hack: allow user to force RETR. */ + if (peek_capable && getenv("FETCHMAIL_POP3_FORCE_RETR")) { + peek_capable = 0; + } + /* * The "Maillennium POP3/PROXY server" deliberately truncates * TOP replies after c. 64 or 80 kByte (we have varying reports), so @@ -337,9 +322,9 @@ static int pop3_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting) * * Matthias Andree */ - if (peek_capable && strstr(greeting, "Maillennium POP3/PROXY server")) { + if (peek_capable && strstr(greeting, "Maillennium POP3")) { if ((ctl->server.workarounds & WKA_TOP) == 0) { - report(stdout, GT_("Warning: \"Maillennium POP3/PROXY server\" found, using RETR command instead of TOP.\n")); + report(stdout, GT_("Warning: \"Maillennium POP3\" found, using RETR command instead of TOP.\n")); ctl->server.workarounds |= WKA_TOP; } peek_capable = 0; @@ -358,22 +343,7 @@ static int pop3_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting) ctl->server.sdps = TRUE; #endif /* SDPS_ENABLE */ -#ifdef NTLM_ENABLE - /* MSN servers require the use of NTLM (MSN) authentication */ - if (!strcasecmp(ctl->server.pollname, "pop3.email.msn.com") || - ctl->server.authenticate == A_MSN) - return (do_pop3_ntlm(sock, ctl, 1) == 0) ? PS_SUCCESS : PS_AUTHFAIL; - if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_NTLM) - return (do_pop3_ntlm(sock, ctl, 0) == 0) ? PS_SUCCESS : PS_AUTHFAIL; -#else - if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_NTLM || ctl->server.authenticate == A_MSN) - { - report(stderr, - GT_("Required NTLM capability not compiled into fetchmail\n")); - } -#endif - - switch (ctl->server.protocol) { + switch (ctl->server.protocol) { case P_POP3: #ifdef RPA_ENABLE /* XXX FIXME: AUTH probing (RFC1734) should become global */ @@ -404,25 +374,29 @@ static int pop3_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting) /* * CAPA command may return a list including available - * authentication mechanisms. if it doesn't, no harm done, we - * just fall back to a plain login. Note that this code - * latches the server's authentication type, so that in daemon mode - * the CAPA check only needs to be done once at start of run. + * authentication mechanisms and STLS capability. + * + * If it doesn't, no harm done, we just fall back to a plain + * login -- if the user allows it. * - * If CAPA fails, then force the authentication method to PASSORD - * and repoll immediately. + * Note that this code latches the server's authentication type, + * so that in daemon mode the CAPA check only needs to be done + * once at start of run. * - * These authentication methods are blessed by RFC1734, - * describing the POP3 AUTHentication command. + * If CAPA fails, then force the authentication method to + * PASSWORD, switch off opportunistic and repoll immediately. + * If TLS is mandatory, fail up front. */ if ((ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY) || - (ctl->server.authenticate == A_GSSAPI) || - (ctl->server.authenticate == A_KERBEROS_V4) || - (ctl->server.authenticate == A_OTP) || - (ctl->server.authenticate == A_CRAM_MD5)) + (ctl->server.authenticate == A_GSSAPI) || + (ctl->server.authenticate == A_KERBEROS_V4) || + (ctl->server.authenticate == A_KERBEROS_V5) || + (ctl->server.authenticate == A_OTP) || + (ctl->server.authenticate == A_CRAM_MD5) || + maybe_tls(ctl)) { if ((ok = capa_probe(sock)) != PS_SUCCESS) - /* we are in STAGE_GETAUTH! */ + /* we are in STAGE_GETAUTH => failure is PS_AUTHFAIL! */ if (ok == PS_AUTHFAIL || /* Some servers directly close the socket. However, if we * have already authenticated before, then a previous CAPA @@ -431,53 +405,97 @@ static int pop3_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting) */ (ok == PS_SOCKET && !ctl->wehaveauthed)) { - ctl->server.authenticate = A_PASSWORD; - /* repoll immediately */ - ok = PS_REPOLL; - break; +#ifdef SSL_ENABLE + if (must_tls(ctl)) { + /* fail with mandatory STLS without repoll */ + report(stderr, GT_("TLS is mandatory for this session, but server refused CAPA command.\n")); + report(stderr, GT_("The CAPA command is however necessary for TLS.\n")); + return ok; + } else if (maybe_tls(ctl)) { + /* defeat opportunistic STLS */ + xfree(ctl->sslproto); + ctl->sslproto = xstrdup(""); + } +#endif + /* If strong authentication was opportunistic, retry without, else fail. */ + switch (ctl->server.authenticate) { + case A_ANY: + ctl->server.authenticate = A_PASSWORD; + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case A_PASSWORD: /* this should only happen with TLS enabled */ + return PS_REPOLL; + default: + return PS_AUTHFAIL; + } } } #ifdef SSL_ENABLE - if (has_ssl - && !ctl->use_ssl - && (!ctl->sslproto || !strcmp(ctl->sslproto,"tls1"))) - { - char *realhost; + if (maybe_tls(ctl)) { + char *commonname; - realhost = ctl->server.via ? ctl->server.via : ctl->server.pollname; - ok = gen_transact(sock, "STLS"); + commonname = ctl->server.pollname; + if (ctl->server.via) + commonname = ctl->server.via; + if (ctl->sslcommonname) + commonname = ctl->sslcommonname; - /* We use "tls1" instead of ctl->sslproto, as we want STLS, - * not other SSL protocols - */ - if (ok == PS_SUCCESS && - SSLOpen(sock,ctl->sslcert,ctl->sslkey,"tls1",ctl->sslcertck, ctl->sslcertpath,ctl->sslfingerprint,realhost,ctl->server.pollname) == -1) + if (has_stls + || must_tls(ctl)) /* if TLS is mandatory, ignore capabilities */ { - if (!ctl->sslproto && !ctl->wehaveauthed) + /* Use "tls1" rather than ctl->sslproto because tls1 is the only + * protocol that will work with STARTTLS. Don't need to worry + * whether TLS is mandatory or opportunistic unless SSLOpen() fails + * (see below). */ + if (gen_transact(sock, "STLS") == PS_SUCCESS + && (set_timeout(mytimeout), SSLOpen(sock, ctl->sslcert, ctl->sslkey, "tls1", ctl->sslcertck, + ctl->sslcertfile, ctl->sslcertpath, ctl->sslfingerprint, commonname, + ctl->server.pollname, &ctl->remotename)) != -1) { - ctl->sslproto = xstrdup(""); - /* repoll immediately */ - return(PS_REPOLL); + /* + * RFC 2595 says this: + * + * "Once TLS has been started, the client MUST discard cached + * information about server capabilities and SHOULD re-issue the + * CAPABILITY command. This is necessary to protect against + * man-in-the-middle attacks which alter the capabilities list prior + * to STARTTLS. The server MAY advertise different capabilities + * after STARTTLS." + * + * Now that we're confident in our TLS connection we can + * guarantee a secure capability re-probe. + */ + set_timeout(0); + done_capa = FALSE; + ok = capa_probe(sock); + if (ok != PS_SUCCESS) { + return ok; + } + if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) + { + report(stdout, GT_("%s: upgrade to TLS succeeded.\n"), commonname); + } + } else if (must_tls(ctl)) { + /* Config required TLS but we couldn't guarantee it, so we must + * stop. */ + set_timeout(0); + report(stderr, GT_("%s: upgrade to TLS failed.\n"), commonname); + return PS_SOCKET; + } else { + /* We don't know whether the connection is usable, and there's + * no command we can reasonably issue to test it (NOOP isn't + * allowed til post-authentication), so leave it in an unknown + * state, mark it as such, and check more carefully if things + * go wrong when we try to authenticate. */ + set_timeout(0); + connection_may_have_tls_errors = TRUE; + if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) + { + report(stdout, GT_("%s: opportunistic upgrade to TLS failed, trying to continue.\n"), commonname); + } } - report(stderr, - GT_("SSL connection failed.\n")); - return PS_SOCKET; - } - did_stls = TRUE; - - /* - * RFC 2595 says this: - * - * "Once TLS has been started, the client MUST discard cached - * information about server capabilities and SHOULD re-issue the - * CAPABILITY command. This is necessary to protect against - * man-in-the-middle attacks which alter the capabilities list prior - * to STARTTLS. The server MAY advertise different capabilities - * after STARTTLS." - */ - capa_probe(sock); - } + } + } /* maybe_tls() */ #endif /* SSL_ENABLE */ /* @@ -503,7 +521,8 @@ static int pop3_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting) #if defined(GSSAPI) if (has_gssapi && (ctl->server.authenticate == A_GSSAPI || - ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY)) + (ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY + && check_gss_creds("pop", ctl->server.truename) == PS_SUCCESS))) { ok = do_gssauth(sock,"AUTH","pop",ctl->server.truename,ctl->remotename); if (ok == PS_SUCCESS || ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY) @@ -522,7 +541,25 @@ static int pop3_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting) } #endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */ - if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_CRAM_MD5 || +#ifdef NTLM_ENABLE + /* MSN servers require the use of NTLM (MSN) authentication */ + if (!strcasecmp(ctl->server.pollname, "pop3.email.msn.com") || + ctl->server.authenticate == A_MSN) + return (do_pop3_ntlm(sock, ctl, 1) == 0) ? PS_SUCCESS : PS_AUTHFAIL; + if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_NTLM || (has_ntlm && ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY)) { + ok = do_pop3_ntlm(sock, ctl, 0); + if (ok == 0 || ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY) + break; + } +#else + if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_NTLM || ctl->server.authenticate == A_MSN) + { + report(stderr, + GT_("Required NTLM capability not compiled into fetchmail\n")); + } +#endif + + if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_CRAM_MD5 || (has_cram && ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY)) { ok = do_cram_md5(sock, "AUTH", ctl, NULL); @@ -561,19 +598,31 @@ static int pop3_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting) } #endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */ - strlcpy(shroud, ctl->password, sizeof(shroud)); - ok = gen_transact(sock, "PASS %s", ctl->password); - shroud[0] = '\0'; -#ifdef SSL_ENABLE - /* this is for servers which claim to support TLS, but actually - * don't! */ - if (did_stls && ok == PS_SOCKET && !ctl->sslproto && !ctl->wehaveauthed) + /* KPOP uses out-of-band authentication and does not check what + * we send here, so send some random fixed string, to avoid + * users switching *to* KPOP accidentally revealing their + * password */ + if ((ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY + || ctl->server.authenticate == A_KERBEROS_V4 + || ctl->server.authenticate == A_KERBEROS_V5) + && (ctl->server.service != NULL + && strcmp(ctl->server.service, KPOP_PORT) == 0)) { - ctl->sslproto = xstrdup(""); - /* repoll immediately */ - ok = PS_REPOLL; + ok = gen_transact(sock, "PASS krb_ticket"); + break; } -#endif + + /* check if we are actually allowed to send the password */ + if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY + || ctl->server.authenticate == A_PASSWORD) { + strlcpy(shroud, ctl->password, sizeof(shroud)); + ok = gen_transact(sock, "PASS %s", ctl->password); + } else { + report(stderr, GT_("We've run out of allowed authenticators and cannot continue.\n")); + ok = PS_AUTHFAIL; + } + memset(shroud, 0x55, sizeof(shroud)); + shroud[0] = '\0'; break; case P_APOP: @@ -598,19 +647,37 @@ static int pop3_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting) else *++end = '\0'; + /* SECURITY: 2007-03-17 + * Strictly validating the presented challenge for RFC-822 + * conformity (it must be a msg-id in terms of that standard) is + * supposed to make attacks against the MD5 implementation + * harder[1] + * + * [1] "Security vulnerability in APOP authentication", + * Gaëtan Leurent, fetchmail-devel, 2007-03-17 */ + if (!rfc822_valid_msgid((unsigned char *)start)) { + report(stderr, + GT_("Invalid APOP timestamp.\n")); + return PS_AUTHFAIL; + } + /* copy timestamp and password into digestion buffer */ - msg = xmalloc((end-start+1) + strlen(ctl->password) + 1); + msg = (char *)xmalloc((end-start+1) + strlen(ctl->password) + 1); strcpy(msg,start); strcat(msg,ctl->password); - strcpy(ctl->digest, MD5Digest((unsigned char *)msg)); + strcpy((char *)ctl->digest, MD5Digest((unsigned char *)msg)); free(msg); - ok = gen_transact(sock, "APOP %s %s", ctl->remotename, ctl->digest); + ok = gen_transact(sock, "APOP %s %s", ctl->remotename, (char *)ctl->digest); break; case P_RPOP: - if ((ok = gen_transact(sock,"USER %s", ctl->remotename)) == 0) + if ((ok = gen_transact(sock,"USER %s", ctl->remotename)) == 0) { + strlcpy(shroud, ctl->password, sizeof(shroud)); ok = gen_transact(sock, "RPOP %s", ctl->password); + memset(shroud, 0x55, sizeof(shroud)); + shroud[0] = '\0'; + } break; default: @@ -618,6 +685,19 @@ static int pop3_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting) ok = PS_ERROR; } +#ifdef SSL_ENABLE + /* this is for servers which claim to support TLS, but actually + * don't! */ + if (connection_may_have_tls_errors + && (ok == PS_SOCKET || ok == PS_PROTOCOL)) + { + xfree(ctl->sslproto); + ctl->sslproto = xstrdup(""); + /* repoll immediately without TLS */ + ok = PS_REPOLL; + } +#endif + if (ok != 0) { /* maybe we detected a lock-busy condition? */ @@ -666,10 +746,10 @@ static int pop3_gettopid(int sock, int num , char *id, size_t idsize) int got_it; char buf [POPBUFSIZE+1]; snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "TOP %d 1", num); - if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, buf )) != 0) + if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "%s", buf)) != 0) return ok; got_it = 0; - while ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))) == 0) + while (gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) == 0) { if (DOTLINE(buf)) break; @@ -735,6 +815,7 @@ static int pop3_fastuidl( int sock, struct query *ctl, unsigned int count, int int ok; unsigned int first_nr, last_nr, try_nr; char id [IDLEN+1]; + struct idlist *savep = NULL; /** pointer to cache save_str result, speeds up saves */ first_nr = 0; last_nr = count + 1; @@ -751,7 +832,7 @@ static int pop3_fastuidl( int sock, struct query *ctl, unsigned int count, int if (mark == UID_DELETED || mark == UID_EXPUNGED) { if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) - report(stderr, GT_("id=%s (num=%d) was deleted, but is still present!\n"), id, try_nr); + report(stderr, GT_("id=%s (num=%u) was deleted, but is still present!\n"), id, try_nr); /* just mark it as seen now! */ newl->val.status.mark = mark = UID_SEEN; } @@ -776,8 +857,8 @@ static int pop3_fastuidl( int sock, struct query *ctl, unsigned int count, int last_nr = try_nr; /* save it */ - newl = save_str(&ctl->oldsaved, id, UID_UNSEEN); - newl->val.status.num = try_nr; + savep = save_str(savep ? &savep : &ctl->oldsaved, id, UID_UNSEEN); + savep->val.status.num = try_nr; } } if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG && last_nr <= count) @@ -904,9 +985,13 @@ static int pop3_getrange(int sock, /* get the total message count */ gen_send(sock, "STAT"); ok = pop3_ok(sock, buf); - if (ok == 0) - sscanf(buf,"%d %d", countp, bytes); - else + if (ok == 0) { + int asgn; + + asgn = sscanf(buf,"%d %d", countp, bytes); + if (asgn != 2) + return PS_PROTOCOL; + } else return(ok); /* @@ -960,10 +1045,10 @@ static int pop3_getrange(int sock, if (dofastuidl) return(pop3_fastuidl( sock, ctl, *countp, newp)); /* grab the mailbox's UID list */ - if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "UIDL")) != 0) + if (gen_transact(sock, "UIDL") != 0) { /* don't worry, yet! do it the slow way */ - if ((ok = pop3_slowuidl(sock, ctl, countp, newp))) + if (pop3_slowuidl(sock, ctl, countp, newp)) { report(stderr, GT_("protocol error while fetching UIDLs\n")); return(PS_ERROR); @@ -973,18 +1058,19 @@ static int pop3_getrange(int sock, { /* UIDL worked - parse reply */ unsigned long unum; + struct idlist *newl = NULL; *newp = 0; - while ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))) == PS_SUCCESS) + while (gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) == PS_SUCCESS) { if (DOTLINE(buf)) break; if (parseuid(buf, &unum, id, sizeof(id)) == PS_SUCCESS) { - struct idlist *old, *newl; + struct idlist *old; - newl = save_str(&ctl->newsaved, id, UID_UNSEEN); + newl = save_str(newl ? &newl : &ctl->newsaved, id, UID_UNSEEN); newl->val.status.num = unum; if ((old = str_in_list(&ctl->oldsaved, id, FALSE))) @@ -1184,12 +1270,12 @@ static int pop3_fetch(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number, int *lenp) * as a workaround. */ if (strspn(buf, " \t") == strlen(buf)) strcpy(buf, "<>"); - sdps_envfrom = xmalloc(strlen(buf)+1); + sdps_envfrom = (char *)xmalloc(strlen(buf)+1); strcpy(sdps_envfrom,buf); break; case 5: /* Wrap address with To: <> so nxtaddr() likes it */ - sdps_envto = xmalloc(strlen(buf)+7); + sdps_envto = (char *)xmalloc(strlen(buf)+7); sprintf(sdps_envto,"To: <%s>",buf); break; }