#include <memory.h>
#endif /* HAVE_MEMORY_H */
#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
#ifndef HAVE_NET_SOCKET_H
#include <sys/socket.h>
#else
#endif /* ndef h_errno */
-extern int mailserver_socket_temp; /* Socket to close if connect timeout */
-
-#if NET_SECURITY
+#ifdef NET_SECURITY
#include <net/security.h>
#endif /* NET_SECURITY */
#ifdef HAVE_SOCKETPAIR
-char *const *parse_plugin(const char *plugin, const char *host, const char *service)
+static char *const *parse_plugin(const char *plugin, const char *host, const char *service)
{ const char **argvec;
const char *c, *p;
char *cp, *plugin_copy;
/* error */
report(stderr, GT_("fetchmail: fork failed\n"));
return -1;
- break;
case 0: /* child */
/* fds[1] is the parent's end; close it for proper EOF
** detection */
#endif /* HAVE_SOCKETPAIR */
#ifdef __UNUSED__
-#include <sys/time.h>
int SockCheckOpen(int fd)
/* poll given socket; is it selectable? */
return sock;
}
-#if INET6_ENABLE
+#ifdef INET6_ENABLE
int SockOpen(const char *host, const char *service, const char *options,
const char *plugin)
{
struct addrinfo *ai, *ai0, req;
int i;
-#if NET_SECURITY
+#ifdef NET_SECURITY
void *request = NULL;
int requestlen;
#endif /* NET_SECURITY */
}
#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
-#include "openssl/ssl.h"
-#include "openssl/err.h"
-#include "openssl/pem.h"
-#include "openssl/x509.h"
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
static SSL_CTX *_ctx = NULL;
static SSL *_ssl_context[FD_SETSIZE];
{
char *newline, *bp = buf;
int n;
+ int maxavailable = 0;
#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
SSL *ssl;
#endif
(void)SSL_get_error(ssl, n);
return(-1);
}
+ maxavailable = n;
if( 0 == n ) {
/* SSL_peek says no data... Does he mean no data
or did the connection blow up? If we got an error
if ((n = fm_peek(sock, bp, len)) <= 0)
#endif
return (-1);
+ maxavailable = n;
if ((newline = memchr(bp, '\n', n)) != NULL)
n = newline - bp + 1;
#ifndef __BEOS__
} while
(!newline && len);
*bp = '\0';
+
+#ifdef FORCE_STUFFING /* too ugly to live -- besides, there's IMAP */
+ /* OK, very weird hack coming up here:
+ * When POP3 servers send us a message, they're supposed to
+ * terminate the message with a line containing only a dot. To protect
+ * against lines in the real message that might contain only a dot,
+ * they're supposed to preface any line that starts with a dot with
+ * an additional dot, which will be removed on the client side. That
+ * process, called byte-stuffing (and unstuffing) is really not the
+ * concern of this low-level routine, ordinarily, but there are some
+ * POP servers (and maybe IMAP servers too, who knows) that fail to
+ * do the byte-stuffing, and this routine is the best place to try to
+ * identify and fix that fault.
+ *
+ * Since the DOT line is supposed to come only at the end of a
+ * message, the implication is that right after we see it, the server
+ * is supposed to go back to waiting for the next command. There
+ * isn't supposed to be any more data to read after we see the dot.
+ * THEREFORE, if we see more data to be read after something that
+ * looks like the dot line, then probably the server is failing to
+ * do byte-stuffing. In that case, we'll byte-pack it for them so
+ * that the higher-level routines see things as hunky-dorey.
+ * This is not a perfect test or fix by any means (it has an
+ * obvious race condition, for one thing), but it should at least
+ * reduce the nastiness that ensues when people don't know how
+ * to write POP servers.
+ */
+ if ((maxavailable > (bp-buf)) &&
+ ((((bp-buf) == 3) &&
+ (buf[0] == '.') &&
+ (buf[1] == '\r') &&
+ (buf[2] == '\n')) ||
+ (((bp-buf) == 2) &&
+ (buf[0] == '.') &&
+ (buf[1] == '\n')))) {
+
+ memmove(buf+1, buf, (bp-buf)+1);
+ buf[0] = '.';
+ bp++;
+ }
+#endif /* FORCE_STUFFING */
return bp - buf;
}
}
-int SSL_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int strict )
+static int SSL_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int strict )
{
char buf[257];
X509 *x509_cert;
int err, depth;
unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
char text[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 3 + 1], *tp, *te;
- EVP_MD *digest_tp;
+ const EVP_MD *digest_tp;
unsigned int dsz, i, esz;
X509_NAME *subj, *issuer;
return (ok_return);
}
-int SSL_nock_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx )
+static int SSL_nock_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx )
{
return SSL_verify_callback(ok_return, ctx, 0);
}
-int SSL_ck_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx )
+static int SSL_ck_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx )
{
return SSL_verify_callback(ok_return, ctx, 1);
}
char *fingerprint, char *servercname, char *label)
{
SSL *ssl;
+ struct stat randstat;
+ int i;
SSL_load_error_strings();
SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms();
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
+ if (stat("/dev/random", &randstat) &&
+ stat("/dev/urandom", &randstat)) {
+ /* Neither /dev/random nor /dev/urandom are present, so add
+ entropy to the SSL PRNG a hard way. */
+ for (i = 0; i < 10000 && ! RAND_status (); ++i) {
+ char buf[4];
+ struct timeval tv;
+ gettimeofday (&tv, 0);
+ buf[0] = tv.tv_usec & 0xF;
+ buf[2] = (tv.tv_usec & 0xF0) >> 4;
+ buf[3] = (tv.tv_usec & 0xF00) >> 8;
+ buf[1] = (tv.tv_usec & 0xF000) >> 12;
+ RAND_add (buf, sizeof buf, 0.1);
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
+
+
if( sock < 0 || sock > FD_SETSIZE ) {
report(stderr, GT_("File descriptor out of range for SSL") );
return( -1 );
SSL_set_fd(_ssl_context[sock], sock);
- if(SSL_connect(_ssl_context[sock]) == -1) {
+ if(SSL_connect(_ssl_context[sock]) < 1) {
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
return(-1);
}
projects / ~andy / fetchmail / blobdiff