#include "config.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <strings.h>
#include <ctype.h>
-#if defined(STDC_HEADERS)
#include <stdlib.h>
-#endif
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <errno.h>
#include "fetchmail.h"
#include "socket.h"
-#ifdef KERBEROS_V4
-#ifdef KERBEROS_V5
-#include <kerberosIV/des.h>
-#include <kerberosIV/krb.h>
-#else
-#if defined (__bsdi__)
-#include <des.h>
-#define krb_get_err_text(e) (krb_err_txt[e])
-#endif
-#if defined(__NetBSD__) || (__FreeBSD__) || defined(__linux__)
-#define krb_get_err_text(e) (krb_err_txt[e])
-#endif
-#include <krb.h>
-#endif
-#endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
-#include "i18n.h"
-
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_H
-#include <gssapi.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H
-#include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
-#include <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h>
-#endif
-#ifndef HAVE_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE
-#define GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE gss_nt_service_name
-#endif
-#endif
-
-#include "md5.h"
-
-#if OPIE_ENABLE
-#include <opie.h>
-#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
-
-#ifndef strstr /* glibc-2.1 declares this as a macro */
-extern char *strstr(); /* needed on sysV68 R3V7.1. */
-#endif /* strstr */
+#include "gettext.h"
/* imap_version values */
-#define IMAP2 -1 /* IMAP2 or IMAP2BIS, RFC1176 */
#define IMAP4 0 /* IMAP4 rev 0, RFC1730 */
#define IMAP4rev1 1 /* IMAP4 rev 1, RFC2060 */
-static int count, seen, recent, unseen, deletions, imap_version, preauth;
-static int expunged, expunge_period;
+/* global variables: please reinitialize them explicitly for proper
+ * working in daemon mode */
+
+/* TODO: session variables to be initialized before server greeting */
+static int preauth = FALSE;
+
+/* session variables initialized in capa_probe() or imap_getauth() */
static char capabilities[MSGBUFSIZE+1];
+static int imap_version = IMAP4;
+static flag do_idle = FALSE, has_idle = FALSE;
+static int expunge_period = 1;
+
+/* mailbox variables initialized in imap_getrange() */
+static int count = 0, oldcount = 0, recentcount = 0, unseen = 0, deletions = 0;
+static unsigned int startcount = 1;
+static int expunged = 0;
+static unsigned int *unseen_messages;
+
+/* for "IMAP> EXPUNGE" */
+static int actual_deletions = 0;
+
+/* for "IMAP> IDLE" */
+static int saved_timeout = 0, idle_timeout = 0;
+static time_t idle_start_time = 0;
+
+static int imap_untagged_response(int sock, const char *buf)
+/* interpret untagged status responses */
+{
+ /* For each individual check, use a BLANK before the word to avoid
+ * confusion with the \Recent flag or similar */
+ if (stage == STAGE_GETAUTH
+ && !strncmp(buf, "* CAPABILITY", 12))
+ {
+ strlcpy(capabilities, buf + 12, sizeof(capabilities));
+ }
+ else if (stage == STAGE_GETAUTH
+ && !strncmp(buf, "* PREAUTH", 9))
+ {
+ preauth = TRUE;
+ }
+ else if (stage != STAGE_LOGOUT
+ && !strncmp(buf, "* BYE", 5))
+ {
+ /* log the unexpected bye from server as we expect the
+ * connection to be cut-off after this */
+ if (outlevel > O_SILENT)
+ report(stderr, GT_("Received BYE response from IMAP server: %s"), buf + 5);
+ }
+ else if (strstr(buf, " EXISTS"))
+ {
+ char *t; unsigned long u;
+ errno = 0;
+ u = strtoul(buf+2, &t, 10);
+ /*
+ * Don't trust the message count passed by the server.
+ * Without this check, it might be possible to do a
+ * DNS-spoofing attack that would pass back a ridiculous
+ * count, and allocate a malloc area that would overlap
+ * a portion of the stack.
+ */
+ if (errno /* strtoul failed */
+ || t == buf+2 /* no valid data */
+ || u > (unsigned long)(INT_MAX/sizeof(int)) /* too large */)
+ {
+ report(stderr, GT_("bogus message count in \"%s\"!"), buf);
+ return(PS_PROTOCOL);
+ }
+ count = u; /* safe as long as count <= INT_MAX - checked above */
+
+ if ((recentcount = count - oldcount) < 0)
+ recentcount = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Nasty kluge to handle RFC2177 IDLE. If we know we're idling
+ * we can't wait for the tag matching the IDLE; we have to tell the
+ * server the IDLE is finished by shipping back a DONE when we
+ * see an EXISTS. Only after that will a tagged response be
+ * shipped. The idling flag also gets cleared on a timeout.
+ */
+ if (stage == STAGE_IDLE)
+ {
+ /* If IDLE isn't supported, we were only sending NOOPs anyway. */
+ if (has_idle)
+ {
+ /* we do our own write and report here to disable tagging */
+ SockWrite(sock, "DONE\r\n", 6);
+ if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
+ report(stdout, "IMAP> DONE\n");
+ }
+
+ mytimeout = saved_timeout;
+ stage = STAGE_GETRANGE;
+ }
+ }
+ /* we now compute recentcount as a difference between
+ * new and old EXISTS, hence disable RECENT check */
+# if 0
+ else if (strstr(buf, " RECENT"))
+ {
+ /* fixme: use strto[u]l and error checking */
+ recentcount = atoi(buf+2);
+ }
+# endif
+ else if (strstr(buf, " EXPUNGE"))
+ {
+ unsigned long u; char *t;
+ /* the response "* 10 EXPUNGE" means that the currently
+ * tenth (i.e. only one) message has been deleted */
+ errno = 0;
+ u = strtoul(buf+2, &t, 10);
+ if (errno /* conversion error */ || t == buf+2 /* no number found */) {
+ report(stderr, GT_("bogus EXPUNGE count in \"%s\"!"), buf);
+ return PS_PROTOCOL;
+ }
+ if (u > 0)
+ {
+ if (count > 0)
+ count--;
+ if (oldcount > 0)
+ oldcount--;
+ /* We do expect an EXISTS response immediately
+ * after this, so this updation of recentcount is
+ * just a precaution! */
+ if ((recentcount = count - oldcount) < 0)
+ recentcount = 0;
+ actual_deletions++;
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * The server may decide to make the mailbox read-only,
+ * which causes fetchmail to go into a endless loop
+ * fetching the same message over and over again.
+ *
+ * However, for check_only, we use EXAMINE which will
+ * mark the mailbox read-only as per the RFC.
+ *
+ * This checks for the condition and aborts if
+ * the mailbox is read-only.
+ *
+ * See RFC 2060 section 6.3.1 (SELECT).
+ * See RFC 2060 section 6.3.2 (EXAMINE).
+ */
+ else if (stage == STAGE_GETRANGE
+ && !check_only && strstr(buf, "[READ-ONLY]"))
+ {
+ return(PS_LOCKBUSY);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ return(PS_UNTAGGED);
+ }
+ return(PS_SUCCESS);
+}
-int imap_ok(int sock, char *argbuf)
+static int imap_response(int sock, char *argbuf, struct RecvSplit *rs)
/* parse command response */
{
- char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1];
+ char buf[MSGBUFSIZE+1];
- seen = 0;
do {
int ok;
char *cp;
- if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
+ if (rs)
+ ok = gen_recv_split(sock, buf, sizeof(buf), rs);
+ else
+ ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (ok != PS_SUCCESS)
return(ok);
/* all tokens in responses are caseblind */
for (cp = buf; *cp; cp++)
- if (islower(*cp))
- *cp = toupper(*cp);
-
- /* interpret untagged status responses */
- if (strstr(buf, "* CAPABILITY"))
- strncpy(capabilities, buf + 12, sizeof(capabilities));
- if (strstr(buf, "EXISTS"))
- count = atoi(buf+2);
- if (strstr(buf, "RECENT"))
- recent = atoi(buf+2);
- if (strstr(buf, "UNSEEN"))
+ if (islower((unsigned char)*cp))
+ *cp = toupper((unsigned char)*cp);
+
+ /* untagged responses start with "* " */
+ if (buf[0] == '*' && buf[1] == ' ') {
+ ok = imap_untagged_response(sock, buf);
+ if (ok == PS_UNTAGGED)
+ {
+ if (argbuf && stage != STAGE_IDLE && tag[0] != '\0')
+ {
+ /* if there is an unmatched response, pass it back to
+ * the calling function for further analysis. The
+ * calling function should call imap_response() again
+ * to read the remaining response */
+ strcpy(argbuf, buf);
+ return(ok);
+ }
+ }
+ else if (ok != PS_SUCCESS)
+ return(ok);
+ }
+
+ if (stage == STAGE_IDLE)
{
- char *cp;
-
- /*
- * Handle both "* 42 UNSEEN" (if tha ever happens) and
- * "* OK [UNSEEN 42] 42". Note that what this gets us is
- * a minimum index, not a count.
- */
- unseen = 0;
- for (cp = buf; *cp && !isdigit(*cp); cp++)
- continue;
- unseen = atoi(cp);
+ /* reduce the timeout: servers may not reset their timeout
+ * when they send some information asynchronously */
+ mytimeout = idle_timeout - (time((time_t *) NULL) - idle_start_time);
+ if (mytimeout <= 0)
+ return(PS_IDLETIMEOUT);
}
- if (strstr(buf, "FLAGS"))
- seen = (strstr(buf, "SEEN") != (char *)NULL);
- if (strstr(buf, "PREAUTH"))
- preauth = TRUE;
} while
(tag[0] != '\0' && strncmp(buf, tag, strlen(tag)));
char *cp;
/* skip the tag */
- for (cp = buf; !isspace(*cp); cp++)
+ for (cp = buf; !isspace((unsigned char)*cp); cp++)
continue;
- while (isspace(*cp))
+ while (isspace((unsigned char)*cp))
cp++;
- if (strncmp(cp, "PREAUTH", 2) == 0)
+ if (strncasecmp(cp, "OK", 2) == 0)
{
if (argbuf)
strcpy(argbuf, cp);
- preauth = TRUE;
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
- else if (strncmp(cp, "OK", 2) == 0)
- {
- if (argbuf)
- strcpy(argbuf, cp);
- return(PS_SUCCESS);
- }
- else if (strncmp(cp, "BAD", 3) == 0)
+ else if (strncasecmp(cp, "BAD", 3) == 0)
return(PS_ERROR);
- else if (strncmp(cp, "NO", 2) == 0)
+ else if (strncasecmp(cp, "NO", 2) == 0)
{
if (stage == STAGE_GETAUTH)
return(PS_AUTHFAIL); /* RFC2060, 6.2.2 */
+ else if (stage == STAGE_GETSIZES)
+ return(PS_SUCCESS); /* see comments in imap_getpartialsizes() */
else
return(PS_ERROR);
}
}
}
-#if OPIE_ENABLE
-static int do_otp(int sock, struct query *ctl)
-{
- int i, rval;
- char buffer[128];
- char challenge[OPIE_CHALLENGE_MAX+1];
- char response[OPIE_RESPONSE_MAX+1];
-
- gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE X-OTP");
-
- if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
- return rval;
-
- if ((i = from64tobits(challenge, buffer)) < 0) {
- report(stderr, _("Could not decode initial BASE64 challenge\n"));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- };
-
-
- to64frombits(buffer, ctl->remotename, strlen(ctl->remotename));
-
- if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
- report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buffer);
-
- /* best not to count on the challenge code handling multiple writes */
- strcat(buffer, "\r\n");
- SockWrite(sock, buffer, strlen(buffer));
-
- if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
- return rval;
-
- if ((i = from64tobits(challenge, buffer)) < 0) {
- report(stderr, _("Could not decode OTP challenge\n"));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- };
-
- rval = opiegenerator(challenge, !strcmp(ctl->password, "opie") ? "" : ctl->password, response);
- if ((rval == -2) && !run.poll_interval) {
- char secret[OPIE_SECRET_MAX+1];
- fprintf(stderr, _("Secret pass phrase: "));
- if (opiereadpass(secret, sizeof(secret), 0))
- rval = opiegenerator(challenge, secret, response);
- memset(secret, 0, sizeof(secret));
- };
-
- if (rval)
- return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
-
- to64frombits(buffer, response, strlen(response));
-
- if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
- report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buffer);
- strcat(buffer, "\r\n");
- SockWrite(sock, buffer, strlen(buffer));
-
- if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
- return rval;
-
- if (strstr(buffer, "OK"))
- return PS_SUCCESS;
- else
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
-};
-#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
-
-#ifdef KERBEROS_V4
-#if SIZEOF_INT == 4
-typedef int int32;
-#elif SIZEOF_SHORT == 4
-typedef short int32;
-#elif SIZEOF_LONG == 4
-typedef long int32;
-#else
-#error Cannot deduce a 32-bit-type
-#endif
-
-static int do_rfc1731(int sock, char *truename)
-/* authenticate as per RFC1731 -- note 32-bit integer requirement here */
-{
- int result = 0, len;
- char buf1[4096], buf2[4096];
- union {
- int32 cint;
- char cstr[4];
- } challenge1, challenge2;
- char srvinst[INST_SZ];
- char *p;
- char srvrealm[REALM_SZ];
- KTEXT_ST authenticator;
- CREDENTIALS credentials;
- char tktuser[MAX_K_NAME_SZ+1+INST_SZ+1+REALM_SZ+1];
- char tktinst[INST_SZ];
- char tktrealm[REALM_SZ];
- des_cblock session;
- des_key_schedule schedule;
-
- gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE KERBEROS_V4");
-
- /* The data encoded in the first ready response contains a random
- * 32-bit number in network byte order. The client should respond
- * with a Kerberos ticket and an authenticator for the principal
- * "imap.hostname@realm", where "hostname" is the first component
- * of the host name of the server with all letters in lower case
- * and where "realm" is the Kerberos realm of the server. The
- * encrypted checksum field included within the Kerberos
- * authenticator should contain the server provided 32-bit number
- * in network byte order.
- */
-
- if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
- return result;
- }
-
- len = from64tobits(challenge1.cstr, buf1);
- if (len < 0) {
- report(stderr, _("could not decode initial BASE64 challenge\n"));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
-
- /* this patch by Dan Root <dar@thekeep.org> solves an endianess
- * problem. */
- {
- char tmp[4];
-
- *(int *)tmp = ntohl(*(int *) challenge1.cstr);
- memcpy(challenge1.cstr, tmp, sizeof(tmp));
- }
-
- /* Client responds with a Kerberos ticket and an authenticator for
- * the principal "imap.hostname@realm" where "hostname" is the
- * first component of the host name of the server with all letters
- * in lower case and where "realm" is the Kerberos realm of the
- * server. The encrypted checksum field included within the
- * Kerberos authenticator should contain the server-provided
- * 32-bit number in network byte order.
- */
-
- strncpy(srvinst, truename, (sizeof srvinst)-1);
- srvinst[(sizeof srvinst)-1] = '\0';
- for (p = srvinst; *p; p++) {
- if (isupper(*p)) {
- *p = tolower(*p);
- }
- }
-
- strncpy(srvrealm, (char *)krb_realmofhost(srvinst), (sizeof srvrealm)-1);
- srvrealm[(sizeof srvrealm)-1] = '\0';
- if (p = strchr(srvinst, '.')) {
- *p = '\0';
- }
-
- result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm, 0);
- if (result) {
- report(stderr, "krb_mq_req: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
-
- result = krb_get_cred("imap", srvinst, srvrealm, &credentials);
- if (result) {
- report(stderr, "krb_get_cred: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
-
- memcpy(session, credentials.session, sizeof session);
- memset(&credentials, 0, sizeof credentials);
- des_key_sched(&session, schedule);
-
- result = krb_get_tf_fullname(TKT_FILE, tktuser, tktinst, tktrealm);
- if (result) {
- report(stderr, "krb_get_tf_fullname: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
-
- if (strcmp(tktuser, user) != 0) {
- report(stderr,
- _("principal %s in ticket does not match -u %s\n"), tktuser,
- user);
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
-
- if (tktinst[0]) {
- report(stderr,
- _("non-null instance (%s) might cause strange behavior\n"),
- tktinst);
- strcat(tktuser, ".");
- strcat(tktuser, tktinst);
- }
-
- if (strcmp(tktrealm, srvrealm) != 0) {
- strcat(tktuser, "@");
- strcat(tktuser, tktrealm);
- }
-
- result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm,
- challenge1.cint);
- if (result) {
- report(stderr, "krb_mq_req: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
-
- to64frombits(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length);
- if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
- report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
- }
- strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
- SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
-
- /* Upon decrypting and verifying the ticket and authenticator, the
- * server should verify that the contained checksum field equals
- * the original server provided random 32-bit number. Should the
- * verification be successful, the server must add one to the
- * checksum and construct 8 octets of data, with the first four
- * octets containing the incremented checksum in network byte
- * order, the fifth octet containing a bit-mask specifying the
- * protection mechanisms supported by the server, and the sixth
- * through eighth octets containing, in network byte order, the
- * maximum cipher-text buffer size the server is able to receive.
- * The server must encrypt the 8 octets of data in the session key
- * and issue that encrypted data in a second ready response. The
- * client should consider the server authenticated if the first
- * four octets the un-encrypted data is equal to one plus the
- * checksum it previously sent.
- */
-
- if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
- return result;
-
- /* The client must construct data with the first four octets
- * containing the original server-issued checksum in network byte
- * order, the fifth octet containing the bit-mask specifying the
- * selected protection mechanism, the sixth through eighth octets
- * containing in network byte order the maximum cipher-text buffer
- * size the client is able to receive, and the following octets
- * containing a user name string. The client must then append
- * from one to eight octets so that the length of the data is a
- * multiple of eight octets. The client must then PCBC encrypt the
- * data with the session key and respond to the second ready
- * response with the encrypted data. The server decrypts the data
- * and verifies the contained checksum. The username field
- * identifies the user for whom subsequent IMAP operations are to
- * be performed; the server must verify that the principal
- * identified in the Kerberos ticket is authorized to connect as
- * that user. After these verifications, the authentication
- * process is complete.
- */
-
- len = from64tobits(buf2, buf1);
- if (len < 0) {
- report(stderr, _("could not decode BASE64 ready response\n"));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
-
- des_ecb_encrypt((des_cblock *)buf2, (des_cblock *)buf2, schedule, 0);
- memcpy(challenge2.cstr, buf2, 4);
- if (ntohl(challenge2.cint) != challenge1.cint + 1) {
- report(stderr, _("challenge mismatch\n"));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
-
- memset(authenticator.dat, 0, sizeof authenticator.dat);
-
- result = htonl(challenge1.cint);
- memcpy(authenticator.dat, &result, sizeof result);
-
- /* The protection mechanisms and their corresponding bit-masks are as
- * follows:
- *
- * 1 No protection mechanism
- * 2 Integrity (krb_mk_safe) protection
- * 4 Privacy (krb_mk_priv) protection
- */
- authenticator.dat[4] = 1;
-
- len = strlen(tktuser);
- strncpy(authenticator.dat+8, tktuser, len);
- authenticator.length = len + 8 + 1;
- while (authenticator.length & 7) {
- authenticator.length++;
- }
- des_pcbc_encrypt((des_cblock *)authenticator.dat,
- (des_cblock *)authenticator.dat, authenticator.length, schedule,
- &session, 1);
-
- to64frombits(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length);
- if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
- report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
- }
-
- strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
- SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
-
- if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
- return result;
-
- if (strstr(buf1, "OK")) {
- return PS_SUCCESS;
- }
- else {
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
-}
-#endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
-
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#define GSSAUTH_P_NONE 1
-#define GSSAUTH_P_INTEGRITY 2
-#define GSSAUTH_P_PRIVACY 4
-
-static int do_gssauth(int sock, char *hostname, char *username)
-{
- gss_buffer_desc request_buf, send_token;
- gss_buffer_t sec_token;
- gss_name_t target_name;
- gss_ctx_id_t context;
- gss_OID mech_name;
- gss_qop_t quality;
- int cflags;
- OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat;
- char buf1[8192], buf2[8192], server_conf_flags;
- unsigned long buf_size;
- int result;
-
- /* first things first: get an imap ticket for host */
- sprintf(buf1, "imap@%s", hostname);
- request_buf.value = buf1;
- request_buf.length = strlen(buf1) + 1;
- maj_stat = gss_import_name(&min_stat, &request_buf, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE,
- &target_name);
- if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
- report(stderr, _("Couldn't get service name for [%s]\n"), buf1);
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
- else if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
- maj_stat = gss_display_name(&min_stat, target_name, &request_buf,
- &mech_name);
- report(stderr, _("Using service name [%s]\n"),request_buf.value);
- maj_stat = gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &request_buf);
- }
-
- gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE GSSAPI");
-
- /* upon receipt of the GSSAPI authentication request, server returns
- * null data ready response. */
- if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
- return result;
- }
-
- /* now start the security context initialisation loop... */
- sec_token = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
- context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
- if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
- report(stdout, _("Sending credentials\n"));
- do {
- send_token.length = 0;
- send_token.value = NULL;
- maj_stat = gss_init_sec_context(&min_stat,
- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
- &context,
- target_name,
- GSS_C_NO_OID,
- GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG,
- 0,
- GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
- sec_token,
- NULL,
- &send_token,
- NULL,
- NULL);
- if (maj_stat!=GSS_S_COMPLETE && maj_stat!=GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
- report(stderr, _("Error exchanging credentials\n"));
- gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
- /* wake up server and await NO response */
- SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
- if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
- return result;
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
- to64frombits(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length);
- gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
- strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
- SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
- if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
- report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
- if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
- if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
- gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
- return result;
- }
- request_buf.length = from64tobits(buf2, buf1 + 2);
- request_buf.value = buf2;
- sec_token = &request_buf;
- }
- } while (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
- gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
-
- /* get security flags and buffer size */
- if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
- return result;
- }
- request_buf.length = from64tobits(buf2, buf1 + 2);
- request_buf.value = buf2;
-
- maj_stat = gss_unwrap(&min_stat, context, &request_buf, &send_token,
- &cflags, &quality);
- if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
- report(stderr, _("Couldn't unwrap security level data\n"));
- gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
- if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
- report(stdout, _("Credential exchange complete\n"));
- /* first octet is security levels supported. We want none, for now */
- server_conf_flags = ((char *)send_token.value)[0];
- if ( !(((char *)send_token.value)[0] & GSSAUTH_P_NONE) ) {
- report(stderr, _("Server requires integrity and/or privacy\n"));
- gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
- ((char *)send_token.value)[0] = 0;
- buf_size = ntohl(*((long *)send_token.value));
- /* we don't care about buffer size if we don't wrap data */
- gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
- if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
- report(stdout, _("Unwrapped security level flags: %s%s%s\n"),
- server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_NONE ? "N" : "-",
- server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_INTEGRITY ? "I" : "-",
- server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_PRIVACY ? "C" : "-");
- report(stdout, _("Maximum GSS token size is %ld\n"),buf_size);
- }
-
- /* now respond in kind (hack!!!) */
- buf_size = htonl(buf_size); /* do as they do... only matters if we do enc */
- memcpy(buf1, &buf_size, 4);
- buf1[0] = GSSAUTH_P_NONE;
- strcpy(buf1+4, username); /* server decides if princ is user */
- request_buf.length = 4 + strlen(username) + 1;
- request_buf.value = buf1;
- maj_stat = gss_wrap(&min_stat, context, 0, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, &request_buf,
- &cflags, &send_token);
- if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
- report(stderr, _("Error creating security level request\n"));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
- to64frombits(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length);
- if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
- report(stdout, _("Requesting authorization as %s\n"), username);
- report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n",buf1);
- }
- strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
- SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
-
- /* we should be done. Get status and finish up */
- if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
- return result;
- if (strstr(buf1, "OK")) {
- /* flush security context */
- if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
- report(stdout, _("Releasing GSS credentials\n"));
- maj_stat = gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat, &context, &send_token);
- if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
- report(stderr, _("Error releasing credentials\n"));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
- /* send_token may contain a notification to the server to flush
- * credentials. RFC 1731 doesn't specify what to do, and since this
- * support is only for authentication, we'll assume the server
- * knows enough to flush its own credentials */
- gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
- return PS_SUCCESS;
- }
-
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
-}
-#endif /* GSSAPI */
-
-static void hmac_md5 (unsigned char *password, size_t pass_len,
- unsigned char *challenge, size_t chal_len,
- unsigned char *response, size_t resp_len)
+static int imap_ok(int sock, char *argbuf)
+/* parse command response */
{
- int i;
- unsigned char ipad[64];
- unsigned char opad[64];
- unsigned char hash_passwd[16];
-
- MD5_CTX ctx;
-
- if (resp_len != 16)
- return;
-
- if (pass_len > sizeof (ipad))
- {
- MD5Init (&ctx);
- MD5Update (&ctx, password, pass_len);
- MD5Final (hash_passwd, &ctx);
- password = hash_passwd; pass_len = sizeof (hash_passwd);
- }
-
- memset (ipad, 0, sizeof (ipad));
- memset (opad, 0, sizeof (opad));
- memcpy (ipad, password, pass_len);
- memcpy (opad, password, pass_len);
-
- for (i=0; i<64; i++) {
- ipad[i] ^= 0x36;
- opad[i] ^= 0x5c;
- }
-
- MD5Init (&ctx);
- MD5Update (&ctx, ipad, sizeof (ipad));
- MD5Update (&ctx, challenge, chal_len);
- MD5Final (response, &ctx);
+ int ok;
- MD5Init (&ctx);
- MD5Update (&ctx, opad, sizeof (opad));
- MD5Update (&ctx, response, resp_len);
- MD5Final (response, &ctx);
+ while ((ok = imap_response(sock, argbuf, NULL)) == PS_UNTAGGED)
+ ; /* wait for the tagged response */
+ return(ok);
}
-#if NTLM_ENABLE
+#ifdef NTLM_ENABLE
#include "ntlm.h"
-static tSmbNtlmAuthRequest request;
-static tSmbNtlmAuthChallenge challenge;
-static tSmbNtlmAuthResponse response;
-
/*
* NTLM support by Grant Edwards.
*
static int do_imap_ntlm(int sock, struct query *ctl)
{
- char msgbuf[2048];
- int result,len;
-
+ int result;
+
gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE NTLM");
- if ((result = gen_recv(sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
- return result;
-
- if (msgbuf[0] != '+')
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
-
- buildSmbNtlmAuthRequest(&request,ctl->remotename,NULL);
-
- if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
- dumpSmbNtlmAuthRequest(stdout, &request);
-
- memset(msgbuf,0,sizeof msgbuf);
- to64frombits (msgbuf, (unsigned char*)&request, SmbLength(&request));
-
- if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
- report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", msgbuf);
-
- strcat(msgbuf,"\r\n");
- SockWrite (sock, msgbuf, strlen (msgbuf));
-
- if ((gen_recv(sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
+ if ((result = ntlm_helper(sock, ctl, "IMAP")))
return result;
-
- len = from64tobits ((unsigned char*)&challenge, msgbuf);
-
- if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
- dumpSmbNtlmAuthChallenge(stdout, &challenge);
-
- buildSmbNtlmAuthResponse(&challenge, &response,ctl->remotename,ctl->password);
-
- if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
- dumpSmbNtlmAuthResponse(stdout, &response);
-
- memset(msgbuf,0,sizeof msgbuf);
- to64frombits (msgbuf, (unsigned char*)&response, SmbLength(&response));
-
- if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
- report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", msgbuf);
-
- strcat(msgbuf,"\r\n");
-
- SockWrite (sock, msgbuf, strlen (msgbuf));
-
- if ((result = gen_recv (sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
- return result;
-
- if (strstr (msgbuf, "OK"))
+
+ result = imap_ok (sock, NULL);
+ if (result == PS_SUCCESS)
return PS_SUCCESS;
else
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
#endif /* NTLM */
-static int do_cram_md5 (int sock, struct query *ctl)
-/* authenticate as per RFC2195 */
-{
- int result;
- int len;
- unsigned char buf1[1024];
- unsigned char msg_id[768];
- unsigned char response[16];
- unsigned char reply[1024];
-
- gen_send (sock, "AUTHENTICATE CRAM-MD5");
-
- /* From RFC2195:
- * The data encoded in the first ready response contains an
- * presumptively arbitrary string of random digits, a timestamp, and the
- * fully-qualified primary host name of the server. The syntax of the
- * unencoded form must correspond to that of an RFC 822 'msg-id'
- * [RFC822] as described in [POP3].
- */
-
- if ((result = gen_recv (sock, buf1, sizeof (buf1)))) {
- return result;
- }
-
- len = from64tobits (msg_id, buf1);
- if (len < 0) {
- report (stderr, _("could not decode BASE64 challenge\n"));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- } else if (len < sizeof (msg_id)) {
- msg_id[len] = 0;
- } else {
- msg_id[sizeof (msg_id)-1] = 0;
- }
- if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
- report (stdout, "decoded as %s\n", msg_id);
- }
-
- /* The client makes note of the data and then responds with a string
- * consisting of the user name, a space, and a 'digest'. The latter is
- * computed by applying the keyed MD5 algorithm from [KEYED-MD5] where
- * the key is a shared secret and the digested text is the timestamp
- * (including angle-brackets).
- */
-
- hmac_md5 (ctl->password, strlen (ctl->password),
- msg_id, strlen (msg_id),
- response, sizeof (response));
-
-#ifdef HAVE_SNPRINTF
- snprintf (reply, sizeof (reply),
-#else
- sprintf(reply,
-#endif
- "%s %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
- ctl->remotename,
- response[0], response[1], response[2], response[3],
- response[4], response[5], response[6], response[7],
- response[8], response[9], response[10], response[11],
- response[12], response[13], response[14], response[15]);
-
- if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
- report (stdout, "replying with %s\n", reply);
- }
-
- to64frombits (buf1, reply, strlen (reply));
- if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
- report (stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
- }
-
- /* PMDF5.2 IMAP has a bug that requires this to be a single write */
- strcat (buf1, "\r\n");
- SockWrite (sock, buf1, strlen (buf1));
-
- if ((result = gen_recv (sock, buf1, sizeof (buf1))))
- return result;
-
- if (strstr (buf1, "OK")) {
- return PS_SUCCESS;
- } else {
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
-}
-
-int imap_canonicalize(char *result, char *raw, int maxlen)
+static void imap_canonicalize(char *result, char *raw, size_t maxlen)
/* encode an IMAP password as per RFC1730's quoting conventions */
{
- int i, j;
+ size_t i, j;
j = 0;
for (i = 0; i < strlen(raw) && i < maxlen; i++)
result[j++] = raw[i];
}
result[j] = '\0';
-
- return(i);
}
-int imap_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting)
-/* apply for connection authorization */
+static int capa_probe(int sock, struct query *ctl)
+/* set capability variables from a CAPA probe */
{
- int ok = 0;
+ int ok;
/* probe to see if we're running IMAP4 and can use RFC822.PEEK */
capabilities[0] = '\0';
if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "CAPABILITY")) == PS_SUCCESS)
{
- /* UW-IMAP server 10.173 notifies in all caps */
+ char *cp;
+
+ /* capability checks are supposed to be caseblind */
+ for (cp = capabilities; *cp; cp++)
+ *cp = toupper((unsigned char)*cp);
+
+ /* UW-IMAP server 10.173 notifies in all caps, but RFC2060 says we
+ should expect a response in mixed-case */
if (strstr(capabilities, "IMAP4REV1"))
{
imap_version = IMAP4rev1;
if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
- report(stdout, _("Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 1\n"));
+ report(stdout, GT_("Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 1\n"));
}
else
{
imap_version = IMAP4;
if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
- report(stdout, _("Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 0\n"));
+ report(stdout, GT_("Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 0\n"));
}
}
- else if (ok == PS_ERROR)
+ else
+ return ok;
+
+ /*
+ * Handle idling. We depend on coming through here on startup
+ * and after each timeout (including timeouts during idles).
+ */
+ do_idle = ctl->idle;
+ if (ctl->idle)
{
- imap_version = IMAP2;
- if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
- report(stdout, _("Protocol identified as IMAP2 or IMAP2BIS\n"));
+ if (strstr(capabilities, "IDLE"))
+ has_idle = TRUE;
+ else
+ has_idle = FALSE;
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
+ report(stdout, GT_("will idle after poll\n"));
+ }
+
+ peek_capable = TRUE;
+
+ return PS_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+static int do_authcert (int sock, const char *command, const char *name)
+/* do authentication "external" (authentication provided by client cert) */
+{
+ char buf[256];
+
+ if (name && name[0])
+ {
+ size_t len = strlen(name);
+ if ((len / 3) + ((len % 3) ? 4 : 0) < sizeof(buf))
+ to64frombits (buf, name, strlen(name));
+ else
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL; /* buffer too small. */
}
else
- return(ok);
+ buf[0]=0;
+ return gen_transact(sock, "%s EXTERNAL %s",command,buf);
+}
- peek_capable = (imap_version >= IMAP4);
+static int imap_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting)
+/* apply for connection authorization */
+{
+ int ok = 0;
+ (void)greeting;
- /*
+ /*
* Assumption: expunges are cheap, so we want to do them
* after every message unless user said otherwise.
*/
else
expunge_period = 1;
- if (preauth)
- return(PS_SUCCESS);
-
-#if OPIE_ENABLE
- if ((ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP) && strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=X-OTP"))
- {
- if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
- report(stdout, _("OTP authentication is supported\n"));
- if (do_otp(sock, ctl) == PS_SUCCESS)
- return(PS_SUCCESS);
- };
-#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
+ if ((ok = capa_probe(sock, ctl)))
+ return ok;
-#ifdef GSSAPI
- if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=GSSAPI"))
- {
- if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_GSS)
- {
- if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
- report(stdout, _("GSS authentication is supported\n"));
- return do_gssauth(sock, ctl->server.truename, ctl->remotename);
- }
- }
- else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_GSS)
+ /*
+ * If either (a) we saw a PREAUTH token in the greeting, or
+ * (b) the user specified ssh preauthentication, then we're done.
+ */
+ if (preauth || ctl->server.authenticate == A_SSH)
{
- report(stderr,
- _("Required GSS capability not supported by server\n"));
- return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
+ preauth = FALSE; /* reset for the next session */
+ return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
-#endif /* GSSAPI */
-#ifdef KERBEROS_V4
- if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=KERBEROS_V4"))
- {
- if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
- report(stdout, _("KERBEROS_V4 authentication is supported\n"));
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
+ if (maybe_tls(ctl)) {
+ char *commonname;
- if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_K4)
+ commonname = ctl->server.pollname;
+ if (ctl->server.via)
+ commonname = ctl->server.via;
+ if (ctl->sslcommonname)
+ commonname = ctl->sslcommonname;
+
+ if (strstr(capabilities, "STARTTLS")
+ || must_tls(ctl)) /* if TLS is mandatory, ignore capabilities */
{
- if ((ok = do_rfc1731(sock, ctl->server.truename)))
+ /* Use "tls1" rather than ctl->sslproto because tls1 is the only
+ * protocol that will work with STARTTLS. Don't need to worry
+ * whether TLS is mandatory or opportunistic unless SSLOpen() fails
+ * (see below). */
+ if (gen_transact(sock, "STARTTLS") == PS_SUCCESS
+ && (set_timeout(mytimeout), SSLOpen(sock, ctl->sslcert, ctl->sslkey, "tls1", ctl->sslcertck,
+ ctl->sslcertfile, ctl->sslcertpath, ctl->sslfingerprint, commonname,
+ ctl->server.pollname, &ctl->remotename)) != -1)
{
- if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
- report(stdout, "IMAP> *\n");
- SockWrite(sock, "*\r\n", 3);
+ /*
+ * RFC 2595 says this:
+ *
+ * "Once TLS has been started, the client MUST discard cached
+ * information about server capabilities and SHOULD re-issue the
+ * CAPABILITY command. This is necessary to protect against
+ * man-in-the-middle attacks which alter the capabilities list prior
+ * to STARTTLS. The server MAY advertise different capabilities
+ * after STARTTLS."
+ *
+ * Now that we're confident in our TLS connection we can
+ * guarantee a secure capability re-probe.
+ */
+ if ((ok = capa_probe(sock, ctl)))
+ return ok;
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
+ {
+ report(stdout, GT_("%s: upgrade to TLS succeeded.\n"), commonname);
+ }
+ } else if (must_tls(ctl)) {
+ /* Config required TLS but we couldn't guarantee it, so we must
+ * stop. */
+ set_timeout(0);
+ report(stderr, GT_("%s: upgrade to TLS failed.\n"), commonname);
+ return PS_SOCKET;
+ } else {
+ set_timeout(0);
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) {
+ report(stdout, GT_("%s: opportunistic upgrade to TLS failed, trying to continue\n"), commonname);
+ }
+ /* We don't know whether the connection is in a working state, so
+ * test by issuing a NOOP. */
+ if (gen_transact(sock, "NOOP") != PS_SUCCESS) {
+ /* Not usable. Empty sslproto to force an unencrypted
+ * connection on the next attempt, and repoll. */
+ ctl->sslproto = xstrdup("");
+ return PS_REPOLL;
+ }
+ /* Usable. Proceed with authenticating insecurely. */
}
-
- return(ok);
}
- /* else fall through to ordinary AUTH=LOGIN case */
}
- else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_K4)
+#endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
+
+ /*
+ * Time to authenticate the user.
+ * Try the protocol variants that don't require passwords first.
+ */
+ ok = PS_AUTHFAIL;
+
+ /* Yahoo hack - we'll just try ID if it was offered by the server,
+ * and IGNORE errors. */
{
- report(stderr,
- _("Required KERBEROS_V4 capability not supported by server\n"));
- return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
+ char *tmp = strstr(capabilities, " ID");
+ if (tmp && !isalnum((unsigned char)tmp[3]) && strstr(ctl->server.via ? ctl->server.via : ctl->server.pollname, "yahoo.com")) {
+ (void)gen_transact(sock, "ID (\"guid\" \"1\")");
+ }
}
-#endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
- if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=CRAM-MD5"))
+ if ((ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY
+ || ctl->server.authenticate == A_EXTERNAL)
+ && strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=EXTERNAL"))
{
- if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
- report (stdout, _("CRAM-MD5 authentication is supported\n"));
- if (ctl->server.protocol != P_IMAP_LOGIN)
+ ok = do_authcert(sock, "AUTHENTICATE", ctl->remotename);
+ if (ok)
{
- if ((ok = do_cram_md5 (sock, ctl)))
- {
- if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
- report (stdout, "IMAP> *\n");
- SockWrite (sock, "*\r\n", 3);
- }
+ /* SASL cancellation of authentication */
+ gen_send(sock, "*");
+ if (ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY)
+ return ok;
+ } else {
return ok;
- }
+ }
+ }
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ if (((ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY && check_gss_creds("imap", ctl->server.truename) == PS_SUCCESS)
+ || ctl->server.authenticate == A_GSSAPI)
+ && strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=GSSAPI"))
+ {
+ if ((ok = do_gssauth(sock, "AUTHENTICATE", "imap",
+ ctl->server.truename, ctl->remotename)))
+ {
+ if (ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY)
+ return ok;
+ } else {
+ return ok;
+ }
}
- else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_CRAM_MD5)
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+ /*
+ * No such luck. OK, now try the variants that mask your password
+ * in a challenge-response.
+ */
+
+ if ((ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY && strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=CRAM-MD5"))
+ || ctl->server.authenticate == A_CRAM_MD5)
+ {
+ if ((ok = do_cram_md5 (sock, "AUTHENTICATE", ctl, NULL)))
+ {
+ if(ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY)
+ return ok;
+ }
+ else
+ return ok;
+ }
+
+#ifdef OPIE_ENABLE
+ if ((ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY
+ || ctl->server.authenticate == A_OTP)
+ && strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=X-OTP")) {
+ if ((ok = do_otp(sock, "AUTHENTICATE", ctl)))
+ {
+ /* SASL cancellation of authentication */
+ gen_send(sock, "*");
+ if(ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY)
+ return ok;
+ } else {
+ return ok;
+ }
+ }
+#else
+ if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_OTP)
{
- report(stderr,
- _("Required CRAM-MD5 capability not supported by server\n"));
- return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
+ report(stderr,
+ GT_("Required OTP capability not compiled into fetchmail\n"));
}
+#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
#ifdef NTLM_ENABLE
- if (strstr (capabilities, "AUTH=NTLM"))
+ if ((ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY
+ || ctl->server.authenticate == A_NTLM)
+ && strstr (capabilities, "AUTH=NTLM")) {
+ if ((ok = do_imap_ntlm(sock, ctl)))
+ {
+ if(ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY)
+ return ok;
+ }
+ else
+ return(ok);
+ }
+#else
+ if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_NTLM)
{
- if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
- report (stdout, _("NTLM authentication is supported\n"));
- return do_imap_ntlm (sock, ctl);
+ report(stderr,
+ GT_("Required NTLM capability not compiled into fetchmail\n"));
}
#endif /* NTLM_ENABLE */
-#ifdef __UNUSED__ /* The Cyrus IMAP4rev1 server chokes on this */
- /* this handles either AUTH=LOGIN or AUTH-LOGIN */
- if ((imap_version >= IMAP4rev1) && (!strstr(capabilities, "LOGIN"))) {
- report(stderr,
- _("Required LOGIN capability not supported by server\n"));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- };
-#endif /* __UNUSED__ */
-
+ /*
+ * We're stuck with sending the password en clair.
+ * The reason for this odd-looking logic is that some
+ * servers return LOGINDISABLED even though login
+ * actually works. So arrange things in such a way that
+ * setting auth passwd makes it ignore this capability.
+ */
+ if((ctl->server.authenticate==A_ANY&&!strstr(capabilities,"LOGINDISABLED"))
+ || ctl->server.authenticate == A_PASSWORD)
{
/* these sizes guarantee no buffer overflow */
- char remotename[NAMELEN*2+1], password[PASSWORDLEN*2+1];
+ char *remotename, *password;
+ size_t rnl, pwl;
+ rnl = 2 * strlen(ctl->remotename) + 1;
+ pwl = 2 * strlen(ctl->password) + 1;
+ remotename = (char *)xmalloc(rnl);
+ password = (char *)xmalloc(pwl);
+
+ imap_canonicalize(remotename, ctl->remotename, rnl);
+ imap_canonicalize(password, ctl->password, pwl);
- imap_canonicalize(remotename, ctl->remotename, NAMELEN);
- imap_canonicalize(password, ctl->password, PASSWORDLEN);
+ snprintf(shroud, sizeof (shroud), "\"%s\"", password);
ok = gen_transact(sock, "LOGIN \"%s\" \"%s\"", remotename, password);
+ memset(shroud, 0x55, sizeof(shroud));
+ shroud[0] = '\0';
+ memset(password, 0x55, strlen(password));
+ free(password);
+ free(remotename);
+ if (ok)
+ {
+ if(ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY)
+ return ok;
+ }
+ else
+ return(ok);
}
- if (ok)
- return(ok);
-
- return(PS_SUCCESS);
+ return(ok);
}
static int internal_expunge(int sock)
{
int ok;
+ actual_deletions = 0;
+
if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "EXPUNGE")))
return(ok);
+ /* if there is a mismatch between the number of mails which should
+ * have been expunged and the number of mails actually expunged,
+ * another email client may be deleting mails. Quit here,
+ * otherwise fetchmail gets out-of-sync with the imap server,
+ * reports the wrong size to the SMTP server on MAIL FROM: and
+ * triggers a "message ... was not the expected length" error on
+ * every subsequent mail */
+ if (deletions > 0 && deletions != actual_deletions)
+ {
+ report(stderr,
+ GT_("mail expunge mismatch (%d actual != %d expected)\n"),
+ actual_deletions, deletions);
+ deletions = 0;
+ return(PS_ERROR);
+ }
+
expunged += deletions;
deletions = 0;
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
+static int imap_idle(int sock)
+/* start an RFC2177 IDLE, or fake one if unsupported */
+{
+ int ok;
+
+ saved_timeout = mytimeout;
+
+ if (has_idle) {
+ /* special timeout to terminate the IDLE and re-issue it
+ * at least every 28 minutes:
+ * (the server may have an inactivity timeout) */
+ mytimeout = idle_timeout = 1680; /* 28 min */
+ time(&idle_start_time);
+ stage = STAGE_IDLE;
+ /* enter IDLE mode */
+ ok = gen_transact(sock, "IDLE");
+
+ if (ok == PS_IDLETIMEOUT) {
+ /* send "DONE" continuation */
+ SockWrite(sock, "DONE\r\n", 6);
+ if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
+ report(stdout, "IMAP> DONE\n");
+ /* reset stage and timeout here: we are not idling any more */
+ mytimeout = saved_timeout;
+ stage = STAGE_GETRANGE;
+ /* get OK IDLE message */
+ ok = imap_ok(sock, NULL);
+ }
+ } else { /* no idle support, fake it */
+ /* Note: stage and timeout have not been changed here as NOOP
+ * does not idle */
+ ok = gen_transact(sock, "NOOP");
+
+ /* no error, but no new mail either */
+ if (ok == PS_SUCCESS && recentcount == 0)
+ {
+ /* There are some servers who do send new mail
+ * notification out of the blue. This is in compliance
+ * with RFC 2060 section 5.3. Wait for that with a low
+ * timeout */
+ mytimeout = idle_timeout = 28;
+ time(&idle_start_time);
+ stage = STAGE_IDLE;
+ /* We are waiting for notification; no tag needed */
+ tag[0] = '\0';
+ /* wait (briefly) for an unsolicited status update */
+ ok = imap_ok(sock, NULL);
+ if (ok == PS_IDLETIMEOUT) {
+ /* no notification came; ok */
+ ok = PS_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* restore normal timeout value */
+ set_timeout(0);
+ mytimeout = saved_timeout;
+ stage = STAGE_GETRANGE;
+
+ return(ok);
+}
+
+static int imap_search(int sock, struct query *ctl, int count)
+/* search for unseen messages */
+{
+ int ok;
+ char buf[MSGBUFSIZE+1], *cp;
+
+ /* Don't count deleted messages. Enabled only for IMAP4 servers or
+ * higher and only when keeping mails. This flag will have an
+ * effect only when user has marked some unread mails for deletion
+ * using another e-mail client. */
+ flag skipdeleted = ctl->keep;
+ const char *undeleted;
+
+ /* structure to keep the end portion of the incomplete response */
+ struct RecvSplit rs;
+
+ /* startcount is higher than count so that if there are no
+ * unseen messages, imap_getsizes() will not need to do
+ * anything! */
+ startcount = count + 1;
+
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ undeleted = (skipdeleted ? " UNDELETED" : "");
+ gen_send(sock, "SEARCH UNSEEN%s", undeleted);
+ gen_recv_split_init("* SEARCH", &rs);
+ while ((ok = imap_response(sock, buf, &rs)) == PS_UNTAGGED)
+ {
+ if ((cp = strstr(buf, "* SEARCH")))
+ {
+ char *ep;
+
+ cp += 8; /* skip "* SEARCH" */
+ while (*cp && unseen < count)
+ {
+ /* skip whitespace */
+ while (*cp && isspace((unsigned char)*cp))
+ cp++;
+ if (*cp)
+ {
+ unsigned long um;
+
+ errno = 0;
+ um = strtoul(cp,&ep,10);
+ if (errno == 0 && ep > cp
+ && um <= INT_MAX && um <= (unsigned)count)
+ {
+ unseen_messages[unseen++] = um;
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, GT_("%lu is unseen\n"), um);
+ if (startcount > um)
+ startcount = um;
+ }
+ cp = ep;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (ok != PS_ERROR) /* success or non-protocol error */
+ return(ok);
+
+ /* there is a protocol error. try a different search command. */
+ if (skipdeleted)
+ {
+ /* retry with "SEARCH UNSEEN" */
+ skipdeleted = FALSE;
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* try with "FETCH 1:n FLAGS" */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (count == 1)
+ gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d FLAGS", count);
+ else
+ gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d:%d FLAGS", 1, count);
+ while ((ok = imap_response(sock, buf, NULL)) == PS_UNTAGGED)
+ {
+ unsigned int num;
+ int consumed;
+
+ /* expected response format:
+ * IMAP< * 1 FETCH (FLAGS (\Seen))
+ * IMAP< * 2 FETCH (FLAGS (\Seen \Deleted))
+ * IMAP< * 3 FETCH (FLAGS ())
+ * IMAP< * 4 FETCH (FLAGS (\Recent))
+ * IMAP< * 5 FETCH (UID 10 FLAGS (\Recent))
+ */
+ if (unseen < count
+ && sscanf(buf, "* %u %n", &num, &consumed) == 1
+ && 0 == strncasecmp(buf+consumed, "FETCH", 5)
+ && isspace((unsigned char)buf[consumed+5])
+ && num >= 1 && num <= (unsigned)count
+ && strstr(buf, "FLAGS ")
+ && !strstr(buf, "\\SEEN")
+ && !strstr(buf, "\\DELETED"))
+ {
+ unseen_messages[unseen++] = num;
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, GT_("%u is unseen\n"), num);
+ if (startcount > num)
+ startcount = num;
+ }
+ }
+ return(ok);
+}
+
static int imap_getrange(int sock,
struct query *ctl,
const char *folder,
int ok;
/* find out how many messages are waiting */
- *bytes = recent = unseen = -1;
+ *bytes = -1;
if (pass > 1)
{
- /*
- * We have to have an expunge here, otherwise the re-poll will
- * infinite-loop picking up un-expunged messages -- unless the
- * expunge period is one and we've been nuking each message
- * just after deletion.
- */
- ok = 0;
- if (deletions && expunge_period != 1)
- internal_expunge(sock);
- count = -1;
- if (ok || gen_transact(sock, "NOOP"))
+ /* deleted mails have already been expunged by
+ * end_mailbox_poll().
+ *
+ * recentcount is already set here by the last imap command which
+ * returned EXISTS on detecting new mail. if recentcount is 0, wait
+ * for new mail.
+ *
+ * this is a while loop because imap_idle() might return on other
+ * mailbox changes also */
+ while (recentcount == 0 && do_idle) {
+ smtp_close(ctl, 1);
+ ok = imap_idle(sock);
+ if (ok)
+ {
+ report(stderr, GT_("re-poll failed\n"));
+ return(ok);
+ }
+ }
+ /* if recentcount is 0, return no mail */
+ if (recentcount == 0)
+ count = 0;
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, ngettext("%d message waiting after re-poll\n",
+ "%d messages waiting after re-poll\n",
+ count), count);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ oldcount = count = 0;
+ ok = gen_transact(sock,
+ check_only ? "EXAMINE \"%s\"" : "SELECT \"%s\"",
+ folder ? folder : "INBOX");
+ /* imap_ok returns PS_LOCKBUSY for READ-ONLY folders,
+ * which we can safely use in fetchall keep only */
+ if (ok == PS_LOCKBUSY && ctl->fetchall && ctl-> keep)
+ ok = 0;
+
+ if (ok != 0)
{
- report(stderr, _("re-poll failed\n"));
+ report(stderr, GT_("mailbox selection failed\n"));
return(ok);
}
- else if (count == -1) /* no EXISTS response to NOOP */
+ else if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, ngettext("%d message waiting after first poll\n",
+ "%d messages waiting after first poll\n",
+ count), count);
+
+ /*
+ * We should have an expunge here to
+ * a) avoid fetching deleted mails during 'fetchall'
+ * b) getting a wrong count of mails during 'no fetchall'
+ */
+ if (!check_only && !ctl->keep && count > 0)
+ {
+ ok = internal_expunge(sock);
+ if (ok)
+ {
+ report(stderr, GT_("expunge failed\n"));
+ return(ok);
+ }
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, ngettext("%d message waiting after expunge\n",
+ "%d messages waiting after expunge\n",
+ count), count);
+ }
+
+ if (count == 0 && do_idle)
{
- count = recent = 0;
- unseen = -1;
+ /* no messages? then we may need to idle until we get some */
+ while (count == 0) {
+ ok = imap_idle(sock);
+ if (ok)
+ {
+ report(stderr, GT_("re-poll failed\n"));
+ return(ok);
+ }
+ }
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, ngettext("%d message waiting after re-poll\n",
+ "%d messages waiting after re-poll\n",
+ count), count);
}
}
- else
+
+ *countp = oldcount = count;
+ recentcount = 0;
+ startcount = 1;
+
+ /* OK, now get a count of unseen messages and their indices */
+ if (!ctl->fetchall && count > 0)
{
- if (!check_only)
- ok = gen_transact(sock, "SELECT %s", folder ? folder : "INBOX");
- else
- ok = gen_transact(sock, "EXAMINE %s", folder ? folder : "INBOX");
+ if (unseen_messages)
+ free(unseen_messages);
+ unseen_messages = (unsigned int *)xmalloc(count * sizeof(unsigned int));
+ memset(unseen_messages, 0, count * sizeof(unsigned int));
+ unseen = 0;
+
+ ok = imap_search(sock, ctl, count);
if (ok != 0)
{
- report(stderr, _("mailbox selection failed\n"));
+ report(stderr, GT_("search for unseen messages failed\n"));
return(ok);
}
- }
-
- *countp = count;
- /*
- * Note: because IMAP has an is_old method, this number is used
- * only for the "X messages (Y unseen)" notification. Accordingly
- * it doesn't matter much that it can be wrong (e.g. if we see an
- * UNSEEN response but not all messages above the first UNSEEN one
- * are likewise).
- */
- if (unseen >= 0) /* optional, but better if we see it */
- *newp = count - unseen + 1;
- else if (recent >= 0) /* mandatory */
- *newp = recent;
- else
- *newp = -1; /* should never happen, RECENT is mandatory */
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG && unseen > 0)
+ report(stdout, GT_("%u is first unseen\n"), startcount);
+ } else
+ unseen = -1;
+ *newp = unseen;
expunged = 0;
+ deletions = 0;
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
-static int imap_getsizes(int sock, int count, int *sizes)
-/* capture the sizes of all messages */
+static int imap_getpartialsizes(int sock, int first, int last, int *sizes)
+/* capture the sizes of messages #first-#last */
{
char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1];
+ int ok;
/*
* Some servers (as in, PMDF5.1-9.1 under OpenVMS 6.1)
* won't accept 1:1 as valid set syntax. Some implementors
* should be taken out and shot for excessive anality.
+ *
+ * Microsoft Exchange (brain-dead piece of crap that it is)
+ * sometimes gets its knickers in a knot about bodiless messages.
+ * You may see responses like this:
+ *
+ * fetchmail: IMAP> A0004 FETCH 1:9 RFC822.SIZE
+ * fetchmail: IMAP< * 2 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 1187)
+ * fetchmail: IMAP< * 3 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 3954)
+ * fetchmail: IMAP< * 4 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 1944)
+ * fetchmail: IMAP< * 5 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 2933)
+ * fetchmail: IMAP< * 6 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 1854)
+ * fetchmail: IMAP< * 7 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 34054)
+ * fetchmail: IMAP< * 8 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 5561)
+ * fetchmail: IMAP< * 9 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 1101)
+ * fetchmail: IMAP< A0004 NO The requested item could not be found.
+ *
+ * This means message 1 has only headers. For kicks and grins
+ * you can telnet in and look:
+ * A003 FETCH 1 FULL
+ * A003 NO The requested item could not be found.
+ * A004 fetch 1 rfc822.header
+ * A004 NO The requested item could not be found.
+ * A006 FETCH 1 BODY
+ * * 1 FETCH (BODY ("TEXT" "PLAIN" ("CHARSET" "US-ASCII") NIL NIL "7BIT" 35 3))
+ * A006 OK FETCH completed.
+ *
+ * To get around this, we treat the final NO as success and count
+ * on the fact that the sizes array has been preinitialized with a
+ * known-bad size value.
*/
- if (count == 1)
- gen_send(sock, "FETCH 1 RFC822.SIZE", count);
- else
- gen_send(sock, "FETCH 1:%d RFC822.SIZE", count);
- for (;;)
- {
- int num, size, ok;
- if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
- return(ok);
- if (strstr(buf, "OK"))
- break;
- else if (sscanf(buf, "* %d FETCH (RFC822.SIZE %d)", &num, &size) == 2)
- sizes[num - 1] = size;
+ /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
+ first -= expunged;
+ last -= expunged;
+
+ if (last == first)
+ gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.SIZE", last);
+ else if (last > first)
+ gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d:%d RFC822.SIZE", first, last);
+ else /* no unseen messages! */
+ return(PS_SUCCESS);
+ while ((ok = imap_response(sock, buf, NULL)) == PS_UNTAGGED)
+ {
+ unsigned int size;
+ int num;
+ int consumed;
+ char *ptr;
+
+ /* expected response formats:
+ * IMAP> A0005 FETCH 1 RFC822.SIZE
+ * IMAP< * 1 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 1187)
+ * IMAP< * 1 FETCH (UID 16 RFC822.SIZE 1447)
+ */
+ if (sscanf(buf, "* %d %n", &num, &consumed) == 1
+ && 0 == strncasecmp(buf + consumed, "FETCH", 5)
+ && isspace((unsigned char)buf[consumed + 5])
+ && (ptr = strstr(buf, "RFC822.SIZE "))
+ && sscanf(ptr, "RFC822.SIZE %u", &size) == 1)
+ {
+ if (num >= first && num <= last)
+ sizes[num - first] = size;
+ else
+ report(stderr,
+ GT_("Warning: ignoring bogus data for message sizes returned by the server.\n"));
+ }
}
+ return(ok);
+}
- return(PS_SUCCESS);
+static int imap_getsizes(int sock, int count, int *sizes)
+/* capture the sizes of all messages */
+{
+ return imap_getpartialsizes(sock, 1, count, sizes);
}
static int imap_is_old(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
/* is the given message old? */
{
- int ok;
+ flag seen = TRUE;
+ int i;
- /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
- number -= expunged;
+ (void)sock;
+ (void)ctl;
+ /*
+ * Expunges change the fetch numbers, but unseen_messages contains
+ * indices from before any expungees were done. So neither the
+ * argument nor the values in message_sequence need to be decremented.
+ */
- if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "FETCH %d FLAGS", number)) != 0)
- return(PS_ERROR);
+ seen = TRUE;
+ for (i = 0; i < unseen; i++)
+ if (unseen_messages[i] == (unsigned)number)
+ {
+ seen = FALSE;
+ break;
+ }
return(seen);
}
+#if 0
+static char *skip_token(char *ptr)
+{
+ while(isspace((unsigned char)*ptr)) ptr++;
+ while(!isspace((unsigned char)*ptr) && !iscntrl((unsigned char)*ptr)) ptr++;
+ while(isspace((unsigned char)*ptr)) ptr++;
+ return(ptr);
+}
+#endif
+
static int imap_fetch_headers(int sock, struct query *ctl,int number,int *lenp)
/* request headers of nth message */
{
char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1];
int num;
+ int ok;
+ char *ptr;
+ (void)ctl;
/* expunges change the fetch numbers */
number -= expunged;
gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.HEADER", number);
/* looking for FETCH response */
- do {
- int ok;
+ if ((ok = imap_response(sock, buf, NULL)) == PS_UNTAGGED)
+ {
+ int consumed;
+ /* expected response formats:
+ * IMAP> A0006 FETCH 1 RFC822.HEADER
+ * IMAP< * 1 FETCH (RFC822.HEADER {1360}
+ * IMAP< * 1 FETCH (UID 16 RFC822.HEADER {1360}
+ * IMAP< * 1 FETCH (UID 16 RFC822.SIZE 4029 RFC822.HEADER {1360}
+ */
+ if (sscanf(buf, "* %d %n", &num, &consumed) == 1
+ && 0 == strncasecmp(buf + consumed, "FETCH", 5)
+ && isspace((unsigned char)buf[5+consumed])
+ && num == number
+ && (ptr = strstr(buf, "RFC822.HEADER"))
+ && sscanf(ptr, "RFC822.HEADER {%d}%n", lenp, &consumed) == 1
+ && ptr[consumed-1] == '}')
+ {
+ return(PS_SUCCESS);
+ }
- if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
- return(ok);
- } while
- (sscanf(buf+2, "%d FETCH (%*s {%d}", &num, lenp) != 2);
+ /* wait for a tagged response */
+ imap_ok (sock, 0);
- if (num != number)
+ /* try to recover for some responses */
+ if (!strncmp(buf, "* NO", 4) ||
+ !strncmp(buf, "* BAD", 5) ||
+ strstr(buf, "FETCH ()"))
+ {
+ return(PS_TRANSIENT);
+ }
+
+ /* a response which does not match any of the above */
+ if (outlevel > O_SILENT)
+ report(stderr, GT_("Incorrect FETCH response: %s.\n"), buf);
return(PS_ERROR);
- else
- return(PS_SUCCESS);
+ }
+ else if (ok == PS_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ /* an unexpected tagged response */
+ if (outlevel > O_SILENT)
+ report(stderr, GT_("Incorrect FETCH response: %s.\n"), buf);
+ return(PS_TRANSIENT);
+ }
+ return(ok);
}
static int imap_fetch_body(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number, int *lenp)
char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1], *cp;
int num;
+ (void)ctl;
/* expunges change the fetch numbers */
number -= expunged;
* craps out during the message, it will still be marked `unseen' on
* the server.
*
- * However...*don't* do this if we're using keep to suppress deletion!
- * In that case, marking the seen flag is the only way to prevent the
- * message from being re-fetched on subsequent runs (and according
- * to RFC2060 p.43 this fetch should set Seen as a side effect).
+ * According to RFC2060, and Mark Crispin the IMAP maintainer,
+ * FETCH %d BODY[TEXT] and RFC822.TEXT are "functionally
+ * equivalent". However, we know of at least one server that
+ * treats them differently in the presence of MIME attachments;
+ * the latter form downloads the attachment, the former does not.
+ * The server is InterChange.
+ *
+ * When I tried working around this by disabling use of the 4rev1 form,
+ * I found that doing this breaks operation with M$ Exchange.
+ * Annoyingly enough, Exchange's refusal to cope is technically legal
+ * under RFC2062.
*/
switch (imap_version)
{
case IMAP4rev1: /* RFC 2060 */
- if (!ctl->keep)
- gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d BODY.PEEK[TEXT]", number);
- else
- gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d BODY[TEXT]", number);
+ default:
+ gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d BODY.PEEK[TEXT]", number);
break;
case IMAP4: /* RFC 1730 */
- if (!ctl->keep)
- gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.TEXT.PEEK", number);
- else
- gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.TEXT", number);
- break;
-
- default: /* RFC 1176 */
- gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.TEXT", number);
+ gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.TEXT.PEEK", number);
break;
}
if (num != number)
return(PS_ERROR);
+ /* Understand "NIL" as length => no body present
+ * (MS Exchange, BerliOS Bug #11980) */
+ if (strstr(buf+10, "NIL)")) {
+ *lenp = 0;
+ return PS_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ /* Understand the empty string. Seen on Yahoo. */
+ /* XXX FIXME: we should be able to handle strings here. */
+ if (strstr(buf+10, "\"\")")) {
+ *lenp = 0;
+ return PS_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
/*
* Try to extract a length from the FETCH response. RFC2060 requires
* it to be present, but at least one IMAP server (Novell GroupWise)
- * botches this.
+ * botches this. The overflow check is needed because of a broken
+ * server called dbmail that returns huge garbage lengths.
*/
- if ((cp = strchr(buf, '{')))
- *lenp = atoi(cp + 1);
- else
+ if ((cp = strchr(buf, '{'))) {
+ long l; char *t;
+ errno = 0;
+ ++ cp;
+ l = strtol(cp, &t, 10);
+ if (errno || t == cp || (t && !strchr(t, '}')) /* parse error */
+ || l < 0 || l > INT_MAX /* range check */) {
+ *lenp = -1;
+ } else {
+ *lenp = l;
+ }
+ } else {
*lenp = -1; /* missing length part in FETCH reponse */
+ }
- return(PS_SUCCESS);
+ return PS_SUCCESS;
}
-static int imap_trail(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
+static int imap_trail(int sock, struct query *ctl, const char *tag)
/* discard tail of FETCH response after reading message text */
{
/* expunges change the fetch numbers */
/* number -= expunged; */
- for (;;)
- {
- char buf[MSGBUFSIZE+1];
- int ok;
-
- if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
- return(ok);
-
- /* UW IMAP returns "OK FETCH", Cyrus returns "OK Completed" */
- if (strstr(buf, "OK"))
- break;
-
-#ifdef __UNUSED__
- /*
- * Any IMAP server that fails to set Seen on a BODY[TEXT]
- * fetch violates RFC2060 p.43 (top). This becomes an issue
- * when keep is on, because seen messages aren't deleted and
- * get refetched on each poll. As a workaround, if keep is on
- * we can set the Seen flag explicitly.
- *
- * This code isn't used yet because we don't know of any IMAP
- * servers broken in this way.
- */
- if (ctl->keep)
- if ((ok = gen_transact(sock,
- imap_version == IMAP4
- ? "STORE %d +FLAGS.SILENT (\\Seen)"
- : "STORE %d +FLAGS (\\Seen)",
- number)))
- return(ok);
-#endif /* __UNUSED__ */
- }
+ (void)ctl;
+ (void)tag;
- return(PS_SUCCESS);
+ return imap_ok(sock, NULL);
}
static int imap_delete(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
{
int ok;
+ (void)ctl;
/* expunges change the fetch numbers */
number -= expunged;
/*
- * Use SILENT if possible as a minor throughput optimization.
- * Note: this has been dropped from IMAP4rev1.
- *
* We set Seen because there are some IMAP servers (notably HP
* OpenMail) that do message-receipt DSNs, but only when the seen
* bit is set. This is the appropriate time -- we get here right
* after the local SMTP response that says delivery was
* successful.
*/
- if ((ok = gen_transact(sock,
- imap_version == IMAP4
- ? "STORE %d +FLAGS.SILENT (\\Seen \\Deleted)"
- : "STORE %d +FLAGS (\\Seen \\Deleted)",
- number)))
+ if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "STORE %d +FLAGS.SILENT (\\Seen \\Deleted)", number)))
return(ok);
else
deletions++;
* the next session.
*/
if (NUM_NONZERO(expunge_period) && (deletions % expunge_period) == 0)
- internal_expunge(sock);
+ {
+ if ((ok = internal_expunge(sock)))
+ return(ok);
+ }
+
+ return(PS_SUCCESS);
+}
+
+static int imap_mark_seen(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
+/* mark the given message as seen */
+{
+ (void)ctl;
+ /* expunges change the message numbers */
+ number -= expunged;
+
+ return(gen_transact(sock,"STORE %d +FLAGS.SILENT (\\Seen)", number));
+}
+
+static int imap_end_mailbox_poll(int sock, struct query *ctl)
+/* cleanup mailbox before we idle or switch to another one */
+{
+ (void)ctl;
+ if (deletions)
+ internal_expunge(sock);
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
static int imap_logout(int sock, struct query *ctl)
/* send logout command */
{
+ (void)ctl;
/* if any un-expunged deletions remain, ship an expunge now */
if (deletions)
internal_expunge(sock);
+#ifdef USE_SEARCH
+ /* Memory clean-up */
+ if (unseen_messages)
+ free(unseen_messages);
+#endif /* USE_SEARCH */
+
return(gen_transact(sock, "LOGOUT"));
}
-const static struct method imap =
+static const struct method imap =
{
"IMAP", /* Internet Message Access Protocol */
-#if INET6_ENABLE
- "imap",
- "imaps",
-#else /* INET6_ENABLE */
- 143, /* standard IMAP2bis/IMAP4 port */
- 993, /* ssl IMAP2bis/IMAP4 port */
-#endif /* INET6_ENABLE */
+ "imap", /* service (plain and TLS) */
+ "imaps", /* service (SSL) */
TRUE, /* this is a tagged protocol */
FALSE, /* no message delimiter */
imap_ok, /* parse command response */
- imap_canonicalize, /* deal with embedded slashes and spaces */
imap_getauth, /* get authorization */
imap_getrange, /* query range of messages */
imap_getsizes, /* get sizes of messages (used for ESMTP SIZE option) */
+ imap_getpartialsizes, /* get sizes of subset of messages (used for ESMTP SIZE option) */
imap_is_old, /* no UID check */
imap_fetch_headers, /* request given message headers */
imap_fetch_body, /* request given message body */
imap_trail, /* eat message trailer */
imap_delete, /* delete the message */
+ imap_mark_seen, /* how to mark a message as seen */
+ imap_end_mailbox_poll, /* end-of-mailbox processing */
imap_logout, /* expunge and exit */
TRUE, /* yes, we can re-poll */
};
projects / ~andy / fetchmail / blobdiff