#include "fetchmail.h"
#include "socket.h"
-#ifdef KERBEROS_V4
-#if defined (__bsdi__)
-#include <des.h>
-#define krb_get_err_text(e) (krb_err_txt[e])
-#endif
-#include <krb.h>
-#endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
+#include "i18n.h"
+
+#if OPIE_ENABLE
+#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
+#ifndef strstr /* glibc-2.1 declares this as a macro */
extern char *strstr(); /* needed on sysV68 R3V7.1. */
+#endif /* strstr */
/* imap_version values */
#define IMAP2 -1 /* IMAP2 or IMAP2BIS, RFC1176 */
#define IMAP4 0 /* IMAP4 rev 0, RFC1730 */
#define IMAP4rev1 1 /* IMAP4 rev 1, RFC2060 */
-static int count, seen, recent, unseen, deletecount, imap_version;
+static int count, unseen, deletions, imap_version, preauth;
+static int expunged, expunge_period, saved_timeout;
+static flag do_idle;
+static char capabilities[MSGBUFSIZE+1];
+static unsigned int *unseen_messages;
-int imap_ok (int sock, char *argbuf)
+static int imap_ok(int sock, char *argbuf)
/* parse command response */
{
- char buf [POPBUFSIZE+1];
+ char buf[MSGBUFSIZE+1];
- seen = 0;
do {
int ok;
+ char *cp;
if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
return(ok);
+ /* all tokens in responses are caseblind */
+ for (cp = buf; *cp; cp++)
+ if (islower(*cp))
+ *cp = toupper(*cp);
+
/* interpret untagged status responses */
- if (strstr(buf, "EXISTS"))
- count = atoi(buf+2);
- if (strstr(buf, "RECENT"))
- recent = atoi(buf+2);
- if (strstr(buf, "UNSEEN"))
+ if (strstr(buf, "* CAPABILITY"))
+ strncpy(capabilities, buf + 12, sizeof(capabilities));
+ else if (strstr(buf, "EXISTS"))
{
- char *cp;
-
+ count = atoi(buf+2);
/*
- * Handle both "* 42 UNSEEN" (if tha ever happens) and
- * "* OK [UNSEEN 42] 42". Note that what this gets us is
- * a minimum index, not a count.
+ * Nasty kluge to handle RFC2177 IDLE. If we know we're idling
+ * we can't wait for the tag matching the IDLE; we have to tell the
+ * server the IDLE is finished by shipping back a DONE when we
+ * see an EXISTS. Only after that will a tagged response be
+ * shipped. The idling flag also gets cleared on a timeout.
*/
- unseen = 0;
- for (cp = buf; *cp && !isdigit(*cp); cp++)
+ if (stage == STAGE_IDLE)
{
- unseen = atoi(cp);
- break;
+ /* we do our own write and report here to disable tagging */
+ SockWrite(sock, "DONE\r\n", 6);
+ if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
+ report(stdout, "IMAP> DONE\n");
+
+ mytimeout = saved_timeout;
+ stage = STAGE_FETCH;
}
}
- if (strstr(buf, "FLAGS"))
- seen = (strstr(buf, "Seen") != (char *)NULL);
+ else if (strstr(buf, "PREAUTH"))
+ preauth = TRUE;
+ /*
+ * The server may decide to make the mailbox read-only,
+ * which causes fetchmail to go into a endless loop
+ * fetching the same message over and over again.
+ *
+ * However, for check_only, we use EXAMINE which will
+ * mark the mailbox read-only as per the RFC.
+ *
+ * This checks for the condition and aborts if
+ * the mailbox is read-only.
+ *
+ * See RFC 2060 section 6.3.1 (SELECT).
+ * See RFC 2060 section 6.3.2 (EXAMINE).
+ */
+ else if (!check_only && strstr(buf, "[READ-ONLY]"))
+ return(PS_LOCKBUSY);
} while
(tag[0] != '\0' && strncmp(buf, tag, strlen(tag)));
if (tag[0] == '\0')
{
- strcpy(argbuf, buf);
+ if (argbuf)
+ strcpy(argbuf, buf);
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
else
while (isspace(*cp))
cp++;
- if (strncmp(cp, "OK", 2) == 0)
+ if (strncmp(cp, "OK", 2) == 0)
{
- strcpy(argbuf, cp);
+ if (argbuf)
+ strcpy(argbuf, cp);
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
- else if (strncmp(cp, "BAD", 2) == 0)
+ else if (strncmp(cp, "BAD", 3) == 0)
return(PS_ERROR);
+ else if (strncmp(cp, "NO", 2) == 0)
+ {
+ if (stage == STAGE_GETAUTH)
+ return(PS_AUTHFAIL); /* RFC2060, 6.2.2 */
+ else
+ return(PS_ERROR);
+ }
else
return(PS_PROTOCOL);
}
}
-#ifdef KERBEROS_V4
-#if SIZEOF_INT == 4
-typedef int int32;
-#elif SIZEOF_SHORT == 4
-typedef short int32;
-#elif SIZEOF_LONG == 4
-typedef long int32;
-#else
-#error Cannot deduce a 32-bit-type
-#endif
+#if NTLM_ENABLE
+#include "ntlm.h"
+
+static tSmbNtlmAuthRequest request;
+static tSmbNtlmAuthChallenge challenge;
+static tSmbNtlmAuthResponse response;
+
+/*
+ * NTLM support by Grant Edwards.
+ *
+ * Handle MS-Exchange NTLM authentication method. This is the same
+ * as the NTLM auth used by Samba for SMB related services. We just
+ * encode the packets in base64 instead of sending them out via a
+ * network interface.
+ *
+ * Much source (ntlm.h, smb*.c smb*.h) was borrowed from Samba.
+ */
-static int do_rfc1731(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *buf)
-/* authenticate as per RFC1731 -- note 32-bit integer requirement here */
+static int do_imap_ntlm(int sock, struct query *ctl)
{
- int result = 0, len;
- char buf1[4096], buf2[4096];
- union {
- int32 cint;
- char cstr[4];
- } challenge1, challenge2;
- char srvinst[INST_SZ];
- char *p;
- char srvrealm[REALM_SZ];
- KTEXT_ST authenticator;
- CREDENTIALS credentials;
- char tktuser[MAX_K_NAME_SZ+1+INST_SZ+1+REALM_SZ+1];
- char tktinst[INST_SZ];
- char tktrealm[REALM_SZ];
- des_cblock session;
- des_key_schedule schedule;
-
- gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE KERBEROS_V4");
-
- /* The data encoded in the first ready response contains a random
- * 32-bit number in network byte order. The client should respond
- * with a Kerberos ticket and an authenticator for the principal
- * "imap.hostname@realm", where "hostname" is the first component
- * of the host name of the server with all letters in lower case
- * and where "realm" is the Kerberos realm of the server. The
- * encrypted checksum field included within the Kerberos
- * authenticator should contain the server provided 32-bit number
- * in network byte order.
- */
+ char msgbuf[2048];
+ int result,len;
+
+ gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE NTLM");
- if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
+ if ((result = gen_recv(sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
return result;
- }
-
- len = from64tobits(challenge1.cstr, buf1);
- if (len < 0) {
- error(0, -1, "could not decode initial BASE64 challenge");
+
+ if (msgbuf[0] != '+')
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
-
- /* Client responds with a Kerberos ticket and an authenticator for
- * the principal "imap.hostname@realm" where "hostname" is the
- * first component of the host name of the server with all letters
- * in lower case and where "realm" is the Kerberos realm of the
- * server. The encrypted checksum field included within the
- * Kerberos authenticator should contain the server-provided
- * 32-bit number in network byte order.
- */
+
+ buildSmbNtlmAuthRequest(&request,ctl->remotename,NULL);
+
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ dumpSmbNtlmAuthRequest(stdout, &request);
+
+ memset(msgbuf,0,sizeof msgbuf);
+ to64frombits (msgbuf, (unsigned char*)&request, SmbLength(&request));
+
+ if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
+ report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", msgbuf);
+
+ strcat(msgbuf,"\r\n");
+ SockWrite (sock, msgbuf, strlen (msgbuf));
+
+ if ((gen_recv(sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
+ return result;
+
+ len = from64tobits ((unsigned char*)&challenge, msgbuf);
+
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ dumpSmbNtlmAuthChallenge(stdout, &challenge);
+
+ buildSmbNtlmAuthResponse(&challenge, &response,ctl->remotename,ctl->password);
+
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ dumpSmbNtlmAuthResponse(stdout, &response);
+
+ memset(msgbuf,0,sizeof msgbuf);
+ to64frombits (msgbuf, (unsigned char*)&response, SmbLength(&response));
+
+ if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
+ report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", msgbuf);
+
+ strcat(msgbuf,"\r\n");
+ SockWrite (sock, msgbuf, strlen (msgbuf));
+
+ if ((result = gen_recv (sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
+ return result;
+
+ if (strstr (msgbuf, "OK"))
+ return PS_SUCCESS;
+ else
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+}
+#endif /* NTLM */
- strncpy(srvinst, ctl->server.truename, (sizeof srvinst)-1);
- srvinst[(sizeof srvinst)-1] = '\0';
- for (p = srvinst; *p; p++) {
- if (isupper(*p)) {
- *p = tolower(*p);
- }
- }
+static int imap_canonicalize(char *result, char *raw, int maxlen)
+/* encode an IMAP password as per RFC1730's quoting conventions */
+{
+ int i, j;
- strncpy(srvrealm, krb_realmofhost(srvinst), (sizeof srvrealm)-1);
- srvrealm[(sizeof srvrealm)-1] = '\0';
- if (p = strchr(srvinst, '.')) {
- *p = '\0';
+ j = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < strlen(raw) && i < maxlen; i++)
+ {
+ if ((raw[i] == '\\') || (raw[i] == '"'))
+ result[j++] = '\\';
+ result[j++] = raw[i];
}
+ result[j] = '\0';
- result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm, 0);
- if (result) {
- error(0, -1, "krb_mq_req: %s", krb_get_err_text(result));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
+ return(i);
+}
- result = krb_get_cred("imap", srvinst, srvrealm, &credentials);
- if (result) {
- error(0, -1, "krb_get_cred: %s", krb_get_err_text(result));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
+static int imap_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting)
+/* apply for connection authorization */
+{
+ int ok = 0;
- memcpy(session, credentials.session, sizeof session);
- memset(&credentials, 0, sizeof credentials);
- des_key_sched(session, schedule);
+ /* probe to see if we're running IMAP4 and can use RFC822.PEEK */
+ capabilities[0] = '\0';
+ if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "CAPABILITY")) == PS_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ char *cp;
- result = krb_get_tf_fullname(TKT_FILE, tktuser, tktinst, tktrealm);
- if (result) {
- error(0, -1, "krb_get_tf_fullname: %s", krb_get_err_text(result));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
+ /* capability checks are supposed to be caseblind */
+ for (cp = capabilities; *cp; cp++)
+ *cp = toupper(*cp);
- if (strcmp(tktuser, user) != 0) {
- error(0, -1, "principal %s in ticket does not match -u %s", tktuser,
- user);
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
-
- if (tktinst[0]) {
- error(0, 0, "non-null instance (%s) might cause strange behavior",
- tktinst);
- strcat(tktuser, ".");
- strcat(tktuser, tktinst);
+ /* UW-IMAP server 10.173 notifies in all caps, but RFC2060 says we
+ should expect a response in mixed-case */
+ if (strstr(capabilities, "IMAP4REV1"))
+ {
+ imap_version = IMAP4rev1;
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, GT_("Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 1\n"));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ imap_version = IMAP4;
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, GT_("Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 0\n"));
+ }
}
-
- if (strcmp(tktrealm, srvrealm) != 0) {
- strcat(tktuser, "@");
- strcat(tktuser, tktrealm);
+ else if (ok == PS_ERROR)
+ {
+ imap_version = IMAP2;
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, GT_("Protocol identified as IMAP2 or IMAP2BIS\n"));
}
+ else
+ return(ok);
- result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm,
- challenge1.cint);
- if (result) {
- error(0, -1, "krb_mq_req: %s", krb_get_err_text(result));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
+ peek_capable = (imap_version >= IMAP4);
- to64frombits(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length);
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE) {
- error(0, 0, "IMAP> %s", buf1);
- }
- SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
- SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
-
- /* Upon decrypting and verifying the ticket and authenticator, the
- * server should verify that the contained checksum field equals
- * the original server provided random 32-bit number. Should the
- * verification be successful, the server must add one to the
- * checksum and construct 8 octets of data, with the first four
- * octets containing the incremented checksum in network byte
- * order, the fifth octet containing a bit-mask specifying the
- * protection mechanisms supported by the server, and the sixth
- * through eighth octets containing, in network byte order, the
- * maximum cipher-text buffer size the server is able to receive.
- * The server must encrypt the 8 octets of data in the session key
- * and issue that encrypted data in a second ready response. The
- * client should consider the server authenticated if the first
- * four octets the un-encrypted data is equal to one plus the
- * checksum it previously sent.
+ /*
+ * Assumption: expunges are cheap, so we want to do them
+ * after every message unless user said otherwise.
*/
-
- if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
- return result;
+ if (NUM_SPECIFIED(ctl->expunge))
+ expunge_period = NUM_VALUE_OUT(ctl->expunge);
+ else
+ expunge_period = 1;
- /* The client must construct data with the first four octets
- * containing the original server-issued checksum in network byte
- * order, the fifth octet containing the bit-mask specifying the
- * selected protection mechanism, the sixth through eighth octets
- * containing in network byte order the maximum cipher-text buffer
- * size the client is able to receive, and the following octets
- * containing a user name string. The client must then append
- * from one to eight octets so that the length of the data is a
- * multiple of eight octets. The client must then PCBC encrypt the
- * data with the session key and respond to the second ready
- * response with the encrypted data. The server decrypts the data
- * and verifies the contained checksum. The username field
- * identifies the user for whom subsequent IMAP operations are to
- * be performed; the server must verify that the principal
- * identified in the Kerberos ticket is authorized to connect as
- * that user. After these verifications, the authentication
- * process is complete.
+ /*
+ * Handle idling. We depend on coming through here on startup
+ * and after each timeout (including timeouts during idles).
*/
+ if (strstr(capabilities, "IDLE") && ctl->idle)
+ {
+ do_idle = TRUE;
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
+ report(stdout, GT_("will idle after poll\n"));
+ }
- len = from64tobits(buf2, buf1);
- if (len < 0) {
- error(0, -1, "could not decode BASE64 ready response");
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ /*
+ * If either (a) we saw a PREAUTH token in the greeting, or
+ * (b) the user specified ssh preauthentication, then we're done.
+ */
+ if (preauth || ctl->server.authenticate == A_SSH)
+ {
+ preauth = FALSE; /* reset for the next session */
+ return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
- des_ecb_encrypt((des_cblock *)buf2, (des_cblock *)buf2, schedule, 0);
- memcpy(challenge2.cstr, buf2, 4);
- if (ntohl(challenge2.cint) != challenge1.cint + 1) {
- error(0, -1, "challenge mismatch");
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
+ /*
+ * Time to authenticate the user.
+ * Try the protocol variants that don't require passwords first.
+ */
+ ok = PS_AUTHFAIL;
- memset(authenticator.dat, 0, sizeof authenticator.dat);
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ if ((ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY
+ || ctl->server.authenticate == A_GSSAPI)
+ && strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=GSSAPI"))
+ if(ok = do_gssauth(sock, "AUTHENTICATE", ctl->server.truename, ctl->remotename))
+ {
+ /* SASL cancellation of authentication */
+ gen_send(sock, "*");
+ if(ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY)
+ return ok;
+ }
+ else
+ return ok;
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
- result = htonl(challenge1.cint);
- memcpy(authenticator.dat, &result, sizeof result);
+#ifdef KERBEROS_V4
+ if ((ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY
+ || ctl->server.authenticate == A_KERBEROS_V4
+ || ctl->server.authenticate == A_KERBEROS_V5)
+ && strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=KERBEROS_V4"))
+ {
+ if ((ok = do_rfc1731(sock, "AUTHENTICATE", ctl->server.truename)))
+ {
+ /* SASL cancellation of authentication */
+ gen_send(sock, "*");
+ if(ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY)
+ return ok;
+ }
+ else
+ return ok;
+ }
+#endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
- /* The protection mechanisms and their corresponding bit-masks are as
- * follows:
- *
- * 1 No protection mechanism
- * 2 Integrity (krb_mk_safe) protection
- * 4 Privacy (krb_mk_priv) protection
+ /*
+ * No such luck. OK, now try the variants that mask your password
+ * in a challenge-response.
*/
- authenticator.dat[4] = 1;
- len = strlen(tktuser);
- strncpy(authenticator.dat+8, tktuser, len);
- authenticator.length = len + 8 + 1;
- while (authenticator.length & 7) {
- authenticator.length++;
+ if ((ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY
+ || ctl->server.authenticate == A_CRAM_MD5)
+ && strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=CRAM-MD5"))
+ {
+ if ((ok = do_cram_md5 (sock, "AUTHENTICATE", ctl, NULL)))
+ {
+ /* SASL cancellation of authentication */
+ gen_send(sock, "*");
+ if(ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY)
+ return ok;
+ }
+ else
+ return ok;
}
- des_pcbc_encrypt((des_cblock *)authenticator.dat,
- (des_cblock *)authenticator.dat, authenticator.length, schedule,
- &session, 1);
- to64frombits(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length);
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE) {
- error(0, 0, "IMAP> %s", buf1);
+#if OPIE_ENABLE
+ if ((ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY
+ || ctl->server.authenticate == A_OTP)
+ && strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=X-OTP"))
+ if ((ok = do_otp(sock, "AUTHENTICATE", ctl)))
+ {
+ /* SASL cancellation of authentication */
+ gen_send(sock, "*");
+ if(ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY)
+ return ok;
+ }
+ else
+ return ok;
+#else
+ if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_OTP)
+ {
+ report(stderr,
+ GT_("Required OTP capability not compiled into fetchmail\n"));
}
- SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
- SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
+#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
- if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
- return result;
+#ifdef NTLM_ENABLE
+ if ((ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY
+ || ctl->server.authenticate == A_NTLM)
+ && strstr (capabilities, "AUTH=NTLM")) {
+ if ((ok = do_imap_ntlm(sock, ctl)))
+ {
+ /* SASL cancellation of authentication */
+ gen_send(sock, "*");
+ if(ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY)
+ return ok;
+ }
+ else
+ return(ok);
+ }
+#else
+ if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_NTLM)
+ {
+ report(stderr,
+ GT_("Required NTLM capability not compiled into fetchmail\n"));
+ }
+#endif /* NTLM_ENABLE */
- if (strstr(buf1, "OK")) {
- return PS_SUCCESS;
+#ifdef __UNUSED__ /* The Cyrus IMAP4rev1 server chokes on this */
+ /* this handles either AUTH=LOGIN or AUTH-LOGIN */
+ if ((imap_version >= IMAP4rev1) && (!strstr(capabilities, "LOGIN")))
+ {
+ report(stderr,
+ GT_("Required LOGIN capability not supported by server\n"));
}
- else {
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+#endif /* __UNUSED__ */
+
+ /* we're stuck with sending the password en clair */
+ if ((ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY
+ || ctl->server.authenticate == A_PASSWORD)
+ && !strstr (capabilities, "LOGINDISABLED"))
+ {
+ /* these sizes guarantee no buffer overflow */
+ char remotename[NAMELEN*2+1], password[PASSWORDLEN*2+1];
+
+ imap_canonicalize(remotename, ctl->remotename, NAMELEN);
+ imap_canonicalize(password, ctl->password, PASSWORDLEN);
+
+ strcpy(shroud, ctl->password);
+ ok = gen_transact(sock, "LOGIN \"%s\" \"%s\"", remotename, password);
+ shroud[0] = '\0';
+ if (ok)
+ {
+ /* SASL cancellation of authentication */
+ gen_send(sock, "*");
+ if(ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY)
+ return ok;
+ }
+ else
+ return(ok);
}
+
+ return(ok);
}
-#endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
-int imap_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *buf)
-/* apply for connection authorization */
+static int internal_expunge(int sock)
+/* ship an expunge, resetting associated counters */
{
- char rbuf [POPBUFSIZE+1];
- int ok = 0;
-#ifdef KERBEROS_V4
- int kerbok = 0;
+ int ok;
- if (ctl->server.protocol != P_IMAP_K4)
-#endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
- /* try to get authorized */
- ok = gen_transact(sock,
- "LOGIN %s \"%s\"", ctl->remotename, ctl->password);
-
- if (ok)
- return(ok);
-
- /* probe to see if we're running IMAP4 and can use RFC822.PEEK */
- gen_send(sock, "CAPABILITY");
- if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, rbuf, sizeof(rbuf))))
- return(ok);
- if (strstr(rbuf, "BAD"))
- {
- imap_version = IMAP2;
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
- error(0, 0, "Protocol identified as IMAP2 or IMAP2BIS");
- }
- /* UW-IMAP server 10.173 notifies in all caps */
- else if (strstr(rbuf, "IMAP4rev1") || strstr(rbuf, "IMAP4REV1"))
- {
- imap_version = IMAP4rev1;
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
- error(0, 0, "Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 1");
- }
- else
- {
- imap_version = IMAP4;
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
- error(0, 0, "Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 0");
- }
-
- peek_capable = (imap_version >= IMAP4);
+ if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "EXPUNGE")))
+ return(ok);
-#ifdef KERBEROS_V4
- if (strstr(rbuf, "AUTH=KERBEROS_V4"))
- {
- kerbok++;
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
- error(0, 0, "KERBEROS_V4 authentication is supported");
- }
-
- /* eat OK response */
- if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, rbuf, sizeof(rbuf))))
- return(ok);
-
- if (!strstr(rbuf, "OK"))
- return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
-
- if ((imap_version >= IMAP4) && (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_K4))
- {
- if (!kerbok)
- {
- error(0, -1, "Required KERBEROS_V4 capability not supported by server");
- return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
- }
-
- if ((ok = do_rfc1731(sock, ctl, buf)))
- {
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
- error(0, 0, "IMAP> *");
- SockWrite(sock, "*\r\n", 3);
- return(ok);
- }
- }
-#endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
+ expunged += deletions;
+ deletions = 0;
+
+#ifdef IMAP_UID /* not used */
+ expunge_uids(ctl);
+#endif /* IMAP_UID */
+
+ return(PS_SUCCESS);
+}
+
+static int imap_idle(int sock)
+/* start an RFC2177 IDLE */
+{
+ stage = STAGE_IDLE;
+ saved_timeout = mytimeout;
+ mytimeout = 0;
- return(PS_SUCCESS);
+ return (gen_transact(sock, "IDLE"));
}
static int imap_getrange(int sock,
struct query *ctl,
const char *folder,
- int *countp, int *newp)
+ int *countp, int *newp, int *bytes)
/* get range of messages to be fetched */
{
int ok;
+ char buf[MSGBUFSIZE+1], *cp;
/* find out how many messages are waiting */
- recent = unseen = -1;
- ok = gen_transact(sock, "SELECT %s", folder ? folder : "INBOX");
- if (ok != 0)
+ *bytes = -1;
+
+ if (pass > 1)
{
- error(0, 0, "mailbox selection failed");
- return(ok);
+ /*
+ * We have to have an expunge here, otherwise the re-poll will
+ * infinite-loop picking up un-expunged messages -- unless the
+ * expunge period is one and we've been nuking each message
+ * just after deletion.
+ */
+ ok = 0;
+ if (deletions && expunge_period != 1)
+ ok = internal_expunge(sock);
+ count = -1;
+ if (do_idle)
+ ok = imap_idle(sock);
+ if (ok || gen_transact(sock, "NOOP"))
+ {
+ report(stderr, GT_("re-poll failed\n"));
+ return(ok);
+ }
+ else if (count == -1) /* no EXISTS response to NOOP/IDLE */
+ {
+ count = 0;
+ }
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, GT_("%d messages waiting after re-poll\n"), count);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ok = gen_transact(sock,
+ check_only ? "EXAMINE \"%s\"" : "SELECT \"%s\"",
+ folder ? folder : "INBOX");
+ if (ok != 0)
+ {
+ report(stderr, GT_("mailbox selection failed\n"));
+ return(ok);
+ }
+ else if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, GT_("%d messages waiting after first poll\n"), count);
+
+ /* no messages? then we may need to idle until we get some */
+ if (count == 0 && do_idle)
+ imap_idle(sock);
}
*countp = count;
- /*
- * Note: because IMAP has an is_old method, this number is used
- * only for the "X messages (Y unseen)" notification. Accordingly
- * it doesn't matter much that it can be wrong (e.g. if we see an
- * UNSEEN response but not all messages above the first UNSEEN one
- * are likewise).
- */
- if (unseen >= 0) /* optional, but better if we see it */
- *newp = count - unseen + 1;
- else if (recent >= 0) /* mandatory */
- *newp = recent;
- else
- *newp = -1; /* should never happen, RECENT is mandatory */
+ /* OK, now get a count of unseen messages and their indices */
+ if (!ctl->fetchall && count > 0)
+ {
+ if (unseen_messages)
+ free(unseen_messages);
+ unseen_messages = xmalloc(count * sizeof(unsigned int));
+ memset(unseen_messages, 0, count * sizeof(unsigned int));
+ unseen = 0;
+
+ gen_send(sock, "SEARCH UNSEEN");
+ do {
+ ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (ok != 0)
+ {
+ report(stderr, GT_("search for unseen messages failed\n"));
+ return(PS_PROTOCOL);
+ }
+ else if ((cp = strstr(buf, "* SEARCH")))
+ {
+ char *ep;
+
+ cp += 8; /* skip "* SEARCH" */
+
+ while (*cp && unseen < count)
+ {
+ /* skip whitespace */
+ while (*cp && isspace(*cp))
+ cp++;
+ if (*cp)
+ {
+ /*
+ * Message numbers are between 1 and 2^32 inclusive,
+ * so unsigned int is large enough.
+ */
+ unseen_messages[unseen]=(unsigned int)strtol(cp,&ep,10);
+
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout,
+ GT_("%u is unseen\n"),
+ unseen_messages[unseen]);
+
+ unseen++;
+ cp = ep;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ } while
+ (tag[0] != '\0' && strncmp(buf, tag, strlen(tag)));
+ } else
+ unseen = -1;
- deletecount = 0;
+ *newp = unseen;
+ expunged = 0;
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
static int imap_getsizes(int sock, int count, int *sizes)
/* capture the sizes of all messages */
{
- char buf [POPBUFSIZE+1];
+ char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1];
- gen_send(sock, "FETCH 1:%d RFC822.SIZE", count);
- while (SockRead(sock, buf, sizeof(buf)))
+ /*
+ * Some servers (as in, PMDF5.1-9.1 under OpenVMS 6.1)
+ * won't accept 1:1 as valid set syntax. Some implementors
+ * should be taken out and shot for excessive anality.
+ *
+ * Microsoft Exchange (brain-dead piece of crap that it is)
+ * sometimes gets its knickers in a knot about bodiless messages.
+ * You may see responses like this:
+ *
+ * fetchmail: IMAP> A0004 FETCH 1:9 RFC822.SIZE
+ * fetchmail: IMAP< * 2 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 1187)
+ * fetchmail: IMAP< * 3 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 3954)
+ * fetchmail: IMAP< * 4 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 1944)
+ * fetchmail: IMAP< * 5 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 2933)
+ * fetchmail: IMAP< * 6 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 1854)
+ * fetchmail: IMAP< * 7 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 34054)
+ * fetchmail: IMAP< * 8 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 5561)
+ * fetchmail: IMAP< * 9 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 1101)
+ * fetchmail: IMAP< A0004 NO The requested item could not be found.
+ *
+ * This means message 1 has only headers. For kicks and grins
+ * you can telnet in and look:
+ * A003 FETCH 1 FULL
+ * A003 NO The requested item could not be found.
+ * A004 fetch 1 rfc822.header
+ * A004 NO The requested item could not be found.
+ * A006 FETCH 1 BODY
+ * * 1 FETCH (BODY ("TEXT" "PLAIN" ("CHARSET" "US-ASCII") NIL NIL "7BIT" 35 3))
+ * A006 OK FETCH completed.
+ *
+ * To get around this, we terminate the read loop on a NO and count
+ * on the fact that the sizes array has been preinitialized with a
+ * known-bad size value.
+ */
+ if (count == 1)
+ gen_send(sock, "FETCH 1 RFC822.SIZE", count);
+ else
+ gen_send(sock, "FETCH 1:%d RFC822.SIZE", count);
+ for (;;)
{
- int num, size, ok;
+ unsigned int num, size;
+ int ok;
if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
return(ok);
- if (strstr(buf, "OK"))
+ else if (strstr(buf, "OK") || strstr(buf, "NO"))
break;
- else if (sscanf(buf, "* %d FETCH (RFC822.SIZE %d)", &num, &size) == 2)
- sizes[num - 1] = size;
- else
- sizes[num - 1] = -1;
+ else if (sscanf(buf, "* %u FETCH (RFC822.SIZE %u)", &num, &size) == 2) {
+ if (num > 0 && num <= count)
+ sizes[num - 1] = size;
+ /* else, strict: protocol error, flexible: nothing
+ * I vote for flexible. */
+ }
}
return(PS_SUCCESS);
static int imap_is_old(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
/* is the given message old? */
{
- int ok;
+ flag seen = TRUE;
+ int i;
- /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
- number -= deletecount;
+ /*
+ * Expunges change the fetch numbers, but unseen_messages contains
+ * indices from before any expungees were done. So neither the
+ * argument nor the values in message_sequence need to be decremented.
+ */
- if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "FETCH %d FLAGS", number)) != 0)
- return(PS_ERROR);
+ seen = TRUE;
+ for (i = 0; i < unseen; i++)
+ if (unseen_messages[i] == number)
+ {
+ seen = FALSE;
+ break;
+ }
return(seen);
}
+static char *skip_token(char *ptr)
+{
+ while(isspace(*ptr)) ptr++;
+ while(!isspace(*ptr) && !iscntrl(*ptr)) ptr++;
+ while(isspace(*ptr)) ptr++;
+ return(ptr);
+}
+
static int imap_fetch_headers(int sock, struct query *ctl,int number,int *lenp)
/* request headers of nth message */
{
- char buf [POPBUFSIZE+1];
+ char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1];
int num;
/* expunges change the fetch numbers */
- number -= deletecount;
+ number -= expunged;
/*
- * This is blessed by RFC 1176, RFC1730, RFC2060.
+ * This is blessed by RFC1176, RFC1730, RFC2060.
* According to the RFCs, it should *not* set the \Seen flag.
*/
gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.HEADER", number);
/* looking for FETCH response */
- do {
+ for (;;)
+ {
int ok;
+ char *ptr;
if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
return(ok);
- } while
- (sscanf(buf+2, "%d FETCH (%*s {%d}", &num, lenp) != 2);
+ ptr = skip_token(buf); /* either "* " or "AXXXX " */
+ if (sscanf(ptr, "%d FETCH (%*s {%d}", &num, lenp) == 2)
+ break;
+ /* try to recover from chronically fucked-up M$ Exchange servers */
+ else if (!strncmp(ptr, "NO", 2))
+ return(PS_TRANSIENT);
+ else if (!strncmp(ptr, "BAD", 3))
+ return(PS_TRANSIENT);
+ }
if (num != number)
return(PS_ERROR);
static int imap_fetch_body(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number, int *lenp)
/* request body of nth message */
{
- char buf [POPBUFSIZE+1], *cp;
+ char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1], *cp;
int num;
/* expunges change the fetch numbers */
- number -= deletecount;
+ number -= expunged;
/*
* If we're using IMAP4, we can fetch the message without setting its
*
* However...*don't* do this if we're using keep to suppress deletion!
* In that case, marking the seen flag is the only way to prevent the
- * message from being re-fetched on subsequent runs.
+ * message from being re-fetched on subsequent runs (and according
+ * to RFC2060 p.43 this fetch should set Seen as a side effect).
+ *
+ * According to RFC2060, and Mark Crispin the IMAP maintainer,
+ * FETCH %d BODY[TEXT] and RFC822.TEXT are "functionally
+ * equivalent". However, we know of at least one server that
+ * treats them differently in the presence of MIME attachments;
+ * the latter form downloads the attachment, the former does not.
+ * The server is InterChange, and the fool who implemented this
+ * misfeature ought to be strung up by his thumbs.
+ *
+ * When I tried working around this by disabling use of the 4rev1 form,
+ * I found that doing this breaks operation with M$ Exchange.
+ * Annoyingly enough, Exchange's refusal to cope is technically legal
+ * under RFC2062. Trust Microsoft, the Great Enemy of interoperability
+ * standards, to find a way to make standards compliance irritating....
*/
switch (imap_version)
{
if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
return(ok);
} while
- (sscanf(buf+2, "%d FETCH", &num) != 1);
+ (!strstr(buf+4, "FETCH") || sscanf(buf+2, "%d", &num) != 1);
if (num != number)
return(PS_ERROR);
- /* try to extract a length */
+ /*
+ * Try to extract a length from the FETCH response. RFC2060 requires
+ * it to be present, but at least one IMAP server (Novell GroupWise)
+ * botches this.
+ */
if ((cp = strchr(buf, '{')))
*lenp = atoi(cp + 1);
else
- *lenp = 0;
+ *lenp = -1; /* missing length part in FETCH reponse */
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
/* discard tail of FETCH response after reading message text */
{
/* expunges change the fetch numbers */
- /* number -= deletecount; */
+ /* number -= expunged; */
for (;;)
{
- char buf[POPBUFSIZE+1];
+ char buf[MSGBUFSIZE+1];
int ok;
if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
return(ok);
- if (strstr(buf, "OK FETCH"))
+
+ /* UW IMAP returns "OK FETCH", Cyrus returns "OK Completed" */
+ if (strstr(buf, "OK"))
break;
+
+#ifdef __UNUSED__
+ /*
+ * Any IMAP server that fails to set Seen on a BODY[TEXT]
+ * fetch violates RFC2060 p.43 (top). This becomes an issue
+ * when keep is on, because seen messages aren't deleted and
+ * get refetched on each poll. As a workaround, if keep is on
+ * we can set the Seen flag explicitly.
+ *
+ * This code isn't used yet because we don't know of any IMAP
+ * servers broken in this way.
+ */
+ if (ctl->keep)
+ if ((ok = gen_transact(sock,
+ imap_version == IMAP4
+ ? "STORE %d +FLAGS.SILENT (\\Seen)"
+ : "STORE %d +FLAGS (\\Seen)",
+ number)))
+ return(ok);
+#endif /* __UNUSED__ */
}
return(PS_SUCCESS);
int ok;
/* expunges change the fetch numbers */
- number -= deletecount;
+ number -= expunged;
/*
* Use SILENT if possible as a minor throughput optimization.
* Note: this has been dropped from IMAP4rev1.
+ *
+ * We set Seen because there are some IMAP servers (notably HP
+ * OpenMail) that do message-receipt DSNs, but only when the seen
+ * bit is set. This is the appropriate time -- we get here right
+ * after the local SMTP response that says delivery was
+ * successful.
*/
if ((ok = gen_transact(sock,
imap_version == IMAP4
- ? "STORE %d +FLAGS.SILENT (\\Deleted)"
- : "STORE %d +FLAGS (\\Deleted)",
+ ? "STORE %d +FLAGS.SILENT (\\Seen \\Deleted)"
+ : "STORE %d +FLAGS (\\Seen \\Deleted)",
number)))
return(ok);
+ else
+ deletions++;
/*
- * We do an expunge after each message, rather than just before quit,
- * so that a line hit during a long session won't result in lots of
- * messages being fetched again during the next session.
+ * We do an expunge after expunge_period messages, rather than
+ * just before quit, so that a line hit during a long session
+ * won't result in lots of messages being fetched again during
+ * the next session.
*/
- if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "EXPUNGE")))
- return(ok);
-
- deletecount++;
+ if (NUM_NONZERO(expunge_period) && (deletions % expunge_period) == 0)
+ internal_expunge(sock);
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
+static int imap_logout(int sock, struct query *ctl)
+/* send logout command */
+{
+ /* if any un-expunged deletions remain, ship an expunge now */
+ if (deletions)
+ internal_expunge(sock);
+
+#ifdef USE_SEARCH
+ /* Memory clean-up */
+ if (unseen_messages)
+ free(unseen_messages);
+#endif /* USE_SEARCH */
+
+ return(gen_transact(sock, "LOGOUT"));
+}
+
const static struct method imap =
{
"IMAP", /* Internet Message Access Protocol */
- 143, /* standard IMAP2bis/IMAP4 port */
+#if INET6_ENABLE
+ "imap",
+ "imaps",
+#else /* INET6_ENABLE */
+ 143, /* standard IMAP2bis/IMAP4 port */
+ 993, /* ssl IMAP2bis/IMAP4 port */
+#endif /* INET6_ENABLE */
TRUE, /* this is a tagged protocol */
FALSE, /* no message delimiter */
- FALSE, /* fetch response size is reliable */
imap_ok, /* parse command response */
imap_getauth, /* get authorization */
imap_getrange, /* query range of messages */
- imap_getsizes, /* grab message sizes */
+ imap_getsizes, /* get sizes of messages (used for ESMTP SIZE option) */
imap_is_old, /* no UID check */
imap_fetch_headers, /* request given message headers */
imap_fetch_body, /* request given message body */
imap_trail, /* eat message trailer */
imap_delete, /* delete the message */
- "LOGOUT", /* the IMAP exit command */
+ imap_logout, /* expunge and exit */
+ TRUE, /* yes, we can re-poll */
};
int doIMAP(struct query *ctl)
projects / ~andy / fetchmail / blobdiff