#include "fetchmail.h"
#include "getaddrinfo.h"
#include "i18n.h"
+#include "sdump.h"
/* Defines to allow BeOS and Cygwin to play nice... */
#ifdef __BEOS__
/* We need to define h_errno only if it is not already */
#ifndef h_errno
-
-#ifdef HAVE_RES_SEARCH
-/* some versions of FreeBSD should declare this but don't */
+# if !HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO
extern int h_errno;
-#else
-/* pretend we have h_errno to avoid some #ifdef's later */
-static int h_errno;
-#endif
-
+# endif
#endif /* ndef h_errno */
#ifdef HAVE_SOCKETPAIR
static char *const *parse_plugin(const char *plugin, const char *host, const char *service)
-{ const char **argvec;
+{
+ char **argvec;
const char *c, *p;
char *cp, *plugin_copy;
unsigned int plugin_copy_len;
}
plugin_copy[plugin_copy_len] = 0;
- argvec = (const char **)malloc(s);
+ argvec = (char **)malloc(s);
if (!argvec)
{
report(stderr, GT_("fetchmail: malloc failed\n"));
return NULL;
}
memset(argvec, 0, s);
- for (c = p = plugin_copy, i = 0; *c; c++)
- { if ((!isspace((unsigned char)*c)) && (c == p ? 1 : isspace((unsigned char)*p))) {
- argvec[i] = c;
+ for (p = cp = plugin_copy, i = 0; *cp; cp++)
+ { if ((!isspace((unsigned char)*cp)) && (cp == p ? 1 : isspace((unsigned char)*p))) {
+ argvec[i] = cp;
i++;
}
- p = c;
+ p = cp;
}
for (cp = plugin_copy; *cp; cp++)
{ if (isspace((unsigned char)*cp))
*cp = 0;
}
- return (char *const*)argvec;
+ return argvec;
}
static int handle_plugin(const char *host,
(void) close(fds[1]);
if ( (dup2(fds[0],0) == -1) || (dup2(fds[0],1) == -1) ) {
report(stderr, GT_("dup2 failed\n"));
- exit(1);
+ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
/* fds[0] is now connected to 0 and 1; close it */
(void) close(fds[0]);
argvec = parse_plugin(plugin,host,service);
execvp(*argvec, argvec);
report(stderr, GT_("execvp(%s) failed\n"), *argvec);
- exit(0);
+ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
break;
default: /* parent */
/* NOP */
}
#endif /* HAVE_SOCKETPAIR */
-#ifdef __UNUSED__
-
-int SockCheckOpen(int fd)
-/* poll given socket; is it selectable? */
-{
- fd_set r, w, e;
- int rt;
+static int setsocktimeout(int sock, int which, int timeout) {
struct timeval tv;
-
- for (;;)
- {
- FD_ZERO(&r); FD_ZERO(&w); FD_ZERO(&e);
- FD_SET(fd, &e);
-
- tv.tv_sec = 0; tv.tv_usec = 0;
- rt = select(fd+1, &r, &w, &e, &tv);
- if (rt == -1 && (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR))
- return 0;
- if (rt != -1)
- return 1;
+ int rc;
+
+ tv.tv_sec = timeout;
+ tv.tv_usec = 0;
+ rc = setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, which, &tv, sizeof(tv));
+ if (rc) {
+ report(stderr, GT_("setsockopt(%d, SOL_SOCKET) failed: %s"), sock, strerror(errno));
}
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/** Configure socket options such as send/receive timeout at the socket
+ * level, to avoid network-induced stalls.
+ */
+int SockTimeout(int sock, int timeout)
+{
+ int err = 0;
+
+ if (setsocktimeout(sock, SO_RCVTIMEO, timeout)) err = 1;
+ if (setsocktimeout(sock, SO_SNDTIMEO, timeout)) err = 1;
+ return err;
}
-#endif /* __UNUSED__ */
int UnixOpen(const char *path)
{
}
int SockOpen(const char *host, const char *service,
- const char *plugin)
+ const char *plugin, struct addrinfo **ai0)
{
- struct addrinfo *ai, *ai0, req;
- int i;
+ struct addrinfo *ai, req;
+ int i, acterr = 0;
+ int ord;
+ char errbuf[8192] = "";
#ifdef HAVE_SOCKETPAIR
if (plugin)
return handle_plugin(host,service,plugin);
#endif /* HAVE_SOCKETPAIR */
+
memset(&req, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
req.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+#ifdef AI_ADDRCONFIG
+ req.ai_flags = AI_ADDRCONFIG;
+#endif
- i = getaddrinfo(host, service, &req, &ai0);
+ i = fm_getaddrinfo(host, service, &req, ai0);
if (i) {
report(stderr, GT_("getaddrinfo(\"%s\",\"%s\") error: %s\n"),
host, service, gai_strerror(i));
return -1;
}
+ /* NOTE a Linux bug here - getaddrinfo will happily return 127.0.0.1
+ * twice if no IPv6 is configured */
i = -1;
- for (ai = ai0; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
- i = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, 0);
- if (i < 0)
+ for (ord = 0, ai = *ai0; ai; ord++, ai = ai->ai_next) {
+ char buf[256]; /* hostname */
+ char pb[256]; /* service name */
+ int gnie; /* getnameinfo result code */
+
+ gnie = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, buf, sizeof(buf), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST);
+ if (gnie)
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), GT_("unknown (%s)"), gai_strerror(gnie));
+ gnie = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, NULL, 0, pb, sizeof(pb), NI_NUMERICSERV);
+ if (gnie)
+ snprintf(pb, sizeof(pb), GT_("unknown (%s)"), gai_strerror(gnie));
+
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
+ report_build(stdout, GT_("Trying to connect to %s/%s..."), buf, pb);
+ i = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ int e = errno;
+ /* mask EAFNOSUPPORT errors, they confuse users for
+ * multihomed hosts */
+ if (errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
+ acterr = errno;
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
+ report_complete(stdout, GT_("cannot create socket: %s\n"), strerror(e));
+ snprintf(errbuf+strlen(errbuf), sizeof(errbuf)-strlen(errbuf),\
+ GT_("name %d: cannot create socket family %d type %d: %s\n"), ord, ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, strerror(e));
continue;
+ }
- /* Socket opened saved. Usefull if connect timeout
- * because it can be closed.
- */
+ /* Save socket descriptor.
+ * Used to close the socket after connect timeout. */
mailserver_socket_temp = i;
if (connect(i, (struct sockaddr *) ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+ int e = errno;
+
+ /* additionally, suppress IPv4 network unreach errors */
+ if (e != EAFNOSUPPORT)
+ acterr = errno;
+
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
+ report_complete(stdout, GT_("connection failed.\n"));
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
+ report(stderr, GT_("connection to %s:%s [%s/%s] failed: %s.\n"), host, service, buf, pb, strerror(e));
+ snprintf(errbuf+strlen(errbuf), sizeof(errbuf)-strlen(errbuf), GT_("name %d: connection to %s:%s [%s/%s] failed: %s.\n"), ord, host, service, buf, pb, strerror(e));
fm_close(i);
i = -1;
continue;
+ } else {
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
+ report_complete(stdout, GT_("connected.\n"));
}
-
+
/* No connect timeout, then no need to set mailserver_socket_temp */
mailserver_socket_temp = -1;
-
+
break;
}
- freeaddrinfo(ai0);
+ fm_freeaddrinfo(*ai0);
+ *ai0 = NULL;
+
+ if (i == -1) {
+ report(stderr, GT_("Connection errors for this poll:\n%s"), errbuf);
+ errno = acterr;
+ }
return i;
}
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
-static SSL_CTX *_ctx = NULL;
+static SSL_CTX *_ctx[FD_SETSIZE];
static SSL *_ssl_context[FD_SETSIZE];
static SSL *SSLGetContext( int );
#endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
-int SockWrite(int sock, char *buf, int len)
+int SockWrite(int sock, const char *buf, int len)
{
int n, wrlen = 0;
#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
{
char *newline, *bp = buf;
int n;
-#ifdef FORCE_STUFFING
- int maxavailable = 0;
-#endif
#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
SSL *ssl;
#endif
/* OK... SSL_peek works a little different from MSG_PEEK
Problem is that SSL_peek can return 0 if there
is no data currently available. If, on the other
- hand, we loose the socket, we also get a zero, but
+ hand, we lose the socket, we also get a zero, but
the SSL_read then SEGFAULTS! To deal with this,
we'll check the error code any time we get a return
of zero from SSL_peek. If we have an error, we bail.
(void)SSL_get_error(ssl, n);
return(-1);
}
-#ifdef FORCE_STUFFING
- maxavailable = n;
-#endif
if( 0 == n ) {
/* SSL_peek says no data... Does he mean no data
or did the connection blow up? If we got an error
then bail! */
- if( 0 != ( n = SSL_get_error(ssl, n) ) ) {
+ if (0 != SSL_get_error(ssl, n)) {
return -1;
}
/* We didn't get an error so read at least one
* We don't have a string to pass through
* the strchr at this point yet */
newline = NULL;
- } else if ((newline = memchr(bp, '\n', n)) != NULL)
+ } else if ((newline = (char *)memchr(bp, '\n', n)) != NULL)
n = newline - bp + 1;
/* Matthias Andree: SSL_read can return 0, in that case
- * we must cal SSL_get_error to figure if there was
+ * we must call SSL_get_error to figure if there was
* an error or just a "no data" condition */
if ((n = SSL_read(ssl, bp, n)) <= 0) {
if ((n = SSL_get_error(ssl, n))) {
if ((n = fm_peek(sock, bp, len)) <= 0)
#endif
return (-1);
-#ifdef FORCE_STUFFING
- maxavailable = n;
-#endif
if ((newline = (char *)memchr(bp, '\n', n)) != NULL)
n = newline - bp + 1;
#ifndef __BEOS__
(!newline && len);
*bp = '\0';
-#ifdef FORCE_STUFFING /* too ugly to live -- besides, there's IMAP */
- /* OK, very weird hack coming up here:
- * When POP3 servers send us a message, they're supposed to
- * terminate the message with a line containing only a dot. To protect
- * against lines in the real message that might contain only a dot,
- * they're supposed to preface any line that starts with a dot with
- * an additional dot, which will be removed on the client side. That
- * process, called byte-stuffing (and unstuffing) is really not the
- * concern of this low-level routine, ordinarily, but there are some
- * POP servers (and maybe IMAP servers too, who knows) that fail to
- * do the byte-stuffing, and this routine is the best place to try to
- * identify and fix that fault.
- *
- * Since the DOT line is supposed to come only at the end of a
- * message, the implication is that right after we see it, the server
- * is supposed to go back to waiting for the next command. There
- * isn't supposed to be any more data to read after we see the dot.
- * THEREFORE, if we see more data to be read after something that
- * looks like the dot line, then probably the server is failing to
- * do byte-stuffing. In that case, we'll byte-pack it for them so
- * that the higher-level routines see things as hunky-dorey.
- * This is not a perfect test or fix by any means (it has an
- * obvious race condition, for one thing), but it should at least
- * reduce the nastiness that ensues when people don't know how
- * to write POP servers.
- */
- if ((maxavailable > (bp-buf)) &&
- ((((bp-buf) == 3) &&
- (buf[0] == '.') &&
- (buf[1] == '\r') &&
- (buf[2] == '\n')) ||
- (((bp-buf) == 2) &&
- (buf[0] == '.') &&
- (buf[1] == '\n')))) {
-
- memmove(buf+1, buf, (bp-buf)+1);
- buf[0] = '.';
- bp++;
- }
-#endif /* FORCE_STUFFING */
return bp - buf;
}
/* SSL_peek says 0... Does that mean no data
or did the connection blow up? If we got an error
then bail! */
- if( 0 != ( n = SSL_get_error(ssl, n) ) ) {
+ if(0 != SSL_get_error(ssl, n)) {
return -1;
}
static char *_check_digest;
static char *_server_label;
static int _depth0ck;
+static int _firstrun;
static int _prev_err;
+static int _verify_ok;
SSL *SSLGetContext( int sock )
{
- /* If SSLOpen has never initialized - just return NULL */
- if( NULL == _ctx )
- return NULL;
-
if( sock < 0 || (unsigned)sock > FD_SETSIZE )
return NULL;
+ if( _ctx[sock] == NULL )
+ return NULL;
return _ssl_context[sock];
}
-
/* ok_return (preverify_ok) is 1 if this stage of certificate verification
passed, or 0 if it failed. This callback lets us display informative
errors, and perform additional validation (e.g. CN matches) */
static int SSL_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int strict )
{
+#define SSLverbose (((outlevel) >= O_DEBUG) || ((outlevel) >= O_VERBOSE && (depth) == 0))
char buf[257];
X509 *x509_cert;
int err, depth, i;
const EVP_MD *digest_tp;
unsigned int dsz, esz;
X509_NAME *subj, *issuer;
+ char *tt;
x509_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
subj = X509_get_subject_name(x509_cert);
issuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x509_cert);
- if (depth == 0 && !_depth0ck) {
- _depth0ck = 1;
-
- if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) {
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) {
+ if (depth == 0 && SSLverbose)
+ report(stderr, GT_("Server certificate:\n"));
+ else {
+ if (_firstrun) {
+ _firstrun = 0;
+ if (SSLverbose)
+ report(stdout, GT_("Certificate chain, from root to peer, starting at depth %d:\n"), depth);
+ } else {
+ if (SSLverbose)
+ report(stdout, GT_("Certificate at depth %d:\n"), depth);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (SSLverbose) {
if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(issuer, NID_organizationName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
- report(stdout, GT_("Issuer Organization: %s\n"), buf);
+ report(stdout, GT_("Issuer Organization: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(buf, i)));
+ xfree(tt);
if ((size_t)i >= sizeof(buf) - 1)
report(stdout, GT_("Warning: Issuer Organization Name too long (possibly truncated).\n"));
} else
report(stdout, GT_("Unknown Organization\n"));
if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(issuer, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
- report(stdout, GT_("Issuer CommonName: %s\n"), buf);
+ report(stdout, GT_("Issuer CommonName: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(buf, i)));
+ xfree(tt);
if ((size_t)i >= sizeof(buf) - 1)
report(stdout, GT_("Warning: Issuer CommonName too long (possibly truncated).\n"));
} else
report(stdout, GT_("Unknown Issuer CommonName\n"));
}
+ }
+
+ if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subj, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
+ if (SSLverbose) {
+ report(stdout, GT_("Subject CommonName: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(buf, i)));
+ xfree(tt);
+ }
+ if ((size_t)i >= sizeof(buf) - 1) {
+ /* Possible truncation. In this case, this is a DNS name, so this
+ * is really bad. We do not tolerate this even in the non-strict case. */
+ report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject CommonName too long!\n"));
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if ((size_t)i > strlen(buf)) {
+ /* Name contains embedded NUL characters, so we complain. This is likely
+ * a certificate spoofing attack. */
+ report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject CommonName contains NUL, aborting!\n"));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (depth == 0) { /* peer certificate */
+ if (!_depth0ck) {
+ _depth0ck = 1;
+ }
+
if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subj, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
- if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
- report(stdout, GT_("Server CommonName: %s\n"), buf);
- if ((size_t)i >= sizeof(buf) - 1) {
- /* Possible truncation. In this case, this is a DNS name, so this
- * is really bad. We do not tolerate this even in the non-strict case. */
- report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject CommonName too long!\n"));
- return (0);
- }
if (_ssl_server_cname != NULL) {
char *p1 = buf;
char *p2 = _ssl_server_cname;
- int n;
int matched = 0;
STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gens;
-
+
/* RFC 2595 section 2.4: find a matching name
* first find a match among alternative names */
- gens = X509_get_ext_d2i(x509_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
+ gens = (STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *)X509_get_ext_d2i(x509_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
if (gens) {
- int i, r;
- for (i = 0, r = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i < r; ++i) {
- const GENERAL_NAME *gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
+ int j, r;
+ for (j = 0, r = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); j < r; ++j) {
+ const GENERAL_NAME *gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, j);
if (gn->type == GEN_DNS) {
- char *p1 = (char *)gn->d.ia5->data;
- char *p2 = _ssl_server_cname;
- if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
- report(stderr, "Subject Alternative Name: %s\n", p1);
- if (*p1 == '*') {
- ++p1;
- n = strlen(p2) - strlen(p1);
- if (n >= 0)
- p2 += n;
+ char *pp1 = (char *)gn->d.ia5->data;
+ char *pp2 = _ssl_server_cname;
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) {
+ report(stdout, GT_("Subject Alternative Name: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(pp1, (size_t)gn->d.ia5->length)));
+ xfree(tt);
+ }
+ /* Name contains embedded NUL characters, so we complain. This
+ * is likely a certificate spoofing attack. */
+ if ((size_t)gn->d.ia5->length != strlen(pp1)) {
+ report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject Alternative Name contains NUL, aborting!\n"));
+ sk_GENERAL_NAME_free(gens);
+ return 0;
}
- if (0 == strcasecmp(p1, p2)) {
- matched = 1;
+ if (name_match(pp1, pp2)) {
+ matched = 1;
}
}
}
sk_GENERAL_NAME_free(gens);
}
- if (*p1 == '*') {
- ++p1;
- n = strlen(p2) - strlen(p1);
- if (n >= 0)
- p2 += n;
- }
- if (0 == strcasecmp(p1, p2)) {
- matched = 1;
+ if (name_match(p1, p2)) {
+ matched = 1;
}
if (!matched) {
- report(stderr,
- GT_("Server CommonName mismatch: %s != %s\n"),
- buf, _ssl_server_cname );
- if (ok_return && strict)
- return (0);
+ if (strict || SSLverbose) {
+ report(stderr,
+ GT_("Server CommonName mismatch: %s != %s\n"),
+ (tt = sdump(buf, i)), _ssl_server_cname );
+ xfree(tt);
+ }
+ ok_return = 0;
}
} else if (ok_return) {
report(stderr, GT_("Server name not set, could not verify certificate!\n"));
}
/* Print the finger print. Note that on errors, we might print it more than once
* normally; we kluge around that by using a global variable. */
- if (_check_fp) {
+ if (_check_fp == 1) {
unsigned dp;
- _check_fp = 0;
+ _check_fp = -1;
digest_tp = EVP_md5();
if (digest_tp == NULL) {
report(stderr, GT_("EVP_md5() failed!\n"));
if (outlevel > O_NORMAL)
report(stdout, GT_("%s key fingerprint: %s\n"), _server_label, text);
if (_check_digest != NULL) {
- if (strcmp(text, _check_digest) == 0) {
+ if (strcasecmp(text, _check_digest) == 0) {
if (outlevel > O_NORMAL)
report(stdout, GT_("%s fingerprints match.\n"), _server_label);
} else {
- if (outlevel > O_SILENT)
- report(stderr, GT_("%s fingerprints do not match!\n"), _server_label);
+ report(stderr, GT_("%s fingerprints do not match!\n"), _server_label);
return (0);
}
- }
- }
- }
+ } /* if (_check_digest != NULL) */
+ } /* if (_check_fp) */
+ } /* if (depth == 0 && !_depth0ck) */
+
+ if (err != X509_V_OK && err != _prev_err && !(_check_fp != 0 && _check_digest && !strict)) {
+ _prev_err = err;
+
+ report(stderr, GT_("Server certificate verification error: %s\n"), X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
+ /* We gave the error code, but maybe we can add some more details for debugging */
- if (err != X509_V_OK && err != _prev_err) {
- _prev_err = err;
- report(stderr, GT_("Server certificate verification error: %s\n"), X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
- /* We gave the error code, but maybe we can add some more details for debugging */
switch (err) {
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
X509_NAME_oneline(issuer, buf, sizeof(buf));
buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0';
- report(stderr, GT_("unknown issuer (first %d characters): %s\n"), sizeof(buf)-1, buf);
+ report(stderr, GT_("unknown issuer (first %d characters): %s\n"), (int)(sizeof(buf)-1), buf);
+ report(stderr, GT_("This error usually happens when the server provides an incomplete certificate "
+ "chain, which is nothing fetchmail could do anything about. For details, "
+ "please see the README.SSL-SERVER document that comes with fetchmail.\n"));
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
+ case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
+ X509_NAME_oneline(subj, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0';
+ report(stderr, GT_("This means that the root signing certificate (issued for %s) is not in the "
+ "trusted CA certificate locations, or that c_rehash needs to be run "
+ "on the certificate directory. For details, please "
+ "see the documentation of --sslcertpath and --sslcertfile in the manual page.\n"), buf);
+ break;
+ default:
break;
}
}
* If not in strict checking mode (--sslcertck), override this
* and pretend that verification had succeeded.
*/
+ _verify_ok &= ok_return;
if (!strict)
ok_return = 1;
return (ok_return);
return SSL_verify_callback(ok_return, ctx, 1);
}
+
+/* get commonName from certificate set in file.
+ * commonName is stored in buffer namebuffer, limited with namebufferlen
+ */
+static const char *SSLCertGetCN(const char *mycert,
+ char *namebuffer, size_t namebufferlen)
+{
+ const char *ret = NULL;
+ BIO *certBio = NULL;
+ X509 *x509_cert = NULL;
+ X509_NAME *certname = NULL;
+
+ if (namebuffer && namebufferlen > 0) {
+ namebuffer[0] = 0x00;
+ certBio = BIO_new_file(mycert,"r");
+ if (certBio) {
+ x509_cert = PEM_read_bio_X509(certBio,NULL,NULL,NULL);
+ BIO_free(certBio);
+ }
+ if (x509_cert) {
+ certname = X509_get_subject_name(x509_cert);
+ if (certname &&
+ X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(certname, NID_commonName,
+ namebuffer, namebufferlen) > 0)
+ ret = namebuffer;
+ X509_free(x509_cert);
+ }
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
/* performs initial SSL handshake over the connected socket
* uses SSL *ssl global variable, which is currently defined
* in this file
*/
-int SSLOpen(int sock, char *mycert, char *mykey, char *myproto, int certck, char *certpath,
- char *fingerprint, char *servercname, char *label)
+int SSLOpen(int sock, char *mycert, char *mykey, const char *myproto, int certck,
+ char *cacertfile, char *certpath,
+ char *fingerprint, char *servercname, char *label, char **remotename)
{
struct stat randstat;
int i;
SSL_load_error_strings();
- SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms();
-
-#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
+ SSL_library_init();
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); /* see Debian Bug#576430 and manpage */
+
if (stat("/dev/random", &randstat) &&
stat("/dev/urandom", &randstat)) {
/* Neither /dev/random nor /dev/urandom are present, so add
RAND_add (buf, sizeof buf, 0.1);
}
}
-#endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
-
if( sock < 0 || (unsigned)sock > FD_SETSIZE ) {
report(stderr, GT_("File descriptor out of range for SSL") );
return( -1 );
}
- if( ! _ctx ) {
- /* Be picky and make sure the memory is cleared */
- memset( _ssl_context, 0, sizeof( _ssl_context ) );
- if(myproto) {
- if(!strcmp("ssl2",myproto)) {
- _ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv2_client_method());
- } else if(!strcmp("ssl3",myproto)) {
- _ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv3_client_method());
- } else if(!strcmp("tls1",myproto)) {
- _ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_client_method());
- } else if (!strcmp("ssl23",myproto)) {
- myproto = NULL;
- } else {
- fprintf(stderr,GT_("Invalid SSL protocol '%s' specified, using default (SSLv23).\n"), myproto);
- myproto = NULL;
- }
- }
- if(!myproto) {
- _ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method());
- }
- if(_ctx == NULL) {
- ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
- return(-1);
+ /* Make sure a connection referring to an older context is not left */
+ _ssl_context[sock] = NULL;
+ if(myproto) {
+ if(!strcasecmp("ssl3",myproto)) {
+ _ctx[sock] = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv3_client_method());
+ } else if(!strcasecmp("tls1",myproto)) {
+ _ctx[sock] = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_client_method());
+ } else if (!strcasecmp("ssl23",myproto)) {
+ myproto = NULL;
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr,GT_("Invalid SSL protocol '%s' specified, using default (SSL23).\n"), myproto);
+ myproto = NULL;
}
}
+ if(!myproto) {
+ _ctx[sock] = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method());
+ }
+ if(_ctx[sock] == NULL) {
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(_ctx[sock], SSL_OP_ALL | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
if (certck) {
- SSL_CTX_set_verify(_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, SSL_ck_verify_callback);
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(_ctx[sock], SSL_VERIFY_PEER, SSL_ck_verify_callback);
} else {
/* In this case, we do not fail if verification fails. However,
- * we provide the callback for output and possible fingerprint checks. */
- SSL_CTX_set_verify(_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, SSL_nock_verify_callback);
+ * we provide the callback for output and possible fingerprint
+ * checks. */
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(_ctx[sock], SSL_VERIFY_PEER, SSL_nock_verify_callback);
+ }
+
+ /* Check which trusted X.509 CA certificate store(s) to load */
+ {
+ char *tmp;
+ int want_default_cacerts = 0;
+
+ /* Load user locations if any is given */
+ if (certpath || cacertfile)
+ SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(_ctx[sock],
+ cacertfile, certpath);
+ else
+ want_default_cacerts = 1;
+
+ tmp = getenv("FETCHMAIL_INCLUDE_DEFAULT_X509_CA_CERTS");
+ if (want_default_cacerts || (tmp && tmp[0])) {
+ SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(_ctx[sock]);
+ }
}
- if (certpath)
- SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(_ctx, NULL, certpath);
- else
- SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(_ctx);
- _ssl_context[sock] = SSL_new(_ctx);
+ _ssl_context[sock] = SSL_new(_ctx[sock]);
if(_ssl_context[sock] == NULL) {
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+ SSL_CTX_free(_ctx[sock]);
+ _ctx[sock] = NULL;
return(-1);
}
_check_fp = 1;
_check_digest = fingerprint;
_depth0ck = 0;
+ _firstrun = 1;
+ _verify_ok = 1;
_prev_err = -1;
if( mycert || mykey ) {
* he does NOT have a separate certificate and private key file then
* assume that it's a combined key and certificate file.
*/
+ char buffer[256];
+
if( !mykey )
mykey = mycert;
if( !mycert )
mycert = mykey;
+
+ if ((!*remotename || !**remotename) && SSLCertGetCN(mycert, buffer, sizeof(buffer))) {
+ free(*remotename);
+ *remotename = xstrdup(buffer);
+ }
SSL_use_certificate_file(_ssl_context[sock], mycert, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(_ssl_context[sock], mykey, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
}
- SSL_set_fd(_ssl_context[sock], sock);
-
- if(SSL_connect(_ssl_context[sock]) < 1) {
+ if (SSL_set_fd(_ssl_context[sock], sock) == 0
+ || SSL_connect(_ssl_context[sock]) < 1) {
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+ SSL_free( _ssl_context[sock] );
+ _ssl_context[sock] = NULL;
+ SSL_CTX_free(_ctx[sock]);
+ _ctx[sock] = NULL;
return(-1);
}
SSL_shutdown( _ssl_context[sock] );
SSL_free( _ssl_context[sock] );
_ssl_context[sock] = NULL;
+ SSL_CTX_free(_ctx[sock]);
+ _ctx[sock] = NULL;
}
return(-1);
}
}
+ if (!certck && !fingerprint &&
+ (SSL_get_verify_result(_ssl_context[sock]) != X509_V_OK || !_verify_ok)) {
+ report(stderr, GT_("Warning: the connection is insecure, continuing anyways. (Better use --sslcertck!)\n"));
+ }
+
return(0);
}
#endif
SSL_shutdown( _ssl_context[sock] );
SSL_free( _ssl_context[sock] );
_ssl_context[sock] = NULL;
+ SSL_CTX_free(_ctx[sock]);
+ _ctx[sock] = NULL;
}
#endif
-#ifdef __UNUSED__
- /*
- * This hangs in RedHat 6.2 after fetchmail runs for a while a
- * FIN_WAIT2 comes up in netstat and fetchmail never returns from
- * the recv system call. (Reported from jtnews
- * <jtnews@bellatlantic.net>, Wed, 24 May 2000 21:26:02.)
- *
- * Half-close the connection first so the other end gets notified.
- *
- * This stops sends but allows receives (effectively, it sends a
- * TCP <FIN>). */
- if (shutdown(sock, 1) == 0) {
- char ch;
- /* If there is any data still waiting in the queue, discard it.
- * Call recv() until either it returns 0 (meaning we received a FIN)
- * or any error occurs. This makes sure all data sent by the other
- * side is acknowledged at the TCP level.
- */
- if (fm_peek(sock, &ch, 1) > 0)
- while (fm_read(sock, &ch, 1) > 0)
- continue;
- }
-#endif /* __UNUSED__ */
-
/* if there's an error closing at this point, not much we can do */
return(fm_close(sock)); /* this is guarded */
}
*/
static ssize_t cygwin_read(int sock, void *buf, size_t count)
{
- char *bp = buf;
- int n = 0;
+ char *bp = (char *)buf;
+ size_t n = 0;
- if ((n = read(sock, bp, count)) == -1)
+ if ((n = read(sock, bp, count)) == (size_t)-1)
return(-1);
if (n != count) {
- int n2 = 0;
+ size_t n2 = 0;
if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
report(stdout, GT_("Cygwin socket read retry\n"));
n2 = read(sock, bp + n, count - n);
- if (n2 == -1 || n + n2 != count) {
+ if (n2 == (size_t)-1 || n + n2 != count) {
report(stderr, GT_("Cygwin socket read retry failed!\n"));
return(-1);
}