/*
* socket.c -- socket library functions
*
+ * Copyright 1998 by Eric S. Raymond.
* For license terms, see the file COPYING in this directory.
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <ctype.h> /* isspace() */
#ifdef HAVE_MEMORY_H
#include <memory.h>
#endif /* HAVE_MEMORY_H */
#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#ifndef HAVE_NET_SOCKET_H
#include <sys/socket.h>
+#else
+#include <net/socket.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/un.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H
#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#endif
#include <netdb.h>
#if defined(STDC_HEADERS)
#include <stdlib.h>
#else
#include <varargs.h>
#endif
-#include "socket.h"
-#include "fetchmail.h"
-
-#ifdef HAVE_RES_SEARCH
-/* some versions of FreeBSD should declare this but don't */
-extern int h_errno;
+#if TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME
+# include <sys/time.h>
+# include <time.h>
#else
-/* pretend we have h_errno to avoid some #ifdef's later */
-static int h_errno;
+# if HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+# else
+# include <time.h>
+# endif
#endif
-#if NET_SECURITY
-#include <net/security.h>
-#endif /* NET_SECURITY */
+#include "socket.h"
+#include "fetchmail.h"
+#include "getaddrinfo.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+#include "sdump.h"
-#if INET6
-int SockOpen(const char *host, const char *service, const char *options)
-{
- int i;
- struct addrinfo *ai, req;
-#if NET_SECURITY
- void *request = NULL;
- int requestlen;
-#endif /* NET_SECURITY */
-
- memset(&req, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
- req.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
-
- if (i = getaddrinfo(host, service, &req, &ai)) {
- error(0, 0, "fetchmail: getaddrinfo(%s.%s): %s(%d)", host, service, gai_strerror(i), i);
- return -1;
- };
-
-#if NET_SECURITY
- if (!options)
- requestlen = 0;
- else
- if (net_security_strtorequest((char *)options, &request, &requestlen))
- goto ret;
-
- i = inner_connect(ai, request, requestlen, NULL, NULL, "fetchmail", NULL);
- if (request)
- free(request);
-
-ret:
-#else /* NET_SECURITY */
- i = inner_connect(ai, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, "fetchmail", NULL);
-#endif /* NET_SECURITY */
-
- freeaddrinfo(ai);
-
- return i;
-};
-#else /* INET6 */
-#ifndef HAVE_INET_ATON
-#ifndef INADDR_NONE
-#ifdef INADDR_BROADCAST
-#define INADDR_NONE INADDR_BROADCAST
+/* Defines to allow BeOS and Cygwin to play nice... */
+#ifdef __BEOS__
+static char peeked;
+#define fm_close(a) closesocket(a)
+#define fm_write(a,b,c) send(a,b,c,0)
+#define fm_peek(a,b,c) recv(a,b,c,0)
+#define fm_read(a,b,c) recv(a,b,c,0)
#else
-#define INADDR_NONE -1
-#endif
+#define fm_close(a) close(a)
+#define fm_write(a,b,c) write(a,b,c)
+#define fm_peek(a,b,c) recv(a,b,c, MSG_PEEK)
+#ifdef __CYGWIN__
+#define fm_read(a,b,c) cygwin_read(a,b,c)
+static ssize_t cygwin_read(int sock, void *buf, size_t count);
+#else /* ! __CYGWIN__ */
+#define fm_read(a,b,c) read(a,b,c)
+#endif /* __CYGWIN__ */
#endif
-#endif /* HAVE_INET_ATON */
-int SockOpen(const char *host, int clientPort, const char *options)
+/* We need to define h_errno only if it is not already */
+#ifndef h_errno
+# if !HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO
+extern int h_errno;
+# endif
+#endif /* ndef h_errno */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SOCKETPAIR
+static char *const *parse_plugin(const char *plugin, const char *host, const char *service)
{
- int sock;
-#ifndef HAVE_INET_ATON
- unsigned long inaddr;
-#endif /* HAVE_INET_ATON */
- struct sockaddr_in ad;
- struct hostent *hp;
+ char **argvec;
+ const char *c, *p;
+ char *cp, *plugin_copy;
+ unsigned int plugin_copy_len;
+ unsigned int plugin_offset = 0, plugin_copy_offset = 0;
+ unsigned int i, s = 2 * sizeof(char*), host_count = 0, service_count = 0;
+ unsigned int plugin_len = strlen(plugin);
+ unsigned int host_len = strlen(host);
+ unsigned int service_len = strlen(service);
- memset(&ad, 0, sizeof(ad));
- ad.sin_family = AF_INET;
-
- /* we'll accept a quad address */
-#ifndef HAVE_INET_ATON
- inaddr = inet_addr(host);
- if (inaddr != INADDR_NONE)
- memcpy(&ad.sin_addr, &inaddr, sizeof(inaddr));
- else
-#else
- if (!inet_aton(host, &ad.sin_addr))
-#endif /* HAVE_INET_ATON */
- {
- hp = gethostbyname(host);
+ for (c = p = plugin; *c; c++)
+ { if (isspace((unsigned char)*c) && !isspace((unsigned char)*p))
+ s += sizeof(char*);
+ if (*p == '%' && *c == 'h')
+ host_count++;
+ if (*p == '%' && *c == 'p')
+ service_count++;
+ p = c;
+ }
- if (hp == NULL)
+ plugin_copy_len = plugin_len + host_len * host_count + service_len * service_count;
+ plugin_copy = (char *)malloc(plugin_copy_len + 1);
+ if (!plugin_copy)
{
- errno = 0;
- return -1;
+ report(stderr, GT_("fetchmail: malloc failed\n"));
+ return NULL;
}
- /*
- * Add a check to make sure the address has a valid IPv4 or IPv6
- * length. This prevents buffer spamming by a broken DNS.
- */
- if(hp->h_length != 4 && hp->h_length != 8)
+
+ while (plugin_copy_offset < plugin_copy_len)
+ { if ((plugin[plugin_offset] == '%') && (plugin[plugin_offset + 1] == 'h'))
+ { strcpy(plugin_copy + plugin_copy_offset, host);
+ plugin_offset += 2;
+ plugin_copy_offset += host_len;
+ }
+ else if ((plugin[plugin_offset] == '%') && (plugin[plugin_offset + 1] == 'p'))
+ { strcpy(plugin_copy + plugin_copy_offset, service);
+ plugin_offset += 2;
+ plugin_copy_offset += service_len;
+ }
+ else
+ { plugin_copy[plugin_copy_offset] = plugin[plugin_offset];
+ plugin_offset++;
+ plugin_copy_offset++;
+ }
+ }
+ plugin_copy[plugin_copy_len] = 0;
+
+ argvec = (char **)malloc(s);
+ if (!argvec)
{
- h_errno = errno = 0;
- error(0, 0, "fetchmail: illegal address length received for host %s");
- return -1;
+ free(plugin_copy);
+ report(stderr, GT_("fetchmail: malloc failed\n"));
+ return NULL;
}
- /*
- * FIXME: make this work for multihomed hosts.
- * We're toast if we get back multiple addresses and h_addrs[0]
- * (aka h_addr) is not one we can actually connect to; this happens
- * with multi-homed boxen.
- */
- memcpy(&ad.sin_addr, hp->h_addr, hp->h_length);
+ memset(argvec, 0, s);
+ for (p = cp = plugin_copy, i = 0; *cp; cp++)
+ { if ((!isspace((unsigned char)*cp)) && (cp == p ? 1 : isspace((unsigned char)*p))) {
+ argvec[i] = cp;
+ i++;
+ }
+ p = cp;
+ }
+ for (cp = plugin_copy; *cp; cp++)
+ { if (isspace((unsigned char)*cp))
+ *cp = 0;
+ }
+ return argvec;
+}
+
+static int handle_plugin(const char *host,
+ const char *service, const char *plugin)
+/* get a socket mediated through a given external command */
+{
+ int fds[2];
+ char *const *argvec;
+
+ /*
+ * The author of this code, Felix von Leitner <felix@convergence.de>, says:
+ * he chose socketpair() instead of pipe() because socketpair creates
+ * bidirectional sockets while allegedly some pipe() implementations don't.
+ */
+ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX,SOCK_STREAM,0,fds))
+ {
+ report(stderr, GT_("fetchmail: socketpair failed\n"));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ switch (fork()) {
+ case -1:
+ /* error */
+ report(stderr, GT_("fetchmail: fork failed\n"));
+ return -1;
+ case 0: /* child */
+ /* fds[1] is the parent's end; close it for proper EOF
+ ** detection */
+ (void) close(fds[1]);
+ if ( (dup2(fds[0],0) == -1) || (dup2(fds[0],1) == -1) ) {
+ report(stderr, GT_("dup2 failed\n"));
+ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ /* fds[0] is now connected to 0 and 1; close it */
+ (void) close(fds[0]);
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
+ report(stderr, GT_("running %s (host %s service %s)\n"), plugin, host, service);
+ argvec = parse_plugin(plugin,host,service);
+ if (argvec == NULL)
+ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ execvp(*argvec, argvec);
+ report(stderr, GT_("execvp(%s) failed\n"), *argvec);
+ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ break;
+ default: /* parent */
+ /* NOP */
+ break;
}
- ad.sin_port = htons(clientPort);
-
- sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ /* fds[0] is the child's end; close it for proper EOF detection */
+ (void) close(fds[0]);
+ return fds[1];
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_SOCKETPAIR */
+
+/** Set socket to SO_KEEPALIVE. \return 0 for success. */
+int SockKeepalive(int sock) {
+ int keepalive = 1;
+ return setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &keepalive, sizeof keepalive);
+}
+
+int UnixOpen(const char *path)
+{
+ int sock = -1;
+ struct sockaddr_un ad;
+ memset(&ad, 0, sizeof(ad));
+ ad.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+ strncpy(ad.sun_path, path, sizeof(ad.sun_path)-1);
+
+ sock = socket( AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0 );
if (sock < 0)
{
h_errno = 0;
- return -1;
+ return -1;
}
+
+ /* Socket opened saved. Usefull if connect timeout
+ * because it can be closed.
+ */
+ mailserver_socket_temp = sock;
+
if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &ad, sizeof(ad)) < 0)
{
int olderr = errno;
- close(sock);
+ fm_close(sock); /* don't use SockClose, no traffic yet */
h_errno = 0;
errno = olderr;
- return -1;
+ sock = -1;
}
- return(sock);
+ /* No connect timeout, then no need to set mailserver_socket_temp */
+ mailserver_socket_temp = -1;
+
+ return sock;
+}
+
+int SockOpen(const char *host, const char *service,
+ const char *plugin, struct addrinfo **ai0)
+{
+ struct addrinfo *ai, req;
+ int i, acterr = 0;
+ int ord;
+ char errbuf[8192] = "";
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SOCKETPAIR
+ if (plugin)
+ return handle_plugin(host,service,plugin);
+#endif /* HAVE_SOCKETPAIR */
+
+ memset(&req, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
+ req.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+#ifdef AI_ADDRCONFIG
+ req.ai_flags = AI_ADDRCONFIG;
+#endif
+
+ i = fm_getaddrinfo(host, service, &req, ai0);
+ if (i) {
+ report(stderr, GT_("getaddrinfo(\"%s\",\"%s\") error: %s\n"),
+ host, service, gai_strerror(i));
+ if (i == EAI_SERVICE)
+ report(stderr, GT_("Try adding the --service option (see also FAQ item R12).\n"));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* NOTE a Linux bug here - getaddrinfo will happily return 127.0.0.1
+ * twice if no IPv6 is configured */
+ i = -1;
+ for (ord = 0, ai = *ai0; ai; ord++, ai = ai->ai_next) {
+ char buf[256]; /* hostname */
+ char pb[256]; /* service name */
+ int gnie; /* getnameinfo result code */
+
+ gnie = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, buf, sizeof(buf), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST);
+ if (gnie)
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), GT_("unknown (%s)"), gai_strerror(gnie));
+ gnie = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, NULL, 0, pb, sizeof(pb), NI_NUMERICSERV);
+ if (gnie)
+ snprintf(pb, sizeof(pb), GT_("unknown (%s)"), gai_strerror(gnie));
+
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
+ report_build(stdout, GT_("Trying to connect to %s/%s..."), buf, pb);
+ i = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ int e = errno;
+ /* mask EAFNOSUPPORT errors, they confuse users for
+ * multihomed hosts */
+ if (errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
+ acterr = errno;
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
+ report_complete(stdout, GT_("cannot create socket: %s\n"), strerror(e));
+ snprintf(errbuf+strlen(errbuf), sizeof(errbuf)-strlen(errbuf),\
+ GT_("name %d: cannot create socket family %d type %d: %s\n"), ord, ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, strerror(e));
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ SockKeepalive(i);
+
+ /* Save socket descriptor.
+ * Used to close the socket after connect timeout. */
+ mailserver_socket_temp = i;
+
+ if (connect(i, (struct sockaddr *) ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+ int e = errno;
+
+ /* additionally, suppress IPv4 network unreach errors */
+ if (e != EAFNOSUPPORT)
+ acterr = errno;
+
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
+ report_complete(stdout, GT_("connection failed.\n"));
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
+ report(stderr, GT_("connection to %s:%s [%s/%s] failed: %s.\n"), host, service, buf, pb, strerror(e));
+ snprintf(errbuf+strlen(errbuf), sizeof(errbuf)-strlen(errbuf), GT_("name %d: connection to %s:%s [%s/%s] failed: %s.\n"), ord, host, service, buf, pb, strerror(e));
+ fm_close(i);
+ i = -1;
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
+ report_complete(stdout, GT_("connected.\n"));
+ }
+
+ /* No connect timeout, then no need to set mailserver_socket_temp */
+ mailserver_socket_temp = -1;
+
+ break;
+ }
+
+ fm_freeaddrinfo(*ai0);
+ *ai0 = NULL;
+
+ if (i == -1) {
+ report(stderr, GT_("Connection errors for this poll:\n%s"), errbuf);
+ errno = acterr;
+ }
+
+ return i;
}
-#endif /* INET6 */
#if defined(HAVE_STDARG_H)
#else
va_start(ap);
#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_VSNPRINTF
vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), format, ap);
-#else
- vsprintf(buf, format, ap);
-#endif
va_end(ap);
return SockWrite(sock, buf, strlen(buf));
}
-int SockWrite(int sock, char *buf, int len)
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+static void report_SSL_errors(FILE *stream)
+{
+ unsigned long err;
+
+ while (0ul != (err = ERR_get_error())) {
+ char *errstr = ERR_error_string(err, NULL);
+ report(stream, GT_("OpenSSL reported: %s\n"), errstr);
+ }
+}
+
+/* override ERR_print_errors_fp to our own implementation */
+#undef ERR_print_errors_fp
+#define ERR_print_errors_fp(stream) report_SSL_errors((stream))
+
+static SSL_CTX *_ctx[FD_SETSIZE];
+static SSL *_ssl_context[FD_SETSIZE];
+
+static SSL *SSLGetContext( int );
+#endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
+
+int SockWrite(int sock, const char *buf, int len)
{
int n, wrlen = 0;
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
+ SSL *ssl;
+#endif
while (len)
{
- n = write(sock, buf, len);
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
+ if( NULL != ( ssl = SSLGetContext( sock ) ) )
+ n = SSL_write(ssl, buf, len);
+ else
+#endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
+ n = fm_write(sock, buf, len);
if (n <= 0)
return -1;
len -= n;
{
char *newline, *bp = buf;
int n;
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
+ SSL *ssl;
+#endif
if (--len < 1)
return(-1);
+#ifdef __BEOS__
+ if (peeked != 0){
+ (*bp) = peeked;
+ bp++;
+ len--;
+ peeked = 0;
+ }
+#endif
do {
/*
* The reason for these gymnastics is that we want two things:
* (2) to return the true length of data read, even if the
* data coming in has embedded NULS.
*/
- if ((n = recv(sock, bp, len, MSG_PEEK)) <= 0)
- return(-1);
- if ((newline = memchr(bp, '\n', n)) != NULL)
- n = newline - bp + 1;
- if ((n = read(sock, bp, n)) == -1)
- return(-1);
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
+ if( NULL != ( ssl = SSLGetContext( sock ) ) ) {
+ /* Hack alert! */
+ /* OK... SSL_peek works a little different from MSG_PEEK
+ Problem is that SSL_peek can return 0 if there
+ is no data currently available. If, on the other
+ hand, we lose the socket, we also get a zero, but
+ the SSL_read then SEGFAULTS! To deal with this,
+ we'll check the error code any time we get a return
+ of zero from SSL_peek. If we have an error, we bail.
+ If we don't, we read one character in SSL_read and
+ loop. This should continue to work even if they
+ later change the behavior of SSL_peek
+ to "fix" this problem... :-( */
+ if ((n = SSL_peek(ssl, bp, len)) < 0) {
+ (void)SSL_get_error(ssl, n);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ if( 0 == n ) {
+ /* SSL_peek says no data... Does he mean no data
+ or did the connection blow up? If we got an error
+ then bail! */
+ if (0 != SSL_get_error(ssl, n)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* We didn't get an error so read at least one
+ character at this point and loop */
+ n = 1;
+ /* Make sure newline start out NULL!
+ * We don't have a string to pass through
+ * the strchr at this point yet */
+ newline = NULL;
+ } else if ((newline = (char *)memchr(bp, '\n', n)) != NULL)
+ n = newline - bp + 1;
+ /* Matthias Andree: SSL_read can return 0, in that case
+ * we must call SSL_get_error to figure if there was
+ * an error or just a "no data" condition */
+ if ((n = SSL_read(ssl, bp, n)) <= 0) {
+ if ((n = SSL_get_error(ssl, n))) {
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+ /* Check for case where our single character turned out to
+ * be a newline... (It wasn't going to get caught by
+ * the strchr above if it came from the hack... ). */
+ if( NULL == newline && 1 == n && '\n' == *bp ) {
+ /* Got our newline - this will break
+ out of the loop now */
+ newline = bp;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
+ {
+
+#ifdef __BEOS__
+ if ((n = fm_read(sock, bp, 1)) <= 0)
+#else
+ if ((n = fm_peek(sock, bp, len)) <= 0)
+#endif
+ return (-1);
+ if ((newline = (char *)memchr(bp, '\n', n)) != NULL)
+ n = newline - bp + 1;
+#ifndef __BEOS__
+ if ((n = fm_read(sock, bp, n)) == -1)
+ return(-1);
+#endif /* __BEOS__ */
+ }
bp += n;
len -= n;
} while
(!newline && len);
*bp = '\0';
+
return bp - buf;
}
{
int n;
char ch;
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
+ SSL *ssl;
+#endif
- if ((n = recv(sock, &ch, 1, MSG_PEEK)) == -1)
- return -1;
- else
- return(ch);
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
+ if( NULL != ( ssl = SSLGetContext( sock ) ) ) {
+ n = SSL_peek(ssl, &ch, 1);
+ if (n < 0) {
+ (void)SSL_get_error(ssl, n);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if( 0 == n ) {
+ /* This code really needs to implement a "hold back"
+ * to simulate a functioning SSL_peek()... sigh...
+ * Has to be coordinated with the read code above.
+ * Next on the list todo... */
+
+ /* SSL_peek says 0... Does that mean no data
+ or did the connection blow up? If we got an error
+ then bail! */
+ if(0 != SSL_get_error(ssl, n)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Haven't seen this case actually occur, but...
+ if the problem in SockRead can occur, this should
+ be possible... Just not sure what to do here.
+ This should be a safe "punt" the "peek" but don't
+ "punt" the "session"... */
+
+ return 0; /* Give him a '\0' character */
+ }
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
+ n = fm_peek(sock, &ch, 1);
+ if (n == -1)
+ return -1;
+
+#ifdef __BEOS__
+ peeked = ch;
+#endif
+ return(ch);
+}
+
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
+
+static char *_ssl_server_cname = NULL;
+static int _check_fp;
+static char *_check_digest;
+static char *_server_label;
+static int _depth0ck;
+static int _firstrun;
+static int _prev_err;
+static int _verify_ok;
+
+SSL *SSLGetContext( int sock )
+{
+ if( sock < 0 || (unsigned)sock > FD_SETSIZE )
+ return NULL;
+ if( _ctx[sock] == NULL )
+ return NULL;
+ return _ssl_context[sock];
+}
+
+/* ok_return (preverify_ok) is 1 if this stage of certificate verification
+ passed, or 0 if it failed. This callback lets us display informative
+ errors, and perform additional validation (e.g. CN matches) */
+static int SSL_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int strict )
+{
+#define SSLverbose (((outlevel) >= O_DEBUG) || ((outlevel) >= O_VERBOSE && (depth) == 0))
+ char buf[257];
+ X509 *x509_cert;
+ int err, depth, i;
+ unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ char text[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 3 + 1], *tp, *te;
+ const EVP_MD *digest_tp;
+ unsigned int dsz, esz;
+ X509_NAME *subj, *issuer;
+ char *tt;
+
+ x509_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
+ err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+ depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
+
+ subj = X509_get_subject_name(x509_cert);
+ issuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x509_cert);
+
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) {
+ if (depth == 0 && SSLverbose)
+ report(stdout, GT_("Server certificate:\n"));
+ else {
+ if (_firstrun) {
+ _firstrun = 0;
+ if (SSLverbose)
+ report(stdout, GT_("Certificate chain, from root to peer, starting at depth %d:\n"), depth);
+ } else {
+ if (SSLverbose)
+ report(stdout, GT_("Certificate at depth %d:\n"), depth);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (SSLverbose) {
+ if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(issuer, NID_organizationName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
+ report(stdout, GT_("Issuer Organization: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(buf, i)));
+ xfree(tt);
+ if ((size_t)i >= sizeof(buf) - 1)
+ report(stdout, GT_("Warning: Issuer Organization Name too long (possibly truncated).\n"));
+ } else
+ report(stdout, GT_("Unknown Organization\n"));
+ if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(issuer, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
+ report(stdout, GT_("Issuer CommonName: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(buf, i)));
+ xfree(tt);
+ if ((size_t)i >= sizeof(buf) - 1)
+ report(stdout, GT_("Warning: Issuer CommonName too long (possibly truncated).\n"));
+ } else
+ report(stdout, GT_("Unknown Issuer CommonName\n"));
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subj, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
+ if (SSLverbose) {
+ report(stdout, GT_("Subject CommonName: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(buf, i)));
+ xfree(tt);
+ }
+ if ((size_t)i >= sizeof(buf) - 1) {
+ /* Possible truncation. In this case, this is a DNS name, so this
+ * is really bad. We do not tolerate this even in the non-strict case. */
+ report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject CommonName too long!\n"));
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if ((size_t)i > strlen(buf)) {
+ /* Name contains embedded NUL characters, so we complain. This is likely
+ * a certificate spoofing attack. */
+ report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject CommonName contains NUL, aborting!\n"));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (depth == 0) { /* peer certificate */
+ if (!_depth0ck) {
+ _depth0ck = 1;
+ }
+
+ if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subj, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
+ if (_ssl_server_cname != NULL) {
+ char *p1 = buf;
+ char *p2 = _ssl_server_cname;
+ int matched = 0;
+ STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gens;
+
+ /* RFC 2595 section 2.4: find a matching name
+ * first find a match among alternative names */
+ gens = (STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *)X509_get_ext_d2i(x509_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
+ if (gens) {
+ int j, r;
+ for (j = 0, r = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); j < r; ++j) {
+ const GENERAL_NAME *gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, j);
+ if (gn->type == GEN_DNS) {
+ char *pp1 = (char *)gn->d.ia5->data;
+ char *pp2 = _ssl_server_cname;
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) {
+ report(stdout, GT_("Subject Alternative Name: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(pp1, (size_t)gn->d.ia5->length)));
+ xfree(tt);
+ }
+ /* Name contains embedded NUL characters, so we complain. This
+ * is likely a certificate spoofing attack. */
+ if ((size_t)gn->d.ia5->length != strlen(pp1)) {
+ report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject Alternative Name contains NUL, aborting!\n"));
+ sk_GENERAL_NAME_free(gens);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (name_match(pp1, pp2)) {
+ matched = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ GENERAL_NAMES_free(gens);
+ }
+ if (name_match(p1, p2)) {
+ matched = 1;
+ }
+ if (!matched) {
+ if (strict || SSLverbose) {
+ report(stderr,
+ GT_("Server CommonName mismatch: %s != %s\n"),
+ (tt = sdump(buf, i)), _ssl_server_cname );
+ xfree(tt);
+ }
+ ok_return = 0;
+ }
+ } else if (ok_return) {
+ report(stderr, GT_("Server name not set, could not verify certificate!\n"));
+ if (strict) return (0);
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
+ report(stdout, GT_("Unknown Server CommonName\n"));
+ if (ok_return && strict) {
+ report(stderr, GT_("Server name not specified in certificate!\n"));
+ return (0);
+ }
+ }
+ /* Print the finger print. Note that on errors, we might print it more than once
+ * normally; we kluge around that by using a global variable. */
+ if (_check_fp == 1) {
+ unsigned dp;
+
+ _check_fp = -1;
+ digest_tp = EVP_md5();
+ if (digest_tp == NULL) {
+ report(stderr, GT_("EVP_md5() failed!\n"));
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if (!X509_digest(x509_cert, digest_tp, digest, &dsz)) {
+ report(stderr, GT_("Out of memory!\n"));
+ return (0);
+ }
+ tp = text;
+ te = text + sizeof(text);
+ for (dp = 0; dp < dsz; dp++) {
+ esz = snprintf(tp, te - tp, dp > 0 ? ":%02X" : "%02X", digest[dp]);
+ if (esz >= (size_t)(te - tp)) {
+ report(stderr, GT_("Digest text buffer too small!\n"));
+ return (0);
+ }
+ tp += esz;
+ }
+ if (outlevel > O_NORMAL)
+ report(stdout, GT_("%s key fingerprint: %s\n"), _server_label, text);
+ if (_check_digest != NULL) {
+ if (strcasecmp(text, _check_digest) == 0) {
+ if (outlevel > O_NORMAL)
+ report(stdout, GT_("%s fingerprints match.\n"), _server_label);
+ } else {
+ report(stderr, GT_("%s fingerprints do not match!\n"), _server_label);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ } /* if (_check_digest != NULL) */
+ } /* if (_check_fp) */
+ } /* if (depth == 0 && !_depth0ck) */
+
+ if (err != X509_V_OK && err != _prev_err && !(_check_fp != 0 && _check_digest && !strict)) {
+ char *tmp;
+ int did_rep_err = 0;
+ _prev_err = err;
+
+ report(stderr, GT_("Server certificate verification error: %s\n"), X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
+ /* We gave the error code, but maybe we can add some more details for debugging */
+
+ switch (err) {
+ /* actually we do not want to lump these together, but
+ * since OpenSSL flipped the meaning of these error
+ * codes in the past, and they do hardly make a
+ * practical difference because servers need not provide
+ * the root signing certificate, we don't bother telling
+ * users the difference:
+ */
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
+ X509_NAME_oneline(issuer, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0';
+ report(stderr, GT_("Broken certification chain at: %s\n"), (tmp = sdump(buf, strlen(buf))));
+ xfree(tmp);
+ report(stderr, GT_( "This could mean that the server did not provide the intermediate CA's certificate(s), "
+ "which is nothing fetchmail could do anything about. For details, "
+ "please see the README.SSL-SERVER document that ships with fetchmail.\n"));
+ did_rep_err = 1;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
+ case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
+ if (!did_rep_err) {
+ X509_NAME_oneline(issuer, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0';
+ report(stderr, GT_("Missing trust anchor certificate: %s\n"), (tmp = sdump(buf, strlen(buf))));
+ xfree(tmp);
+ }
+ report(stderr, GT_( "This could mean that the root CA's signing certificate is not in the "
+ "trusted CA certificate location, or that c_rehash needs to be run "
+ "on the certificate directory. For details, please "
+ "see the documentation of --sslcertpath and --sslcertfile in the manual page.\n"));
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * If not in strict checking mode (--sslcertck), override this
+ * and pretend that verification had succeeded.
+ */
+ _verify_ok &= ok_return;
+ if (!strict)
+ ok_return = 1;
+ return (ok_return);
+}
+
+static int SSL_nock_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx )
+{
+ return SSL_verify_callback(ok_return, ctx, 0);
+}
+
+static int SSL_ck_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx )
+{
+ return SSL_verify_callback(ok_return, ctx, 1);
+}
+
+
+/* get commonName from certificate set in file.
+ * commonName is stored in buffer namebuffer, limited with namebufferlen
+ */
+static const char *SSLCertGetCN(const char *mycert,
+ char *namebuffer, size_t namebufferlen)
+{
+ const char *ret = NULL;
+ BIO *certBio = NULL;
+ X509 *x509_cert = NULL;
+ X509_NAME *certname = NULL;
+
+ if (namebuffer && namebufferlen > 0) {
+ namebuffer[0] = 0x00;
+ certBio = BIO_new_file(mycert,"r");
+ if (certBio) {
+ x509_cert = PEM_read_bio_X509(certBio,NULL,NULL,NULL);
+ BIO_free(certBio);
+ }
+ if (x509_cert) {
+ certname = X509_get_subject_name(x509_cert);
+ if (certname &&
+ X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(certname, NID_commonName,
+ namebuffer, namebufferlen) > 0)
+ ret = namebuffer;
+ X509_free(x509_cert);
+ }
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* performs initial SSL handshake over the connected socket
+ * uses SSL *ssl global variable, which is currently defined
+ * in this file
+ */
+int SSLOpen(int sock, char *mycert, char *mykey, const char *myproto, int certck,
+ char *cacertfile, char *certpath,
+ char *fingerprint, char *servercname, char *label, char **remotename)
+{
+ struct stat randstat;
+ int i;
+ long sslopts = SSL_OP_ALL;
+
+ SSL_load_error_strings();
+ SSL_library_init();
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); /* see Debian Bug#576430 and manpage */
+
+ if (stat("/dev/random", &randstat) &&
+ stat("/dev/urandom", &randstat)) {
+ /* Neither /dev/random nor /dev/urandom are present, so add
+ entropy to the SSL PRNG a hard way. */
+ for (i = 0; i < 10000 && ! RAND_status (); ++i) {
+ char buf[4];
+ struct timeval tv;
+ gettimeofday (&tv, 0);
+ buf[0] = tv.tv_usec & 0xF;
+ buf[2] = (tv.tv_usec & 0xF0) >> 4;
+ buf[3] = (tv.tv_usec & 0xF00) >> 8;
+ buf[1] = (tv.tv_usec & 0xF000) >> 12;
+ RAND_add (buf, sizeof buf, 0.1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if( sock < 0 || (unsigned)sock > FD_SETSIZE ) {
+ report(stderr, GT_("File descriptor out of range for SSL") );
+ return( -1 );
+ }
+
+ /* Make sure a connection referring to an older context is not left */
+ _ssl_context[sock] = NULL;
+ if(myproto) {
+ if(!strcasecmp("ssl2",myproto)) {
+#if HAVE_DECL_SSLV2_CLIENT_METHOD + 0 > 0
+ _ctx[sock] = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv2_client_method());
+#else
+ report(stderr, GT_("Your operating system does not support SSLv2.\n"));
+ return -1;
+#endif
+ } else if(!strcasecmp("ssl3",myproto)) {
+ _ctx[sock] = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv3_client_method());
+ } else if(!strcasecmp("tls1",myproto)) {
+ _ctx[sock] = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_client_method());
+ } else if (!strcasecmp("ssl23",myproto)) {
+ myproto = NULL;
+ } else {
+ report(stderr,GT_("Invalid SSL protocol '%s' specified, using default (SSLv23).\n"), myproto);
+ myproto = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ if(!myproto) {
+ _ctx[sock] = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method());
+ }
+ if(_ctx[sock] == NULL) {
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ {
+ char *tmp = getenv("FETCHMAIL_DISABLE_CBC_IV_COUNTERMEASURE");
+ if (tmp == NULL || *tmp == '\0' || strspn(tmp, " \t") == strlen(tmp))
+ sslopts &= ~ SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS;
+ }
+
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(_ctx[sock], sslopts);
+
+ if (certck) {
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(_ctx[sock], SSL_VERIFY_PEER, SSL_ck_verify_callback);
+ } else {
+ /* In this case, we do not fail if verification fails. However,
+ * we provide the callback for output and possible fingerprint
+ * checks. */
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(_ctx[sock], SSL_VERIFY_PEER, SSL_nock_verify_callback);
+ }
+
+ /* Check which trusted X.509 CA certificate store(s) to load */
+ {
+ char *tmp;
+ int want_default_cacerts = 0;
+
+ /* Load user locations if any is given */
+ if (certpath || cacertfile)
+ SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(_ctx[sock],
+ cacertfile, certpath);
+ else
+ want_default_cacerts = 1;
+
+ tmp = getenv("FETCHMAIL_INCLUDE_DEFAULT_X509_CA_CERTS");
+ if (want_default_cacerts || (tmp && tmp[0])) {
+ SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(_ctx[sock]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ _ssl_context[sock] = SSL_new(_ctx[sock]);
+
+ if(_ssl_context[sock] == NULL) {
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+ SSL_CTX_free(_ctx[sock]);
+ _ctx[sock] = NULL;
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ /* This static is for the verify callback */
+ _ssl_server_cname = servercname;
+ _server_label = label;
+ _check_fp = 1;
+ _check_digest = fingerprint;
+ _depth0ck = 0;
+ _firstrun = 1;
+ _verify_ok = 1;
+ _prev_err = -1;
+
+ if( mycert || mykey ) {
+
+ /* Ok... He has a certificate file defined, so lets declare it. If
+ * he does NOT have a separate certificate and private key file then
+ * assume that it's a combined key and certificate file.
+ */
+ char buffer[256];
+
+ if( !mykey )
+ mykey = mycert;
+ if( !mycert )
+ mycert = mykey;
+
+ if ((!*remotename || !**remotename) && SSLCertGetCN(mycert, buffer, sizeof(buffer))) {
+ free(*remotename);
+ *remotename = xstrdup(buffer);
+ }
+ SSL_use_certificate_file(_ssl_context[sock], mycert, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
+ SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(_ssl_context[sock], mykey, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_set_fd(_ssl_context[sock], sock) == 0
+ || SSL_connect(_ssl_context[sock]) < 1) {
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+ SSL_free( _ssl_context[sock] );
+ _ssl_context[sock] = NULL;
+ SSL_CTX_free(_ctx[sock]);
+ _ctx[sock] = NULL;
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ /* Paranoia: was the callback not called as we expected? */
+ if (!_depth0ck) {
+ report(stderr, GT_("Certificate/fingerprint verification was somehow skipped!\n"));
+
+ if (fingerprint != NULL || certck) {
+ if( NULL != SSLGetContext( sock ) ) {
+ /* Clean up the SSL stack */
+ SSL_shutdown( _ssl_context[sock] );
+ SSL_free( _ssl_context[sock] );
+ _ssl_context[sock] = NULL;
+ SSL_CTX_free(_ctx[sock]);
+ _ctx[sock] = NULL;
+ }
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!certck && !fingerprint &&
+ (SSL_get_verify_result(_ssl_context[sock]) != X509_V_OK || !_verify_ok)) {
+ report(stderr, GT_("Warning: the connection is insecure, continuing anyways. (Better use --sslcertck!)\n"));
+ }
+
+ return(0);
}
+#endif
int SockClose(int sock)
-/* close a socket (someday we may do other cleanup here) */
+/* close a socket gracefully */
{
- return(close(sock));
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
+ if( NULL != SSLGetContext( sock ) ) {
+ /* Clean up the SSL stack */
+ SSL_shutdown( _ssl_context[sock] );
+ SSL_free( _ssl_context[sock] );
+ _ssl_context[sock] = NULL;
+ SSL_CTX_free(_ctx[sock]);
+ _ctx[sock] = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* if there's an error closing at this point, not much we can do */
+ return(fm_close(sock)); /* this is guarded */
}
-#ifdef MAIN
+#ifdef __CYGWIN__
/*
- * Use the chargen service to test input buffering directly.
- * You may have to uncomment the `chargen' service description in your
- * inetd.conf (and then SIGHUP inetd) for this to work.
+ * Workaround Microsoft Winsock recv/WSARecv(..., MSG_PEEK) bug.
+ * See http://sources.redhat.com/ml/cygwin/2001-08/msg00628.html
+ * for more details.
*/
-main()
+static ssize_t cygwin_read(int sock, void *buf, size_t count)
{
- int sock = SockOpen("localhost", 19, NULL);
- char buf[80];
+ char *bp = (char *)buf;
+ size_t n = 0;
- while (SockRead(sock, buf, sizeof(buf)-1))
- SockWrite(1, buf, strlen(buf));
- SockClose(sock);
-}
-#endif /* MAIN */
+ if ((n = read(sock, bp, count)) == (size_t)-1)
+ return(-1);
-/* socket.c ends here */
+ if (n != count) {
+ size_t n2 = 0;
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
+ report(stdout, GT_("Cygwin socket read retry\n"));
+ n2 = read(sock, bp + n, count - n);
+ if (n2 == (size_t)-1 || n + n2 != count) {
+ report(stderr, GT_("Cygwin socket read retry failed!\n"));
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return count;
+}
+#endif /* __CYGWIN__ */
projects / ~andy / fetchmail / blobdiff