* we have a means of reliably tracking which mail we need to
* refetch should the connection abort in the middle.
* fetchall forces RETR, as does keep without UIDL */
- peek_capable = !ctl->fetchall && (!ctl->keep || ctl->server.uidl);
+ peek_capable = !ctl->fetchall;
+}
+
+static int do_apop(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting)
+{
+ char *start, *end;
+
+ /* build MD5 digest from greeting timestamp + password */
+ /* find start of timestamp */
+ start = strchr(greeting, '<');
+ if (!start) {
+ if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_APOP || outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
+ report(ctl->server.authenticate == A_APOP ? stderr : stdout,
+ GT_("Required APOP timestamp not found in greeting\n"));
+ }
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ }
+
+ /* find end of timestamp */
+ end = strchr(start + 1, '>');
+
+ if (!end || end == start + 1) {
+ report(stderr,
+ GT_("Timestamp syntax error in greeting\n"));
+ return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
+ } else {
+ *++end = '\0';
+ }
+
+ /* SECURITY: 2007-03-17
+ * Strictly validating the presented challenge for RFC-822
+ * conformity (it must be a msg-id in terms of that standard) is
+ * supposed to make attacks against the MD5 implementation
+ * harder[1]
+ *
+ * [1] "Security vulnerability in APOP authentication",
+ * Gaëtan Leurent, fetchmail-devel, 2007-03-17 */
+ if (!rfc822_valid_msgid((unsigned char *)start)) {
+ report(stderr,
+ GT_("Invalid APOP timestamp.\n"));
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ }
+
+ /* copy timestamp and password into digestion buffer */
+ char *msg = (char *)xmalloc((end-start+1) + strlen(ctl->password) + 1);
+ strcpy(msg,start);
+ strcat(msg,ctl->password);
+ strcpy((char *)ctl->digest, MD5Digest((unsigned char *)msg));
+ free(msg);
+
+ return gen_transact(sock, "APOP %s %s", ctl->remotename, (char *)ctl->digest);
}
static int pop3_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting)
/* apply for connection authorization */
{
int ok;
- char *start,*end;
- char *msg;
#ifdef OPIE_ENABLE
char *challenge;
#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
*
* Matthias Andree
*/
- if (peek_capable && strstr(greeting, "Maillennium POP3/PROXY server")) {
+ if (peek_capable && strstr(greeting, "Maillennium POP3")) {
if ((ctl->server.workarounds & WKA_TOP) == 0) {
- report(stdout, GT_("Warning: \"Maillennium POP3/PROXY server\" found, using RETR command instead of TOP.\n"));
+ report(stdout, GT_("Warning: \"Maillennium POP3\" found, using RETR command instead of TOP.\n"));
ctl->server.workarounds |= WKA_TOP;
}
peek_capable = 0;
ctl->server.sdps = TRUE;
#endif /* SDPS_ENABLE */
+ /* this is a leftover from the times 6.3.X and older when APOP was a
+ * "protocol" (P_APOP) rather than an authenticator (A_APOP),
+ * however, the switch is still useful because we can break; after
+ * an authenticator failed. */
switch (ctl->server.protocol) {
- case P_POP3:
+ case P_POP3:
#ifdef RPA_ENABLE
/* XXX FIXME: AUTH probing (RFC1734) should become global */
/* CompuServe POP3 Servers as of 990730 want AUTH first for RPA */
* whether TLS is mandatory or opportunistic unless SSLOpen() fails
* (see below). */
if (gen_transact(sock, "STLS") == PS_SUCCESS
- && SSLOpen(sock, ctl->sslcert, ctl->sslkey, "tls1", ctl->sslcertck,
+ && (set_timeout(mytimeout), SSLOpen(sock, ctl->sslcert, ctl->sslkey, "tls1", ctl->sslcertck,
ctl->sslcertfile, ctl->sslcertpath, ctl->sslfingerprint, commonname,
- ctl->server.pollname, &ctl->remotename) != -1)
+ ctl->server.pollname, &ctl->remotename)) != -1)
{
/*
* RFC 2595 says this:
* Now that we're confident in our TLS connection we can
* guarantee a secure capability re-probe.
*/
+ set_timeout(0);
done_capa = FALSE;
ok = capa_probe(sock);
if (ok != PS_SUCCESS) {
} else if (must_tls(ctl)) {
/* Config required TLS but we couldn't guarantee it, so we must
* stop. */
+ set_timeout(0);
report(stderr, GT_("%s: upgrade to TLS failed.\n"), commonname);
return PS_SOCKET;
} else {
* allowed til post-authentication), so leave it in an unknown
* state, mark it as such, and check more carefully if things
* go wrong when we try to authenticate. */
+ set_timeout(0);
connection_may_have_tls_errors = TRUE;
if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
{
#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
#ifdef NTLM_ENABLE
- /* MSN servers require the use of NTLM (MSN) authentication */
- if (!strcasecmp(ctl->server.pollname, "pop3.email.msn.com") ||
- ctl->server.authenticate == A_MSN)
- return (do_pop3_ntlm(sock, ctl, 1) == 0) ? PS_SUCCESS : PS_AUTHFAIL;
- if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_NTLM || (has_ntlm && ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY)) {
- ok = do_pop3_ntlm(sock, ctl, 0);
- if (ok == 0 || ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY)
- break;
- }
+ /* MSN servers require the use of NTLM (MSN) authentication */
+ if (!strcasecmp(ctl->server.pollname, "pop3.email.msn.com") ||
+ ctl->server.authenticate == A_MSN)
+ return (do_pop3_ntlm(sock, ctl, 1) == 0) ? PS_SUCCESS : PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_NTLM || (has_ntlm && ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY)) {
+ ok = do_pop3_ntlm(sock, ctl, 0);
+ if (ok == 0 || ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY)
+ break;
+ }
#else
- if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_NTLM || ctl->server.authenticate == A_MSN)
- {
- report(stderr,
- GT_("Required NTLM capability not compiled into fetchmail\n"));
- }
+ if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_NTLM || ctl->server.authenticate == A_MSN)
+ {
+ report(stderr,
+ GT_("Required NTLM capability not compiled into fetchmail\n"));
+ }
#endif
- if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_CRAM_MD5 ||
- (has_cram && ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY))
+ if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_CRAM_MD5 ||
+ (has_cram && ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY))
{
ok = do_cram_md5(sock, "AUTH", ctl, NULL);
if (ok == PS_SUCCESS || ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY)
break;
}
+ if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_APOP
+ || ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY)
+ {
+ ok = do_apop(sock, ctl, greeting);
+ if (ok == PS_SUCCESS || ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY)
+ break;
+ }
+
/* ordinary validation, no one-time password or RPA */
if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "USER %s", ctl->remotename)))
break;
shroud[0] = '\0';
break;
- case P_APOP:
- /* build MD5 digest from greeting timestamp + password */
- /* find start of timestamp */
- for (start = greeting; *start != 0 && *start != '<'; start++)
- continue;
- if (*start == 0) {
- report(stderr,
- GT_("Required APOP timestamp not found in greeting\n"));
- return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
- }
-
- /* find end of timestamp */
- for (end = start; *end != 0 && *end != '>'; end++)
- continue;
- if (*end == 0 || end == start + 1) {
- report(stderr,
- GT_("Timestamp syntax error in greeting\n"));
- return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
- }
- else
- *++end = '\0';
-
- /* SECURITY: 2007-03-17
- * Strictly validating the presented challenge for RFC-822
- * conformity (it must be a msg-id in terms of that standard) is
- * supposed to make attacks against the MD5 implementation
- * harder[1]
- *
- * [1] "Security vulnerability in APOP authentication",
- * Gaëtan Leurent, fetchmail-devel, 2007-03-17 */
- if (!rfc822_valid_msgid((unsigned char *)start)) {
- report(stderr,
- GT_("Invalid APOP timestamp.\n"));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
-
- /* copy timestamp and password into digestion buffer */
- msg = (char *)xmalloc((end-start+1) + strlen(ctl->password) + 1);
- strcpy(msg,start);
- strcat(msg,ctl->password);
- strcpy((char *)ctl->digest, MD5Digest((unsigned char *)msg));
- free(msg);
-
- ok = gen_transact(sock, "APOP %s %s", ctl->remotename, (char *)ctl->digest);
- break;
-
default:
report(stderr, GT_("Undefined protocol request in POP3_auth\n"));
ok = PS_ERROR;
return(ok);
}
-/* Disable the sleep. Based on patch by Brian Candler 2004-04-19/2004-11-08,
- * accepted by Matthias Andree.
- *
- * Rationale: the server must have locked the spool before returning +OK;
- * this sleep just wastes time and hence, for modem and GSM CSD users, money. */
-#ifdef WANT_BOGUS
- /*
- * Empirical experience shows some server/OS combinations
- * may need a brief pause even after any lockfiles on the
- * server are released, to give the server time to finish
- * copying back very large mailfolders from the temp-file...
- * this is only ever an issue with extremely large mailboxes.
- */
- sleep(3); /* to be _really_ safe, probably need sleep(5)! */
-#endif
-
/* we're approved */
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
} else
return(ok);
- /*
- * Newer, RFC-1725/1939-conformant POP servers may not have the LAST
- * command. We work as hard as possible to hide this, but it makes
- * counting new messages intrinsically quadratic in the worst case.
- */
+ /* unless fetching all mail, get UID list (UIDL) */
last = 0;
*newp = -1;
- /* if there are messages, and UIDL is desired, use UIDL
- * also use UIDL if fetchall is unset */
- if (*countp > 0 && (!ctl->fetchall || ctl->server.uidl))
+ if (*countp > 0)
{
int fastuidl;
char id [IDLEN+1];
else
dofastuidl = 0;
- if (!ctl->server.uidl) {
- gen_send(sock, "LAST");
- ok = pop3_ok(sock, buf);
- } else
- ok = 1;
-
- if (ok == 0)
- {
- /* scan LAST reply */
- if (sscanf(buf, "%d", &last) == 0)
- {
- report(stderr, GT_("protocol error\n"));
- return(PS_ERROR);
- }
- *newp = (*countp - last);
- }
- else
{
/* do UIDL */
if (dofastuidl)
/* grab the mailbox's UID list */
if (gen_transact(sock, "UIDL") != 0)
{
+ if (!ctl->fetchall) {
report(stderr, GT_("protocol error while fetching UIDLs\n"));
return(PS_ERROR);
+ }
}
else
{
old_rec = uid_db_insert(&ctl->oldsaved, id, UID_UNSEEN);
}
- /* save the number */
- if (new_rec->status == UID_UNSEEN || !ctl->keep) {
+ /*
+ * save the number if it will be needed later on
+ * (messsage will either be fetched or deleted)
+ */
+ if (new_rec->status == UID_UNSEEN || ctl->flush) {
set_uid_db_num(&ctl->oldsaved, old_rec, unum);
set_uid_db_num(&ctl->newsaved, new_rec, unum);
}
return(TRUE);
/* in fast uidl, we manipulate the old list only! */
-
if ((rec = find_uid_by_num(&ctl->oldsaved, num)))
{
/* we already have the id! */