static char lastok[POPBUFSIZE+1];
#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
+/* these variables are shared between the CAPA probe and the authenticator */
+#if defined(GSSAPI)
+ flag has_gssapi = FALSE;
+#endif /* defined(GSSAPI) */
+#if defined(KERBEROS_V4) || defined(KERBEROS_V5)
+ flag has_kerberos = FALSE;
+#endif /* defined(KERBEROS_V4) || defined(KERBEROS_V5) */
+ flag has_cram = FALSE;
+#ifdef OPIE_ENABLE
+ flag has_otp = FALSE;
+#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
+ flag has_ssl = FALSE;
+#endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
+
#define DOTLINE(s) (s[0] == '.' && (s[1]=='\r'||s[1]=='\n'||s[1]=='\0'))
-int pop3_ok (int sock, char *argbuf)
+static int pop3_ok (int sock, char *argbuf)
/* parse command response */
{
int ok;
char *bufp;
if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))) == 0)
- {
- bufp = buf;
+ { bufp = buf;
if (*bufp == '+' || *bufp == '-')
bufp++;
else
}
else if (strncmp(buf,"-ERR", 4) == 0)
{
- if (stage > STAGE_GETAUTH)
+ if (stage == STAGE_FETCH)
+ ok = PS_TRANSIENT;
+ else if (stage > STAGE_GETAUTH)
ok = PS_PROTOCOL;
/*
* We're checking for "lock busy", "unable to lock",
/* these are blessed by RFC 2449 */
|| strstr(bufp,"[IN-USE]")||strstr(bufp,"[LOGIN-DELAY]"))
ok = PS_LOCKBUSY;
+ else if ((strstr(bufp,"Service")
+ || strstr(bufp,"service"))
+ && (strstr(bufp,"unavailable")))
+ ok = PS_SERVBUSY;
else
ok = PS_AUTHFAIL;
/*
return(ok);
}
-int pop3_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting)
+
+
+static int capa_probe(sock)
+/* probe the capabilities of the remote server */
+{
+ int ok;
+
+ ok = gen_transact(sock, "CAPA");
+ if (ok == PS_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ char buffer[64];
+
+ /* determine what authentication methods we have available */
+ while ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer))) == 0)
+ {
+ if (DOTLINE(buffer))
+ break;
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
+ if (strstr(buffer, "STLS"))
+ has_ssl = TRUE;
+#endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
+#if defined(GSSAPI)
+ if (strstr(buffer, "GSSAPI"))
+ has_gssapi = TRUE;
+#endif /* defined(GSSAPI) */
+#if defined(KERBEROS_V4)
+ if (strstr(buffer, "KERBEROS_V4"))
+ has_kerberos = TRUE;
+#endif /* defined(KERBEROS_V4) */
+#ifdef OPIE_ENABLE
+ if (strstr(buffer, "X-OTP"))
+ has_otp = TRUE;
+#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
+ if (strstr(buffer, "CRAM-MD5"))
+ has_cram = TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+ return(ok);
+}
+
+static int pop3_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting)
/* apply for connection authorization */
{
int ok;
#if OPIE_ENABLE
char *challenge;
#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
+ flag did_stls = FALSE;
+#endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
+
+ if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_SSH) {
+ return PS_SUCCESS;
+ }
#ifdef SDPS_ENABLE
/*
* latches the server's authentication type, so that in daemon mode
* the CAPA check only needs to be done once at start of run.
*
- * APOP was introduced in RFC 1450, and CAPA not until
- * RFC2449. So the < check is an easy way to prevent CAPA from
- * being sent to the more primitive POP3 servers dating from
- * RFC 1081 and RFC 1225, which seem more likely to choke on
- * it. This certainly catches IMAP-2000's POP3 gateway.
- *
+ * If CAPA fails, then force the authentication method to PASSORD
+ * and repoll immediately.
+ *
* These authentication methods are blessed by RFC1734,
* describing the POP3 AUTHentication command.
*/
- if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY
- && strchr(greeting, '<')
- && gen_transact(sock, "CAPA") == 0)
+ if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY)
{
-#if defined(GSSAPI)
- flag has_gssapi = FALSE;
-#endif /* defined(GSSAPI) */
-#if defined(KERBEROS_V4) || defined(KERBEROS_V5)
- flag has_kerberos = FALSE;
-#endif /* defined(KERBEROS_V4) || defined(KERBEROS_V5) */
- flag has_cram = FALSE;
-#ifdef OPIE_ENABLE
- flag has_otp = FALSE;
-#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
- char buffer[64];
-
- /* determine what authentication methods we have available */
- while ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer))) == 0)
- {
- if (DOTLINE(buffer))
+ if (capa_probe(sock) != PS_SUCCESS)
+ /* we are in STAGE_GETAUTH! */
+ if (ok == PS_AUTHFAIL ||
+ /* Some servers directly close the socket. However, if we
+ * have already authenticated before, then a previous CAPA
+ * must have succeeded. In that case, treat this as a
+ * genuine socket error and do not change the auth method.
+ */
+ (ok == PS_SOCKET && !ctl->wehaveauthed))
+ {
+ ctl->server.authenticate = A_PASSWORD;
+ /* repoll immediately */
+ ok = PS_REPOLL;
break;
-#if defined(GSSAPI)
- if (strstr(buffer, "GSSAPI"))
- has_gssapi = TRUE;
-#endif /* defined(GSSAPI) */
-#if defined(KERBEROS_V4) || defined(KERBEROS_V5)
- if (strstr(buffer, "KERBEROS_V4"))
- has_kerberos = TRUE;
-#endif /* defined(KERBEROS_V4) || defined(KERBEROS_V5) */
-#ifdef OPIE_ENABLE
- if (strstr(buffer, "X-OTP"))
- has_otp = TRUE;
-#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
- if (strstr(buffer, "CRAM-MD5"))
- has_cram = TRUE;
- }
+ }
+ }
- /*
- * Here's where we set priorities. Note that we must do tests
- * in *reverse* order of desirability.
- */
- if (has_cram)
- ctl->server.authenticate = A_CRAM_MD5;
-#ifdef OPIE_ENABLE
- if (has_otp)
- ctl->server.authenticate = A_OTP;
-#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
-#if defined(GSSAPI)
- if (has_gssapi)
- ctl->server.authenticate = A_GSSAPI;
-#endif /* defined(GSSAPI) */
-#if defined(KERBEROS_V4) || defined(KERBEROS_V5)
- if (has_kerberos)
- ctl->server.authenticate = A_KERBEROS_V4;
-#endif /* defined(KERBEROS_V4) || defined(KERBEROS_V5) */
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
+ if (has_ssl
+ && !ctl->use_ssl
+ && (!ctl->sslproto || !strcmp(ctl->sslproto,"tls1")))
+ {
+ char *realhost;
+
+ realhost = ctl->server.via ? ctl->server.via : ctl->server.pollname;
+ ok = gen_transact(sock, "STLS");
+
+ /* We use "tls1" instead of ctl->sslproto, as we want STLS,
+ * not other SSL protocols
+ */
+ if (ok == PS_SUCCESS &&
+ SSLOpen(sock,ctl->sslcert,ctl->sslkey,"tls1",ctl->sslcertck, ctl->sslcertpath,ctl->sslfingerprint,realhost,ctl->server.pollname) == -1)
+ {
+ if (!ctl->sslproto && !ctl->wehaveauthed)
+ {
+ ctl->sslproto = xstrdup("");
+ /* repoll immediately */
+ return(PS_REPOLL);
+ }
+ report(stderr,
+ GT_("SSL connection failed.\n"));
+ return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
+ }
+ did_stls = TRUE;
+
+ /*
+ * RFC 2595 says this:
+ *
+ * "Once TLS has been started, the client MUST discard cached
+ * information about server capabilities and SHOULD re-issue the
+ * CAPABILITY command. This is necessary to protect against
+ * man-in-the-middle attacks which alter the capabilities list prior
+ * to STARTTLS. The server MAY advertise different capabilities
+ * after STARTTLS."
+ */
+ capa_probe(sock);
}
+#endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
/*
* OK, we have an authentication type now.
*/
-#if defined(KERBEROS_V4) || defined(KERBEROS_V5)
+#if defined(KERBEROS_V4)
/*
* Servers doing KPOP have to go through a dummy login sequence
* rather than doing SASL.
*/
- if (
+ if (has_kerberos &&
#if INET6_ENABLE
ctl->server.service && (strcmp(ctl->server.service, KPOP_PORT)!=0)
#else /* INET6_ENABLE */
ctl->server.port != KPOP_PORT
#endif /* INET6_ENABLE */
&& (ctl->server.authenticate == A_KERBEROS_V4
- || ctl->server.authenticate == A_KERBEROS_V5))
- return(do_rfc1731(sock, "AUTH", ctl->server.truename));
+ || ctl->server.authenticate == A_KERBEROS_V5
+ || ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY))
+ {
+ ok = do_rfc1731(sock, "AUTH", ctl->server.truename);
+ if (ok == PS_SUCCESS || ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY)
+ break;
+ }
#endif /* defined(KERBEROS_V4) || defined(KERBEROS_V5) */
+
#if defined(GSSAPI)
- if (ctl->server.authenticate==A_GSSAPI))
- return(do_gssauth(sock, "AUTH",
- ctl->server.truename, ctl->remotename));
+ if (has_gssapi &&
+ (ctl->server.authenticate == A_GSSAPI ||
+ ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY))
+ {
+ ok = do_gssauth(sock,"AUTH",ctl->server.truename,ctl->remotename);
+ if (ok == PS_SUCCESS || ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY)
+ break;
+ }
#endif /* defined(GSSAPI) */
+
#ifdef OPIE_ENABLE
- if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_OTP)
- do_otp(sock, "AUTH", ctl);
+ if (has_otp &&
+ (ctl->server.authenticate == A_OTP ||
+ ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY))
+ {
+ ok = do_otp(sock, "AUTH", ctl);
+ if (ok == PS_SUCCESS || ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY)
+ break;
+ }
#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
- if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_CRAM_MD5)
- return(do_cram_md5(sock, "AUTH", ctl));
+
+ if (has_cram &&
+ (ctl->server.authenticate == A_CRAM_MD5 ||
+ ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY))
+ {
+ ok = do_cram_md5(sock, "AUTH", ctl, NULL);
+ if (ok == PS_SUCCESS || ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY)
+ break;
+ }
/* ordinary validation, no one-time password or RPA */
gen_transact(sock, "USER %s", ctl->remotename);
+
+#if OPIE_ENABLE
+ /* see RFC1938: A One-Time Password System */
+ if (challenge = strstr(lastok, "otp-")) {
+ char response[OPIE_RESPONSE_MAX+1];
+ int i;
+
+ i = opiegenerator(challenge, !strcmp(ctl->password, "opie") ? "" : ctl->password, response);
+ if ((i == -2) && !run.poll_interval) {
+ char secret[OPIE_SECRET_MAX+1];
+ fprintf(stderr, GT_("Secret pass phrase: "));
+ if (opiereadpass(secret, sizeof(secret), 0))
+ i = opiegenerator(challenge, secret, response);
+ memset(secret, 0, sizeof(secret));
+ };
+
+ if (i) {
+ ok = PS_ERROR;
+ break;
+ };
+
+ ok = gen_transact(sock, "PASS %s", response);
+ break;
+ }
+#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
+
+ strcpy(shroud, ctl->password);
ok = gen_transact(sock, "PASS %s", ctl->password);
+ shroud[0] = '\0';
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
+ /* this is for servers which claim to support TLS, but actually
+ * don't! */
+ if (did_stls && ok == PS_SOCKET && !ctl->sslproto && !ctl->wehaveauthed)
+ {
+ ctl->sslproto = xstrdup("");
+ /* repoll immediately */
+ ok = PS_REPOLL;
+ }
+#endif
break;
case P_APOP:
continue;
if (*start == 0) {
report(stderr,
- _("Required APOP timestamp not found in greeting\n"));
+ GT_("Required APOP timestamp not found in greeting\n"));
return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
}
continue;
if (*end == 0 || end == start + 1) {
report(stderr,
- _("Timestamp syntax error in greeting\n"));
+ GT_("Timestamp syntax error in greeting\n"));
return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
}
else
break;
default:
- report(stderr, _("Undefined protocol request in POP3_auth\n"));
+ report(stderr, GT_("Undefined protocol request in POP3_auth\n"));
ok = PS_ERROR;
}
{
/* maybe we detected a lock-busy condition? */
if (ok == PS_LOCKBUSY)
- report(stderr, _("lock busy! Is another session active?\n"));
+ report(stderr, GT_("lock busy! Is another session active?\n"));
return(ok);
}
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
-static int
-pop3_gettopid( int sock, int num , char *id)
+static int pop3_gettopid( int sock, int num , char *id)
{
int ok;
int got_it;
return 0;
}
-static int
-pop3_slowuidl( int sock, struct query *ctl, int *countp, int *newp)
+static int pop3_slowuidl( int sock, struct query *ctl, int *countp, int *newp)
{
/* This approach tries to get the message headers from the
* remote hosts and compares the message-id to the already known
}
} else {
report(stderr,
- _("Messages inserted into list on server. Cannot handle this.\n"));
+ GT_("Messages inserted into list on server. Cannot handle this.\n"));
return -1;
}
}
{
if (sscanf(buf, "%d", &last) == 0)
{
- report(stderr, _("protocol error\n"));
+ report(stderr, GT_("protocol error\n"));
return(PS_ERROR);
}
*newp = (*countp - last);
/* don't worry, yet! do it the slow way */
if((ok = pop3_slowuidl( sock, ctl, countp, newp))!=0)
{
- report(stderr, _("protocol error while fetching UIDLs\n"));
+ report(stderr, GT_("protocol error while fetching UIDLs\n"));
return(PS_ERROR);
}
}
while ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))) == 0)
{
- int num, size;
+ unsigned int num, size;
if (DOTLINE(buf))
break;
- else if (sscanf(buf, "%d %d", &num, &size) == 2)
- sizes[num - 1] = size;
+ else if (sscanf(buf, "%u %u", &num, &size) == 2) {
+ if (num > 0 && num <= count)
+ sizes[num - 1] = size;
+ else
+ /* warn about possible attempt to induce buffer overrun */
+ report(stderr, "Warning: ignoring bogus data for message sizes returned by server.\n");
+ }
}
return(ok);
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
+static void mark_uid_seen(struct query *ctl, int number)
+/* Tell the UID code we've seen this. */
+{
+ if (ctl->newsaved)
+ {
+ struct idlist *sdp;
+
+ for (sdp = ctl->newsaved; sdp; sdp = sdp->next)
+ if (sdp->val.status.num == number)
+ {
+ sdp->val.status.mark = UID_SEEN;
+ save_str(&ctl->oldsaved, sdp->id,UID_SEEN);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
static int pop3_delete(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
/* delete a given message */
{
+ int ok;
+ mark_uid_seen(ctl, number);
/* actually, mark for deletion -- doesn't happen until QUIT time */
- return(gen_transact(sock, "DELE %d", number));
+ ok = gen_transact(sock, "DELE %d", number);
+ if (ok != PS_SUCCESS)
+ return(ok);
+ delete_str(&ctl->newsaved, number);
+ return(PS_SUCCESS);
+}
+
+static int pop3_mark_seen(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
+/* mark a given message as seen */
+{
+ mark_uid_seen(ctl, number);
+ return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
static int pop3_logout(int sock, struct query *ctl)
{
int ok;
+#ifdef __UNUSED__
+ /*
+ * We used to do this in case the server marks messages deleted when seen.
+ * (Yes, this has been reported, in the MercuryP/NLM server.
+ * It's even legal under RFC 1939 (section 8) as a site policy.)
+ * It interacted badly with UIDL, though. Thomas Zajic wrote:
+ * "Running 'fetchmail -F -v' and checking the logs, I found out
+ * that fetchmail did in fact flush my mailbox properly, but sent
+ * a RSET just before sending QUIT to log off. This caused the
+ * POP3 server to undo/forget about the previous DELEs, resetting
+ * my mailbox to its original (ie. unflushed) state. The
+ * ~/.fetchids file did get flushed though, so the next time
+ * fetchmail was run it saw all the old messages as new ones ..."
+ */
+ if (ctl->keep)
+ gen_transact(sock, "RSET");
+#endif /* __UNUSED__ */
+
ok = gen_transact(sock, "QUIT");
if (!ok)
expunge_uids(ctl);
FALSE, /* this is not a tagged protocol */
TRUE, /* this uses a message delimiter */
pop3_ok, /* parse command response */
- NULL, /* no password canonicalization */
pop3_getauth, /* get authorization */
pop3_getrange, /* query range of messages */
pop3_getsizes, /* we can get a list of sizes */
NULL, /* no way to fetch body alone */
NULL, /* no message trailer */
pop3_delete, /* how to delete a message */
+ pop3_mark_seen, /* how to mark a message as seen */
pop3_logout, /* log out, we're done */
FALSE, /* no, we can't re-poll */
};
{
#ifndef MBOX
if (ctl->mailboxes->id) {
- fprintf(stderr,_("Option --remote is not supported with POP3\n"));
+ fprintf(stderr,GT_("Option --remote is not supported with POP3\n"));
return(PS_SYNTAX);
}
#endif /* MBOX */
projects / ~andy / fetchmail / blobdiff