SELinux: unify the selinux_audit_data and selinux_late_audit_data

[~andy/linux] / security / selinux / avc.c

diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 1a70fa26da72683c4bd3fe343baa83117f5ed285..c03a964ffde249bcf657ca8fc50aeeb6a67f24a9 100644 (file)
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -436,9 +436,9 @@ static void avc_audit_pre_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
 {
        struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
        audit_log_format(ab, "avc:  %s ",
-                        ad->selinux_audit_data.denied ? "denied" : "granted");
-       avc_dump_av(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data.tclass,
-                       ad->selinux_audit_data.audited);
+                        ad->selinux_audit_data->denied ? "denied" : "granted");
+       avc_dump_av(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->tclass,
+                       ad->selinux_audit_data->audited);
        audit_log_format(ab, " for ");
 }
 
@@ -452,22 +452,23 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
 {
        struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
        audit_log_format(ab, " ");
-       avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data.ssid,
-                          ad->selinux_audit_data.tsid,
-                          ad->selinux_audit_data.tclass);
+       avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->ssid,
+                          ad->selinux_audit_data->tsid,
+                          ad->selinux_audit_data->tclass);
 }
 
 /* This is the slow part of avc audit with big stack footprint */
-static noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
                u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied,
-               struct av_decision *avd, struct common_audit_data *a,
+               struct common_audit_data *a,
                unsigned flags)
 {
        struct common_audit_data stack_data;
+       struct selinux_audit_data sad;
 
        if (!a) {
                a = &stack_data;
-               COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(a, NONE);
+               a->type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
        }
 
        /*
@@ -481,77 +482,17 @@ static noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
            (flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK))
                return -ECHILD;
 
-       a->selinux_audit_data.tclass = tclass;
-       a->selinux_audit_data.requested = requested;
-       a->selinux_audit_data.ssid = ssid;
-       a->selinux_audit_data.tsid = tsid;
-       a->selinux_audit_data.audited = audited;
-       a->selinux_audit_data.denied = denied;
-       a->lsm_pre_audit = avc_audit_pre_callback;
-       a->lsm_post_audit = avc_audit_post_callback;
-       common_lsm_audit(a);
-       return 0;
-}
+       sad.tclass = tclass;
+       sad.requested = requested;
+       sad.ssid = ssid;
+       sad.tsid = tsid;
+       sad.audited = audited;
+       sad.denied = denied;
 
-/**
- * avc_audit - Audit the granting or denial of permissions.
- * @ssid: source security identifier
- * @tsid: target security identifier
- * @tclass: target security class
- * @requested: requested permissions
- * @avd: access vector decisions
- * @result: result from avc_has_perm_noaudit
- * @a:  auxiliary audit data
- * @flags: VFS walk flags
- *
- * Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance
- * with the policy.  This function is typically called by
- * avc_has_perm() after a permission check, but can also be
- * called directly by callers who use avc_has_perm_noaudit()
- * in order to separate the permission check from the auditing.
- * For example, this separation is useful when the permission check must
- * be performed under a lock, to allow the lock to be released
- * before calling the auditing code.
- */
-inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-              u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-              struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct common_audit_data *a,
-              unsigned flags)
-{
-       u32 denied, audited;
-       denied = requested & ~avd->allowed;
-       if (unlikely(denied)) {
-               audited = denied & avd->auditdeny;
-               /*
-                * a->selinux_audit_data.auditdeny is TRICKY!  Setting a bit in
-                * this field means that ANY denials should NOT be audited if
-                * the policy contains an explicit dontaudit rule for that
-                * permission.  Take notice that this is unrelated to the
-                * actual permissions that were denied.  As an example lets
-                * assume:
-                *
-                * denied == READ
-                * avd.auditdeny & ACCESS == 0 (not set means explicit rule)
-                * selinux_audit_data.auditdeny & ACCESS == 1
-                *
-                * We will NOT audit the denial even though the denied
-                * permission was READ and the auditdeny checks were for
-                * ACCESS
-                */
-               if (a &&
-                   a->selinux_audit_data.auditdeny &&
-                   !(a->selinux_audit_data.auditdeny & avd->auditdeny))
-                       audited = 0;
-       } else if (result)
-               audited = denied = requested;
-       else
-               audited = requested & avd->auditallow;
-       if (likely(!audited))
-               return 0;
-
-       return slow_avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass,
-               requested, audited, denied,
-               avd, a, flags);
+       a->selinux_audit_data = &sad;
+
+       common_lsm_audit(a, avc_audit_pre_callback, avc_audit_post_callback);
+       return 0;
 }
 
 /**