X-Git-Url: http://pileus.org/git/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=imap.c;h=9043a9ad3e6b222e7dfea551499ca4de9eaeace2;hb=c260a67eb2a4a93567a7a975b6ebe92204fc9b49;hp=ba351b2bdd7b659b28ee5f3320e424846901c7dd;hpb=e92253bc3c827f46a06a74986b12da8c8628e703;p=~andy%2Ffetchmail diff --git a/imap.c b/imap.c index ba351b2b..9043a9ad 100644 --- a/imap.c +++ b/imap.c @@ -15,31 +15,10 @@ #include "fetchmail.h" #include "socket.h" -#ifdef KERBEROS_V4 -#ifdef KERBEROS_V5 -#include -#include -#else -#if defined (__bsdi__) -#include -#define krb_get_err_text(e) (krb_err_txt[e]) -#endif -#if defined(__NetBSD__) || (__FreeBSD__) || defined(__linux__) -#define krb_get_err_text(e) (krb_err_txt[e]) -#endif -#include -#endif -#endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */ #include "i18n.h" -#ifdef GSSAPI -#include -#include -#endif - -#if OPIE -#include -#endif /* OPIE */ +#if OPIE_ENABLE +#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */ #ifndef strstr /* glibc-2.1 declares this as a macro */ extern char *strstr(); /* needed on sysV68 R3V7.1. */ @@ -50,16 +29,18 @@ extern char *strstr(); /* needed on sysV68 R3V7.1. */ #define IMAP4 0 /* IMAP4 rev 0, RFC1730 */ #define IMAP4rev1 1 /* IMAP4 rev 1, RFC2060 */ -static int count, seen, recent, unseen, deletions, imap_version; -static int expunged, expunge_period; +static int count, unseen, deletions = 0; +static int expunged, expunge_period, saved_timeout = 0; +static int imap_version, preauth; +static flag do_idle; static char capabilities[MSGBUFSIZE+1]; +static unsigned int *unseen_messages; -int imap_ok(int sock, char *argbuf) +static int imap_ok(int sock, char *argbuf) /* parse command response */ { - char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1]; + char buf[MSGBUFSIZE+1]; - seen = 0; do { int ok; char *cp; @@ -75,26 +56,45 @@ int imap_ok(int sock, char *argbuf) /* interpret untagged status responses */ if (strstr(buf, "* CAPABILITY")) strncpy(capabilities, buf + 12, sizeof(capabilities)); - if (strstr(buf, "EXISTS")) - count = atoi(buf+2); - if (strstr(buf, "RECENT")) - recent = atoi(buf+2); - if (strstr(buf, "UNSEEN")) + else if (strstr(buf, "EXISTS")) { - char *cp; - + count = atoi(buf+2); /* - * Handle both "* 42 UNSEEN" (if tha ever happens) and - * "* OK [UNSEEN 42] 42". Note that what this gets us is - * a minimum index, not a count. + * Nasty kluge to handle RFC2177 IDLE. If we know we're idling + * we can't wait for the tag matching the IDLE; we have to tell the + * server the IDLE is finished by shipping back a DONE when we + * see an EXISTS. Only after that will a tagged response be + * shipped. The idling flag also gets cleared on a timeout. */ - unseen = 0; - for (cp = buf; *cp && !isdigit(*cp); cp++) - continue; - unseen = atoi(cp); + if (stage == STAGE_IDLE) + { + /* we do our own write and report here to disable tagging */ + SockWrite(sock, "DONE\r\n", 6); + if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) + report(stdout, "IMAP> DONE\n"); + + mytimeout = saved_timeout; + stage = STAGE_FETCH; + } } - if (strstr(buf, "FLAGS")) - seen = (strstr(buf, "SEEN") != (char *)NULL); + else if (strstr(buf, "PREAUTH")) + preauth = TRUE; + /* + * The server may decide to make the mailbox read-only, + * which causes fetchmail to go into a endless loop + * fetching the same message over and over again. + * + * However, for check_only, we use EXAMINE which will + * mark the mailbox read-only as per the RFC. + * + * This checks for the condition and aborts if + * the mailbox is read-only. + * + * See RFC 2060 section 6.3.1 (SELECT). + * See RFC 2060 section 6.3.2 (EXAMINE). + */ + else if (!check_only && strstr(buf, "[READ-ONLY]")) + return(PS_LOCKBUSY); } while (tag[0] != '\0' && strncmp(buf, tag, strlen(tag))); @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ int imap_ok(int sock, char *argbuf) while (isspace(*cp)) cp++; - if (strncmp(cp, "OK", 2) == 0) + if (strncmp(cp, "OK", 2) == 0) { if (argbuf) strcpy(argbuf, cp); @@ -123,602 +123,319 @@ int imap_ok(int sock, char *argbuf) else if (strncmp(cp, "BAD", 3) == 0) return(PS_ERROR); else if (strncmp(cp, "NO", 2) == 0) - return(PS_ERROR); + { + if (stage == STAGE_GETAUTH) + return(PS_AUTHFAIL); /* RFC2060, 6.2.2 */ + else + return(PS_ERROR); + } else return(PS_PROTOCOL); } } -#if OPIE -static int do_otp(int sock, struct query *ctl) -{ - int i, rval; - char buffer[128]; - char challenge[OPIE_CHALLENGE_MAX+1]; - char response[OPIE_RESPONSE_MAX+1]; - - gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE X-OTP"); - - if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer))) - return rval; - - if ((i = from64tobits(challenge, buffer)) < 0) { - report(stderr, _("Could not decode initial BASE64 challenge\n")); - return PS_AUTHFAIL; - }; - - - to64frombits(buffer, ctl->remotename, strlen(ctl->remotename)); +#if NTLM_ENABLE +#include "ntlm.h" - if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) - report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buffer); - SockWrite(sock, buffer, strlen(buffer)); - SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2); - - if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer))) - return rval; - - if ((i = from64tobits(challenge, buffer)) < 0) { - report(stderr, _("Could not decode OTP challenge\n")); - return PS_AUTHFAIL; - }; - - rval = opiegenerator(challenge, !strcmp(ctl->password, "opie") ? "" : ctl->password, response); - if ((rval == -2) && !run.poll_interval) { - char secret[OPIE_SECRET_MAX+1]; - fprintf(stderr, _("Secret pass phrase: ")); - if (opiereadpass(secret, sizeof(secret), 0)) - rval = opiegenerator(challenge, secret, response); - memset(secret, 0, sizeof(secret)); - }; - - if (rval) - return PS_AUTHFAIL; - - to64frombits(buffer, response, strlen(response)); - - if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) - report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buffer); - SockWrite(sock, buffer, strlen(buffer)); - SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2); +static tSmbNtlmAuthRequest request; +static tSmbNtlmAuthChallenge challenge; +static tSmbNtlmAuthResponse response; - if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer))) - return rval; - - if (strstr(buffer, "OK")) - return PS_SUCCESS; - else - return PS_AUTHFAIL; -}; -#endif /* OPIE */ - -#ifdef KERBEROS_V4 -#if SIZEOF_INT == 4 -typedef int int32; -#elif SIZEOF_SHORT == 4 -typedef short int32; -#elif SIZEOF_LONG == 4 -typedef long int32; -#else -#error Cannot deduce a 32-bit-type -#endif +/* + * NTLM support by Grant Edwards. + * + * Handle MS-Exchange NTLM authentication method. This is the same + * as the NTLM auth used by Samba for SMB related services. We just + * encode the packets in base64 instead of sending them out via a + * network interface. + * + * Much source (ntlm.h, smb*.c smb*.h) was borrowed from Samba. + */ -static int do_rfc1731(int sock, char *truename) -/* authenticate as per RFC1731 -- note 32-bit integer requirement here */ +static int do_imap_ntlm(int sock, struct query *ctl) { - int result = 0, len; - char buf1[4096], buf2[4096]; - union { - int32 cint; - char cstr[4]; - } challenge1, challenge2; - char srvinst[INST_SZ]; - char *p; - char srvrealm[REALM_SZ]; - KTEXT_ST authenticator; - CREDENTIALS credentials; - char tktuser[MAX_K_NAME_SZ+1+INST_SZ+1+REALM_SZ+1]; - char tktinst[INST_SZ]; - char tktrealm[REALM_SZ]; - des_cblock session; - des_key_schedule schedule; - - gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE KERBEROS_V4"); - - /* The data encoded in the first ready response contains a random - * 32-bit number in network byte order. The client should respond - * with a Kerberos ticket and an authenticator for the principal - * "imap.hostname@realm", where "hostname" is the first component - * of the host name of the server with all letters in lower case - * and where "realm" is the Kerberos realm of the server. The - * encrypted checksum field included within the Kerberos - * authenticator should contain the server provided 32-bit number - * in network byte order. - */ + char msgbuf[2048]; + int result,len; + + gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE NTLM"); - if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) { + if ((result = gen_recv(sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf))) return result; - } - - /* this patch by Dan Root solves an endianess problem. */ - { - char tmp[4]; - - *(int *)tmp = ntohl(*(int *) challenge1.cstr); - memcpy(challenge1.cstr, tmp, sizeof(tmp)); - } - - len = from64tobits(challenge1.cstr, buf1); - if (len < 0) { - report(stderr, _("could not decode initial BASE64 challenge\n")); + + if (msgbuf[0] != '+') return PS_AUTHFAIL; - } - - /* Client responds with a Kerberos ticket and an authenticator for - * the principal "imap.hostname@realm" where "hostname" is the - * first component of the host name of the server with all letters - * in lower case and where "realm" is the Kerberos realm of the - * server. The encrypted checksum field included within the - * Kerberos authenticator should contain the server-provided - * 32-bit number in network byte order. - */ - - strncpy(srvinst, truename, (sizeof srvinst)-1); - srvinst[(sizeof srvinst)-1] = '\0'; - for (p = srvinst; *p; p++) { - if (isupper(*p)) { - *p = tolower(*p); - } - } - - strncpy(srvrealm, (char *)krb_realmofhost(srvinst), (sizeof srvrealm)-1); - srvrealm[(sizeof srvrealm)-1] = '\0'; - if (p = strchr(srvinst, '.')) { - *p = '\0'; - } + + buildSmbNtlmAuthRequest(&request,ctl->remotename,NULL); - result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm, 0); - if (result) { - report(stderr, "krb_mq_req: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result)); - return PS_AUTHFAIL; - } - - result = krb_get_cred("imap", srvinst, srvrealm, &credentials); - if (result) { - report(stderr, "krb_get_cred: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result)); - return PS_AUTHFAIL; - } - - memcpy(session, credentials.session, sizeof session); - memset(&credentials, 0, sizeof credentials); - des_key_sched(session, schedule); - - result = krb_get_tf_fullname(TKT_FILE, tktuser, tktinst, tktrealm); - if (result) { - report(stderr, "krb_get_tf_fullname: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result)); - return PS_AUTHFAIL; - } - - if (strcmp(tktuser, user) != 0) { - report(stderr, - _("principal %s in ticket does not match -u %s\n"), tktuser, - user); - return PS_AUTHFAIL; - } - - if (tktinst[0]) { - report(stderr, - _("non-null instance (%s) might cause strange behavior\n"), - tktinst); - strcat(tktuser, "."); - strcat(tktuser, tktinst); - } - - if (strcmp(tktrealm, srvrealm) != 0) { - strcat(tktuser, "@"); - strcat(tktuser, tktrealm); - } + if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) + dumpSmbNtlmAuthRequest(stdout, &request); - result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm, - challenge1.cint); - if (result) { - report(stderr, "krb_mq_req: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result)); - return PS_AUTHFAIL; - } + memset(msgbuf,0,sizeof msgbuf); + to64frombits (msgbuf, (unsigned char*)&request, SmbLength(&request)); + + if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) + report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", msgbuf); + + strcat(msgbuf,"\r\n"); + SockWrite (sock, msgbuf, strlen (msgbuf)); - to64frombits(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length); - if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) { - report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1); - } - SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1)); - SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2); - - /* Upon decrypting and verifying the ticket and authenticator, the - * server should verify that the contained checksum field equals - * the original server provided random 32-bit number. Should the - * verification be successful, the server must add one to the - * checksum and construct 8 octets of data, with the first four - * octets containing the incremented checksum in network byte - * order, the fifth octet containing a bit-mask specifying the - * protection mechanisms supported by the server, and the sixth - * through eighth octets containing, in network byte order, the - * maximum cipher-text buffer size the server is able to receive. - * The server must encrypt the 8 octets of data in the session key - * and issue that encrypted data in a second ready response. The - * client should consider the server authenticated if the first - * four octets the un-encrypted data is equal to one plus the - * checksum it previously sent. - */ - - if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) + if ((gen_recv(sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf))) return result; + + len = from64tobits ((unsigned char*)&challenge, msgbuf, sizeof(msgbuf)); + + if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) + dumpSmbNtlmAuthChallenge(stdout, &challenge); + + buildSmbNtlmAuthResponse(&challenge, &response,ctl->remotename,ctl->password); + + if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) + dumpSmbNtlmAuthResponse(stdout, &response); + + memset(msgbuf,0,sizeof msgbuf); + to64frombits (msgbuf, (unsigned char*)&response, SmbLength(&response)); - /* The client must construct data with the first four octets - * containing the original server-issued checksum in network byte - * order, the fifth octet containing the bit-mask specifying the - * selected protection mechanism, the sixth through eighth octets - * containing in network byte order the maximum cipher-text buffer - * size the client is able to receive, and the following octets - * containing a user name string. The client must then append - * from one to eight octets so that the length of the data is a - * multiple of eight octets. The client must then PCBC encrypt the - * data with the session key and respond to the second ready - * response with the encrypted data. The server decrypts the data - * and verifies the contained checksum. The username field - * identifies the user for whom subsequent IMAP operations are to - * be performed; the server must verify that the principal - * identified in the Kerberos ticket is authorized to connect as - * that user. After these verifications, the authentication - * process is complete. - */ - - len = from64tobits(buf2, buf1); - if (len < 0) { - report(stderr, _("could not decode BASE64 ready response\n")); - return PS_AUTHFAIL; - } - - des_ecb_encrypt((des_cblock *)buf2, (des_cblock *)buf2, schedule, 0); - memcpy(challenge2.cstr, buf2, 4); - if (ntohl(challenge2.cint) != challenge1.cint + 1) { - report(stderr, _("challenge mismatch\n")); - return PS_AUTHFAIL; - } - - memset(authenticator.dat, 0, sizeof authenticator.dat); - - result = htonl(challenge1.cint); - memcpy(authenticator.dat, &result, sizeof result); - - /* The protection mechanisms and their corresponding bit-masks are as - * follows: - * - * 1 No protection mechanism - * 2 Integrity (krb_mk_safe) protection - * 4 Privacy (krb_mk_priv) protection - */ - authenticator.dat[4] = 1; - - len = strlen(tktuser); - strncpy(authenticator.dat+8, tktuser, len); - authenticator.length = len + 8 + 1; - while (authenticator.length & 7) { - authenticator.length++; - } - des_pcbc_encrypt((des_cblock *)authenticator.dat, - (des_cblock *)authenticator.dat, authenticator.length, schedule, - &session, 1); - - to64frombits(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length); - if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) { - report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1); - } - SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1)); - SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2); - - if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) + if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) + report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", msgbuf); + + strcat(msgbuf,"\r\n"); + SockWrite (sock, msgbuf, strlen (msgbuf)); + + if ((result = gen_recv (sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf))) return result; - - if (strstr(buf1, "OK")) { - return PS_SUCCESS; - } - else { + + if (strstr (msgbuf, "OK")) + return PS_SUCCESS; + else return PS_AUTHFAIL; - } } -#endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */ - -#ifdef GSSAPI -#define GSSAUTH_P_NONE 1 -#define GSSAUTH_P_INTEGRITY 2 -#define GSSAUTH_P_PRIVACY 4 - -static int do_gssauth(int sock, char *hostname, char *username) -{ - gss_buffer_desc request_buf, send_token; - gss_buffer_t sec_token; - gss_name_t target_name; - gss_ctx_id_t context; - gss_OID mech_name; - gss_qop_t quality; - int cflags; - OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat; - char buf1[8192], buf2[8192], server_conf_flags; - unsigned long buf_size; - int result; - - /* first things first: get an imap ticket for host */ - sprintf(buf1, "imap@%s", hostname); - request_buf.value = buf1; - request_buf.length = strlen(buf1) + 1; - maj_stat = gss_import_name(&min_stat, &request_buf, gss_nt_service_name, - &target_name); - if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) { - report(stderr, _("Couldn't get service name for [%s]\n"), buf1); - return PS_AUTHFAIL; - } - else if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) { - maj_stat = gss_display_name(&min_stat, target_name, &request_buf, - &mech_name); - report(stderr, _("Using service name [%s]\n"),request_buf.value); - maj_stat = gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &request_buf); - } - - gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE GSSAPI"); +#endif /* NTLM */ - /* upon receipt of the GSSAPI authentication request, server returns - * null data ready response. */ - if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) { - return result; - } - - /* now start the security context initialisation loop... */ - sec_token = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER; - context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; - if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) - report(stdout, _("Sending credentials\n")); - do { - maj_stat = gss_init_sec_context(&min_stat, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, - &context, target_name, NULL, 0, 0, NULL, sec_token, NULL, - &send_token, &cflags, NULL); - if (maj_stat!=GSS_S_COMPLETE && maj_stat!=GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { - report(stderr, _("Error exchanging credentials\n")); - gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name); - /* wake up server and await NO response */ - SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2); - if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) - return result; - return PS_AUTHFAIL; - } - to64frombits(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length); - gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token); - SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1)); - SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2); - if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) - report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1); - if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) { - if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) { - gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name); - return result; - } - request_buf.length = from64tobits(buf2, buf1 + 2); - request_buf.value = buf2; - sec_token = &request_buf; - } - } while (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); - gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name); - - /* get security flags and buffer size */ - if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) { - return result; - } - request_buf.length = from64tobits(buf2, buf1 + 2); - request_buf.value = buf2; - - maj_stat = gss_unwrap(&min_stat, context, &request_buf, &send_token, - &cflags, &quality); - if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) { - report(stderr, _("Couldn't unwrap security level data\n")); - gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token); - return PS_AUTHFAIL; - } - if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) - report(stdout, _("Credential exchange complete\n")); - /* first octet is security levels supported. We want none, for now */ - server_conf_flags = ((char *)send_token.value)[0]; - if ( !(((char *)send_token.value)[0] & GSSAUTH_P_NONE) ) { - report(stderr, _("Server requires integrity and/or privacy\n")); - gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token); - return PS_AUTHFAIL; - } - ((char *)send_token.value)[0] = 0; - buf_size = ntohl(*((long *)send_token.value)); - /* we don't care about buffer size if we don't wrap data */ - gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token); - if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) { - report(stdout, _("Unwrapped security level flags: %s%s%s\n"), - server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_NONE ? "N" : "-", - server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_INTEGRITY ? "I" : "-", - server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_PRIVACY ? "C" : "-"); - report(stdout, _("Maximum GSS token size is %ld\n"),buf_size); - } - - /* now respond in kind (hack!!!) */ - buf_size = htonl(buf_size); /* do as they do... only matters if we do enc */ - memcpy(buf1, &buf_size, 4); - buf1[0] = GSSAUTH_P_NONE; - strcpy(buf1+4, username); /* server decides if princ is user */ - request_buf.length = 4 + strlen(username) + 1; - request_buf.value = buf1; - maj_stat = gss_wrap(&min_stat, context, 0, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, &request_buf, - &cflags, &send_token); - if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) { - report(stderr, _("Error creating security level request\n")); - return PS_AUTHFAIL; - } - to64frombits(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length); - if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) { - report(stdout, _("Requesting authorisation as %s\n"), username); - report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n",buf1); - } - SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1)); - SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2); - - /* we should be done. Get status and finish up */ - if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) - return result; - if (strstr(buf1, "OK")) { - /* flush security context */ - if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) - report(stdout, _("Releasing GSS credentials\n")); - maj_stat = gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat, &context, &send_token); - if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) { - report(stderr, _("Error releasing credentials\n")); - return PS_AUTHFAIL; - } - /* send_token may contain a notification to the server to flush - * credentials. RFC 1731 doesn't specify what to do, and since this - * support is only for authentication, we'll assume the server - * knows enough to flush its own credentials */ - gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token); - return PS_SUCCESS; - } - - return PS_AUTHFAIL; -} -#endif /* GSSAPI */ - -int imap_canonicalize(char *result, char *passwd) +static int imap_canonicalize(char *result, char *raw, int maxlen) /* encode an IMAP password as per RFC1730's quoting conventions */ { int i, j; j = 0; - for (i = 0; i < strlen(passwd); i++) + for (i = 0; i < strlen(raw) && i < maxlen; i++) { - if ((passwd[i] == '\\') || (passwd[i] == '"')) + if ((raw[i] == '\\') || (raw[i] == '"')) result[j++] = '\\'; - result[j++] = passwd[i]; + result[j++] = raw[i]; } result[j] = '\0'; return(i); } -int imap_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting) +static int imap_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting) /* apply for connection authorization */ { int ok = 0; - char password[PASSWORDLEN*2]; /* probe to see if we're running IMAP4 and can use RFC822.PEEK */ capabilities[0] = '\0'; if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "CAPABILITY")) == PS_SUCCESS) { - /* UW-IMAP server 10.173 notifies in all caps */ + char *cp; + + /* capability checks are supposed to be caseblind */ + for (cp = capabilities; *cp; cp++) + *cp = toupper(*cp); + + /* UW-IMAP server 10.173 notifies in all caps, but RFC2060 says we + should expect a response in mixed-case */ if (strstr(capabilities, "IMAP4REV1")) { imap_version = IMAP4rev1; if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) - report(stdout, _("Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 1\n")); + report(stdout, GT_("Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 1\n")); } else { imap_version = IMAP4; if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) - report(stdout, _("Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 0\n")); + report(stdout, GT_("Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 0\n")); } } else if (ok == PS_ERROR) { imap_version = IMAP2; if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) - report(stdout, _("Protocol identified as IMAP2 or IMAP2BIS\n")); + report(stdout, GT_("Protocol identified as IMAP2 or IMAP2BIS\n")); } else return(ok); peek_capable = (imap_version >= IMAP4); -#if OPIE - if ((ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP) && strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=X-OTP")) - { - if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) - report(stdout, _("OTP authentication is supported\n")); - if (do_otp(sock, ctl) == PS_SUCCESS) - return(PS_SUCCESS); - }; -#endif /* OPIE */ + /* + * Assumption: expunges are cheap, so we want to do them + * after every message unless user said otherwise. + */ + if (NUM_SPECIFIED(ctl->expunge)) + expunge_period = NUM_VALUE_OUT(ctl->expunge); + else + expunge_period = 1; -#ifdef GSSAPI - if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=GSSAPI")) + /* + * Handle idling. We depend on coming through here on startup + * and after each timeout (including timeouts during idles). + */ + if (strstr(capabilities, "IDLE") && ctl->idle) { - if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_GSS) - { - if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) - report(stdout, _("GSS authentication is supported\n")); - return do_gssauth(sock, ctl->server.truename, ctl->remotename); - } + do_idle = TRUE; + if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) + report(stdout, GT_("will idle after poll\n")); } - else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_GSS) + + /* + * If either (a) we saw a PREAUTH token in the greeting, or + * (b) the user specified ssh preauthentication, then we're done. + */ + if (preauth || ctl->server.authenticate == A_SSH) { - report(stderr, - _("Required GSS capability not supported by server\n")); - return(PS_AUTHFAIL); + preauth = FALSE; /* reset for the next session */ + return(PS_SUCCESS); } + + /* + * Time to authenticate the user. + * Try the protocol variants that don't require passwords first. + */ + ok = PS_AUTHFAIL; + +#ifdef GSSAPI + if ((ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY + || ctl->server.authenticate == A_GSSAPI) + && strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=GSSAPI")) + if(ok = do_gssauth(sock, "AUTHENTICATE", ctl->server.truename, ctl->remotename)) + { + /* SASL cancellation of authentication */ + gen_send(sock, "*"); + if(ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY) + return ok; + } + else + return ok; #endif /* GSSAPI */ #ifdef KERBEROS_V4 - if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=KERBEROS_V4")) + if ((ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY + || ctl->server.authenticate == A_KERBEROS_V4 + || ctl->server.authenticate == A_KERBEROS_V5) + && strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=KERBEROS_V4")) { - if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) - report(stdout, _("KERBEROS_V4 authentication is supported\n")); + if ((ok = do_rfc1731(sock, "AUTHENTICATE", ctl->server.truename))) + { + /* SASL cancellation of authentication */ + gen_send(sock, "*"); + if(ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY) + return ok; + } + else + return ok; + } +#endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */ + + /* + * No such luck. OK, now try the variants that mask your password + * in a challenge-response. + */ - if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_K4) + if ((ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY + || ctl->server.authenticate == A_CRAM_MD5) + && strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=CRAM-MD5")) + { + if ((ok = do_cram_md5 (sock, "AUTHENTICATE", ctl, NULL))) { - if ((ok = do_rfc1731(sock, ctl->server.truename))) - { - if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) - report(stdout, "IMAP> *\n"); - SockWrite(sock, "*\r\n", 3); - } - - return(ok); + /* SASL cancellation of authentication */ + gen_send(sock, "*"); + if(ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY) + return ok; } - /* else fall through to ordinary AUTH=LOGIN case */ + else + return ok; } - else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_K4) + +#if OPIE_ENABLE + if ((ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY + || ctl->server.authenticate == A_OTP) + && strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=X-OTP")) + if ((ok = do_otp(sock, "AUTHENTICATE", ctl))) + { + /* SASL cancellation of authentication */ + gen_send(sock, "*"); + if(ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY) + return ok; + } + else + return ok; +#else + if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_OTP) { report(stderr, - _("Required KERBEROS_V4 capability not supported by server\n")); - return(PS_AUTHFAIL); + GT_("Required OTP capability not compiled into fetchmail\n")); } -#endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */ +#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */ + +#ifdef NTLM_ENABLE + if ((ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY + || ctl->server.authenticate == A_NTLM) + && strstr (capabilities, "AUTH=NTLM")) { + if ((ok = do_imap_ntlm(sock, ctl))) + { + /* SASL cancellation of authentication */ + gen_send(sock, "*"); + if(ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY) + return ok; + } + else + return(ok); + } +#else + if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_NTLM) + { + report(stderr, + GT_("Required NTLM capability not compiled into fetchmail\n")); + } +#endif /* NTLM_ENABLE */ #ifdef __UNUSED__ /* The Cyrus IMAP4rev1 server chokes on this */ /* this handles either AUTH=LOGIN or AUTH-LOGIN */ - if ((imap_version >= IMAP4rev1) && (!strstr(capabilities, "LOGIN"))) { - report(stderr, - _("Required LOGIN capability not supported by server\n")); - return PS_AUTHFAIL; - }; + if ((imap_version >= IMAP4rev1) && (!strstr(capabilities, "LOGIN"))) + { + report(stderr, + GT_("Required LOGIN capability not supported by server\n")); + } #endif /* __UNUSED__ */ - imap_canonicalize(password, ctl->password); - ok = gen_transact(sock, "LOGIN \"%s\" \"%s\"", ctl->remotename, password); - if (ok) - return(ok); - - /* - * Assumption: expunges are cheap, so we want to do them - * after every message unless user said otherwise. - */ - if (NUM_SPECIFIED(ctl->expunge)) - expunge_period = NUM_VALUE_OUT(ctl->expunge); - else - expunge_period = 1; + /* we're stuck with sending the password en clair */ + if ((ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY + || ctl->server.authenticate == A_PASSWORD) + && !strstr (capabilities, "LOGINDISABLED")) + { + /* these sizes guarantee no buffer overflow */ + char remotename[NAMELEN*2+1], password[PASSWORDLEN*2+1]; - return(PS_SUCCESS); + imap_canonicalize(remotename, ctl->remotename, NAMELEN); + imap_canonicalize(password, ctl->password, PASSWORDLEN); + + strcpy(shroud, ctl->password); + ok = gen_transact(sock, "LOGIN \"%s\" \"%s\"", remotename, password); + shroud[0] = '\0'; + if (ok) + { + /* SASL cancellation of authentication */ + gen_send(sock, "*"); + if(ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY) + return ok; + } + else + return(ok); + } + + return(ok); } static int internal_expunge(int sock) @@ -739,6 +456,16 @@ static int internal_expunge(int sock) return(PS_SUCCESS); } +static int imap_idle(int sock) +/* start an RFC2177 IDLE */ +{ + stage = STAGE_IDLE; + saved_timeout = mytimeout; + mytimeout = 0; + + return (gen_transact(sock, "IDLE")); +} + static int imap_getrange(int sock, struct query *ctl, const char *folder, @@ -746,61 +473,128 @@ static int imap_getrange(int sock, /* get range of messages to be fetched */ { int ok; + char buf[MSGBUFSIZE+1], *cp; /* find out how many messages are waiting */ - *bytes = recent = unseen = -1; + *bytes = -1; if (pass > 1) { /* * We have to have an expunge here, otherwise the re-poll will - * infinite-loop picking up un-expunged message. + * infinite-loop picking up un-expunged messages -- unless the + * expunge period is one and we've been nuking each message + * just after deletion. */ ok = 0; - if (deletions && expunge_period > 1) - internal_expunge(sock); + if (deletions && expunge_period != 1) + ok = internal_expunge(sock); count = -1; + if (do_idle) + ok = imap_idle(sock); if (ok || gen_transact(sock, "NOOP")) { - report(stderr, _("re-poll failed\n")); + report(stderr, GT_("re-poll failed\n")); return(ok); } - else if (count == -1) /* no EXISTS response to NOOP */ + else if (count == -1) /* no EXISTS response to NOOP/IDLE */ { - count = recent = 0; - unseen = -1; + count = 0; } + if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) + report(stdout, GT_("%d messages waiting after re-poll\n"), count); } else { - if (!check_only) - ok = gen_transact(sock, "SELECT %s", folder ? folder : "INBOX"); - else - ok = gen_transact(sock, "EXAMINE %s", folder ? folder : "INBOX"); + ok = gen_transact(sock, + check_only ? "EXAMINE \"%s\"" : "SELECT \"%s\"", + folder ? folder : "INBOX"); if (ok != 0) { - report(stderr, _("mailbox selection failed\n")); + report(stderr, GT_("mailbox selection failed\n")); return(ok); } + else if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) + report(stdout, GT_("%d messages waiting after first poll\n"), count); + + /* no messages? then we may need to idle until we get some */ + if (count == 0 && do_idle) + imap_idle(sock); + + /* + * We should have an expunge here to + * a) avoid fetching deleted mails during 'fetchall' + * b) getting a wrong count of mails during 'no fetchall' + */ + if (!check_only && !ctl->keep && count > 0) + { + ok = internal_expunge(sock); + if (ok) + { + report(stderr, GT_("expunge failed\n")); + return(ok); + } + if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) + report(stdout, GT_("%d messages waiting after expunge\n"), count); + } } *countp = count; - /* - * Note: because IMAP has an is_old method, this number is used - * only for the "X messages (Y unseen)" notification. Accordingly - * it doesn't matter much that it can be wrong (e.g. if we see an - * UNSEEN response but not all messages above the first UNSEEN one - * are likewise). - */ - if (unseen >= 0) /* optional, but better if we see it */ - *newp = count - unseen + 1; - else if (recent >= 0) /* mandatory */ - *newp = recent; - else - *newp = -1; /* should never happen, RECENT is mandatory */ + /* OK, now get a count of unseen messages and their indices */ + if (!ctl->fetchall && count > 0) + { + if (unseen_messages) + free(unseen_messages); + unseen_messages = xmalloc(count * sizeof(unsigned int)); + memset(unseen_messages, 0, count * sizeof(unsigned int)); + unseen = 0; + + gen_send(sock, "SEARCH UNSEEN"); + do { + ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (ok != 0) + { + report(stderr, GT_("search for unseen messages failed\n")); + return(PS_PROTOCOL); + } + else if ((cp = strstr(buf, "* SEARCH"))) + { + char *ep; + + cp += 8; /* skip "* SEARCH" */ + + while (*cp && unseen < count) + { + /* skip whitespace */ + while (*cp && isspace(*cp)) + cp++; + if (*cp) + { + /* + * Message numbers are between 1 and 2^32 inclusive, + * so unsigned int is large enough. + */ + unseen_messages[unseen]=(unsigned int)strtol(cp,&ep,10); + + if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) + report(stdout, + GT_("%u is unseen\n"), + unseen_messages[unseen]); + + unseen++; + cp = ep; + } + } + } + } while + (tag[0] != '\0' && strncmp(buf, tag, strlen(tag))); + } else + unseen = -1; + *newp = unseen; expunged = 0; + deletions = 0; return(PS_SUCCESS); } @@ -814,6 +608,35 @@ static int imap_getsizes(int sock, int count, int *sizes) * Some servers (as in, PMDF5.1-9.1 under OpenVMS 6.1) * won't accept 1:1 as valid set syntax. Some implementors * should be taken out and shot for excessive anality. + * + * Microsoft Exchange (brain-dead piece of crap that it is) + * sometimes gets its knickers in a knot about bodiless messages. + * You may see responses like this: + * + * fetchmail: IMAP> A0004 FETCH 1:9 RFC822.SIZE + * fetchmail: IMAP< * 2 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 1187) + * fetchmail: IMAP< * 3 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 3954) + * fetchmail: IMAP< * 4 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 1944) + * fetchmail: IMAP< * 5 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 2933) + * fetchmail: IMAP< * 6 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 1854) + * fetchmail: IMAP< * 7 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 34054) + * fetchmail: IMAP< * 8 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 5561) + * fetchmail: IMAP< * 9 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 1101) + * fetchmail: IMAP< A0004 NO The requested item could not be found. + * + * This means message 1 has only headers. For kicks and grins + * you can telnet in and look: + * A003 FETCH 1 FULL + * A003 NO The requested item could not be found. + * A004 fetch 1 rfc822.header + * A004 NO The requested item could not be found. + * A006 FETCH 1 BODY + * * 1 FETCH (BODY ("TEXT" "PLAIN" ("CHARSET" "US-ASCII") NIL NIL "7BIT" 35 3)) + * A006 OK FETCH completed. + * + * To get around this, we terminate the read loop on a NO and count + * on the fact that the sizes array has been preinitialized with a + * known-bad size value. */ if (count == 1) gen_send(sock, "FETCH 1 RFC822.SIZE", count); @@ -821,14 +644,19 @@ static int imap_getsizes(int sock, int count, int *sizes) gen_send(sock, "FETCH 1:%d RFC822.SIZE", count); for (;;) { - int num, size, ok; + unsigned int num, size; + int ok; if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf)))) return(ok); - if (strstr(buf, "OK")) + else if (strstr(buf, "OK") || strstr(buf, "NO")) break; - else if (sscanf(buf, "* %d FETCH (RFC822.SIZE %d)", &num, &size) == 2) - sizes[num - 1] = size; + else if (sscanf(buf, "* %u FETCH (RFC822.SIZE %u)", &num, &size) == 2) { + if (num > 0 && num <= count) + sizes[num - 1] = size; + else + report(stderr, "Warning: ignoring bogus data for message sizes returned by the server.\n"); + } } return(PS_SUCCESS); @@ -837,17 +665,34 @@ static int imap_getsizes(int sock, int count, int *sizes) static int imap_is_old(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number) /* is the given message old? */ { - int ok; + flag seen = TRUE; + int i; - /* expunges change the fetch numbers */ - number -= expunged; + /* + * Expunges change the fetch numbers, but unseen_messages contains + * indices from before any expungees were done. So neither the + * argument nor the values in message_sequence need to be decremented. + */ - if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "FETCH %d FLAGS", number)) != 0) - return(PS_ERROR); + seen = TRUE; + for (i = 0; i < unseen; i++) + if (unseen_messages[i] == number) + { + seen = FALSE; + break; + } return(seen); } +static char *skip_token(char *ptr) +{ + while(isspace(*ptr)) ptr++; + while(!isspace(*ptr) && !iscntrl(*ptr)) ptr++; + while(isspace(*ptr)) ptr++; + return(ptr); +} + static int imap_fetch_headers(int sock, struct query *ctl,int number,int *lenp) /* request headers of nth message */ { @@ -858,19 +703,28 @@ static int imap_fetch_headers(int sock, struct query *ctl,int number,int *lenp) number -= expunged; /* - * This is blessed by RFC 1176, RFC1730, RFC2060. + * This is blessed by RFC1176, RFC1730, RFC2060. * According to the RFCs, it should *not* set the \Seen flag. */ gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.HEADER", number); /* looking for FETCH response */ - do { + for (;;) + { int ok; + char *ptr; if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf)))) return(ok); - } while - (sscanf(buf+2, "%d FETCH (%*s {%d}", &num, lenp) != 2); + ptr = skip_token(buf); /* either "* " or "AXXXX " */ + if (sscanf(ptr, "%d FETCH (%*s {%d}", &num, lenp) == 2) + break; + /* try to recover from chronically fucked-up M$ Exchange servers */ + else if (!strncmp(ptr, "NO", 2)) + return(PS_TRANSIENT); + else if (!strncmp(ptr, "BAD", 3)) + return(PS_TRANSIENT); + } if (num != number) return(PS_ERROR); @@ -895,7 +749,22 @@ static int imap_fetch_body(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number, int *lenp) * * However...*don't* do this if we're using keep to suppress deletion! * In that case, marking the seen flag is the only way to prevent the - * message from being re-fetched on subsequent runs. + * message from being re-fetched on subsequent runs (and according + * to RFC2060 p.43 this fetch should set Seen as a side effect). + * + * According to RFC2060, and Mark Crispin the IMAP maintainer, + * FETCH %d BODY[TEXT] and RFC822.TEXT are "functionally + * equivalent". However, we know of at least one server that + * treats them differently in the presence of MIME attachments; + * the latter form downloads the attachment, the former does not. + * The server is InterChange, and the fool who implemented this + * misfeature ought to be strung up by his thumbs. + * + * When I tried working around this by disabling use of the 4rev1 form, + * I found that doing this breaks operation with M$ Exchange. + * Annoyingly enough, Exchange's refusal to cope is technically legal + * under RFC2062. Trust Microsoft, the Great Enemy of interoperability + * standards, to find a way to make standards compliance irritating.... */ switch (imap_version) { @@ -925,16 +794,20 @@ static int imap_fetch_body(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number, int *lenp) if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf)))) return(ok); } while - (sscanf(buf+2, "%d FETCH", &num) != 1); + (!strstr(buf+4, "FETCH") || sscanf(buf+2, "%d", &num) != 1); if (num != number) return(PS_ERROR); - /* try to extract a length */ + /* + * Try to extract a length from the FETCH response. RFC2060 requires + * it to be present, but at least one IMAP server (Novell GroupWise) + * botches this. + */ if ((cp = strchr(buf, '{'))) *lenp = atoi(cp + 1); else - *lenp = 0; + *lenp = -1; /* missing length part in FETCH reponse */ return(PS_SUCCESS); } @@ -956,6 +829,26 @@ static int imap_trail(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number) /* UW IMAP returns "OK FETCH", Cyrus returns "OK Completed" */ if (strstr(buf, "OK")) break; + +#ifdef __UNUSED__ + /* + * Any IMAP server that fails to set Seen on a BODY[TEXT] + * fetch violates RFC2060 p.43 (top). This becomes an issue + * when keep is on, because seen messages aren't deleted and + * get refetched on each poll. As a workaround, if keep is on + * we can set the Seen flag explicitly. + * + * This code isn't used yet because we don't know of any IMAP + * servers broken in this way. + */ + if (ctl->keep) + if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, + imap_version == IMAP4 + ? "STORE %d +FLAGS.SILENT (\\Seen)" + : "STORE %d +FLAGS (\\Seen)", + number))) + return(ok); +#endif /* __UNUSED__ */ } return(PS_SUCCESS); @@ -1003,28 +896,35 @@ static int imap_delete(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number) static int imap_logout(int sock, struct query *ctl) /* send logout command */ { - /* if expunges after deletion have been suppressed, ship one now */ - if (NUM_SPECIFIED(expunge_period) && NUM_ZERO(expunge_period) && deletions) + /* if any un-expunged deletions remain, ship an expunge now */ + if (deletions) internal_expunge(sock); +#ifdef USE_SEARCH + /* Memory clean-up */ + if (unseen_messages) + free(unseen_messages); +#endif /* USE_SEARCH */ + return(gen_transact(sock, "LOGOUT")); } const static struct method imap = { "IMAP", /* Internet Message Access Protocol */ -#if INET6 +#if INET6_ENABLE "imap", -#else /* INET6 */ + "imaps", +#else /* INET6_ENABLE */ 143, /* standard IMAP2bis/IMAP4 port */ -#endif /* INET6 */ + 993, /* ssl IMAP2bis/IMAP4 port */ +#endif /* INET6_ENABLE */ TRUE, /* this is a tagged protocol */ FALSE, /* no message delimiter */ imap_ok, /* parse command response */ - imap_canonicalize, /* deal with embedded slashes and spaces */ imap_getauth, /* get authorization */ imap_getrange, /* query range of messages */ - imap_getsizes, /* get sizes of messages (used for --limit option */ + imap_getsizes, /* get sizes of messages (used for ESMTP SIZE option) */ imap_is_old, /* no UID check */ imap_fetch_headers, /* request given message headers */ imap_fetch_body, /* request given message body */