#include <ctype.h>
#if defined(STDC_HEADERS)
#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <limits.h>
#endif
#include "fetchmail.h"
#include "socket.h"
-#ifdef KERBEROS_V4
-#ifdef KERBEROS_V5
-#include <kerberosIV/des.h>
-#include <kerberosIV/krb.h>
-#else
-#if defined (__bsdi__)
-#include <des.h>
-#define krb_get_err_text(e) (krb_err_txt[e])
-#endif
-#if defined(__NetBSD__) || (__FreeBSD__) || defined(__linux__)
-#define krb_get_err_text(e) (krb_err_txt[e])
-#endif
-#include <krb.h>
-#endif
-#endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
#include "i18n.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_H
-#include <gssapi.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H
-#include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
-#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
-#include <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h>
-#endif
-#ifndef HAVE_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE
-#define GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE gss_nt_service_name
-#endif
-#endif
-
-#include "md5.h"
-
#if OPIE_ENABLE
-#include <opie.h>
#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
#ifndef strstr /* glibc-2.1 declares this as a macro */
#define IMAP4 0 /* IMAP4 rev 0, RFC1730 */
#define IMAP4rev1 1 /* IMAP4 rev 1, RFC2060 */
-static int count, seen, recent, unseen, deletions, imap_version, preauth;
-static int expunged, expunge_period;
+static int count = 0, recentcount = 0, unseen = 0, deletions = 0;
+static unsigned int startcount = 1;
+static int expunged, expunge_period, saved_timeout = 0;
+static int imap_version, preauth;
+static flag do_idle;
static char capabilities[MSGBUFSIZE+1];
+static unsigned int *unseen_messages;
-int imap_ok(int sock, char *argbuf)
+static int imap_ok(int sock, char *argbuf)
/* parse command response */
{
- char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1];
+ char buf[MSGBUFSIZE+1];
- seen = 0;
do {
int ok;
char *cp;
/* interpret untagged status responses */
if (strstr(buf, "* CAPABILITY"))
+ {
strncpy(capabilities, buf + 12, sizeof(capabilities));
- if (strstr(buf, "EXISTS"))
- count = atoi(buf+2);
- if (strstr(buf, "RECENT"))
- recent = atoi(buf+2);
- if (strstr(buf, "UNSEEN"))
+ capabilities[sizeof(capabilities)-1] = '\0';
+ }
+ else if (strstr(buf, "EXISTS"))
{
- char *cp;
+ count = atoi(buf+2);
+ /*
+ * Don't trust the message count passed by the server.
+ * Without this check, it might be possible to do a
+ * DNS-spoofing attack that would pass back a ridiculous
+ * count, and allocate a malloc area that would overlap
+ * a portion of the stack.
+ */
+ if (count > INT_MAX/sizeof(int))
+ {
+ report(stderr, "bogus message count!");
+ return(PS_PROTOCOL);
+ }
/*
- * Handle both "* 42 UNSEEN" (if tha ever happens) and
- * "* OK [UNSEEN 42] 42". Note that what this gets us is
- * a minimum index, not a count.
+ * Nasty kluge to handle RFC2177 IDLE. If we know we're idling
+ * we can't wait for the tag matching the IDLE; we have to tell the
+ * server the IDLE is finished by shipping back a DONE when we
+ * see an EXISTS. Only after that will a tagged response be
+ * shipped. The idling flag also gets cleared on a timeout.
*/
- unseen = 0;
- for (cp = buf; *cp && !isdigit(*cp); cp++)
- continue;
- unseen = atoi(cp);
+ if (stage == STAGE_IDLE)
+ {
+ /* we do our own write and report here to disable tagging */
+ SockWrite(sock, "DONE\r\n", 6);
+ if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
+ report(stdout, "IMAP> DONE\n");
+
+ mytimeout = saved_timeout;
+ stage = STAGE_FETCH;
+ }
+ }
+ /* a space is required to avoid confusion with the \Recent flag */
+ else if (strstr(buf, " RECENT"))
+ {
+ recentcount = atoi(buf+2);
}
- if (strstr(buf, "FLAGS"))
- seen = (strstr(buf, "SEEN") != (char *)NULL);
- if (strstr(buf, "PREAUTH"))
+ else if (strstr(buf, "PREAUTH"))
preauth = TRUE;
+ /*
+ * The server may decide to make the mailbox read-only,
+ * which causes fetchmail to go into a endless loop
+ * fetching the same message over and over again.
+ *
+ * However, for check_only, we use EXAMINE which will
+ * mark the mailbox read-only as per the RFC.
+ *
+ * This checks for the condition and aborts if
+ * the mailbox is read-only.
+ *
+ * See RFC 2060 section 6.3.1 (SELECT).
+ * See RFC 2060 section 6.3.2 (EXAMINE).
+ */
+ else if (!check_only && strstr(buf, "[READ-ONLY]"))
+ return(PS_LOCKBUSY);
} while
(tag[0] != '\0' && strncmp(buf, tag, strlen(tag)));
while (isspace(*cp))
cp++;
- if (strncmp(cp, "PREAUTH", 2) == 0)
- {
- if (argbuf)
- strcpy(argbuf, cp);
- preauth = TRUE;
- return(PS_SUCCESS);
- }
- else if (strncmp(cp, "OK", 2) == 0)
+ if (strncasecmp(cp, "OK", 2) == 0)
{
if (argbuf)
strcpy(argbuf, cp);
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
- else if (strncmp(cp, "BAD", 3) == 0)
+ else if (strncasecmp(cp, "BAD", 3) == 0)
return(PS_ERROR);
- else if (strncmp(cp, "NO", 2) == 0)
+ else if (strncasecmp(cp, "NO", 2) == 0)
{
if (stage == STAGE_GETAUTH)
return(PS_AUTHFAIL); /* RFC2060, 6.2.2 */
}
}
-#if OPIE_ENABLE
-static int do_otp(int sock, struct query *ctl)
-{
- int i, rval;
- char buffer[128];
- char challenge[OPIE_CHALLENGE_MAX+1];
- char response[OPIE_RESPONSE_MAX+1];
-
- gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE X-OTP");
-
- if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
- return rval;
-
- if ((i = from64tobits(challenge, buffer)) < 0) {
- report(stderr, _("Could not decode initial BASE64 challenge\n"));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- };
-
-
- to64frombits(buffer, ctl->remotename, strlen(ctl->remotename));
-
- if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
- report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buffer);
-
- /* best not to count on the challenge code handling multiple writes */
- strcat(buffer, "\r\n");
- SockWrite(sock, buffer, strlen(buffer));
-
- if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
- return rval;
-
- if ((i = from64tobits(challenge, buffer)) < 0) {
- report(stderr, _("Could not decode OTP challenge\n"));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- };
-
- rval = opiegenerator(challenge, !strcmp(ctl->password, "opie") ? "" : ctl->password, response);
- if ((rval == -2) && !run.poll_interval) {
- char secret[OPIE_SECRET_MAX+1];
- fprintf(stderr, _("Secret pass phrase: "));
- if (opiereadpass(secret, sizeof(secret), 0))
- rval = opiegenerator(challenge, secret, response);
- memset(secret, 0, sizeof(secret));
- };
-
- if (rval)
- return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
-
- to64frombits(buffer, response, strlen(response));
-
- if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
- report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buffer);
- strcat(buffer, "\r\n");
- SockWrite(sock, buffer, strlen(buffer));
-
- if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
- return rval;
-
- if (strstr(buffer, "OK"))
- return PS_SUCCESS;
- else
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
-};
-#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
-
-#ifdef KERBEROS_V4
-#if SIZEOF_INT == 4
-typedef int int32;
-#elif SIZEOF_SHORT == 4
-typedef short int32;
-#elif SIZEOF_LONG == 4
-typedef long int32;
-#else
-#error Cannot deduce a 32-bit-type
-#endif
-
-static int do_rfc1731(int sock, char *truename)
-/* authenticate as per RFC1731 -- note 32-bit integer requirement here */
-{
- int result = 0, len;
- char buf1[4096], buf2[4096];
- union {
- int32 cint;
- char cstr[4];
- } challenge1, challenge2;
- char srvinst[INST_SZ];
- char *p;
- char srvrealm[REALM_SZ];
- KTEXT_ST authenticator;
- CREDENTIALS credentials;
- char tktuser[MAX_K_NAME_SZ+1+INST_SZ+1+REALM_SZ+1];
- char tktinst[INST_SZ];
- char tktrealm[REALM_SZ];
- des_cblock session;
- des_key_schedule schedule;
-
- gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE KERBEROS_V4");
-
- /* The data encoded in the first ready response contains a random
- * 32-bit number in network byte order. The client should respond
- * with a Kerberos ticket and an authenticator for the principal
- * "imap.hostname@realm", where "hostname" is the first component
- * of the host name of the server with all letters in lower case
- * and where "realm" is the Kerberos realm of the server. The
- * encrypted checksum field included within the Kerberos
- * authenticator should contain the server provided 32-bit number
- * in network byte order.
- */
-
- if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
- return result;
- }
-
- len = from64tobits(challenge1.cstr, buf1);
- if (len < 0) {
- report(stderr, _("could not decode initial BASE64 challenge\n"));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
-
- /* this patch by Dan Root <dar@thekeep.org> solves an endianess
- * problem. */
- {
- char tmp[4];
-
- *(int *)tmp = ntohl(*(int *) challenge1.cstr);
- memcpy(challenge1.cstr, tmp, sizeof(tmp));
- }
-
- /* Client responds with a Kerberos ticket and an authenticator for
- * the principal "imap.hostname@realm" where "hostname" is the
- * first component of the host name of the server with all letters
- * in lower case and where "realm" is the Kerberos realm of the
- * server. The encrypted checksum field included within the
- * Kerberos authenticator should contain the server-provided
- * 32-bit number in network byte order.
- */
-
- strncpy(srvinst, truename, (sizeof srvinst)-1);
- srvinst[(sizeof srvinst)-1] = '\0';
- for (p = srvinst; *p; p++) {
- if (isupper(*p)) {
- *p = tolower(*p);
- }
- }
-
- strncpy(srvrealm, (char *)krb_realmofhost(srvinst), (sizeof srvrealm)-1);
- srvrealm[(sizeof srvrealm)-1] = '\0';
- if (p = strchr(srvinst, '.')) {
- *p = '\0';
- }
-
- result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm, 0);
- if (result) {
- report(stderr, "krb_mq_req: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
-
- result = krb_get_cred("imap", srvinst, srvrealm, &credentials);
- if (result) {
- report(stderr, "krb_get_cred: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
-
- memcpy(session, credentials.session, sizeof session);
- memset(&credentials, 0, sizeof credentials);
- des_key_sched(&session, schedule);
-
- result = krb_get_tf_fullname(TKT_FILE, tktuser, tktinst, tktrealm);
- if (result) {
- report(stderr, "krb_get_tf_fullname: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
-
- if (strcmp(tktuser, user) != 0) {
- report(stderr,
- _("principal %s in ticket does not match -u %s\n"), tktuser,
- user);
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
-
- if (tktinst[0]) {
- report(stderr,
- _("non-null instance (%s) might cause strange behavior\n"),
- tktinst);
- strcat(tktuser, ".");
- strcat(tktuser, tktinst);
- }
-
- if (strcmp(tktrealm, srvrealm) != 0) {
- strcat(tktuser, "@");
- strcat(tktuser, tktrealm);
- }
-
- result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm,
- challenge1.cint);
- if (result) {
- report(stderr, "krb_mq_req: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
-
- to64frombits(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length);
- if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
- report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
- }
- strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
- SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
-
- /* Upon decrypting and verifying the ticket and authenticator, the
- * server should verify that the contained checksum field equals
- * the original server provided random 32-bit number. Should the
- * verification be successful, the server must add one to the
- * checksum and construct 8 octets of data, with the first four
- * octets containing the incremented checksum in network byte
- * order, the fifth octet containing a bit-mask specifying the
- * protection mechanisms supported by the server, and the sixth
- * through eighth octets containing, in network byte order, the
- * maximum cipher-text buffer size the server is able to receive.
- * The server must encrypt the 8 octets of data in the session key
- * and issue that encrypted data in a second ready response. The
- * client should consider the server authenticated if the first
- * four octets the un-encrypted data is equal to one plus the
- * checksum it previously sent.
- */
-
- if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
- return result;
-
- /* The client must construct data with the first four octets
- * containing the original server-issued checksum in network byte
- * order, the fifth octet containing the bit-mask specifying the
- * selected protection mechanism, the sixth through eighth octets
- * containing in network byte order the maximum cipher-text buffer
- * size the client is able to receive, and the following octets
- * containing a user name string. The client must then append
- * from one to eight octets so that the length of the data is a
- * multiple of eight octets. The client must then PCBC encrypt the
- * data with the session key and respond to the second ready
- * response with the encrypted data. The server decrypts the data
- * and verifies the contained checksum. The username field
- * identifies the user for whom subsequent IMAP operations are to
- * be performed; the server must verify that the principal
- * identified in the Kerberos ticket is authorized to connect as
- * that user. After these verifications, the authentication
- * process is complete.
- */
-
- len = from64tobits(buf2, buf1);
- if (len < 0) {
- report(stderr, _("could not decode BASE64 ready response\n"));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
-
- des_ecb_encrypt((des_cblock *)buf2, (des_cblock *)buf2, schedule, 0);
- memcpy(challenge2.cstr, buf2, 4);
- if (ntohl(challenge2.cint) != challenge1.cint + 1) {
- report(stderr, _("challenge mismatch\n"));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
-
- memset(authenticator.dat, 0, sizeof authenticator.dat);
-
- result = htonl(challenge1.cint);
- memcpy(authenticator.dat, &result, sizeof result);
-
- /* The protection mechanisms and their corresponding bit-masks are as
- * follows:
- *
- * 1 No protection mechanism
- * 2 Integrity (krb_mk_safe) protection
- * 4 Privacy (krb_mk_priv) protection
- */
- authenticator.dat[4] = 1;
-
- len = strlen(tktuser);
- strncpy(authenticator.dat+8, tktuser, len);
- authenticator.length = len + 8 + 1;
- while (authenticator.length & 7) {
- authenticator.length++;
- }
- des_pcbc_encrypt((des_cblock *)authenticator.dat,
- (des_cblock *)authenticator.dat, authenticator.length, schedule,
- &session, 1);
-
- to64frombits(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length);
- if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
- report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
- }
-
- strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
- SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
-
- if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
- return result;
-
- if (strstr(buf1, "OK")) {
- return PS_SUCCESS;
- }
- else {
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
-}
-#endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
-
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#define GSSAUTH_P_NONE 1
-#define GSSAUTH_P_INTEGRITY 2
-#define GSSAUTH_P_PRIVACY 4
-
-static int do_gssauth(int sock, char *hostname, char *username)
-{
- gss_buffer_desc request_buf, send_token;
- gss_buffer_t sec_token;
- gss_name_t target_name;
- gss_ctx_id_t context;
- gss_OID mech_name;
- gss_qop_t quality;
- int cflags;
- OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat;
- char buf1[8192], buf2[8192], server_conf_flags;
- unsigned long buf_size;
- int result;
-
- /* first things first: get an imap ticket for host */
- sprintf(buf1, "imap@%s", hostname);
- request_buf.value = buf1;
- request_buf.length = strlen(buf1) + 1;
- maj_stat = gss_import_name(&min_stat, &request_buf, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE,
- &target_name);
- if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
- report(stderr, _("Couldn't get service name for [%s]\n"), buf1);
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
- else if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
- maj_stat = gss_display_name(&min_stat, target_name, &request_buf,
- &mech_name);
- report(stderr, _("Using service name [%s]\n"),request_buf.value);
- maj_stat = gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &request_buf);
- }
-
- gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE GSSAPI");
-
- /* upon receipt of the GSSAPI authentication request, server returns
- * null data ready response. */
- if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
- return result;
- }
-
- /* now start the security context initialisation loop... */
- sec_token = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
- context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
- if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
- report(stdout, _("Sending credentials\n"));
- do {
- send_token.length = 0;
- send_token.value = NULL;
- maj_stat = gss_init_sec_context(&min_stat,
- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
- &context,
- target_name,
- GSS_C_NO_OID,
- GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG,
- 0,
- GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
- sec_token,
- NULL,
- &send_token,
- NULL,
- NULL);
- if (maj_stat!=GSS_S_COMPLETE && maj_stat!=GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
- report(stderr, _("Error exchanging credentials\n"));
- gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
- /* wake up server and await NO response */
- SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
- if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
- return result;
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
- to64frombits(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length);
- gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
- strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
- SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
- if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
- report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
- if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
- if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
- gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
- return result;
- }
- request_buf.length = from64tobits(buf2, buf1 + 2);
- request_buf.value = buf2;
- sec_token = &request_buf;
- }
- } while (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
- gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
-
- /* get security flags and buffer size */
- if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
- return result;
- }
- request_buf.length = from64tobits(buf2, buf1 + 2);
- request_buf.value = buf2;
-
- maj_stat = gss_unwrap(&min_stat, context, &request_buf, &send_token,
- &cflags, &quality);
- if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
- report(stderr, _("Couldn't unwrap security level data\n"));
- gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
- if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
- report(stdout, _("Credential exchange complete\n"));
- /* first octet is security levels supported. We want none, for now */
- server_conf_flags = ((char *)send_token.value)[0];
- if ( !(((char *)send_token.value)[0] & GSSAUTH_P_NONE) ) {
- report(stderr, _("Server requires integrity and/or privacy\n"));
- gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
- ((char *)send_token.value)[0] = 0;
- buf_size = ntohl(*((long *)send_token.value));
- /* we don't care about buffer size if we don't wrap data */
- gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
- if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
- report(stdout, _("Unwrapped security level flags: %s%s%s\n"),
- server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_NONE ? "N" : "-",
- server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_INTEGRITY ? "I" : "-",
- server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_PRIVACY ? "C" : "-");
- report(stdout, _("Maximum GSS token size is %ld\n"),buf_size);
- }
-
- /* now respond in kind (hack!!!) */
- buf_size = htonl(buf_size); /* do as they do... only matters if we do enc */
- memcpy(buf1, &buf_size, 4);
- buf1[0] = GSSAUTH_P_NONE;
- strcpy(buf1+4, username); /* server decides if princ is user */
- request_buf.length = 4 + strlen(username) + 1;
- request_buf.value = buf1;
- maj_stat = gss_wrap(&min_stat, context, 0, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, &request_buf,
- &cflags, &send_token);
- if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
- report(stderr, _("Error creating security level request\n"));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
- to64frombits(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length);
- if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
- report(stdout, _("Requesting authorization as %s\n"), username);
- report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n",buf1);
- }
- strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
- SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
-
- /* we should be done. Get status and finish up */
- if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
- return result;
- if (strstr(buf1, "OK")) {
- /* flush security context */
- if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
- report(stdout, _("Releasing GSS credentials\n"));
- maj_stat = gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat, &context, &send_token);
- if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
- report(stderr, _("Error releasing credentials\n"));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
- /* send_token may contain a notification to the server to flush
- * credentials. RFC 1731 doesn't specify what to do, and since this
- * support is only for authentication, we'll assume the server
- * knows enough to flush its own credentials */
- gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
- return PS_SUCCESS;
- }
-
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
-}
-#endif /* GSSAPI */
-
-static void hmac_md5 (unsigned char *password, size_t pass_len,
- unsigned char *challenge, size_t chal_len,
- unsigned char *response, size_t resp_len)
-{
- int i;
- unsigned char ipad[64];
- unsigned char opad[64];
- unsigned char hash_passwd[16];
-
- MD5_CTX ctx;
-
- if (resp_len != 16)
- return;
-
- if (pass_len > sizeof (ipad))
- {
- MD5Init (&ctx);
- MD5Update (&ctx, password, pass_len);
- MD5Final (hash_passwd, &ctx);
- password = hash_passwd; pass_len = sizeof (hash_passwd);
- }
-
- memset (ipad, 0, sizeof (ipad));
- memset (opad, 0, sizeof (opad));
- memcpy (ipad, password, pass_len);
- memcpy (opad, password, pass_len);
-
- for (i=0; i<64; i++) {
- ipad[i] ^= 0x36;
- opad[i] ^= 0x5c;
- }
-
- MD5Init (&ctx);
- MD5Update (&ctx, ipad, sizeof (ipad));
- MD5Update (&ctx, challenge, chal_len);
- MD5Final (response, &ctx);
-
- MD5Init (&ctx);
- MD5Update (&ctx, opad, sizeof (opad));
- MD5Update (&ctx, response, resp_len);
- MD5Final (response, &ctx);
-}
-
#if NTLM_ENABLE
#include "ntlm.h"
if ((gen_recv(sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
return result;
- len = from64tobits ((unsigned char*)&challenge, msgbuf);
+ len = from64tobits ((char*)&challenge, msgbuf, sizeof(challenge));
if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
dumpSmbNtlmAuthChallenge(stdout, &challenge);
report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", msgbuf);
strcat(msgbuf,"\r\n");
-
SockWrite (sock, msgbuf, strlen (msgbuf));
if ((result = gen_recv (sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
}
#endif /* NTLM */
-static int do_cram_md5 (int sock, struct query *ctl)
-/* authenticate as per RFC2195 */
-{
- int result;
- int len;
- unsigned char buf1[1024];
- unsigned char msg_id[768];
- unsigned char response[16];
- unsigned char reply[1024];
-
- gen_send (sock, "AUTHENTICATE CRAM-MD5");
-
- /* From RFC2195:
- * The data encoded in the first ready response contains an
- * presumptively arbitrary string of random digits, a timestamp, and the
- * fully-qualified primary host name of the server. The syntax of the
- * unencoded form must correspond to that of an RFC 822 'msg-id'
- * [RFC822] as described in [POP3].
- */
-
- if ((result = gen_recv (sock, buf1, sizeof (buf1)))) {
- return result;
- }
-
- len = from64tobits (msg_id, buf1);
- if (len < 0) {
- report (stderr, _("could not decode BASE64 challenge\n"));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- } else if (len < sizeof (msg_id)) {
- msg_id[len] = 0;
- } else {
- msg_id[sizeof (msg_id)-1] = 0;
- }
- if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
- report (stdout, "decoded as %s\n", msg_id);
- }
-
- /* The client makes note of the data and then responds with a string
- * consisting of the user name, a space, and a 'digest'. The latter is
- * computed by applying the keyed MD5 algorithm from [KEYED-MD5] where
- * the key is a shared secret and the digested text is the timestamp
- * (including angle-brackets).
- */
-
- hmac_md5 (ctl->password, strlen (ctl->password),
- msg_id, strlen (msg_id),
- response, sizeof (response));
-
-#ifdef HAVE_SNPRINTF
- snprintf (reply, sizeof (reply),
-#else
- sprintf(reply,
-#endif
- "%s %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
- ctl->remotename,
- response[0], response[1], response[2], response[3],
- response[4], response[5], response[6], response[7],
- response[8], response[9], response[10], response[11],
- response[12], response[13], response[14], response[15]);
-
- if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
- report (stdout, "replying with %s\n", reply);
- }
-
- to64frombits (buf1, reply, strlen (reply));
- if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
- report (stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
- }
-
- /* PMDF5.2 IMAP has a bug that requires this to be a single write */
- strcat (buf1, "\r\n");
- SockWrite (sock, buf1, strlen (buf1));
-
- if ((result = gen_recv (sock, buf1, sizeof (buf1))))
- return result;
-
- if (strstr (buf1, "OK")) {
- return PS_SUCCESS;
- } else {
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
-}
-
-int imap_canonicalize(char *result, char *raw, int maxlen)
+static int imap_canonicalize(char *result, char *raw, int maxlen)
/* encode an IMAP password as per RFC1730's quoting conventions */
{
int i, j;
return(i);
}
-int imap_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting)
-/* apply for connection authorization */
+static void capa_probe(int sock, struct query *ctl)
+/* set capability variables from a CAPA probe */
{
- int ok = 0;
+ int ok;
/* probe to see if we're running IMAP4 and can use RFC822.PEEK */
capabilities[0] = '\0';
if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "CAPABILITY")) == PS_SUCCESS)
{
- /* UW-IMAP server 10.173 notifies in all caps */
+ char *cp;
+
+ /* capability checks are supposed to be caseblind */
+ for (cp = capabilities; *cp; cp++)
+ *cp = toupper(*cp);
+
+ /* UW-IMAP server 10.173 notifies in all caps, but RFC2060 says we
+ should expect a response in mixed-case */
if (strstr(capabilities, "IMAP4REV1"))
{
imap_version = IMAP4rev1;
if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
- report(stdout, _("Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 1\n"));
+ report(stdout, GT_("Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 1\n"));
}
else
{
imap_version = IMAP4;
if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
- report(stdout, _("Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 0\n"));
+ report(stdout, GT_("Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 0\n"));
}
}
else if (ok == PS_ERROR)
{
imap_version = IMAP2;
if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
- report(stdout, _("Protocol identified as IMAP2 or IMAP2BIS\n"));
+ report(stdout, GT_("Protocol identified as IMAP2 or IMAP2BIS\n"));
}
- else
- return(ok);
-
- peek_capable = (imap_version >= IMAP4);
/*
- * Assumption: expunges are cheap, so we want to do them
- * after every message unless user said otherwise.
+ * Handle idling. We depend on coming through here on startup
+ * and after each timeout (including timeouts during idles).
*/
- if (NUM_SPECIFIED(ctl->expunge))
- expunge_period = NUM_VALUE_OUT(ctl->expunge);
- else
- expunge_period = 1;
+ if (strstr(capabilities, "IDLE") && ctl->idle)
+ {
+ do_idle = TRUE;
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
+ report(stdout, GT_("will idle after poll\n"));
+ }
+}
+
+static int imap_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting)
+/* apply for connection authorization */
+{
+ int ok = 0;
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
+ flag did_stls = FALSE;
+#endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
+
+ capa_probe(sock, ctl);
/*
- * If either (a) we saw a PREAUTH token in the capability response, or
+ * If either (a) we saw a PREAUTH token in the greeting, or
* (b) the user specified ssh preauthentication, then we're done.
*/
- if (preauth || ctl->server.preauthenticate == A_SSH)
- return(PS_SUCCESS);
-
-#if OPIE_ENABLE
- if ((ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP) && strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=X-OTP"))
+ if (preauth || ctl->server.authenticate == A_SSH)
{
- if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
- report(stdout, _("OTP authentication is supported\n"));
- if (do_otp(sock, ctl) == PS_SUCCESS)
- return(PS_SUCCESS);
- };
-#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
+ preauth = FALSE; /* reset for the next session */
+ return(PS_SUCCESS);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Time to authenticate the user.
+ * Try the protocol variants that don't require passwords first.
+ */
+ ok = PS_AUTHFAIL;
#ifdef GSSAPI
- if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=GSSAPI"))
- {
- if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_GSS)
- {
- if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
- report(stdout, _("GSS authentication is supported\n"));
- return do_gssauth(sock, ctl->server.truename, ctl->remotename);
- }
- }
- else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_GSS)
- {
- report(stderr,
- _("Required GSS capability not supported by server\n"));
- return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
- }
+ if ((ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY
+ || ctl->server.authenticate == A_GSSAPI)
+ && strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=GSSAPI"))
+ if(ok = do_gssauth(sock, "AUTHENTICATE", ctl->server.truename, ctl->remotename))
+ {
+ /* SASL cancellation of authentication */
+ gen_send(sock, "*");
+ if(ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY)
+ return ok;
+ }
+ else
+ return ok;
#endif /* GSSAPI */
#ifdef KERBEROS_V4
- if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=KERBEROS_V4"))
+ if ((ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY
+ || ctl->server.authenticate == A_KERBEROS_V4
+ || ctl->server.authenticate == A_KERBEROS_V5)
+ && strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=KERBEROS_V4"))
{
- if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
- report(stdout, _("KERBEROS_V4 authentication is supported\n"));
-
- if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_K4)
+ if ((ok = do_rfc1731(sock, "AUTHENTICATE", ctl->server.truename)))
{
- if ((ok = do_rfc1731(sock, ctl->server.truename)))
- {
- if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
- report(stdout, "IMAP> *\n");
- SockWrite(sock, "*\r\n", 3);
- }
-
- return(ok);
+ /* SASL cancellation of authentication */
+ gen_send(sock, "*");
+ if(ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY)
+ return ok;
}
- /* else fall through to ordinary AUTH=LOGIN case */
+ else
+ return ok;
}
- else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_K4)
+#endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
+
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
+ if ((!ctl->sslproto || !strcmp(ctl->sslproto,"tls1"))
+ && !ctl->use_ssl
+ && strstr(capabilities, "STARTTLS"))
{
- report(stderr,
- _("Required KERBEROS_V4 capability not supported by server\n"));
- return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
+ char *realhost;
+
+ realhost = ctl->server.via ? ctl->server.via : ctl->server.pollname;
+ ok = gen_transact(sock, "STARTTLS");
+
+ /* We use "tls1" instead of ctl->sslproto, as we want STARTTLS,
+ * not other SSL protocols
+ */
+ if (ok == PS_SUCCESS &&
+ SSLOpen(sock,ctl->sslcert,ctl->sslkey,"tls1",ctl->sslcertck, ctl->sslcertpath,ctl->sslfingerprint,realhost,ctl->server.pollname) == -1)
+ {
+ if (!ctl->sslproto && !ctl->wehaveauthed)
+ {
+ ctl->sslproto = xstrdup("");
+ /* repoll immediately */
+ return(PS_REPOLL);
+ }
+ report(stderr,
+ GT_("SSL connection failed.\n"));
+ return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
+ }
+ did_stls = TRUE;
+
+ /*
+ * RFC 2595 says this:
+ *
+ * "Once TLS has been started, the client MUST discard cached
+ * information about server capabilities and SHOULD re-issue the
+ * CAPABILITY command. This is necessary to protect against
+ * man-in-the-middle attacks which alter the capabilities list prior
+ * to STARTTLS. The server MAY advertise different capabilities
+ * after STARTTLS."
+ */
+ capa_probe(sock, ctl);
}
-#endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
+#endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
+
+ peek_capable = (imap_version >= IMAP4);
+
+ /*
+ * Assumption: expunges are cheap, so we want to do them
+ * after every message unless user said otherwise.
+ */
+ if (NUM_SPECIFIED(ctl->expunge))
+ expunge_period = NUM_VALUE_OUT(ctl->expunge);
+ else
+ expunge_period = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * No such luck. OK, now try the variants that mask your password
+ * in a challenge-response.
+ */
- if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=CRAM-MD5"))
+ if ((ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY && strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=CRAM-MD5"))
+ || ctl->server.authenticate == A_CRAM_MD5)
{
- if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
- report (stdout, _("CRAM-MD5 authentication is supported\n"));
- if (ctl->server.protocol != P_IMAP_LOGIN)
- {
- if ((ok = do_cram_md5 (sock, ctl)))
- {
- if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
- report (stdout, "IMAP> *\n");
- SockWrite (sock, "*\r\n", 3);
- }
- return ok;
- }
+ if ((ok = do_cram_md5 (sock, "AUTHENTICATE", ctl, NULL)))
+ {
+ /* SASL cancellation of authentication */
+ gen_send(sock, "*");
+ if(ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY)
+ return ok;
+ }
+ else
+ return ok;
}
- else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_CRAM_MD5)
+
+#if OPIE_ENABLE
+ if ((ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY
+ || ctl->server.authenticate == A_OTP)
+ && strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=X-OTP"))
+ if ((ok = do_otp(sock, "AUTHENTICATE", ctl)))
+ {
+ /* SASL cancellation of authentication */
+ gen_send(sock, "*");
+ if(ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY)
+ return ok;
+ }
+ else
+ return ok;
+#else
+ if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_OTP)
{
- report(stderr,
- _("Required CRAM-MD5 capability not supported by server\n"));
- return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
+ report(stderr,
+ GT_("Required OTP capability not compiled into fetchmail\n"));
}
+#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
#ifdef NTLM_ENABLE
- if (strstr (capabilities, "AUTH=NTLM"))
+ if ((ctl->server.authenticate == A_ANY
+ || ctl->server.authenticate == A_NTLM)
+ && strstr (capabilities, "AUTH=NTLM")) {
+ if ((ok = do_imap_ntlm(sock, ctl)))
+ {
+ /* SASL cancellation of authentication */
+ gen_send(sock, "*");
+ if(ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY)
+ return ok;
+ }
+ else
+ return(ok);
+ }
+#else
+ if (ctl->server.authenticate == A_NTLM)
{
- if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
- report (stdout, _("NTLM authentication is supported\n"));
- return do_imap_ntlm (sock, ctl);
+ report(stderr,
+ GT_("Required NTLM capability not compiled into fetchmail\n"));
}
#endif /* NTLM_ENABLE */
#ifdef __UNUSED__ /* The Cyrus IMAP4rev1 server chokes on this */
/* this handles either AUTH=LOGIN or AUTH-LOGIN */
- if ((imap_version >= IMAP4rev1) && (!strstr(capabilities, "LOGIN"))) {
- report(stderr,
- _("Required LOGIN capability not supported by server\n"));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- };
+ if ((imap_version >= IMAP4rev1) && (!strstr(capabilities, "LOGIN")))
+ {
+ report(stderr,
+ GT_("Required LOGIN capability not supported by server\n"));
+ }
#endif /* __UNUSED__ */
+ /*
+ * We're stuck with sending the password en clair.
+ * The reason for this odd-looking logic is that some
+ * servers return LOGINDISABLED even though login
+ * actually works. So arrange things in such a way that
+ * setting auth passwd makes it ignore this capability.
+ */
+ if((ctl->server.authenticate==A_ANY&&!strstr(capabilities,"LOGINDISABLED"))
+ || ctl->server.authenticate == A_PASSWORD)
{
/* these sizes guarantee no buffer overflow */
char remotename[NAMELEN*2+1], password[PASSWORDLEN*2+1];
imap_canonicalize(remotename, ctl->remotename, NAMELEN);
imap_canonicalize(password, ctl->password, PASSWORDLEN);
+
+ strcpy(shroud, password);
ok = gen_transact(sock, "LOGIN \"%s\" \"%s\"", remotename, password);
+ shroud[0] = '\0';
+#ifdef SSL_ENABLE
+ /* this is for servers which claim to support TLS, but actually
+ * don't! */
+ if (did_stls && ok == PS_SOCKET && !ctl->sslproto && !ctl->wehaveauthed)
+ {
+ ctl->sslproto = xstrdup("");
+ /* repoll immediately */
+ ok = PS_REPOLL;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (ok)
+ {
+ /* SASL cancellation of authentication */
+ gen_send(sock, "*");
+ if(ctl->server.authenticate != A_ANY)
+ return ok;
+ }
+ else
+ return(ok);
}
- if (ok)
- return(ok);
-
- return(PS_SUCCESS);
+ return(ok);
}
static int internal_expunge(int sock)
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
+static int imap_idle(int sock)
+/* start an RFC2177 IDLE */
+{
+ int ok;
+
+ /* special timeout to terminate the IDLE and re-issue it
+ * at least every 28 minutes:
+ * (the server may have an inactivity timeout) */
+ stage = STAGE_IDLE;
+ saved_timeout = mytimeout;
+ mytimeout = 1680; /* 28 min */
+
+ /* enter IDLE mode */
+ ok = gen_transact(sock, "IDLE");
+
+ if(ok == PS_IDLETIMEOUT) {
+ /* send "DONE" continuation */
+ SockWrite(sock, "DONE\r\n", 6);
+ if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
+ report(stdout, "IMAP> DONE\n");
+
+ /* restore normal timeout value */
+ mytimeout = saved_timeout;
+ stage = STAGE_FETCH;
+
+ /* get OK IDLE message */
+ return imap_ok(sock, NULL);
+ } else
+ /* not idle timeout */
+ return ok;
+}
+
static int imap_getrange(int sock,
struct query *ctl,
const char *folder,
/* get range of messages to be fetched */
{
int ok;
+ char buf[MSGBUFSIZE+1], *cp;
/* find out how many messages are waiting */
- *bytes = recent = unseen = -1;
+ *bytes = -1;
if (pass > 1)
{
* just after deletion.
*/
ok = 0;
- if (deletions && expunge_period != 1)
- internal_expunge(sock);
- count = -1;
- if (ok || gen_transact(sock, "NOOP"))
- {
- report(stderr, _("re-poll failed\n"));
- return(ok);
+ if (deletions) {
+ ok = internal_expunge(sock);
+ if (ok)
+ {
+ report(stderr, GT_("expunge failed\n"));
+ return(ok);
+ }
}
- else if (count == -1) /* no EXISTS response to NOOP */
- {
- count = recent = 0;
- unseen = -1;
+
+ /*
+ * recentcount is already set here by the last imap command which
+ * returned RECENT on detecting new mail. if recentcount is 0, wait
+ * for new mail.
+ */
+
+ /* some servers do not report RECENT after an EXPUNGE. this check
+ * forces an incorrect recentcount to be ignored. */
+ if (recentcount > count)
+ recentcount = 0;
+ /* this is a while loop because imap_idle() might return on other
+ * mailbox changes also */
+ while (recentcount == 0 && do_idle) {
+ smtp_close(ctl, 1);
+ ok = imap_idle(sock);
+ if (ok)
+ {
+ report(stderr, GT_("re-poll failed\n"));
+ return(ok);
+ }
}
+ /* if recentcount is 0, return no mail */
+ if (recentcount == 0)
+ count = 0;
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, GT_("%d messages waiting after re-poll\n"), count);
}
else
{
+ count = 0;
ok = gen_transact(sock,
check_only ? "EXAMINE \"%s\"" : "SELECT \"%s\"",
folder ? folder : "INBOX");
if (ok != 0)
{
- report(stderr, _("mailbox selection failed\n"));
+ report(stderr, GT_("mailbox selection failed\n"));
return(ok);
}
+ else if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, GT_("%d messages waiting after first poll\n"), count);
+
+ /* no messages? then we may need to idle until we get some */
+ while (count == 0 && do_idle) {
+ ok = imap_idle(sock);
+ if (ok)
+ {
+ report(stderr, GT_("re-poll failed\n"));
+ return(ok);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We should have an expunge here to
+ * a) avoid fetching deleted mails during 'fetchall'
+ * b) getting a wrong count of mails during 'no fetchall'
+ */
+ if (!check_only && !ctl->keep && count > 0)
+ {
+ ok = internal_expunge(sock);
+ if (ok)
+ {
+ report(stderr, GT_("expunge failed\n"));
+ return(ok);
+ }
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, GT_("%d messages waiting after expunge\n"), count);
+ }
}
*countp = count;
+ recentcount = 0;
+ startcount = 1;
- /*
- * Note: because IMAP has an is_old method, this number is used
- * only for the "X messages (Y unseen)" notification. Accordingly
- * it doesn't matter much that it can be wrong (e.g. if we see an
- * UNSEEN response but not all messages above the first UNSEEN one
- * are likewise).
- */
- if (unseen >= 0) /* optional, but better if we see it */
- *newp = count - unseen + 1;
- else if (recent >= 0) /* mandatory */
- *newp = recent;
- else
- *newp = -1; /* should never happen, RECENT is mandatory */
+ /* OK, now get a count of unseen messages and their indices */
+ if (!ctl->fetchall && count > 0)
+ {
+ if (unseen_messages)
+ free(unseen_messages);
+ unseen_messages = xmalloc(count * sizeof(unsigned int));
+ memset(unseen_messages, 0, count * sizeof(unsigned int));
+ unseen = 0;
+
+ gen_send(sock, "SEARCH UNSEEN");
+ do {
+ ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (ok != 0)
+ {
+ report(stderr, GT_("search for unseen messages failed\n"));
+ return(PS_PROTOCOL);
+ }
+ else if ((cp = strstr(buf, "* SEARCH")))
+ {
+ char *ep;
+
+ cp += 8; /* skip "* SEARCH" */
+ /* startcount is higher than count so that if there are no
+ * unseen messages, imap_getsizes() will not need to do
+ * anything! */
+ startcount = count + 1;
+
+ while (*cp && unseen < count)
+ {
+ /* skip whitespace */
+ while (*cp && isspace(*cp))
+ cp++;
+ if (*cp)
+ {
+ unsigned int um;
+ /*
+ * Message numbers are between 1 and 2^32 inclusive,
+ * so unsigned int is large enough.
+ */
+ um=(unsigned int)strtol(cp,&ep,10);
+ if (um <= count)
+ {
+ unseen_messages[unseen++] = um;
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, GT_("%u is unseen\n"), um);
+ if (startcount > um)
+ startcount = um;
+ }
+ cp = ep;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ } while
+ (tag[0] != '\0' && strncmp(buf, tag, strlen(tag)));
+
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG && unseen > 0)
+ report(stdout, GT_("%u is first unseen\n"), startcount);
+ } else
+ unseen = -1;
+ *newp = unseen;
+ count = 0;
expunged = 0;
+ deletions = 0;
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
* on the fact that the sizes array has been preinitialized with a
* known-bad size value.
*/
- if (count == 1)
- gen_send(sock, "FETCH 1 RFC822.SIZE", count);
- else
- gen_send(sock, "FETCH 1:%d RFC822.SIZE", count);
+ /* if fetchall is specified, startcount is 1;
+ * else if there is new mail, startcount is first unseen message;
+ * else startcount is greater than count.
+ */
+ if (count == startcount)
+ gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.SIZE", count);
+ else if (count > startcount)
+ gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d:%d RFC822.SIZE", startcount, count);
+ else /* no unseen messages! */
+ return(PS_SUCCESS);
for (;;)
{
- int num, size, ok;
+ unsigned int num, size;
+ int ok;
+ char *cp;
if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
return(ok);
+ /* we want response matching to be case-insensitive */
+ for (cp = buf; *cp; cp++)
+ *cp = toupper(*cp);
+ /* an untagged NO means that a message was not readable */
+ if (strstr(buf, "* NO"))
+ ;
else if (strstr(buf, "OK") || strstr(buf, "NO"))
break;
- else if (sscanf(buf, "* %d FETCH (RFC822.SIZE %d)", &num, &size) == 2)
- sizes[num - 1] = size;
+ else if (sscanf(buf, "* %u FETCH (RFC822.SIZE %u)", &num, &size) == 2)
+ {
+ if (num > 0 && num <= count)
+ sizes[num - 1] = size;
+ else
+ report(stderr, "Warning: ignoring bogus data for message sizes returned by the server.\n");
+ }
}
return(PS_SUCCESS);
static int imap_is_old(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
/* is the given message old? */
{
- int ok;
+ flag seen = TRUE;
+ int i;
- /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
- number -= expunged;
+ /*
+ * Expunges change the fetch numbers, but unseen_messages contains
+ * indices from before any expungees were done. So neither the
+ * argument nor the values in message_sequence need to be decremented.
+ */
- if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "FETCH %d FLAGS", number)) != 0)
- return(PS_ERROR);
+ seen = TRUE;
+ for (i = 0; i < unseen; i++)
+ if (unseen_messages[i] == number)
+ {
+ seen = FALSE;
+ break;
+ }
return(seen);
}
+static char *skip_token(char *ptr)
+{
+ while(isspace(*ptr)) ptr++;
+ while(!isspace(*ptr) && !iscntrl(*ptr)) ptr++;
+ while(isspace(*ptr)) ptr++;
+ return(ptr);
+}
+
static int imap_fetch_headers(int sock, struct query *ctl,int number,int *lenp)
/* request headers of nth message */
{
gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.HEADER", number);
/* looking for FETCH response */
- do {
+ for (;;)
+ {
int ok;
+ char *ptr;
if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
return(ok);
- } while
- (sscanf(buf+2, "%d FETCH (%*s {%d}", &num, lenp) != 2);
+ ptr = skip_token(buf); /* either "* " or "AXXXX " */
+ if (sscanf(ptr, "%d FETCH (%*s {%d}", &num, lenp) == 2)
+ break;
+ /* try to recover from chronically fucked-up M$ Exchange servers */
+ else if (!strncmp(ptr, "NO", 2))
+ {
+ /* wait for a tagged response */
+ if (strstr (buf, "* NO"))
+ imap_ok (sock, 0);
+ return(PS_TRANSIENT);
+ }
+ else if (!strncmp(ptr, "BAD", 3))
+ {
+ /* wait for a tagged response */
+ if (strstr (buf, "* BAD"))
+ imap_ok (sock, 0);
+ return(PS_TRANSIENT);
+ }
+ }
if (num != number)
return(PS_ERROR);
* craps out during the message, it will still be marked `unseen' on
* the server.
*
- * However...*don't* do this if we're using keep to suppress deletion!
- * In that case, marking the seen flag is the only way to prevent the
- * message from being re-fetched on subsequent runs (and according
- * to RFC2060 p.43 this fetch should set Seen as a side effect).
+ * According to RFC2060, and Mark Crispin the IMAP maintainer,
+ * FETCH %d BODY[TEXT] and RFC822.TEXT are "functionally
+ * equivalent". However, we know of at least one server that
+ * treats them differently in the presence of MIME attachments;
+ * the latter form downloads the attachment, the former does not.
+ * The server is InterChange, and the fool who implemented this
+ * misfeature ought to be strung up by his thumbs.
+ *
+ * When I tried working around this by disabling use of the 4rev1 form,
+ * I found that doing this breaks operation with M$ Exchange.
+ * Annoyingly enough, Exchange's refusal to cope is technically legal
+ * under RFC2062. Trust Microsoft, the Great Enemy of interoperability
+ * standards, to find a way to make standards compliance irritating....
*/
switch (imap_version)
{
case IMAP4rev1: /* RFC 2060 */
- if (!ctl->keep)
- gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d BODY.PEEK[TEXT]", number);
- else
- gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d BODY[TEXT]", number);
+ gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d BODY.PEEK[TEXT]", number);
break;
case IMAP4: /* RFC 1730 */
- if (!ctl->keep)
- gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.TEXT.PEEK", number);
- else
- gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.TEXT", number);
+ gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.TEXT.PEEK", number);
break;
default: /* RFC 1176 */
/* UW IMAP returns "OK FETCH", Cyrus returns "OK Completed" */
if (strstr(buf, "OK"))
break;
-
-#ifdef __UNUSED__
- /*
- * Any IMAP server that fails to set Seen on a BODY[TEXT]
- * fetch violates RFC2060 p.43 (top). This becomes an issue
- * when keep is on, because seen messages aren't deleted and
- * get refetched on each poll. As a workaround, if keep is on
- * we can set the Seen flag explicitly.
- *
- * This code isn't used yet because we don't know of any IMAP
- * servers broken in this way.
- */
- if (ctl->keep)
- if ((ok = gen_transact(sock,
- imap_version == IMAP4
- ? "STORE %d +FLAGS.SILENT (\\Seen)"
- : "STORE %d +FLAGS (\\Seen)",
- number)))
- return(ok);
-#endif /* __UNUSED__ */
}
return(PS_SUCCESS);
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
+static int imap_mark_seen(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
+/* mark the given message as seen */
+{
+ return(gen_transact(sock,
+ imap_version == IMAP4
+ ? "STORE %d +FLAGS.SILENT (\\Seen)"
+ : "STORE %d +FLAGS (\\Seen)",
+ number));
+}
+
static int imap_logout(int sock, struct query *ctl)
/* send logout command */
{
if (deletions)
internal_expunge(sock);
+#ifdef USE_SEARCH
+ /* Memory clean-up */
+ if (unseen_messages)
+ free(unseen_messages);
+#endif /* USE_SEARCH */
+
return(gen_transact(sock, "LOGOUT"));
}
TRUE, /* this is a tagged protocol */
FALSE, /* no message delimiter */
imap_ok, /* parse command response */
- imap_canonicalize, /* deal with embedded slashes and spaces */
imap_getauth, /* get authorization */
imap_getrange, /* query range of messages */
imap_getsizes, /* get sizes of messages (used for ESMTP SIZE option) */
imap_fetch_body, /* request given message body */
imap_trail, /* eat message trailer */
imap_delete, /* delete the message */
+ imap_mark_seen, /* how to mark a message as seen */
imap_logout, /* expunge and exit */
TRUE, /* yes, we can re-poll */
};