* whether TLS is mandatory or opportunistic unless SSLOpen() fails
* (see below). */
if (gen_transact(sock, "STLS") == PS_SUCCESS
- && SSLOpen(sock, ctl->sslcert, ctl->sslkey, "tls1", ctl->sslcertck,
+ && (set_timeout(mytimeout), SSLOpen(sock, ctl->sslcert, ctl->sslkey, "tls1", ctl->sslcertck,
ctl->sslcertfile, ctl->sslcertpath, ctl->sslfingerprint, commonname,
- ctl->server.pollname, &ctl->remotename) != -1)
+ ctl->server.pollname, &ctl->remotename)) != -1)
{
/*
* RFC 2595 says this:
* Now that we're confident in our TLS connection we can
* guarantee a secure capability re-probe.
*/
+ set_timeout(0);
done_capa = FALSE;
ok = capa_probe(sock);
if (ok != PS_SUCCESS) {
} else if (must_tls(ctl)) {
/* Config required TLS but we couldn't guarantee it, so we must
* stop. */
+ set_timeout(0);
report(stderr, GT_("%s: upgrade to TLS failed.\n"), commonname);
return PS_SOCKET;
} else {
* allowed til post-authentication), so leave it in an unknown
* state, mark it as such, and check more carefully if things
* go wrong when we try to authenticate. */
+ set_timeout(0);
connection_may_have_tls_errors = TRUE;
if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
{
old_rec = uid_db_insert(&ctl->oldsaved, id, UID_UNSEEN);
}
- /* save the number */
- if (new_rec->status == UID_UNSEEN || !ctl->keep) {
+ /*
+ * save the number if it will be needed later on
+ * (messsage will either be fetched or deleted)
+ */
+ if (new_rec->status == UID_UNSEEN || ctl->flush) {
set_uid_db_num(&ctl->oldsaved, old_rec, unum);
set_uid_db_num(&ctl->newsaved, new_rec, unum);
}