/* We need to define h_errno only if it is not already */
#ifndef h_errno
-
-#ifdef HAVE_RES_SEARCH
-/* some versions of FreeBSD should declare this but don't */
+# if !HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO
extern int h_errno;
-#else
-/* pretend we have h_errno to avoid some #ifdef's later */
-static int h_errno;
-#endif
-
+# endif
#endif /* ndef h_errno */
#ifdef HAVE_SOCKETPAIR
static char *const *parse_plugin(const char *plugin, const char *host, const char *service)
-{ const char **argvec;
+{
+ char **argvec;
const char *c, *p;
char *cp, *plugin_copy;
unsigned int plugin_copy_len;
}
plugin_copy[plugin_copy_len] = 0;
- argvec = (const char **)malloc(s);
+ argvec = (char **)malloc(s);
if (!argvec)
{
report(stderr, GT_("fetchmail: malloc failed\n"));
return NULL;
}
memset(argvec, 0, s);
- for (c = p = plugin_copy, i = 0; *c; c++)
- { if ((!isspace((unsigned char)*c)) && (c == p ? 1 : isspace((unsigned char)*p))) {
- argvec[i] = c;
+ for (p = cp = plugin_copy, i = 0; *cp; cp++)
+ { if ((!isspace((unsigned char)*cp)) && (cp == p ? 1 : isspace((unsigned char)*p))) {
+ argvec[i] = cp;
i++;
}
- p = c;
+ p = cp;
}
for (cp = plugin_copy; *cp; cp++)
{ if (isspace((unsigned char)*cp))
*cp = 0;
}
- return (char *const*)argvec;
+ return argvec;
}
static int handle_plugin(const char *host,
static SSL *SSLGetContext( int );
#endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
-int SockWrite(int sock, char *buf, int len)
+int SockWrite(int sock, const char *buf, int len)
{
int n, wrlen = 0;
#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
/* SSL_peek says no data... Does he mean no data
or did the connection blow up? If we got an error
then bail! */
- if( 0 != ( n = SSL_get_error(ssl, n) ) ) {
+ if (0 != SSL_get_error(ssl, n)) {
return -1;
}
/* We didn't get an error so read at least one
/* SSL_peek says 0... Does that mean no data
or did the connection blow up? If we got an error
then bail! */
- if( 0 != ( n = SSL_get_error(ssl, n) ) ) {
+ if(0 != SSL_get_error(ssl, n)) {
return -1;
}
static char *_check_digest;
static char *_server_label;
static int _depth0ck;
+static int _firstrun;
static int _prev_err;
+static int _verify_ok;
SSL *SSLGetContext( int sock )
{
errors, and perform additional validation (e.g. CN matches) */
static int SSL_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int strict )
{
+#define SSLverbose (((outlevel) >= O_DEBUG) || ((outlevel) >= O_VERBOSE && (depth) == 0))
char buf[257];
X509 *x509_cert;
int err, depth, i;
subj = X509_get_subject_name(x509_cert);
issuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x509_cert);
- if (depth == 0 && !_depth0ck) {
- _depth0ck = 1;
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) {
+ if (depth == 0 && SSLverbose)
+ report(stderr, GT_("Server certificate:\n"));
+ else {
+ if (_firstrun) {
+ _firstrun = 0;
+ if (SSLverbose)
+ report(stdout, GT_("Certificate chain, from root to peer, starting at depth %d:\n"), depth);
+ } else {
+ if (SSLverbose)
+ report(stdout, GT_("Certificate at depth %d:\n"), depth);
+ }
+ }
- if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) {
+ if (SSLverbose) {
if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(issuer, NID_organizationName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
report(stdout, GT_("Issuer Organization: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(buf, i)));
xfree(tt);
} else
report(stdout, GT_("Unknown Issuer CommonName\n"));
}
- if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subj, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
- if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
- report(stdout, GT_("Server CommonName: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(buf, i)));
+ }
+
+ if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subj, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
+ if (SSLverbose) {
+ report(stdout, GT_("Subject CommonName: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(buf, i)));
xfree(tt);
- if ((size_t)i >= sizeof(buf) - 1) {
- /* Possible truncation. In this case, this is a DNS name, so this
- * is really bad. We do not tolerate this even in the non-strict case. */
- report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject CommonName too long!\n"));
- return (0);
- }
- if ((size_t)i > strlen(buf)) {
- /* Name contains embedded NUL characters, so we complain. This is likely
- * a certificate spoofing attack. */
- report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject CommonName contains NUL, aborting!\n"));
- return 0;
- }
+ }
+ if ((size_t)i >= sizeof(buf) - 1) {
+ /* Possible truncation. In this case, this is a DNS name, so this
+ * is really bad. We do not tolerate this even in the non-strict case. */
+ report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject CommonName too long!\n"));
+ return (0);
+ }
+ if ((size_t)i > strlen(buf)) {
+ /* Name contains embedded NUL characters, so we complain. This is likely
+ * a certificate spoofing attack. */
+ report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject CommonName contains NUL, aborting!\n"));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (depth == 0) { /* peer certificate */
+ if (!_depth0ck) {
+ _depth0ck = 1;
+ }
+
+ if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subj, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
if (_ssl_server_cname != NULL) {
char *p1 = buf;
char *p2 = _ssl_server_cname;
if (gn->type == GEN_DNS) {
char *p1 = (char *)gn->d.ia5->data;
char *p2 = _ssl_server_cname;
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) {
+ report(stdout, GT_("Subject Alternative Name: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(p1, (size_t)gn->d.ia5->length)));
+ xfree(tt);
+ }
/* Name contains embedded NUL characters, so we complain. This
* is likely a certificate spoofing attack. */
if ((size_t)gn->d.ia5->length != strlen(p1)) {
sk_GENERAL_NAME_free(gens);
return 0;
}
- if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) {
- report(stdout, GT_("Subject Alternative Name: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(p1, (size_t)gn->d.ia5->length)));
- xfree(tt);
- }
if (*p1 == '*') {
++p1;
n = strlen(p2) - strlen(p1);
matched = 1;
}
if (!matched) {
- report(stderr,
- GT_("Server CommonName mismatch: %s != %s\n"),
- (tt = sdump(buf, i)), _ssl_server_cname );
- xfree(tt);
- if (ok_return && strict)
- return (0);
+ if (strict || SSLverbose) {
+ report(stderr,
+ GT_("Server CommonName mismatch: %s != %s\n"),
+ (tt = sdump(buf, i)), _ssl_server_cname );
+ xfree(tt);
+ }
+ ok_return = 0;
}
} else if (ok_return) {
report(stderr, GT_("Server name not set, could not verify certificate!\n"));
if (err != X509_V_OK && err != _prev_err && !(_check_fp != 0 && _check_digest && !strict)) {
_prev_err = err;
- report(stderr, GT_("Server certificate verification error: %s\n"), X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
- /* We gave the error code, but maybe we can add some more details for debugging */
+
+ report(stderr, GT_("Server certificate verification error: %s\n"), X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
+ /* We gave the error code, but maybe we can add some more details for debugging */
+
switch (err) {
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
X509_NAME_oneline(issuer, buf, sizeof(buf));
buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0';
report(stderr, GT_("unknown issuer (first %d characters): %s\n"), (int)(sizeof(buf)-1), buf);
+ report(stderr, GT_("This error usually happens when the server provides an incomplete certificate "
+ "chain, which is nothing fetchmail could do anything about. For details, "
+ "please see the README.SSL-SERVER document that comes with fetchmail.\n"));
+ break;
+ case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
+ case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
+ case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
+ X509_NAME_oneline(subj, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0';
+ report(stderr, GT_("This means that the root signing certificate (issued for %s) is not in the "
+ "trusted CA certificate locations, or that c_rehash needs to be run "
+ "on the certificate directory. For details, please "
+ "see the documentation of --sslcertpath and --sslcertfile in the manual page.\n"), buf);
+ break;
+ default:
break;
}
}
* If not in strict checking mode (--sslcertck), override this
* and pretend that verification had succeeded.
*/
+ _verify_ok &= ok_return;
if (!strict)
ok_return = 1;
return (ok_return);
* uses SSL *ssl global variable, which is currently defined
* in this file
*/
-int SSLOpen(int sock, char *mycert, char *mykey, char *myproto, int certck, char *certpath,
+int SSLOpen(int sock, char *mycert, char *mykey, const char *myproto, int certck,
+ char *cacertfile, char *certpath,
char *fingerprint, char *servercname, char *label, char **remotename)
{
struct stat randstat;
int i;
SSL_load_error_strings();
- SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms(); /* synonym for SSL_library_init() */
-
-#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
+ SSL_library_init();
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); /* see Debian Bug#576430 and manpage */
+
if (stat("/dev/random", &randstat) &&
stat("/dev/urandom", &randstat)) {
/* Neither /dev/random nor /dev/urandom are present, so add
RAND_add (buf, sizeof buf, 0.1);
}
}
-#endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
-
if( sock < 0 || (unsigned)sock > FD_SETSIZE ) {
report(stderr, GT_("File descriptor out of range for SSL") );
SSL_CTX_set_verify(_ctx[sock], SSL_VERIFY_PEER, SSL_ck_verify_callback);
} else {
/* In this case, we do not fail if verification fails. However,
- * we provide the callback for output and possible fingerprint checks. */
+ * we provide the callback for output and possible fingerprint
+ * checks. */
SSL_CTX_set_verify(_ctx[sock], SSL_VERIFY_PEER, SSL_nock_verify_callback);
}
- if (certpath)
- SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(_ctx[sock], NULL, certpath);
- else
- SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(_ctx[sock]);
+
+ /* Check which trusted X.509 CA certificate store(s) to load */
+ {
+ char *tmp;
+ int want_default_cacerts = 0;
+
+ /* Load user locations if any is given */
+ if (certpath || cacertfile)
+ SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(_ctx[sock],
+ cacertfile, certpath);
+ else
+ want_default_cacerts = 1;
+
+ tmp = getenv("FETCHMAIL_INCLUDE_DEFAULT_X509_CA_CERTS");
+ if (want_default_cacerts || (tmp && tmp[0])) {
+ SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(_ctx[sock]);
+ }
+ }
_ssl_context[sock] = SSL_new(_ctx[sock]);
_check_fp = 1;
_check_digest = fingerprint;
_depth0ck = 0;
+ _firstrun = 1;
+ _verify_ok = 1;
_prev_err = -1;
if( mycert || mykey ) {
}
}
+ if (!certck && !fingerprint &&
+ (SSL_get_verify_result(_ssl_context[sock]) != X509_V_OK || !_verify_ok)) {
+ report(stderr, GT_("Warning: the connection is insecure, continuing anyways. (Better use --sslcertck!)\n"));
+ }
+
return(0);
}
#endif
static ssize_t cygwin_read(int sock, void *buf, size_t count)
{
char *bp = buf;
- int n = 0;
+ size_t n = 0;
- if ((n = read(sock, bp, count)) == -1)
+ if ((n = read(sock, bp, count)) == (size_t)-1)
return(-1);
if (n != count) {
- int n2 = 0;
+ size_t n2 = 0;
if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
report(stdout, GT_("Cygwin socket read retry\n"));
n2 = read(sock, bp + n, count - n);
- if (n2 == -1 || n + n2 != count) {
+ if (n2 == (size_t)-1 || n + n2 != count) {
report(stderr, GT_("Cygwin socket read retry failed!\n"));
return(-1);
}
projects / ~andy / fetchmail / blobdiff