fcaps: clear the same personality flags as suid when fcaps are used

[~andy/linux] / security / commoncap.c

diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 7ce191ea29a0c22cb1eb1549a8358e12bed3e5bb..0ecf4ba321cbeaa812dadc6524e138bc40b866b3 100644 (file)
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 #include <linux/prctl.h>
 #include <linux/securebits.h>
 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
 
 /*
  * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in
@@ -504,6 +505,11 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
        }
 skip:
 
+       /* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */
+       if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted))
+               bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
+
+
        /* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised
         * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit
         */