/*
* imap.c -- IMAP2bis/IMAP4 protocol methods
*
- * Copyright 1996 by Eric S. Raymond
- * All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright 1997 by Eric S. Raymond
* For license terms, see the file COPYING in this directory.
*/
-#include <config.h>
+#include "config.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#endif
#include "fetchmail.h"
#include "socket.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+
+#ifdef KERBEROS_V4
+#ifdef KERBEROS_V5
+#include <kerberosIV/des.h>
+#include <kerberosIV/krb.h>
+#else
+#if defined (__bsdi__)
+#include <des.h>
+#define krb_get_err_text(e) (krb_err_txt[e])
+#endif
+#if defined(__NetBSD__) || (__FreeBSD__) || defined(__linux__)
+#define krb_get_err_text(e) (krb_err_txt[e])
+#endif
+#include <krb.h>
+#endif
+#endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
+#include <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h>
+#endif
+
+#if OPIE
+#include <opie.h>
+#endif /* OPIE */
+
+#ifndef strstr /* glibc-2.1 declares this as a macro */
extern char *strstr(); /* needed on sysV68 R3V7.1. */
+#endif /* strstr */
/* imap_version values */
#define IMAP2 -1 /* IMAP2 or IMAP2BIS, RFC1176 */
#define IMAP4 0 /* IMAP4 rev 0, RFC1730 */
#define IMAP4rev1 1 /* IMAP4 rev 1, RFC2060 */
-static int count, seen, recent, unseen, deletecount, imap_version;
+static int count, seen, recent, unseen, deletions, expunged, imap_version;
+static char capabilities[MSGBUFSIZE+1];
-int imap_ok (FILE *sockfp, char *argbuf)
+int imap_ok(int sock, char *argbuf)
/* parse command response */
{
- char buf [POPBUFSIZE+1];
+ char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1];
seen = 0;
do {
int ok;
+ char *cp;
- if (ok = gen_recv(sockfp, buf, sizeof(buf)))
+ if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
return(ok);
+ /* all tokens in responses are caseblind */
+ for (cp = buf; *cp; cp++)
+ if (islower(*cp))
+ *cp = toupper(*cp);
+
/* interpret untagged status responses */
+ if (strstr(buf, "* CAPABILITY"))
+ strncpy(capabilities, buf + 12, sizeof(capabilities));
if (strstr(buf, "EXISTS"))
count = atoi(buf+2);
if (strstr(buf, "RECENT"))
recent = atoi(buf+2);
if (strstr(buf, "UNSEEN"))
- unseen = atoi(buf+2);
+ {
+ char *cp;
+
+ /*
+ * Handle both "* 42 UNSEEN" (if tha ever happens) and
+ * "* OK [UNSEEN 42] 42". Note that what this gets us is
+ * a minimum index, not a count.
+ */
+ unseen = 0;
+ for (cp = buf; *cp && !isdigit(*cp); cp++)
+ continue;
+ unseen = atoi(cp);
+ }
if (strstr(buf, "FLAGS"))
- seen = (strstr(buf, "Seen") != (char *)NULL);
+ seen = (strstr(buf, "SEEN") != (char *)NULL);
} while
(tag[0] != '\0' && strncmp(buf, tag, strlen(tag)));
if (tag[0] == '\0')
{
- strcpy(argbuf, buf);
+ if (argbuf)
+ strcpy(argbuf, buf);
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
else
if (strncmp(cp, "OK", 2) == 0)
{
- strcpy(argbuf, cp);
+ if (argbuf)
+ strcpy(argbuf, cp);
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
- else if (strncmp(cp, "BAD", 2) == 0)
+ else if (strncmp(cp, "BAD", 3) == 0)
+ return(PS_ERROR);
+ else if (strncmp(cp, "NO", 2) == 0)
return(PS_ERROR);
else
return(PS_PROTOCOL);
}
}
-int imap_getauth(FILE *sockfp, struct query *ctl, char *buf)
-/* apply for connection authorization */
+#if OPIE
+static int do_otp(int sock, struct query *ctl)
{
- char rbuf [POPBUFSIZE+1];
+ int i, rval;
+ char buffer[128];
+ char challenge[OPIE_CHALLENGE_MAX+1];
+ char response[OPIE_RESPONSE_MAX+1];
- /* try to get authorized */
- int ok = gen_transact(sockfp,
- "LOGIN %s \"%s\"",
- ctl->remotename, ctl->password);
+ gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE X-OTP");
- if (ok)
- return(ok);
+ if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
+ return rval;
+
+ if ((i = from64tobits(challenge, buffer)) < 0) {
+ report(stderr, -1, _("Could not decode initial BASE64 challenge"));
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ };
+
+
+ to64frombits(buffer, ctl->remotename, strlen(ctl->remotename));
+
+ if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
+ report(stdout, 0, "IMAP> %s", buffer);
+ SockWrite(sock, buffer, strlen(buffer));
+ SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
+
+ if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
+ return rval;
+
+ if ((i = from64tobits(challenge, buffer)) < 0) {
+ report(stderr, -1, _("Could not decode OTP challenge"));
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ };
+
+ rval = opiegenerator(challenge, !strcmp(ctl->password, "opie") ? "" : ctl->password, response);
+ if ((rval == -2) && !run.poll_interval) {
+ char secret[OPIE_SECRET_MAX+1];
+ fprintf(stderr, _("Secret pass phrase: "));
+ if (opiereadpass(secret, sizeof(secret), 0))
+ rval = opiegenerator(challenge, secret, response);
+ memset(secret, 0, sizeof(secret));
+ };
+
+ if (rval)
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+
+ to64frombits(buffer, response, strlen(response));
+
+ if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
+ report(stdout, 0, "IMAP> %s", buffer);
+ SockWrite(sock, buffer, strlen(buffer));
+ SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
+
+ if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
+ return rval;
+
+ if (strstr(buffer, "OK"))
+ return PS_SUCCESS;
+ else
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+};
+#endif /* OPIE */
+
+#ifdef KERBEROS_V4
+#if SIZEOF_INT == 4
+typedef int int32;
+#elif SIZEOF_SHORT == 4
+typedef short int32;
+#elif SIZEOF_LONG == 4
+typedef long int32;
+#else
+#error Cannot deduce a 32-bit-type
+#endif
+
+static int do_rfc1731(int sock, char *truename)
+/* authenticate as per RFC1731 -- note 32-bit integer requirement here */
+{
+ int result = 0, len;
+ char buf1[4096], buf2[4096];
+ union {
+ int32 cint;
+ char cstr[4];
+ } challenge1, challenge2;
+ char srvinst[INST_SZ];
+ char *p;
+ char srvrealm[REALM_SZ];
+ KTEXT_ST authenticator;
+ CREDENTIALS credentials;
+ char tktuser[MAX_K_NAME_SZ+1+INST_SZ+1+REALM_SZ+1];
+ char tktinst[INST_SZ];
+ char tktrealm[REALM_SZ];
+ des_cblock session;
+ des_key_schedule schedule;
+
+ gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE KERBEROS_V4");
+
+ /* The data encoded in the first ready response contains a random
+ * 32-bit number in network byte order. The client should respond
+ * with a Kerberos ticket and an authenticator for the principal
+ * "imap.hostname@realm", where "hostname" is the first component
+ * of the host name of the server with all letters in lower case
+ * and where "realm" is the Kerberos realm of the server. The
+ * encrypted checksum field included within the Kerberos
+ * authenticator should contain the server provided 32-bit number
+ * in network byte order.
+ */
+
+ if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ len = from64tobits(challenge1.cstr, buf1);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ report(stderr, -1, _("could not decode initial BASE64 challenge"));
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ }
+
+ /* Client responds with a Kerberos ticket and an authenticator for
+ * the principal "imap.hostname@realm" where "hostname" is the
+ * first component of the host name of the server with all letters
+ * in lower case and where "realm" is the Kerberos realm of the
+ * server. The encrypted checksum field included within the
+ * Kerberos authenticator should contain the server-provided
+ * 32-bit number in network byte order.
+ */
+
+ strncpy(srvinst, truename, (sizeof srvinst)-1);
+ srvinst[(sizeof srvinst)-1] = '\0';
+ for (p = srvinst; *p; p++) {
+ if (isupper(*p)) {
+ *p = tolower(*p);
+ }
+ }
+
+ strncpy(srvrealm, (char *)krb_realmofhost(srvinst), (sizeof srvrealm)-1);
+ srvrealm[(sizeof srvrealm)-1] = '\0';
+ if (p = strchr(srvinst, '.')) {
+ *p = '\0';
+ }
+
+ result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm, 0);
+ if (result) {
+ report(stderr, -1, "krb_mq_req: %s", krb_get_err_text(result));
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ }
+
+ result = krb_get_cred("imap", srvinst, srvrealm, &credentials);
+ if (result) {
+ report(stderr, -1, "krb_get_cred: %s", krb_get_err_text(result));
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(session, credentials.session, sizeof session);
+ memset(&credentials, 0, sizeof credentials);
+ des_key_sched(session, schedule);
+
+ result = krb_get_tf_fullname(TKT_FILE, tktuser, tktinst, tktrealm);
+ if (result) {
+ report(stderr, -1, "krb_get_tf_fullname: %s", krb_get_err_text(result));
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(tktuser, user) != 0) {
+ report(stderr, -1, _("principal %s in ticket does not match -u %s"), tktuser,
+ user);
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ }
+
+ if (tktinst[0]) {
+ report(stderr, 0, _("non-null instance (%s) might cause strange behavior"),
+ tktinst);
+ strcat(tktuser, ".");
+ strcat(tktuser, tktinst);
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(tktrealm, srvrealm) != 0) {
+ strcat(tktuser, "@");
+ strcat(tktuser, tktrealm);
+ }
+
+ result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm,
+ challenge1.cint);
+ if (result) {
+ report(stderr, -1, "krb_mq_req: %s", krb_get_err_text(result));
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ }
+
+ to64frombits(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length);
+ if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
+ report(stdout, 0, "IMAP> %s", buf1);
+ }
+ SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
+ SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
+
+ /* Upon decrypting and verifying the ticket and authenticator, the
+ * server should verify that the contained checksum field equals
+ * the original server provided random 32-bit number. Should the
+ * verification be successful, the server must add one to the
+ * checksum and construct 8 octets of data, with the first four
+ * octets containing the incremented checksum in network byte
+ * order, the fifth octet containing a bit-mask specifying the
+ * protection mechanisms supported by the server, and the sixth
+ * through eighth octets containing, in network byte order, the
+ * maximum cipher-text buffer size the server is able to receive.
+ * The server must encrypt the 8 octets of data in the session key
+ * and issue that encrypted data in a second ready response. The
+ * client should consider the server authenticated if the first
+ * four octets the un-encrypted data is equal to one plus the
+ * checksum it previously sent.
+ */
+
+ if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
+ return result;
+
+ /* The client must construct data with the first four octets
+ * containing the original server-issued checksum in network byte
+ * order, the fifth octet containing the bit-mask specifying the
+ * selected protection mechanism, the sixth through eighth octets
+ * containing in network byte order the maximum cipher-text buffer
+ * size the client is able to receive, and the following octets
+ * containing a user name string. The client must then append
+ * from one to eight octets so that the length of the data is a
+ * multiple of eight octets. The client must then PCBC encrypt the
+ * data with the session key and respond to the second ready
+ * response with the encrypted data. The server decrypts the data
+ * and verifies the contained checksum. The username field
+ * identifies the user for whom subsequent IMAP operations are to
+ * be performed; the server must verify that the principal
+ * identified in the Kerberos ticket is authorized to connect as
+ * that user. After these verifications, the authentication
+ * process is complete.
+ */
+
+ len = from64tobits(buf2, buf1);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ report(stderr, -1, _("could not decode BASE64 ready response"));
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ }
+
+ des_ecb_encrypt((des_cblock *)buf2, (des_cblock *)buf2, schedule, 0);
+ memcpy(challenge2.cstr, buf2, 4);
+ if (ntohl(challenge2.cint) != challenge1.cint + 1) {
+ report(stderr, -1, _("challenge mismatch"));
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ }
+
+ memset(authenticator.dat, 0, sizeof authenticator.dat);
+
+ result = htonl(challenge1.cint);
+ memcpy(authenticator.dat, &result, sizeof result);
+
+ /* The protection mechanisms and their corresponding bit-masks are as
+ * follows:
+ *
+ * 1 No protection mechanism
+ * 2 Integrity (krb_mk_safe) protection
+ * 4 Privacy (krb_mk_priv) protection
+ */
+ authenticator.dat[4] = 1;
+
+ len = strlen(tktuser);
+ strncpy(authenticator.dat+8, tktuser, len);
+ authenticator.length = len + 8 + 1;
+ while (authenticator.length & 7) {
+ authenticator.length++;
+ }
+ des_pcbc_encrypt((des_cblock *)authenticator.dat,
+ (des_cblock *)authenticator.dat, authenticator.length, schedule,
+ &session, 1);
+
+ to64frombits(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length);
+ if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
+ report(stdout, 0, "IMAP> %s", buf1);
+ }
+ SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
+ SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
+
+ if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
+ return result;
+
+ if (strstr(buf1, "OK")) {
+ return PS_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ else {
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ }
+}
+#endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#define GSSAUTH_P_NONE 1
+#define GSSAUTH_P_INTEGRITY 2
+#define GSSAUTH_P_PRIVACY 4
+
+static int do_gssauth(int sock, char *hostname, char *username)
+{
+ gss_buffer_desc request_buf, send_token;
+ gss_buffer_t sec_token;
+ gss_name_t target_name;
+ gss_ctx_id_t context;
+ gss_OID mech_name;
+ gss_qop_t quality;
+ int cflags;
+ OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat;
+ char buf1[8192], buf2[8192], server_conf_flags;
+ unsigned long buf_size;
+ int result;
+
+ /* first things first: get an imap ticket for host */
+ sprintf(buf1, "imap@%s", hostname);
+ request_buf.value = buf1;
+ request_buf.length = strlen(buf1) + 1;
+ maj_stat = gss_import_name(&min_stat, &request_buf, gss_nt_service_name,
+ &target_name);
+ if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ report(stderr, -1, _("Couldn't get service name for [%s]"), buf1);
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ }
+ else if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
+ maj_stat = gss_display_name(&min_stat, target_name, &request_buf,
+ &mech_name);
+ report(stderr, 0, _("Using service name [%s]"),request_buf.value);
+ maj_stat = gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &request_buf);
+ }
+
+ gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE GSSAPI");
+
+ /* upon receipt of the GSSAPI authentication request, server returns
+ * null data ready response. */
+ if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ /* now start the security context initialisation loop... */
+ sec_token = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
+ context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
+ report(stdout, 0, _("Sending credentials"));
+ do {
+ maj_stat = gss_init_sec_context(&min_stat, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
+ &context, target_name, NULL, 0, 0, NULL, sec_token, NULL,
+ &send_token, &cflags, NULL);
+ if (maj_stat!=GSS_S_COMPLETE && maj_stat!=GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
+ report(stderr, -1,_("Error exchanging credentials"));
+ gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
+ /* wake up server and await NO response */
+ SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
+ if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
+ return result;
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ }
+ to64frombits(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length);
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
+ SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
+ SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
+ if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
+ report(stdout, 0, "IMAP> %s", buf1);
+ if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
+ if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
+ gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
+ return result;
+ }
+ request_buf.length = from64tobits(buf2, buf1 + 2);
+ request_buf.value = buf2;
+ sec_token = &request_buf;
+ }
+ } while (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
+ gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
+
+ /* get security flags and buffer size */
+ if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
+ return result;
+ }
+ request_buf.length = from64tobits(buf2, buf1 + 2);
+ request_buf.value = buf2;
+
+ maj_stat = gss_unwrap(&min_stat, context, &request_buf, &send_token,
+ &cflags, &quality);
+ if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ report(stderr, 0,-1,_("Couldn't unwrap security level data"));
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ }
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, 0, _("Credential exchange complete"));
+ /* first octet is security levels supported. We want none, for now */
+ server_conf_flags = ((char *)send_token.value)[0];
+ if ( !(((char *)send_token.value)[0] & GSSAUTH_P_NONE) ) {
+ report(stderr, 0,-1,_("Server requires integrity and/or privacy"));
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ }
+ ((char *)send_token.value)[0] = 0;
+ buf_size = ntohl(*((long *)send_token.value));
+ /* we don't care about buffer size if we don't wrap data */
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
+ report(stdout, 0, _("Unwrapped security level flags: %s%s%s"),
+ server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_NONE ? "N" : "-",
+ server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_INTEGRITY ? "I" : "-",
+ server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_PRIVACY ? "C" : "-");
+ report(stdout, 0, _("Maximum GSS token size is %ld"),buf_size);
+ }
+
+ /* now respond in kind (hack!!!) */
+ buf_size = htonl(buf_size); /* do as they do... only matters if we do enc */
+ memcpy(buf1, &buf_size, 4);
+ buf1[0] = GSSAUTH_P_NONE;
+ strcpy(buf1+4, username); /* server decides if princ is user */
+ request_buf.length = 4 + strlen(username) + 1;
+ request_buf.value = buf1;
+ maj_stat = gss_wrap(&min_stat, context, 0, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, &request_buf,
+ &cflags, &send_token);
+ if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ report(stderr, 0,-1,_("Error creating security level request"));
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ }
+ to64frombits(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length);
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
+ report(stdout, 0, _("Requesting authorisation as %s"), username);
+ report(stdout, 0, "IMAP> %s",buf1);
+ }
+ SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
+ SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
+
+ /* we should be done. Get status and finish up */
+ if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
+ return result;
+ if (strstr(buf1, "OK")) {
+ /* flush security context */
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, 0, _("Releasing GSS credentials"));
+ maj_stat = gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat, &context, &send_token);
+ if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ report(stderr, -1, _("Error releasing credentials"));
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ }
+ /* send_token may contain a notification to the server to flush
+ * credentials. RFC 1731 doesn't specify what to do, and since this
+ * support is only for authentication, we'll assume the server
+ * knows enough to flush its own credentials */
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
+ return PS_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+}
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+int imap_canonicalize(char *result, char *passwd)
+/* encode an IMAP password as per RFC1730's quoting conventions */
+{
+ int i, j;
+
+ j = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < strlen(passwd); i++)
+ {
+ if ((passwd[i] == '\\') || (passwd[i] == '"'))
+ result[j++] = '\\';
+ result[j++] = passwd[i];
+ }
+ result[j] = '\0';
+
+ return(i);
+}
+
+int imap_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting)
+/* apply for connection authorization */
+{
+ int ok = 0;
+ char password[PASSWORDLEN*2];
/* probe to see if we're running IMAP4 and can use RFC822.PEEK */
- gen_send(sockfp, "CAPABILITY");
- if (ok = gen_recv(sockfp, rbuf, sizeof(rbuf)))
- return(ok);
- if (strstr(rbuf, "BAD"))
+ capabilities[0] = '\0';
+ if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "CAPABILITY")) == PS_SUCCESS)
{
- imap_version = IMAP2;
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
- error(0, 0, "Protocol identified as IMAP2 or IMAP2BIS");
+ /* UW-IMAP server 10.173 notifies in all caps */
+ if (strstr(capabilities, "IMAP4REV1"))
+ {
+ imap_version = IMAP4rev1;
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, 0, _("Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 1"));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ imap_version = IMAP4;
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, 0, _("Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 0"));
+ }
}
- else if (strstr(rbuf, "IMAP4rev1"))
+ else if (ok == PS_ERROR)
{
- imap_version = IMAP4rev1;
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
- error(0, 0, "Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 1");
+ imap_version = IMAP2;
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, 0, _("Protocol identified as IMAP2 or IMAP2BIS"));
}
else
+ return(ok);
+
+ peek_capable = (imap_version >= IMAP4);
+
+#if OPIE
+ if ((ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP) && strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=X-OTP"))
{
- imap_version = IMAP4;
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
- error(0, 0, "Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 0");
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, 0, _("OTP authentication is supported"));
+ if (do_otp(sock, ctl) == PS_SUCCESS)
+ return(PS_SUCCESS);
+ };
+#endif /* OPIE */
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=GSSAPI"))
+ {
+ if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_GSS)
+ {
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, 0, _("GSS authentication is supported"));
+ return do_gssauth(sock, ctl->server.truename, ctl->remotename);
+ }
}
+ else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_GSS)
+ {
+ report(stderr, 0,-1, _("Required GSS capability not supported by server"));
+ return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
+ }
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
- peek_capable = (imap_version >= IMAP4);
+#ifdef KERBEROS_V4
+ if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=KERBEROS_V4"))
+ {
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, 0, _("KERBEROS_V4 authentication is supported"));
+ if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_K4)
+ {
+ if ((ok = do_rfc1731(sock, ctl->server.truename)))
+ {
+ if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
+ report(stdout, 0, "IMAP> *");
+ SockWrite(sock, "*\r\n", 3);
+ }
+
+ return(ok);
+ }
+ /* else fall through to ordinary AUTH=LOGIN case */
+ }
+ else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_K4)
+ {
+ report(stderr, 0,-1, _("Required KERBEROS_V4 capability not supported by server"));
+ return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
+ }
+#endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
+
+#ifdef __UNUSED__ /* The Cyrus IMAP4rev1 server chokes on this */
+ /* this handles either AUTH=LOGIN or AUTH-LOGIN */
+ if ((imap_version >= IMAP4rev1) && (!strstr(capabilities, "LOGIN"))) {
+ report(stderr, 0,-1, _("Required LOGIN capability not supported by server"));
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ };
+#endif /* __UNUSED__ */
+
+ imap_canonicalize(password, ctl->password);
+ ok = gen_transact(sock, "LOGIN \"%s\" \"%s\"", ctl->remotename, password);
+ if (ok)
+ return(ok);
+
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
-static int imap_getrange(FILE *sockfp, struct query *ctl, int*countp, int*newp)
+static int internal_expunge(int sock)
+/* ship an expunge, resetting associated counters */
+{
+ int ok;
+
+ if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "EXPUNGE")))
+ return(ok);
+
+ expunged += deletions;
+ deletions = 0;
+
+#ifdef IMAP_UID /* not used */
+ expunge_uids(ctl);
+#endif /* IMAP_UID */
+
+ return(PS_SUCCESS);
+}
+
+static int imap_getrange(int sock,
+ struct query *ctl,
+ const char *folder,
+ int *countp, int *newp, int *bytes)
/* get range of messages to be fetched */
{
int ok;
/* find out how many messages are waiting */
- recent = unseen = 0;
- ok = gen_transact(sockfp,
- "SELECT %s",
- ctl->mailbox ? ctl->mailbox : "INBOX");
- if (ok != 0)
+ *bytes = recent = unseen = -1;
+
+ if (pass > 1)
{
- error(0, 0, "mailbox selection failed");
- return(ok);
+ /*
+ * We have to have an expunge here, otherwise the re-poll will
+ * infinite-loop picking up un-expunged message.
+ */
+ ok = 0;
+ if (deletions && ctl->expunge > 1)
+ internal_expunge(sock);
+ count = -1;
+ if (ok || gen_transact(sock, "NOOP"))
+ {
+ report(stderr, 0, _("re-poll failed"));
+ return(ok);
+ }
+ else if (count == -1) /* no EXISTS response to NOOP */
+ {
+ count = recent = 0;
+ unseen = -1;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (!check_only)
+ ok = gen_transact(sock, "SELECT %s", folder ? folder : "INBOX");
+ else
+ ok = gen_transact(sock, "EXAMINE %s", folder ? folder : "INBOX");
+ if (ok != 0)
+ {
+ report(stderr, 0, _("mailbox selection failed"));
+ return(ok);
+ }
}
*countp = count;
- if (unseen) /* optional response, but better if we see it */
- *newp = unseen;
- else if (recent) /* mandatory */
+ /*
+ * Note: because IMAP has an is_old method, this number is used
+ * only for the "X messages (Y unseen)" notification. Accordingly
+ * it doesn't matter much that it can be wrong (e.g. if we see an
+ * UNSEEN response but not all messages above the first UNSEEN one
+ * are likewise).
+ */
+ if (unseen >= 0) /* optional, but better if we see it */
+ *newp = count - unseen + 1;
+ else if (recent >= 0) /* mandatory */
*newp = recent;
else
- *newp = -1; /* should never happen, RECENT is mandatory */
+ *newp = -1; /* should never happen, RECENT is mandatory */
- deletecount = 0;
+ expunged = 0;
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
-static int imap_getsizes(FILE *sockfp, int count, int *sizes)
+static int imap_getsizes(int sock, int count, int *sizes)
/* capture the sizes of all messages */
{
- char buf [POPBUFSIZE+1];
+ char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1];
- gen_send(sockfp, "FETCH 1:%d RFC822.SIZE", count);
- while (SockGets(buf, sizeof(buf), sockfp))
+ /*
+ * Some servers (as in, PMDF5.1-9.1 under OpenVMS 6.1)
+ * won't accept 1:1 as valid set syntax. Some implementors
+ * should be taken out and shot for excessive anality.
+ */
+ if (count == 1)
+ gen_send(sock, "FETCH 1 RFC822.SIZE", count);
+ else
+ gen_send(sock, "FETCH 1:%d RFC822.SIZE", count);
+ for (;;)
{
int num, size, ok;
- if (ok = gen_recv(sockfp, buf, sizeof(buf)))
+ if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
return(ok);
if (strstr(buf, "OK"))
break;
else if (sscanf(buf, "* %d FETCH (RFC822.SIZE %d)", &num, &size) == 2)
sizes[num - 1] = size;
- else
- sizes[num - 1] = -1;
}
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
-static int imap_is_old(FILE *sockfp, struct query *ctl, int number)
+static int imap_is_old(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
/* is the given message old? */
{
int ok;
/* expunges change the fetch numbers */
- number -= deletecount;
+ number -= expunged;
- if ((ok = gen_transact(sockfp, "FETCH %d FLAGS", number)) != 0)
+ if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "FETCH %d FLAGS", number)) != 0)
return(PS_ERROR);
return(seen);
}
-static int imap_fetch(FILE *sockfp, struct query *ctl, int number, int *lenp)
-/* request nth message */
+static int imap_fetch_headers(int sock, struct query *ctl,int number,int *lenp)
+/* request headers of nth message */
+{
+ char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1];
+ int num;
+
+ /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
+ number -= expunged;
+
+ /*
+ * This is blessed by RFC 1176, RFC1730, RFC2060.
+ * According to the RFCs, it should *not* set the \Seen flag.
+ */
+ gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.HEADER", number);
+
+ /* looking for FETCH response */
+ do {
+ int ok;
+
+ if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
+ return(ok);
+ } while
+ (sscanf(buf+2, "%d FETCH (%*s {%d}", &num, lenp) != 2);
+
+ if (num != number)
+ return(PS_ERROR);
+ else
+ return(PS_SUCCESS);
+}
+
+static int imap_fetch_body(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number, int *lenp)
+/* request body of nth message */
{
- char buf [POPBUFSIZE+1], *fetch;
+ char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1], *cp;
int num;
/* expunges change the fetch numbers */
- number -= deletecount;
+ number -= expunged;
/*
* If we're using IMAP4, we can fetch the message without setting its
{
case IMAP4rev1: /* RFC 2060 */
if (!ctl->keep)
- gen_send(sockfp, "FETCH %d BODY.PEEK[]", number);
+ gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d BODY.PEEK[TEXT]", number);
else
- gen_send(sockfp, "FETCH %d BODY", number);
+ gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d BODY[TEXT]", number);
break;
case IMAP4: /* RFC 1730 */
if (!ctl->keep)
- gen_send(sockfp, "FETCH %d RFC822.PEEK", number);
+ gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.TEXT.PEEK", number);
else
- gen_send(sockfp, "FETCH %d RFC822", number);
+ gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.TEXT", number);
break;
default: /* RFC 1176 */
- gen_send(sockfp, "FETCH %d RFC822", number);
+ gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.TEXT", number);
break;
}
do {
int ok;
- if (ok = gen_recv(sockfp, buf, sizeof(buf)))
+ if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
return(ok);
} while
- /* third token can be "RFC822" or "BODY[]" */
- (sscanf(buf+2, "%d FETCH (%*s {%d}", &num, lenp) != 2);
+ (sscanf(buf+2, "%d FETCH", &num) != 1);
if (num != number)
return(PS_ERROR);
+
+ /* try to extract a length */
+ if ((cp = strchr(buf, '{')))
+ *lenp = atoi(cp + 1);
else
- return(PS_SUCCESS);
+ *lenp = 0;
+
+ return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
-static int imap_trail(FILE *sockfp, struct query *ctl, int number)
+static int imap_trail(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
/* discard tail of FETCH response after reading message text */
{
- char buf [POPBUFSIZE+1];
-
/* expunges change the fetch numbers */
- /* number -= deletecount; */
+ /* number -= expunged; */
+
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ char buf[MSGBUFSIZE+1];
+ int ok;
+
+ if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
+ return(ok);
+
+ /* UW IMAP returns "OK FETCH", Cyrus returns "OK Completed" */
+ if (strstr(buf, "OK"))
+ break;
+ }
- return(gen_recv(sockfp, buf, sizeof(buf)));
+ return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
-static int imap_delete(FILE *sockfp, struct query *ctl, int number)
+static int imap_delete(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
/* set delete flag for given message */
{
int ok;
/* expunges change the fetch numbers */
- number -= deletecount;
+ number -= expunged;
- /* use SILENT if possible as a minor throughput optimization */
- if ((ok = gen_transact(sockfp,
- imap_version >= IMAP4
+ /*
+ * Use SILENT if possible as a minor throughput optimization.
+ * Note: this has been dropped from IMAP4rev1.
+ */
+ if ((ok = gen_transact(sock,
+ imap_version == IMAP4
? "STORE %d +FLAGS.SILENT (\\Deleted)"
: "STORE %d +FLAGS (\\Deleted)",
number)))
return(ok);
+ else
+ deletions++;
/*
- * We do an expunge after each message, rather than just before quit,
- * so that a line hit during a long session won't result in lots of
- * messages being fetched again during the next session.
+ * We do an expunge after ctl->expunge messages, rather than
+ * just before quit, so that a line hit during a long session
+ * won't result in lots of messages being fetched again during
+ * the next session.
*/
- if ((ok = gen_transact(sockfp, "EXPUNGE")))
- return(ok);
-
- deletecount++;
+ if (NUM_NONZERO(ctl->expunge) && (deletions % ctl->expunge) == 0)
+ internal_expunge(sock);
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
+static int imap_logout(int sock, struct query *ctl)
+/* send logout command */
+{
+ /* if expunges after deletion have been suppressed, ship one now */
+ if (NUM_SPECIFIED(ctl->expunge) && NUM_ZERO(ctl->expunge) && deletions)
+ internal_expunge(sock);
+
+ return(gen_transact(sock, "LOGOUT"));
+}
+
const static struct method imap =
{
"IMAP", /* Internet Message Access Protocol */
- 143, /* standard IMAP2bis/IMAP4 port */
- 1, /* this is a tagged protocol */
- 0, /* no message delimiter */
+#if INET6
+ "imap",
+#else /* INET6 */
+ 143, /* standard IMAP2bis/IMAP4 port */
+#endif /* INET6 */
+ TRUE, /* this is a tagged protocol */
+ FALSE, /* no message delimiter */
imap_ok, /* parse command response */
+ imap_canonicalize, /* deal with embedded slashes and spaces */
imap_getauth, /* get authorization */
imap_getrange, /* query range of messages */
- imap_getsizes, /* grab message sizes */
+ imap_getsizes, /* get sizes of messages (used for --limit option */
imap_is_old, /* no UID check */
- imap_fetch, /* request given message */
+ imap_fetch_headers, /* request given message headers */
+ imap_fetch_body, /* request given message body */
imap_trail, /* eat message trailer */
imap_delete, /* delete the message */
- "LOGOUT", /* the IMAP exit command */
+ imap_logout, /* expunge and exit */
+ TRUE, /* yes, we can re-poll */
};
int doIMAP(struct query *ctl)
projects / ~andy / fetchmail / blobdiff