X-Git-Url: http://pileus.org/git/?a=blobdiff_plain;ds=sidebyside;f=imap.c;h=ed63c0760e9de448fb64f09f3e89fa3c99a98b06;hb=4a44b7b1d7ef9f5ad446d598c8d775ff3f583d0b;hp=36bdaf068c14bfa784f4c28969c7145499975ebc;hpb=cda98906893b358d8dd22775af95c9ade5cfe5e5;p=~andy%2Ffetchmail diff --git a/imap.c b/imap.c index 36bdaf06..ed63c076 100644 --- a/imap.c +++ b/imap.c @@ -1,12 +1,11 @@ /* * imap.c -- IMAP2bis/IMAP4 protocol methods * - * Copyright 1996 by Eric S. Raymond - * All rights reserved. + * Copyright 1997 by Eric S. Raymond * For license terms, see the file COPYING in this directory. */ -#include +#include "config.h" #include #include #include @@ -16,47 +15,92 @@ #include "fetchmail.h" #include "socket.h" -#ifdef KERBEROS_V4 -#include -#include "base64.h" -#endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */ +#include "i18n.h" +#if OPIE_ENABLE +#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */ + +#ifndef strstr /* glibc-2.1 declares this as a macro */ extern char *strstr(); /* needed on sysV68 R3V7.1. */ +#endif /* strstr */ /* imap_version values */ #define IMAP2 -1 /* IMAP2 or IMAP2BIS, RFC1176 */ #define IMAP4 0 /* IMAP4 rev 0, RFC1730 */ #define IMAP4rev1 1 /* IMAP4 rev 1, RFC2060 */ -static int count, seen, recent, unseen, deletecount, imap_version; +static int count, unseen, deletions, imap_version, preauth; +static int expunged, expunge_period, saved_timeout; +static flag do_idle; +static char capabilities[MSGBUFSIZE+1]; +static unsigned int *unseen_messages; -int imap_ok (int sock, char *argbuf) +static int imap_ok(int sock, char *argbuf) /* parse command response */ { - char buf [POPBUFSIZE+1]; + char buf[MSGBUFSIZE+1]; - seen = 0; do { int ok; + char *cp; if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf)))) return(ok); + /* all tokens in responses are caseblind */ + for (cp = buf; *cp; cp++) + if (islower(*cp)) + *cp = toupper(*cp); + /* interpret untagged status responses */ - if (strstr(buf, "EXISTS")) + if (strstr(buf, "* CAPABILITY")) + strncpy(capabilities, buf + 12, sizeof(capabilities)); + else if (strstr(buf, "EXISTS")) + { count = atoi(buf+2); - if (strstr(buf, "RECENT")) - recent = atoi(buf+2); - if (strstr(buf, "UNSEEN")) - unseen = atoi(buf+2); - if (strstr(buf, "FLAGS")) - seen = (strstr(buf, "Seen") != (char *)NULL); + /* + * Nasty kluge to handle RFC2177 IDLE. If we know we're idling + * we can't wait for the tag matching the IDLE; we have to tell the + * server the IDLE is finished by shipping back a DONE when we + * see an EXISTS. Only after that will a tagged response be + * shipped. The idling flag also gets cleared on a timeout. + */ + if (stage == STAGE_IDLE) + { + /* we do our own write and report here to disable tagging */ + SockWrite(sock, "DONE\r\n", 6); + if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) + report(stdout, "IMAP> DONE\n"); + + mytimeout = saved_timeout; + stage = STAGE_FETCH; + } + } + else if (strstr(buf, "PREAUTH")) + preauth = TRUE; + /* + * The server may decide to make the mailbox read-only, + * which causes fetchmail to go into a endless loop + * fetching the same message over and over again. + * + * However, for check_only, we use EXAMINE which will + * mark the mailbox read-only as per the RFC. + * + * This checks for the condition and aborts if + * the mailbox is read-only. + * + * See RFC 2060 section 6.3.1 (SELECT). + * See RFC 2060 section 6.3.2 (EXAMINE). + */ + else if (!check_only && strstr(buf, "[READ-ONLY]")) + return(PS_LOCKBUSY); } while (tag[0] != '\0' && strncmp(buf, tag, strlen(tag))); if (tag[0] == '\0') { - strcpy(argbuf, buf); + if (argbuf) + strcpy(argbuf, buf); return(PS_SUCCESS); } else @@ -69,348 +113,469 @@ int imap_ok (int sock, char *argbuf) while (isspace(*cp)) cp++; - if (strncmp(cp, "OK", 2) == 0) + if (strncmp(cp, "OK", 2) == 0) { - strcpy(argbuf, cp); + if (argbuf) + strcpy(argbuf, cp); return(PS_SUCCESS); } - else if (strncmp(cp, "BAD", 2) == 0) + else if (strncmp(cp, "BAD", 3) == 0) return(PS_ERROR); + else if (strncmp(cp, "NO", 2) == 0) + { + if (stage == STAGE_GETAUTH) + return(PS_AUTHFAIL); /* RFC2060, 6.2.2 */ + else + return(PS_ERROR); + } else return(PS_PROTOCOL); } } -#ifdef KERBEROS_V4 -static int do_rfc1731(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *buf) -/* authenticate as per RFC1731 - * note 32-bit integer requirement here... - * sizeof int must be 4! +#if NTLM_ENABLE +#include "ntlm.h" + +static tSmbNtlmAuthRequest request; +static tSmbNtlmAuthChallenge challenge; +static tSmbNtlmAuthResponse response; + +/* + * NTLM support by Grant Edwards. * - * Note: Base64 conversion routines come from Cyrus IMAPd and have - * possibly too-restrictive redistribution requirements. See base64.c - * for details. Base64 is defined in RFC2045 section 6.8, "Base64 - * Content-Transfer-Encoding", but lines must not be broken in the - * scheme used here. + * Handle MS-Exchange NTLM authentication method. This is the same + * as the NTLM auth used by Samba for SMB related services. We just + * encode the packets in base64 instead of sending them out via a + * network interface. + * + * Much source (ntlm.h, smb*.c smb*.h) was borrowed from Samba. */ + +static int do_imap_ntlm(int sock, struct query *ctl) { - int result = 0, len; - char buf1[4096], buf2[4096]; - union { - int cint; - char cstr[4]; - } challenge1, challenge2; - char srvinst[INST_SZ]; - char *p; - char srvrealm[REALM_SZ]; - KTEXT_ST authenticator; - CREDENTIALS credentials; - char tktuser[MAX_K_NAME_SZ+1+INST_SZ+1+REALM_SZ+1]; - char tktinst[INST_SZ]; - char tktrealm[REALM_SZ]; - des_cblock session; - des_key_schedule schedule; - - gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE KERBEROS_V4"); - - /* The data encoded in the first ready response contains a random - * 32-bit number in network byte order. The client should respond - * with a Kerberos ticket and an authenticator for the principal - * "imap.hostname@realm", where "hostname" is the first component - * of the host name of the server with all letters in lower case - * and where "realm" is the Kerberos realm of the server. The - * encrypted checksum field included within the Kerberos - * authenticator should contain the server provided 32-bit number - * in network byte order. - */ + char msgbuf[2048]; + int result,len; + + gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE NTLM"); - if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) { + if ((result = gen_recv(sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf))) return result; - } - - len = from64(challenge1.cstr, buf1); - if (len < 0) { - error(0, -1, "could not decode initial BASE64 challenge"); + + if (msgbuf[0] != '+') return PS_AUTHFAIL; - } - - /* Client responds with a Kerberos ticket and an authenticator for - * the principal "imap.hostname@realm" where "hostname" is the - * first component of the host name of the server with all letters - * in lower case and where "realm" is the Kerberos realm of the - * server. The encrypted checksum field included within the - * Kerberos authenticator should contain the server-provided - * 32-bit number in network byte order. - */ - - strncpy(srvinst, ctl->server.names->id, (sizeof srvinst)-1); - srvinst[(sizeof srvinst)-1] = '\0'; - for (p = srvinst; *p; p++) { - if (isupper(*p)) { - *p = tolower(*p); - } - } + + buildSmbNtlmAuthRequest(&request,ctl->remotename,NULL); + + if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) + dumpSmbNtlmAuthRequest(stdout, &request); + + memset(msgbuf,0,sizeof msgbuf); + to64frombits (msgbuf, (unsigned char*)&request, SmbLength(&request)); + + if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) + report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", msgbuf); + + strcat(msgbuf,"\r\n"); + SockWrite (sock, msgbuf, strlen (msgbuf)); + + if ((gen_recv(sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf))) + return result; + + len = from64tobits ((unsigned char*)&challenge, msgbuf); + + if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) + dumpSmbNtlmAuthChallenge(stdout, &challenge); + + buildSmbNtlmAuthResponse(&challenge, &response,ctl->remotename,ctl->password); + + if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) + dumpSmbNtlmAuthResponse(stdout, &response); + + memset(msgbuf,0,sizeof msgbuf); + to64frombits (msgbuf, (unsigned char*)&response, SmbLength(&response)); + + if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) + report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", msgbuf); + + strcat(msgbuf,"\r\n"); + SockWrite (sock, msgbuf, strlen (msgbuf)); + + if ((result = gen_recv (sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf))) + return result; + + if (strstr (msgbuf, "OK")) + return PS_SUCCESS; + else + return PS_AUTHFAIL; +} +#endif /* NTLM */ - strncpy(srvrealm, krb_realmofhost(srvinst), (sizeof srvrealm)-1); - srvrealm[(sizeof srvrealm)-1] = '\0'; - if (p = strchr(srvinst, '.')) { - *p = '\0'; - } +static int imap_canonicalize(char *result, char *raw, int maxlen) +/* encode an IMAP password as per RFC1730's quoting conventions */ +{ + int i, j; - result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm, 0); - if (result) { - error(0, -1, "krb_mq_req: %s", krb_get_err_text(result)); - return PS_AUTHFAIL; + j = 0; + for (i = 0; i < strlen(raw) && i < maxlen; i++) + { + if ((raw[i] == '\\') || (raw[i] == '"')) + result[j++] = '\\'; + result[j++] = raw[i]; } + result[j] = '\0'; - result = krb_get_cred("imap", srvinst, srvrealm, &credentials); - if (result) { - error(0, -1, "krb_get_cred: %s", krb_get_err_text(result)); - return PS_AUTHFAIL; - } + return(i); +} - memcpy(session, credentials.session, sizeof session); - memset(&credentials, 0, sizeof credentials); - des_key_sched(session, schedule); +static int imap_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting) +/* apply for connection authorization */ +{ + int ok = 0; - result = krb_get_tf_fullname(TKT_FILE, tktuser, tktinst, tktrealm); - if (result) { - error(0, -1, "krb_get_tf_fullname: %s", krb_get_err_text(result)); - return PS_AUTHFAIL; - } + /* probe to see if we're running IMAP4 and can use RFC822.PEEK */ + capabilities[0] = '\0'; + if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "CAPABILITY")) == PS_SUCCESS) + { + char *cp; - if (strcmp(tktuser, user) != 0) { - error(0, -1, "principal %s in ticket does not match -u %s", tktuser, - user); - return PS_AUTHFAIL; - } + /* capability checks are supposed to be caseblind */ + for (cp = capabilities; *cp; cp++) + *cp = toupper(*cp); - if (tktinst[0]) { - error(0, 0, "non-null instance (%s) might cause strange behavior", - tktinst); - strcat(tktuser, "."); - strcat(tktuser, tktinst); + /* UW-IMAP server 10.173 notifies in all caps, but RFC2060 says we + should expect a response in mixed-case */ + if (strstr(capabilities, "IMAP4REV1")) + { + imap_version = IMAP4rev1; + if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) + report(stdout, GT_("Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 1\n")); + } + else + { + imap_version = IMAP4; + if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) + report(stdout, GT_("Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 0\n")); + } } - - if (strcmp(tktrealm, srvrealm) != 0) { - strcat(tktuser, "@"); - strcat(tktuser, tktrealm); + else if (ok == PS_ERROR) + { + imap_version = IMAP2; + if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) + report(stdout, GT_("Protocol identified as IMAP2 or IMAP2BIS\n")); } + else + return(ok); - result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm, - challenge1.cint); - if (result) { - error(0, -1, "krb_mq_req: %s", krb_get_err_text(result)); - return PS_AUTHFAIL; - } + peek_capable = (imap_version >= IMAP4); - to64(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length); - if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE) { - error(0, 0, "IMAP> %s", buf1); - } - SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1)); - SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2); - - /* Upon decrypting and verifying the ticket and authenticator, the - * server should verify that the contained checksum field equals - * the original server provided random 32-bit number. Should the - * verification be successful, the server must add one to the - * checksum and construct 8 octets of data, with the first four - * octets containing the incremented checksum in network byte - * order, the fifth octet containing a bit-mask specifying the - * protection mechanisms supported by the server, and the sixth - * through eighth octets containing, in network byte order, the - * maximum cipher-text buffer size the server is able to receive. - * The server must encrypt the 8 octets of data in the session key - * and issue that encrypted data in a second ready response. The - * client should consider the server authenticated if the first - * four octets the un-encrypted data is equal to one plus the - * checksum it previously sent. + /* + * Assumption: expunges are cheap, so we want to do them + * after every message unless user said otherwise. */ - - if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) - return result; + if (NUM_SPECIFIED(ctl->expunge)) + expunge_period = NUM_VALUE_OUT(ctl->expunge); + else + expunge_period = 1; - /* The client must construct data with the first four octets - * containing the original server-issued checksum in network byte - * order, the fifth octet containing the bit-mask specifying the - * selected protection mechanism, the sixth through eighth octets - * containing in network byte order the maximum cipher-text buffer - * size the client is able to receive, and the following octets - * containing a user name string. The client must then append - * from one to eight octets so that the length of the data is a - * multiple of eight octets. The client must then PCBC encrypt the - * data with the session key and respond to the second ready - * response with the encrypted data. The server decrypts the data - * and verifies the contained checksum. The username field - * identifies the user for whom subsequent IMAP operations are to - * be performed; the server must verify that the principal - * identified in the Kerberos ticket is authorized to connect as - * that user. After these verifications, the authentication - * process is complete. + /* + * Handle idling. We depend on coming through here on startup + * and after each timeout (including timeouts during idles). */ + if (strstr(capabilities, "IDLE") && ctl->idle) + { + do_idle = TRUE; + if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) + report(stdout, GT_("will idle after poll\n")); + } - len = from64(buf2, buf1); - if (len < 0) { - error(0, -1, "could not decode BASE64 ready response"); - return PS_AUTHFAIL; + /* + * If either (a) we saw a PREAUTH token in the greeting, or + * (b) the user specified ssh preauthentication, then we're done. + */ + if (preauth || ctl->server.authenticate == A_SSH) + { + preauth = FALSE; /* reset for the next session */ + return(PS_SUCCESS); } - des_ecb_encrypt((des_cblock *)buf2, (des_cblock *)buf2, schedule, 0); - memcpy(challenge2.cstr, buf2, 4); - if (ntohl(challenge2.cint) != challenge1.cint + 1) { - error(0, -1, "challenge mismatch"); - return PS_AUTHFAIL; - } + /* + * Time to authenticate the user. + * Try the protocol variants that don't require passwords first. + */ + ok = PS_AUTHFAIL; - memset(authenticator.dat, 0, sizeof authenticator.dat); +#ifdef GSSAPI + if ((ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY + || ctl->server.authenticate == A_GSSAPI) + && strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=GSSAPI")) + if(ok = do_gssauth(sock, "AUTHENTICATE", ctl->server.truename, ctl->remotename)) + { + /* SASL cancellation of authentication */ + gen_send(sock, "*"); + if(ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY) + return ok; + } + else + return ok; +#endif /* GSSAPI */ - result = htonl(challenge1.cint); - memcpy(authenticator.dat, &result, sizeof result); +#ifdef KERBEROS_V4 + if ((ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY + || ctl->server.authenticate == A_KERBEROS_V4 + || ctl->server.authenticate == A_KERBEROS_V5) + && strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=KERBEROS_V4")) + { + if ((ok = do_rfc1731(sock, "AUTHENTICATE", ctl->server.truename))) + { + /* SASL cancellation of authentication */ + gen_send(sock, "*"); + if(ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY) + return ok; + } + else + return ok; + } +#endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */ - /* The protection mechanisms and their corresponding bit-masks are as - * follows: - * - * 1 No protection mechanism - * 2 Integrity (krb_mk_safe) protection - * 4 Privacy (krb_mk_priv) protection + /* + * No such luck. OK, now try the variants that mask your password + * in a challenge-response. */ - authenticator.dat[4] = 1; - len = strlen(tktuser); - strncpy(authenticator.dat+8, tktuser, len); - authenticator.length = len + 8 + 1; - while (authenticator.length & 7) { - authenticator.length++; + if ((ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY + || ctl->server.authenticate == A_CRAM_MD5) + && strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=CRAM-MD5")) + { + if ((ok = do_cram_md5 (sock, "AUTHENTICATE", ctl, NULL))) + { + /* SASL cancellation of authentication */ + gen_send(sock, "*"); + if(ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY) + return ok; + } + else + return ok; } - des_pcbc_encrypt((des_cblock *)authenticator.dat, - (des_cblock *)authenticator.dat, authenticator.length, schedule, - &session, 1); - to64(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length); - if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE) { - error(0, 0, "IMAP> %s", buf1); +#if OPIE_ENABLE + if ((ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY + || ctl->server.authenticate == A_OTP) + && strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=X-OTP")) + if ((ok = do_otp(sock, "AUTHENTICATE", ctl))) + { + /* SASL cancellation of authentication */ + gen_send(sock, "*"); + if(ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY) + return ok; + } + else + return ok; +#else + if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_OTP) + { + report(stderr, + GT_("Required OTP capability not compiled into fetchmail\n")); } - SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1)); - SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2); +#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */ - if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) - return result; +#ifdef NTLM_ENABLE + if ((ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY + || ctl->server.authenticate == A_NTLM) + && strstr (capabilities, "AUTH=NTLM")) { + if ((ok = do_imap_ntlm(sock, ctl))) + { + /* SASL cancellation of authentication */ + gen_send(sock, "*"); + if(ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY) + return ok; + } + else + return(ok); + } +#else + if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_NTLM) + { + report(stderr, + GT_("Required NTLM capability not compiled into fetchmail\n")); + } +#endif /* NTLM_ENABLE */ - if (strstr(buf1, "OK")) { - return PS_SUCCESS; +#ifdef __UNUSED__ /* The Cyrus IMAP4rev1 server chokes on this */ + /* this handles either AUTH=LOGIN or AUTH-LOGIN */ + if ((imap_version >= IMAP4rev1) && (!strstr(capabilities, "LOGIN"))) + { + report(stderr, + GT_("Required LOGIN capability not supported by server\n")); } - else { - return PS_AUTHFAIL; +#endif /* __UNUSED__ */ + + /* we're stuck with sending the password en clair */ + if ((ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY + || ctl->server.authenticate == A_PASSWORD) + && !strstr (capabilities, "LOGINDISABLED")) + { + /* these sizes guarantee no buffer overflow */ + char remotename[NAMELEN*2+1], password[PASSWORDLEN*2+1]; + + imap_canonicalize(remotename, ctl->remotename, NAMELEN); + imap_canonicalize(password, ctl->password, PASSWORDLEN); + + strcpy(shroud, ctl->password); + ok = gen_transact(sock, "LOGIN \"%s\" \"%s\"", remotename, password); + shroud[0] = '\0'; + if (ok) + { + /* SASL cancellation of authentication */ + gen_send(sock, "*"); + if(ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY) + return ok; + } + else + return(ok); } + + return(ok); } -#endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */ -int imap_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *buf) -/* apply for connection authorization */ +static int internal_expunge(int sock) +/* ship an expunge, resetting associated counters */ { - char rbuf [POPBUFSIZE+1]; - int ok = 0; -#ifdef KERBEROS_V4 - int kerbok = 0; + int ok; - if (ctl->server.protocol != P_IMAP_K4) -#endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */ - /* try to get authorized */ - ok = gen_transact(sock, - "LOGIN %s \"%s\"", ctl->remotename, ctl->password); - - if (ok) - return(ok); - - /* probe to see if we're running IMAP4 and can use RFC822.PEEK */ - gen_send(sock, "CAPABILITY"); - if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, rbuf, sizeof(rbuf)))) - return(ok); - if (strstr(rbuf, "BAD")) - { - imap_version = IMAP2; - if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE) - error(0, 0, "Protocol identified as IMAP2 or IMAP2BIS"); - } - else if (strstr(rbuf, "IMAP4rev1")) - { - imap_version = IMAP4rev1; - if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE) - error(0, 0, "Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 1"); - } - else - { - imap_version = IMAP4; - if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE) - error(0, 0, "Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 0"); - } - - peek_capable = (imap_version >= IMAP4); + if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "EXPUNGE"))) + return(ok); -#ifdef KERBEROS_V4 - if (strstr(rbuf, "AUTH=KERBEROS_V4")) - { - kerbok++; - if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE) - error(0, 0, "KERBEROS_V4 authentication is supported"); - } - - /* eat OK response */ - if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, rbuf, sizeof(rbuf)))) - return(ok); - - if (!strstr(rbuf, "OK")) - return(PS_AUTHFAIL); - - if ((imap_version >= IMAP4) && (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_K4)) - { - if (!kerbok) - { - error(0, -1, "Required KERBEROS_V4 capability not supported by server"); - return(PS_AUTHFAIL); - } - - if ((ok = do_rfc1731(sock, ctl, buf))) - { - if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE) - error(0, 0, "IMAP> *"); - SockWrite(sock, "*\r\n", 3); - return(ok); - } - } -#endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */ + expunged += deletions; + deletions = 0; + +#ifdef IMAP_UID /* not used */ + expunge_uids(ctl); +#endif /* IMAP_UID */ + + return(PS_SUCCESS); +} + +static int imap_idle(int sock) +/* start an RFC2177 IDLE */ +{ + stage = STAGE_IDLE; + saved_timeout = mytimeout; + mytimeout = 0; - return(PS_SUCCESS); + return (gen_transact(sock, "IDLE")); } static int imap_getrange(int sock, struct query *ctl, const char *folder, - int *countp, int *newp) + int *countp, int *newp, int *bytes) /* get range of messages to be fetched */ { int ok; + char buf[MSGBUFSIZE+1], *cp; /* find out how many messages are waiting */ - recent = unseen = 0; - ok = gen_transact(sock, "SELECT %s", folder ? folder : "INBOX"); - if (ok != 0) + *bytes = -1; + + if (pass > 1) { - error(0, 0, "mailbox selection failed"); - return(ok); + /* + * We have to have an expunge here, otherwise the re-poll will + * infinite-loop picking up un-expunged messages -- unless the + * expunge period is one and we've been nuking each message + * just after deletion. + */ + ok = 0; + if (deletions && expunge_period != 1) + ok = internal_expunge(sock); + count = -1; + if (do_idle) + ok = imap_idle(sock); + if (ok || gen_transact(sock, "NOOP")) + { + report(stderr, GT_("re-poll failed\n")); + return(ok); + } + else if (count == -1) /* no EXISTS response to NOOP/IDLE */ + { + count = 0; + } + if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) + report(stdout, GT_("%d messages waiting after re-poll\n"), count); + } + else + { + ok = gen_transact(sock, + check_only ? "EXAMINE \"%s\"" : "SELECT \"%s\"", + folder ? folder : "INBOX"); + if (ok != 0) + { + report(stderr, GT_("mailbox selection failed\n")); + return(ok); + } + else if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) + report(stdout, GT_("%d messages waiting after first poll\n"), count); + + /* no messages? then we may need to idle until we get some */ + if (count == 0 && do_idle) + imap_idle(sock); } *countp = count; - if (unseen) /* optional response, but better if we see it */ - *newp = unseen; - else if (recent) /* mandatory */ - *newp = recent; - else - *newp = -1; /* should never happen, RECENT is mandatory */ - - deletecount = 0; + /* OK, now get a count of unseen messages and their indices */ + if (!ctl->fetchall && count > 0) + { + if (unseen_messages) + free(unseen_messages); + unseen_messages = xmalloc(count * sizeof(unsigned int)); + memset(unseen_messages, 0, count * sizeof(unsigned int)); + unseen = 0; + + gen_send(sock, "SEARCH UNSEEN"); + do { + ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (ok != 0) + { + report(stderr, GT_("search for unseen messages failed\n")); + return(PS_PROTOCOL); + } + else if ((cp = strstr(buf, "* SEARCH"))) + { + char *ep; + + cp += 8; /* skip "* SEARCH" */ + + while (*cp && unseen < count) + { + /* skip whitespace */ + while (*cp && isspace(*cp)) + cp++; + if (*cp) + { + /* + * Message numbers are between 1 and 2^32 inclusive, + * so unsigned int is large enough. + */ + unseen_messages[unseen]=(unsigned int)strtol(cp,&ep,10); + + if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) + report(stdout, + GT_("%u is unseen\n"), + unseen_messages[unseen]); + + unseen++; + cp = ep; + } + } + } + } while + (tag[0] != '\0' && strncmp(buf, tag, strlen(tag))); + } else + unseen = -1; + + *newp = unseen; + expunged = 0; return(PS_SUCCESS); } @@ -418,21 +583,61 @@ static int imap_getrange(int sock, static int imap_getsizes(int sock, int count, int *sizes) /* capture the sizes of all messages */ { - char buf [POPBUFSIZE+1]; + char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1]; - gen_send(sock, "FETCH 1:%d RFC822.SIZE", count); - while (SockRead(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))) + /* + * Some servers (as in, PMDF5.1-9.1 under OpenVMS 6.1) + * won't accept 1:1 as valid set syntax. Some implementors + * should be taken out and shot for excessive anality. + * + * Microsoft Exchange (brain-dead piece of crap that it is) + * sometimes gets its knickers in a knot about bodiless messages. + * You may see responses like this: + * + * fetchmail: IMAP> A0004 FETCH 1:9 RFC822.SIZE + * fetchmail: IMAP< * 2 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 1187) + * fetchmail: IMAP< * 3 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 3954) + * fetchmail: IMAP< * 4 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 1944) + * fetchmail: IMAP< * 5 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 2933) + * fetchmail: IMAP< * 6 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 1854) + * fetchmail: IMAP< * 7 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 34054) + * fetchmail: IMAP< * 8 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 5561) + * fetchmail: IMAP< * 9 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 1101) + * fetchmail: IMAP< A0004 NO The requested item could not be found. + * + * This means message 1 has only headers. For kicks and grins + * you can telnet in and look: + * A003 FETCH 1 FULL + * A003 NO The requested item could not be found. + * A004 fetch 1 rfc822.header + * A004 NO The requested item could not be found. + * A006 FETCH 1 BODY + * * 1 FETCH (BODY ("TEXT" "PLAIN" ("CHARSET" "US-ASCII") NIL NIL "7BIT" 35 3)) + * A006 OK FETCH completed. + * + * To get around this, we terminate the read loop on a NO and count + * on the fact that the sizes array has been preinitialized with a + * known-bad size value. + */ + if (count == 1) + gen_send(sock, "FETCH 1 RFC822.SIZE", count); + else + gen_send(sock, "FETCH 1:%d RFC822.SIZE", count); + for (;;) { - int num, size, ok; + unsigned int num, size; + int ok; if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf)))) return(ok); - if (strstr(buf, "OK")) + else if (strstr(buf, "OK") || strstr(buf, "NO")) break; - else if (sscanf(buf, "* %d FETCH (RFC822.SIZE %d)", &num, &size) == 2) - sizes[num - 1] = size; - else - sizes[num - 1] = -1; + else if (sscanf(buf, "* %u FETCH (RFC822.SIZE %u)", &num, &size) == 2) { + if (num > 0 && num <= count) + sizes[num - 1] = size; + /* else, strict: protocol error, flexible: nothing + * I vote for flexible. */ + } } return(PS_SUCCESS); @@ -441,40 +646,66 @@ static int imap_getsizes(int sock, int count, int *sizes) static int imap_is_old(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number) /* is the given message old? */ { - int ok; + flag seen = TRUE; + int i; - /* expunges change the fetch numbers */ - number -= deletecount; + /* + * Expunges change the fetch numbers, but unseen_messages contains + * indices from before any expungees were done. So neither the + * argument nor the values in message_sequence need to be decremented. + */ - if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "FETCH %d FLAGS", number)) != 0) - return(PS_ERROR); + seen = TRUE; + for (i = 0; i < unseen; i++) + if (unseen_messages[i] == number) + { + seen = FALSE; + break; + } return(seen); } +static char *skip_token(char *ptr) +{ + while(isspace(*ptr)) ptr++; + while(!isspace(*ptr) && !iscntrl(*ptr)) ptr++; + while(isspace(*ptr)) ptr++; + return(ptr); +} + static int imap_fetch_headers(int sock, struct query *ctl,int number,int *lenp) /* request headers of nth message */ { - char buf [POPBUFSIZE+1]; + char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1]; int num; /* expunges change the fetch numbers */ - number -= deletecount; + number -= expunged; /* - * This is blessed by RFC 1176, RFC1730, RFC2060. + * This is blessed by RFC1176, RFC1730, RFC2060. * According to the RFCs, it should *not* set the \Seen flag. */ gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.HEADER", number); /* looking for FETCH response */ - do { + for (;;) + { int ok; + char *ptr; if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf)))) return(ok); - } while - (sscanf(buf+2, "%d FETCH (%*s {%d}", &num, lenp) != 2); + ptr = skip_token(buf); /* either "* " or "AXXXX " */ + if (sscanf(ptr, "%d FETCH (%*s {%d}", &num, lenp) == 2) + break; + /* try to recover from chronically fucked-up M$ Exchange servers */ + else if (!strncmp(ptr, "NO", 2)) + return(PS_TRANSIENT); + else if (!strncmp(ptr, "BAD", 3)) + return(PS_TRANSIENT); + } if (num != number) return(PS_ERROR); @@ -485,11 +716,11 @@ static int imap_fetch_headers(int sock, struct query *ctl,int number,int *lenp) static int imap_fetch_body(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number, int *lenp) /* request body of nth message */ { - char buf [POPBUFSIZE+1]; + char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1], *cp; int num; /* expunges change the fetch numbers */ - number -= deletecount; + number -= expunged; /* * If we're using IMAP4, we can fetch the message without setting its @@ -499,7 +730,22 @@ static int imap_fetch_body(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number, int *lenp) * * However...*don't* do this if we're using keep to suppress deletion! * In that case, marking the seen flag is the only way to prevent the - * message from being re-fetched on subsequent runs. + * message from being re-fetched on subsequent runs (and according + * to RFC2060 p.43 this fetch should set Seen as a side effect). + * + * According to RFC2060, and Mark Crispin the IMAP maintainer, + * FETCH %d BODY[TEXT] and RFC822.TEXT are "functionally + * equivalent". However, we know of at least one server that + * treats them differently in the presence of MIME attachments; + * the latter form downloads the attachment, the former does not. + * The server is InterChange, and the fool who implemented this + * misfeature ought to be strung up by his thumbs. + * + * When I tried working around this by disabling use of the 4rev1 form, + * I found that doing this breaks operation with M$ Exchange. + * Annoyingly enough, Exchange's refusal to cope is technically legal + * under RFC2062. Trust Microsoft, the Great Enemy of interoperability + * standards, to find a way to make standards compliance irritating.... */ switch (imap_version) { @@ -529,24 +775,64 @@ static int imap_fetch_body(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number, int *lenp) if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf)))) return(ok); } while - /* third token can be "RFC822" or "BODY[]" */ - (sscanf(buf+2, "%d FETCH (%*s {%d}", &num, lenp) != 2); + (!strstr(buf+4, "FETCH") || sscanf(buf+2, "%d", &num) != 1); if (num != number) return(PS_ERROR); + + /* + * Try to extract a length from the FETCH response. RFC2060 requires + * it to be present, but at least one IMAP server (Novell GroupWise) + * botches this. + */ + if ((cp = strchr(buf, '{'))) + *lenp = atoi(cp + 1); else - return(PS_SUCCESS); + *lenp = -1; /* missing length part in FETCH reponse */ + + return(PS_SUCCESS); } static int imap_trail(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number) /* discard tail of FETCH response after reading message text */ { - char buf [POPBUFSIZE+1]; - /* expunges change the fetch numbers */ - /* number -= deletecount; */ + /* number -= expunged; */ + + for (;;) + { + char buf[MSGBUFSIZE+1]; + int ok; + + if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf)))) + return(ok); + + /* UW IMAP returns "OK FETCH", Cyrus returns "OK Completed" */ + if (strstr(buf, "OK")) + break; + +#ifdef __UNUSED__ + /* + * Any IMAP server that fails to set Seen on a BODY[TEXT] + * fetch violates RFC2060 p.43 (top). This becomes an issue + * when keep is on, because seen messages aren't deleted and + * get refetched on each poll. As a workaround, if keep is on + * we can set the Seen flag explicitly. + * + * This code isn't used yet because we don't know of any IMAP + * servers broken in this way. + */ + if (ctl->keep) + if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, + imap_version == IMAP4 + ? "STORE %d +FLAGS.SILENT (\\Seen)" + : "STORE %d +FLAGS (\\Seen)", + number))) + return(ok); +#endif /* __UNUSED__ */ + } - return(gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))); + return(PS_SUCCESS); } static int imap_delete(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number) @@ -555,48 +841,78 @@ static int imap_delete(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number) int ok; /* expunges change the fetch numbers */ - number -= deletecount; + number -= expunged; /* * Use SILENT if possible as a minor throughput optimization. * Note: this has been dropped from IMAP4rev1. + * + * We set Seen because there are some IMAP servers (notably HP + * OpenMail) that do message-receipt DSNs, but only when the seen + * bit is set. This is the appropriate time -- we get here right + * after the local SMTP response that says delivery was + * successful. */ if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, imap_version == IMAP4 - ? "STORE %d +FLAGS.SILENT (\\Deleted)" - : "STORE %d +FLAGS (\\Deleted)", + ? "STORE %d +FLAGS.SILENT (\\Seen \\Deleted)" + : "STORE %d +FLAGS (\\Seen \\Deleted)", number))) return(ok); + else + deletions++; /* - * We do an expunge after each message, rather than just before quit, - * so that a line hit during a long session won't result in lots of - * messages being fetched again during the next session. + * We do an expunge after expunge_period messages, rather than + * just before quit, so that a line hit during a long session + * won't result in lots of messages being fetched again during + * the next session. */ - if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "EXPUNGE"))) - return(ok); - - deletecount++; + if (NUM_NONZERO(expunge_period) && (deletions % expunge_period) == 0) + internal_expunge(sock); return(PS_SUCCESS); } +static int imap_logout(int sock, struct query *ctl) +/* send logout command */ +{ + /* if any un-expunged deletions remain, ship an expunge now */ + if (deletions) + internal_expunge(sock); + +#ifdef USE_SEARCH + /* Memory clean-up */ + if (unseen_messages) + free(unseen_messages); +#endif /* USE_SEARCH */ + + return(gen_transact(sock, "LOGOUT")); +} + const static struct method imap = { "IMAP", /* Internet Message Access Protocol */ - 143, /* standard IMAP2bis/IMAP4 port */ - 1, /* this is a tagged protocol */ - 0, /* no message delimiter */ +#if INET6_ENABLE + "imap", + "imaps", +#else /* INET6_ENABLE */ + 143, /* standard IMAP2bis/IMAP4 port */ + 993, /* ssl IMAP2bis/IMAP4 port */ +#endif /* INET6_ENABLE */ + TRUE, /* this is a tagged protocol */ + FALSE, /* no message delimiter */ imap_ok, /* parse command response */ imap_getauth, /* get authorization */ imap_getrange, /* query range of messages */ - imap_getsizes, /* grab message sizes */ + imap_getsizes, /* get sizes of messages (used for ESMTP SIZE option) */ imap_is_old, /* no UID check */ imap_fetch_headers, /* request given message headers */ imap_fetch_body, /* request given message body */ imap_trail, /* eat message trailer */ imap_delete, /* delete the message */ - "LOGOUT", /* the IMAP exit command */ + imap_logout, /* expunge and exit */ + TRUE, /* yes, we can re-poll */ }; int doIMAP(struct query *ctl)