#include <memory.h>
#endif /* HAVE_MEMORY_H */
#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
#ifndef HAVE_NET_SOCKET_H
#include <sys/socket.h>
#else
#else
#include <varargs.h>
#endif
-#include <signal.h>
+#if TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME
+# include <sys/time.h>
+# include <time.h>
+#else
+# if HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+# else
+# include <time.h>
+# endif
+#endif
+
#include "socket.h"
#include "fetchmail.h"
+#include "getaddrinfo.h"
#include "i18n.h"
+#include "sdump.h"
-/* Defines to allow BeOS to play nice... */
+/* Defines to allow BeOS and Cygwin to play nice... */
#ifdef __BEOS__
static char peeked;
#define fm_close(a) closesocket(a)
#define fm_close(a) close(a)
#define fm_write(a,b,c) write(a,b,c)
#define fm_peek(a,b,c) recv(a,b,c, MSG_PEEK)
+#ifdef __CYGWIN__
+#define fm_read(a,b,c) cygwin_read(a,b,c)
+static ssize_t cygwin_read(int sock, void *buf, size_t count);
+#else /* ! __CYGWIN__ */
#define fm_read(a,b,c) read(a,b,c)
+#endif /* __CYGWIN__ */
#endif
/* We need to define h_errno only if it is not already */
#ifndef h_errno
-
-#ifdef HAVE_RES_SEARCH
-/* some versions of FreeBSD should declare this but don't */
+# if !HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO
extern int h_errno;
-#else
-/* pretend we have h_errno to avoid some #ifdef's later */
-static int h_errno;
-#endif
-
+# endif
#endif /* ndef h_errno */
-#if NET_SECURITY
-#include <net/security.h>
-#endif /* NET_SECURITY */
-
#ifdef HAVE_SOCKETPAIR
-char *const *parse_plugin(const char *plugin, const char *host, const char *service)
-{ const char **argvec;
+static char *const *parse_plugin(const char *plugin, const char *host, const char *service)
+{
+ char **argvec;
const char *c, *p;
char *cp, *plugin_copy;
unsigned int plugin_copy_len;
unsigned int service_len = strlen(service);
for (c = p = plugin; *c; c++)
- { if (isspace(*c) && !isspace(*p))
+ { if (isspace((unsigned char)*c) && !isspace((unsigned char)*p))
s += sizeof(char*);
if (*p == '%' && *c == 'h')
host_count++;
}
plugin_copy_len = plugin_len + host_len * host_count + service_len * service_count;
- plugin_copy = malloc(plugin_copy_len + 1);
+ plugin_copy = (char *)malloc(plugin_copy_len + 1);
if (!plugin_copy)
{
report(stderr, GT_("fetchmail: malloc failed\n"));
}
plugin_copy[plugin_copy_len] = 0;
- argvec = malloc(s);
+ argvec = (char **)malloc(s);
if (!argvec)
{
report(stderr, GT_("fetchmail: malloc failed\n"));
return NULL;
}
memset(argvec, 0, s);
- for (c = p = plugin_copy, i = 0; *c; c++)
- { if ((!isspace(*c)) && (c == p ? 1 : isspace(*p))) {
- argvec[i] = c;
+ for (p = cp = plugin_copy, i = 0; *cp; cp++)
+ { if ((!isspace((unsigned char)*cp)) && (cp == p ? 1 : isspace((unsigned char)*p))) {
+ argvec[i] = cp;
i++;
}
- p = c;
+ p = cp;
}
for (cp = plugin_copy; *cp; cp++)
- { if (isspace(*cp))
+ { if (isspace((unsigned char)*cp))
*cp = 0;
}
- return (char *const*)argvec;
+ return argvec;
}
static int handle_plugin(const char *host,
/* error */
report(stderr, GT_("fetchmail: fork failed\n"));
return -1;
- break;
case 0: /* child */
/* fds[1] is the parent's end; close it for proper EOF
** detection */
(void) close(fds[1]);
if ( (dup2(fds[0],0) == -1) || (dup2(fds[0],1) == -1) ) {
report(stderr, GT_("dup2 failed\n"));
- exit(1);
+ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
/* fds[0] is now connected to 0 and 1; close it */
(void) close(fds[0]);
argvec = parse_plugin(plugin,host,service);
execvp(*argvec, argvec);
report(stderr, GT_("execvp(%s) failed\n"), *argvec);
- exit(0);
+ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
break;
default: /* parent */
/* NOP */
}
#endif /* HAVE_SOCKETPAIR */
-#ifdef __UNUSED__
-#include <sys/time.h>
-
-int SockCheckOpen(int fd)
-/* poll given socket; is it selectable? */
-{
- fd_set r, w, e;
- int rt;
- struct timeval tv;
-
- for (;;)
- {
- FD_ZERO(&r); FD_ZERO(&w); FD_ZERO(&e);
- FD_SET(fd, &e);
-
- tv.tv_sec = 0; tv.tv_usec = 0;
- rt = select(fd+1, &r, &w, &e, &tv);
- if (rt == -1 && (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR))
- return 0;
- if (rt != -1)
- return 1;
- }
+/** Set socket to SO_KEEPALIVE. \return 0 for success. */
+int SockKeepalive(int sock) {
+ int keepalive = 1;
+ return setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &keepalive, sizeof keepalive);
}
-#endif /* __UNUSED__ */
int UnixOpen(const char *path)
{
-#ifdef HAVE_SIGPROCMASK
- sigset_t allsigs;
-#endif /* HAVE_SIGPROCMASK */
-
- int stat, sock = -1;
+ int sock = -1;
struct sockaddr_un ad;
memset(&ad, 0, sizeof(ad));
ad.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
return -1;
}
-#ifdef HAVE_SIGPROCMASK
- /* avoid socket leak on alarm signal during connect(2) */
- sigfillset(&allsigs);
- sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &allsigs, NULL);
-#endif /* HAVE_SIGPROCMASK */
+ /* Socket opened saved. Usefull if connect timeout
+ * because it can be closed.
+ */
+ mailserver_socket_temp = sock;
if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &ad, sizeof(ad)) < 0)
{
sock = -1;
}
-#ifdef HAVE_SIGPROCMASK
- sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &allsigs, NULL);
-#endif /* HAVE_SIGPROCMASK */
+ /* No connect timeout, then no need to set mailserver_socket_temp */
+ mailserver_socket_temp = -1;
return sock;
}
-#if INET6_ENABLE
-int SockOpen(const char *host, const char *service, const char *options,
- const char *plugin)
+int SockOpen(const char *host, const char *service,
+ const char *plugin, struct addrinfo **ai0)
{
-#ifdef HAVE_SIGPROCMASK
- sigset_t allsigs;
-#endif /* HAVE_SIGPROCMASK */
-
- struct addrinfo *ai, *ai0, req;
- int i;
-#if NET_SECURITY
- void *request = NULL;
- int requestlen;
-#endif /* NET_SECURITY */
+ struct addrinfo *ai, req;
+ int i, acterr = 0;
+ int ord;
+ char errbuf[8192] = "";
#ifdef HAVE_SOCKETPAIR
if (plugin)
return handle_plugin(host,service,plugin);
#endif /* HAVE_SOCKETPAIR */
+
memset(&req, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
req.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+#ifdef AI_ADDRCONFIG
+ req.ai_flags = AI_ADDRCONFIG;
+#endif
- if (getaddrinfo(host, service, &req, &ai0)) {
- report(stderr, GT_("fetchmail: getaddrinfo(%s.%s)\n"), host,service);
+ i = fm_getaddrinfo(host, service, &req, ai0);
+ if (i) {
+ report(stderr, GT_("getaddrinfo(\"%s\",\"%s\") error: %s\n"),
+ host, service, gai_strerror(i));
+ if (i == EAI_SERVICE)
+ report(stderr, GT_("Try adding the --service option (see also FAQ item R12).\n"));
return -1;
}
-#if NET_SECURITY
- if (!options)
- requestlen = 0;
- else
- if (net_security_strtorequest((char *)options, &request, &requestlen))
- goto ret;
-
- i = inner_connect(ai0, request, requestlen, NULL, NULL, "fetchmail", NULL);
- if (request)
- free(request);
-
- ret:
-#else /* NET_SECURITY */
-#ifdef HAVE_INNER_CONNECT
- i = inner_connect(ai0, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, "fetchmail", NULL);
- if (i >= 0)
- break;
-#else
-
-#ifdef HAVE_SIGPROCMASK
- /* avoid socket leak on alarm signal during connect(2) */
- sigfillset(&allsigs);
- sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &allsigs, NULL);
-#endif /* HAVE_SIGPROCMASK */
-
+ /* NOTE a Linux bug here - getaddrinfo will happily return 127.0.0.1
+ * twice if no IPv6 is configured */
i = -1;
- for (ai = ai0; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
- i = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, 0);
- if (i < 0)
- continue;
- if (connect(i, (struct sockaddr *) ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
- fm_close(i);
- i = -1;
+ for (ord = 0, ai = *ai0; ai; ord++, ai = ai->ai_next) {
+ char buf[256]; /* hostname */
+ char pb[256]; /* service name */
+ int gnie; /* getnameinfo result code */
+
+ gnie = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, buf, sizeof(buf), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST);
+ if (gnie)
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), GT_("unknown (%s)"), gai_strerror(gnie));
+ gnie = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, NULL, 0, pb, sizeof(pb), NI_NUMERICSERV);
+ if (gnie)
+ snprintf(pb, sizeof(pb), GT_("unknown (%s)"), gai_strerror(gnie));
+
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
+ report_build(stdout, GT_("Trying to connect to %s/%s..."), buf, pb);
+ i = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ int e = errno;
+ /* mask EAFNOSUPPORT errors, they confuse users for
+ * multihomed hosts */
+ if (errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
+ acterr = errno;
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
+ report_complete(stdout, GT_("cannot create socket: %s\n"), strerror(e));
+ snprintf(errbuf+strlen(errbuf), sizeof(errbuf)-strlen(errbuf),\
+ GT_("name %d: cannot create socket family %d type %d: %s\n"), ord, ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, strerror(e));
continue;
}
- break;
- }
-
-#ifdef HAVE_SIGPROCMASK
- sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &allsigs, NULL);
-#endif /* HAVE_SIGPROCMASK */
-#endif
-#endif /* NET_SECURITY */
-
- freeaddrinfo(ai0);
+ SockKeepalive(i);
- return i;
-}
-#else /* INET6_ENABLE */
-#ifndef HAVE_INET_ATON
-#ifndef INADDR_NONE
-#ifdef INADDR_BROADCAST
-#define INADDR_NONE INADDR_BROADCAST
-#else
-#define INADDR_NONE -1
-#endif
-#endif
-#endif /* HAVE_INET_ATON */
+ /* Save socket descriptor.
+ * Used to close the socket after connect timeout. */
+ mailserver_socket_temp = i;
-int SockOpen(const char *host, int clientPort, const char *options,
- const char *plugin)
-{
- int sock = -1; /* pacify -Wall */
-#ifndef HAVE_INET_ATON
- unsigned long inaddr;
-#endif /* HAVE_INET_ATON */
- struct sockaddr_in ad, **pptr;
- struct hostent *hp;
+ if (connect(i, (struct sockaddr *) ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+ int e = errno;
-#ifdef HAVE_SOCKETPAIR
- if (plugin) {
- char buf[10];
-#ifdef HAVE_SNPRINTF
- snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), /* Yeah, paranoic. So what? :P */
-#else
- sprintf(buf,
-#endif /* HAVE_SNPRINTF */
- "%d",clientPort);
- return handle_plugin(host,buf,plugin);
- }
-#endif /* HAVE_SOCKETPAIR */
+ /* additionally, suppress IPv4 network unreach errors */
+ if (e != EAFNOSUPPORT)
+ acterr = errno;
- memset(&ad, 0, sizeof(ad));
- ad.sin_family = AF_INET;
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
+ report_complete(stdout, GT_("connection failed.\n"));
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
+ report(stderr, GT_("connection to %s:%s [%s/%s] failed: %s.\n"), host, service, buf, pb, strerror(e));
+ snprintf(errbuf+strlen(errbuf), sizeof(errbuf)-strlen(errbuf), GT_("name %d: connection to %s:%s [%s/%s] failed: %s.\n"), ord, host, service, buf, pb, strerror(e));
+ fm_close(i);
+ i = -1;
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
+ report_complete(stdout, GT_("connected.\n"));
+ }
- /* we'll accept a quad address */
-#ifndef HAVE_INET_ATON
- inaddr = inet_addr((char*)host);
- if (inaddr != INADDR_NONE)
- {
- memcpy(&ad.sin_addr, &inaddr, sizeof(inaddr));
-#else
- if (inet_aton(host, &ad.sin_addr))
- {
-#endif /* HAVE_INET_ATON */
- ad.sin_port = htons(clientPort);
+ /* No connect timeout, then no need to set mailserver_socket_temp */
+ mailserver_socket_temp = -1;
- sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
- if (sock < 0)
- {
- h_errno = 0;
- return -1;
- }
- if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &ad, sizeof(ad)) < 0)
- {
- int olderr = errno;
- fm_close(sock); /* don't use SockClose, no traffic yet */
- h_errno = 0;
- errno = olderr;
- return -1;
- }
-#ifndef HAVE_INET_ATON
- }
-#else
+ break;
}
-#endif /* HAVE_INET_ATON */
- else {
- hp = gethostbyname((char*)host);
- if (hp == NULL)
- {
- errno = 0;
- return -1;
- }
- /*
- * Add a check to make sure the address has a valid IPv4 or IPv6
- * length. This prevents buffer spamming by a broken DNS.
- */
- if(hp->h_length != 4 && hp->h_length != 8)
- {
- h_errno = errno = 0;
- report(stderr,
- GT_("fetchmail: illegal address length received for host %s\n"),host);
- return -1;
- }
- /*
- * Try all addresses of a possibly multihomed host until we get
- * a successful connect or until we run out of addresses.
- */
- pptr = (struct sockaddr_in **)hp->h_addr_list;
- for(; *pptr != NULL; pptr++)
- {
- sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
- if (sock < 0)
- {
- h_errno = 0;
- return -1;
- }
- ad.sin_port = htons(clientPort);
- memcpy(&ad.sin_addr, *pptr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
- if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &ad, sizeof(ad)) == 0)
- break; /* success */
- fm_close(sock); /* don't use SockClose, no traffic yet */
- memset(&ad, 0, sizeof(ad));
- ad.sin_family = AF_INET;
- }
- if(*pptr == NULL)
- {
- int olderr = errno;
- fm_close(sock); /* don't use SockClose, no traffic yet */
- h_errno = 0;
- errno = olderr;
- return -1;
- }
+ fm_freeaddrinfo(*ai0);
+ *ai0 = NULL;
+
+ if (i == -1) {
+ report(stderr, GT_("Connection errors for this poll:\n%s"), errbuf);
+ errno = acterr;
}
- return(sock);
+ return i;
}
-#endif /* INET6_ENABLE */
#if defined(HAVE_STDARG_H)
#else
va_start(ap);
#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_VSNPRINTF
vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), format, ap);
-#else
- vsprintf(buf, format, ap);
-#endif
va_end(ap);
return SockWrite(sock, buf, strlen(buf));
}
#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
-#include "openssl/ssl.h"
-#include "openssl/err.h"
-#include "openssl/pem.h"
-#include "openssl/x509.h"
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
-static SSL_CTX *_ctx = NULL;
+static SSL_CTX *_ctx[FD_SETSIZE];
static SSL *_ssl_context[FD_SETSIZE];
-SSL *SSLGetContext( int );
+static SSL *SSLGetContext( int );
#endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
-int SockWrite(int sock, char *buf, int len)
+int SockWrite(int sock, const char *buf, int len)
{
int n, wrlen = 0;
#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
if( NULL != ( ssl = SSLGetContext( sock ) ) )
n = SSL_write(ssl, buf, len);
else
- n = fm_write(sock, buf, len);
-#else
- n = fm_write(sock, buf, len);
-#endif
+#endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
+ n = fm_write(sock, buf, len);
if (n <= 0)
return -1;
len -= n;
/* OK... SSL_peek works a little different from MSG_PEEK
Problem is that SSL_peek can return 0 if there
is no data currently available. If, on the other
- hand, we loose the socket, we also get a zero, but
+ hand, we lose the socket, we also get a zero, but
the SSL_read then SEGFAULTS! To deal with this,
we'll check the error code any time we get a return
of zero from SSL_peek. If we have an error, we bail.
later change the behavior of SSL_peek
to "fix" this problem... :-( */
if ((n = SSL_peek(ssl, bp, len)) < 0) {
+ (void)SSL_get_error(ssl, n);
return(-1);
}
if( 0 == n ) {
/* SSL_peek says no data... Does he mean no data
or did the connection blow up? If we got an error
then bail! */
- if( 0 != ( n = ERR_get_error() ) ) {
+ if (0 != SSL_get_error(ssl, n)) {
return -1;
}
/* We didn't get an error so read at least one
* We don't have a string to pass through
* the strchr at this point yet */
newline = NULL;
- } else if ((newline = memchr(bp, '\n', n)) != NULL)
+ } else if ((newline = (char *)memchr(bp, '\n', n)) != NULL)
n = newline - bp + 1;
- if ((n = SSL_read(ssl, bp, n)) == -1) {
- return(-1);
+ /* Matthias Andree: SSL_read can return 0, in that case
+ * we must call SSL_get_error to figure if there was
+ * an error or just a "no data" condition */
+ if ((n = SSL_read(ssl, bp, n)) <= 0) {
+ if ((n = SSL_get_error(ssl, n))) {
+ return(-1);
+ }
}
/* Check for case where our single character turned out to
* be a newline... (It wasn't going to get caught by
out of the loop now */
newline = bp;
}
- } else {
- if ((n = fm_peek(sock, bp, len)) <= 0)
- return(-1);
- if ((newline = memchr(bp, '\n', n)) != NULL)
- n = newline - bp + 1;
- if ((n = fm_read(sock, bp, n)) == -1)
- return(-1);
}
-#else
+ else
+#endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
+ {
#ifdef __BEOS__
- if ((n = fm_read(sock, bp, 1)) <= 0)
+ if ((n = fm_read(sock, bp, 1)) <= 0)
#else
- if ((n = fm_peek(sock, bp, len)) <= 0)
+ if ((n = fm_peek(sock, bp, len)) <= 0)
#endif
- return (-1);
- if ((newline = memchr(bp, '\n', n)) != NULL)
- n = newline - bp + 1;
+ return (-1);
+ if ((newline = (char *)memchr(bp, '\n', n)) != NULL)
+ n = newline - bp + 1;
#ifndef __BEOS__
- if ((n = fm_read(sock, bp, n)) == -1)
- return(-1);
+ if ((n = fm_read(sock, bp, n)) == -1)
+ return(-1);
#endif /* __BEOS__ */
-#endif
+ }
bp += n;
len -= n;
} while
(!newline && len);
*bp = '\0';
+
return bp - buf;
}
#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
if( NULL != ( ssl = SSLGetContext( sock ) ) ) {
n = SSL_peek(ssl, &ch, 1);
+ if (n < 0) {
+ (void)SSL_get_error(ssl, n);
+ return -1;
+ }
if( 0 == n ) {
/* This code really needs to implement a "hold back"
* to simulate a functioning SSL_peek()... sigh...
* Has to be coordinated with the read code above.
* Next on the list todo... */
- /* SSL_peek says no data... Does he mean no data
+ /* SSL_peek says 0... Does that mean no data
or did the connection blow up? If we got an error
then bail! */
- if( 0 != ( n = ERR_get_error() ) ) {
+ if(0 != SSL_get_error(ssl, n)) {
return -1;
}
return 0; /* Give him a '\0' character */
}
- } else {
- n = fm_peek(sock, &ch, 1);
}
-#else
-
- n = fm_peek(sock, &ch, 1);
-
+ else
#endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
+ n = fm_peek(sock, &ch, 1);
if (n == -1)
return -1;
static char *_check_digest;
static char *_server_label;
static int _depth0ck;
+static int _firstrun;
+static int _prev_err;
+static int _verify_ok;
SSL *SSLGetContext( int sock )
{
- /* If SSLOpen has never initialized - just return NULL */
- if( NULL == _ctx )
+ if( sock < 0 || (unsigned)sock > FD_SETSIZE )
return NULL;
-
- if( sock < 0 || sock > FD_SETSIZE )
+ if( _ctx[sock] == NULL )
return NULL;
return _ssl_context[sock];
}
-
-int SSL_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int strict )
+/* ok_return (preverify_ok) is 1 if this stage of certificate verification
+ passed, or 0 if it failed. This callback lets us display informative
+ errors, and perform additional validation (e.g. CN matches) */
+static int SSL_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int strict )
{
+#define SSLverbose (((outlevel) >= O_DEBUG) || ((outlevel) >= O_VERBOSE && (depth) == 0))
char buf[257];
X509 *x509_cert;
- int err, depth;
+ int err, depth, i;
unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
char text[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 3 + 1], *tp, *te;
- EVP_MD *digest_tp;
- unsigned int dsz, i, esz;
+ const EVP_MD *digest_tp;
+ unsigned int dsz, esz;
X509_NAME *subj, *issuer;
+ char *tt;
x509_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
subj = X509_get_subject_name(x509_cert);
issuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x509_cert);
- if (depth == 0) {
- _depth0ck = 1;
-
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE) {
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) {
+ if (depth == 0 && SSLverbose)
+ report(stdout, GT_("Server certificate:\n"));
+ else {
+ if (_firstrun) {
+ _firstrun = 0;
+ if (SSLverbose)
+ report(stdout, GT_("Certificate chain, from root to peer, starting at depth %d:\n"), depth);
+ } else {
+ if (SSLverbose)
+ report(stdout, GT_("Certificate at depth %d:\n"), depth);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (SSLverbose) {
if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(issuer, NID_organizationName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
- report(stdout, GT_("Issuer Organization: %s\n"), buf);
- if (i >= sizeof(buf) - 1)
+ report(stdout, GT_("Issuer Organization: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(buf, i)));
+ xfree(tt);
+ if ((size_t)i >= sizeof(buf) - 1)
report(stdout, GT_("Warning: Issuer Organization Name too long (possibly truncated).\n"));
} else
report(stdout, GT_("Unknown Organization\n"));
if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(issuer, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
- report(stdout, GT_("Issuer CommonName: %s\n"), buf);
- if (i >= sizeof(buf) - 1)
+ report(stdout, GT_("Issuer CommonName: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(buf, i)));
+ xfree(tt);
+ if ((size_t)i >= sizeof(buf) - 1)
report(stdout, GT_("Warning: Issuer CommonName too long (possibly truncated).\n"));
} else
report(stdout, GT_("Unknown Issuer CommonName\n"));
}
+ }
+
+ if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subj, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
+ if (SSLverbose) {
+ report(stdout, GT_("Subject CommonName: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(buf, i)));
+ xfree(tt);
+ }
+ if ((size_t)i >= sizeof(buf) - 1) {
+ /* Possible truncation. In this case, this is a DNS name, so this
+ * is really bad. We do not tolerate this even in the non-strict case. */
+ report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject CommonName too long!\n"));
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if ((size_t)i > strlen(buf)) {
+ /* Name contains embedded NUL characters, so we complain. This is likely
+ * a certificate spoofing attack. */
+ report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject CommonName contains NUL, aborting!\n"));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (depth == 0) { /* peer certificate */
+ if (!_depth0ck) {
+ _depth0ck = 1;
+ }
+
if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subj, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
- report(stdout, GT_("Server CommonName: %s\n"), buf);
- if (i >= sizeof(buf) - 1) {
- /* Possible truncation. In this case, this is a DNS name, so this
- * is really bad. We do not tolerate this even in the non-strict case. */
- report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject CommonName too long!\n"));
- return (0);
- }
if (_ssl_server_cname != NULL) {
char *p1 = buf;
char *p2 = _ssl_server_cname;
- int n;
-
- if (*p1 == '*') {
- ++p1;
- n = strlen(p2) - strlen(p1);
- if (n >= 0)
- p2 += n;
- }
- if (0 != strcasecmp(p1, p2)) {
- report(stderr,
- GT_("Server CommonName mismatch: %s != %s\n"),
- buf, _ssl_server_cname );
- if (ok_return && strict)
- return (0);
+ int matched = 0;
+ STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gens;
+
+ /* RFC 2595 section 2.4: find a matching name
+ * first find a match among alternative names */
+ gens = (STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *)X509_get_ext_d2i(x509_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
+ if (gens) {
+ int j, r;
+ for (j = 0, r = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); j < r; ++j) {
+ const GENERAL_NAME *gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, j);
+ if (gn->type == GEN_DNS) {
+ char *pp1 = (char *)gn->d.ia5->data;
+ char *pp2 = _ssl_server_cname;
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) {
+ report(stdout, GT_("Subject Alternative Name: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(pp1, (size_t)gn->d.ia5->length)));
+ xfree(tt);
+ }
+ /* Name contains embedded NUL characters, so we complain. This
+ * is likely a certificate spoofing attack. */
+ if ((size_t)gn->d.ia5->length != strlen(pp1)) {
+ report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject Alternative Name contains NUL, aborting!\n"));
+ sk_GENERAL_NAME_free(gens);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (name_match(pp1, pp2)) {
+ matched = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ GENERAL_NAMES_free(gens);
}
- } else if (ok_return && strict) {
+ if (name_match(p1, p2)) {
+ matched = 1;
+ }
+ if (!matched) {
+ if (strict || SSLverbose) {
+ report(stderr,
+ GT_("Server CommonName mismatch: %s != %s\n"),
+ (tt = sdump(buf, i)), _ssl_server_cname );
+ xfree(tt);
+ }
+ ok_return = 0;
+ }
+ } else if (ok_return) {
report(stderr, GT_("Server name not set, could not verify certificate!\n"));
- return (0);
+ if (strict) return (0);
}
} else {
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
report(stdout, GT_("Unknown Server CommonName\n"));
if (ok_return && strict) {
report(stderr, GT_("Server name not specified in certificate!\n"));
}
/* Print the finger print. Note that on errors, we might print it more than once
* normally; we kluge around that by using a global variable. */
- if (_check_fp) {
- _check_fp = 0;
+ if (_check_fp == 1) {
+ unsigned dp;
+
+ _check_fp = -1;
digest_tp = EVP_md5();
if (digest_tp == NULL) {
report(stderr, GT_("EVP_md5() failed!\n"));
}
tp = text;
te = text + sizeof(text);
- for (i = 0; i < dsz; i++) {
-#ifdef HAVE_SNPRINTF
- esz = snprintf(tp, te - tp, i > 0 ? ":%02X" : "%02X", digest[i]);
-#else
- esz = sprintf(tp, i > 0 ? ":%02X" : "%02X", digest[i]);
-#endif
- if (esz >= te - tp) {
+ for (dp = 0; dp < dsz; dp++) {
+ esz = snprintf(tp, te - tp, dp > 0 ? ":%02X" : "%02X", digest[dp]);
+ if (esz >= (size_t)(te - tp)) {
report(stderr, GT_("Digest text buffer too small!\n"));
return (0);
}
tp += esz;
}
- report(stdout, GT_("%s key fingerprint: %s\n"), _server_label, text);
+ if (outlevel > O_NORMAL)
+ report(stdout, GT_("%s key fingerprint: %s\n"), _server_label, text);
if (_check_digest != NULL) {
- if (strcmp(text, _check_digest) == 0)
+ if (strcasecmp(text, _check_digest) == 0) {
+ if (outlevel > O_NORMAL)
report(stdout, GT_("%s fingerprints match.\n"), _server_label);
- else {
- report(stderr, GT_("%s fingerprints do not match!\n"), _server_label);
- return (0);
+ } else {
+ report(stderr, GT_("%s fingerprints do not match!\n"), _server_label);
+ return (0);
}
- }
- }
- }
+ } /* if (_check_digest != NULL) */
+ } /* if (_check_fp) */
+ } /* if (depth == 0 && !_depth0ck) */
+
+ if (err != X509_V_OK && err != _prev_err && !(_check_fp != 0 && _check_digest && !strict)) {
+ _prev_err = err;
+
+ report(stderr, GT_("Server certificate verification error: %s\n"), X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
+ /* We gave the error code, but maybe we can add some more details for debugging */
- if (err != X509_V_OK && (strict || outlevel == O_VERBOSE)) {
- report(strict ? stderr : stdout, GT_("Warning: server certificate verification: %s\n"), X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
- /* We gave the error code, but maybe we can add some more details for debugging */
switch (err) {
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
X509_NAME_oneline(issuer, buf, sizeof(buf));
buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0';
- report(stdout, GT_("unknown issuer (first %d characters): %s\n"), sizeof(buf), buf);
+ report(stderr, GT_("unknown issuer (first %d characters): %s\n"), (int)(sizeof(buf)-1), buf);
+ report(stderr, GT_("This error usually happens when the server provides an incomplete certificate "
+ "chain, which is nothing fetchmail could do anything about. For details, "
+ "please see the README.SSL-SERVER document that comes with fetchmail.\n"));
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
+ case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
+ X509_NAME_oneline(subj, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0';
+ report(stderr, GT_("This means that the root signing certificate (issued for %s) is not in the "
+ "trusted CA certificate locations, or that c_rehash needs to be run "
+ "on the certificate directory. For details, please "
+ "see the documentation of --sslcertpath and --sslcertfile in the manual page.\n"), buf);
+ break;
+ default:
break;
}
}
+ /*
+ * If not in strict checking mode (--sslcertck), override this
+ * and pretend that verification had succeeded.
+ */
+ _verify_ok &= ok_return;
if (!strict)
ok_return = 1;
return (ok_return);
}
-int SSL_nock_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx )
+static int SSL_nock_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx )
{
return SSL_verify_callback(ok_return, ctx, 0);
}
-int SSL_ck_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx )
+static int SSL_ck_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx )
{
return SSL_verify_callback(ok_return, ctx, 1);
}
+
+/* get commonName from certificate set in file.
+ * commonName is stored in buffer namebuffer, limited with namebufferlen
+ */
+static const char *SSLCertGetCN(const char *mycert,
+ char *namebuffer, size_t namebufferlen)
+{
+ const char *ret = NULL;
+ BIO *certBio = NULL;
+ X509 *x509_cert = NULL;
+ X509_NAME *certname = NULL;
+
+ if (namebuffer && namebufferlen > 0) {
+ namebuffer[0] = 0x00;
+ certBio = BIO_new_file(mycert,"r");
+ if (certBio) {
+ x509_cert = PEM_read_bio_X509(certBio,NULL,NULL,NULL);
+ BIO_free(certBio);
+ }
+ if (x509_cert) {
+ certname = X509_get_subject_name(x509_cert);
+ if (certname &&
+ X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(certname, NID_commonName,
+ namebuffer, namebufferlen) > 0)
+ ret = namebuffer;
+ X509_free(x509_cert);
+ }
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
/* performs initial SSL handshake over the connected socket
* uses SSL *ssl global variable, which is currently defined
* in this file
*/
-int SSLOpen(int sock, char *mycert, char *mykey, char *myproto, int certck, char *certpath,
- char *fingerprint, char *servercname, char *label)
+int SSLOpen(int sock, char *mycert, char *mykey, const char *myproto, int certck,
+ char *cacertfile, char *certpath,
+ char *fingerprint, char *servercname, char *label, char **remotename)
{
- SSL *ssl;
-
+ struct stat randstat;
+ int i;
+ long sslopts = SSL_OP_ALL;
+
SSL_load_error_strings();
- SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms();
-
- if( sock < 0 || sock > FD_SETSIZE ) {
+ SSL_library_init();
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); /* see Debian Bug#576430 and manpage */
+
+ if (stat("/dev/random", &randstat) &&
+ stat("/dev/urandom", &randstat)) {
+ /* Neither /dev/random nor /dev/urandom are present, so add
+ entropy to the SSL PRNG a hard way. */
+ for (i = 0; i < 10000 && ! RAND_status (); ++i) {
+ char buf[4];
+ struct timeval tv;
+ gettimeofday (&tv, 0);
+ buf[0] = tv.tv_usec & 0xF;
+ buf[2] = (tv.tv_usec & 0xF0) >> 4;
+ buf[3] = (tv.tv_usec & 0xF00) >> 8;
+ buf[1] = (tv.tv_usec & 0xF000) >> 12;
+ RAND_add (buf, sizeof buf, 0.1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if( sock < 0 || (unsigned)sock > FD_SETSIZE ) {
report(stderr, GT_("File descriptor out of range for SSL") );
return( -1 );
}
- if( ! _ctx ) {
- /* Be picky and make sure the memory is cleared */
- memset( _ssl_context, 0, sizeof( _ssl_context ) );
- if(myproto) {
- if(!strcmp("ssl2",myproto)) {
- _ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv2_client_method());
- } else if(!strcmp("ssl3",myproto)) {
- _ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv3_client_method());
- } else if(!strcmp("tls1",myproto)) {
- _ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_client_method());
- } else {
- fprintf(stderr,GT_("Invalid SSL protocol '%s' specified, using default (SSLv23).\n"), myproto);
- myproto = NULL;
- }
- }
- if(!myproto) {
- _ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method());
- }
- if(_ctx == NULL) {
- ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
- return(-1);
+ /* Make sure a connection referring to an older context is not left */
+ _ssl_context[sock] = NULL;
+ if(myproto) {
+ if(!strcasecmp("ssl2",myproto)) {
+#if HAVE_DECL_SSLV2_CLIENT_METHOD + 0 > 0
+ _ctx[sock] = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv2_client_method());
+#else
+ report(stderr, GT_("Your operating system does not support SSLv2.\n"));
+ return -1;
+#endif
+ } else if(!strcasecmp("ssl3",myproto)) {
+ _ctx[sock] = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv3_client_method());
+ } else if(!strcasecmp("tls1",myproto)) {
+ _ctx[sock] = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_client_method());
+ } else if (!strcasecmp("ssl23",myproto)) {
+ myproto = NULL;
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr,GT_("Invalid SSL protocol '%s' specified, using default (SSLv23).\n"), myproto);
+ myproto = NULL;
}
}
+ if(!myproto) {
+ _ctx[sock] = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method());
+ }
+ if(_ctx[sock] == NULL) {
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ {
+ char *tmp = getenv("FETCHMAIL_DISABLE_CBC_IV_COUNTERMEASURE");
+ if (tmp == NULL || *tmp == '\0' || strspn(tmp, " \t") == strlen(tmp))
+ sslopts &= ~ SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS;
+ }
+
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(_ctx[sock], sslopts);
if (certck) {
- SSL_CTX_set_verify(_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, SSL_ck_verify_callback);
- if (certpath)
- SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(_ctx, NULL, certpath);
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(_ctx[sock], SSL_VERIFY_PEER, SSL_ck_verify_callback);
} else {
/* In this case, we do not fail if verification fails. However,
- * we provide the callback for output and possible fingerprint checks. */
- SSL_CTX_set_verify(_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, SSL_nock_verify_callback);
+ * we provide the callback for output and possible fingerprint
+ * checks. */
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(_ctx[sock], SSL_VERIFY_PEER, SSL_nock_verify_callback);
+ }
+
+ /* Check which trusted X.509 CA certificate store(s) to load */
+ {
+ char *tmp;
+ int want_default_cacerts = 0;
+
+ /* Load user locations if any is given */
+ if (certpath || cacertfile)
+ SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(_ctx[sock],
+ cacertfile, certpath);
+ else
+ want_default_cacerts = 1;
+
+ tmp = getenv("FETCHMAIL_INCLUDE_DEFAULT_X509_CA_CERTS");
+ if (want_default_cacerts || (tmp && tmp[0])) {
+ SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(_ctx[sock]);
+ }
}
- _ssl_context[sock] = SSL_new(_ctx);
+ _ssl_context[sock] = SSL_new(_ctx[sock]);
if(_ssl_context[sock] == NULL) {
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+ SSL_CTX_free(_ctx[sock]);
+ _ctx[sock] = NULL;
return(-1);
}
_check_fp = 1;
_check_digest = fingerprint;
_depth0ck = 0;
+ _firstrun = 1;
+ _verify_ok = 1;
+ _prev_err = -1;
if( mycert || mykey ) {
* he does NOT have a separate certificate and private key file then
* assume that it's a combined key and certificate file.
*/
+ char buffer[256];
+
if( !mykey )
mykey = mycert;
if( !mycert )
mycert = mykey;
+
+ if ((!*remotename || !**remotename) && SSLCertGetCN(mycert, buffer, sizeof(buffer))) {
+ free(*remotename);
+ *remotename = xstrdup(buffer);
+ }
SSL_use_certificate_file(_ssl_context[sock], mycert, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(_ssl_context[sock], mykey, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
}
- SSL_set_fd(_ssl_context[sock], sock);
-
- if(SSL_connect(_ssl_context[sock]) == -1) {
+ if (SSL_set_fd(_ssl_context[sock], sock) == 0
+ || SSL_connect(_ssl_context[sock]) < 1) {
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+ SSL_free( _ssl_context[sock] );
+ _ssl_context[sock] = NULL;
+ SSL_CTX_free(_ctx[sock]);
+ _ctx[sock] = NULL;
return(-1);
}
/* Paranoia: was the callback not called as we expected? */
- if ((fingerprint != NULL || certck) && !_depth0ck) {
+ if (!_depth0ck) {
report(stderr, GT_("Certificate/fingerprint verification was somehow skipped!\n"));
-
- if( NULL != ( ssl = SSLGetContext( sock ) ) ) {
- /* Clean up the SSL stack */
- SSL_free( _ssl_context[sock] );
- _ssl_context[sock] = NULL;
+
+ if (fingerprint != NULL || certck) {
+ if( NULL != SSLGetContext( sock ) ) {
+ /* Clean up the SSL stack */
+ SSL_shutdown( _ssl_context[sock] );
+ SSL_free( _ssl_context[sock] );
+ _ssl_context[sock] = NULL;
+ SSL_CTX_free(_ctx[sock]);
+ _ctx[sock] = NULL;
+ }
+ return(-1);
}
- return(-1);
+ }
+
+ if (!certck && !fingerprint &&
+ (SSL_get_verify_result(_ssl_context[sock]) != X509_V_OK || !_verify_ok)) {
+ report(stderr, GT_("Warning: the connection is insecure, continuing anyways. (Better use --sslcertck!)\n"));
}
return(0);
/* close a socket gracefully */
{
#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
- SSL *ssl;
-
- if( NULL != ( ssl = SSLGetContext( sock ) ) ) {
+ if( NULL != SSLGetContext( sock ) ) {
/* Clean up the SSL stack */
+ SSL_shutdown( _ssl_context[sock] );
SSL_free( _ssl_context[sock] );
_ssl_context[sock] = NULL;
+ SSL_CTX_free(_ctx[sock]);
+ _ctx[sock] = NULL;
}
#endif
-#ifdef __UNUSED__
- /*
- * This hangs in RedHat 6.2 after fetchmail runs for a while a
- * FIN_WAIT2 comes up in netstat and fetchmail never returns from
- * the recv system call. (Reported from jtnews
- * <jtnews@bellatlantic.net>, Wed, 24 May 2000 21:26:02.)
- *
- * Half-close the connection first so the other end gets notified.
- *
- * This stops sends but allows receives (effectively, it sends a
- * TCP <FIN>). */
- if (shutdown(sock, 1) == 0) {
- char ch;
- /* If there is any data still waiting in the queue, discard it.
- * Call recv() until either it returns 0 (meaning we received a FIN)
- * or any error occurs. This makes sure all data sent by the other
- * side is acknowledged at the TCP level.
- */
- if (fm_peek(sock, &ch, 1) > 0)
- while (fm_read(sock, &ch, 1) > 0)
- continue;
- }
-#endif /* __UNUSED__ */
-
/* if there's an error closing at this point, not much we can do */
return(fm_close(sock)); /* this is guarded */
}
-#ifdef MAIN
+#ifdef __CYGWIN__
/*
- * Use the chargen service to test input buffering directly.
- * You may have to uncomment the `chargen' service description in your
- * inetd.conf (and then SIGHUP inetd) for this to work. */
-main()
+ * Workaround Microsoft Winsock recv/WSARecv(..., MSG_PEEK) bug.
+ * See http://sources.redhat.com/ml/cygwin/2001-08/msg00628.html
+ * for more details.
+ */
+static ssize_t cygwin_read(int sock, void *buf, size_t count)
{
- int sock = SockOpen("localhost", 19, NULL);
- char buf[80];
+ char *bp = (char *)buf;
+ size_t n = 0;
- while (SockRead(sock, buf, sizeof(buf)-1))
- SockWrite(1, buf, strlen(buf));
- SockClose(sock);
-}
-#endif /* MAIN */
+ if ((n = read(sock, bp, count)) == (size_t)-1)
+ return(-1);
+
+ if (n != count) {
+ size_t n2 = 0;
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
+ report(stdout, GT_("Cygwin socket read retry\n"));
+ n2 = read(sock, bp + n, count - n);
+ if (n2 == (size_t)-1 || n + n2 != count) {
+ report(stderr, GT_("Cygwin socket read retry failed!\n"));
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
-/* socket.c ends here */
+ return count;
+}
+#endif /* __CYGWIN__ */