#include "socket.h"
#ifdef KERBEROS_V4
+#ifdef KERBEROS_V5
+#include <kerberosIV/des.h>
+#include <kerberosIV/krb.h>
+#else
#if defined (__bsdi__)
#include <des.h>
#define krb_get_err_text(e) (krb_err_txt[e])
#endif
-#if defined (__FreeBSD__)
+#if defined(__NetBSD__) || (__FreeBSD__) || defined(__linux__)
#define krb_get_err_text(e) (krb_err_txt[e])
#endif
#include <krb.h>
+#endif
#endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
+#include "i18n.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_H
+#include <gssapi.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H
+#include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
+#include <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE
+#define GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE gss_nt_service_name
+#endif
+#endif
+#include "md5.h"
+
+#if OPIE_ENABLE
+#include <opie.h>
+#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
+
+#ifndef strstr /* glibc-2.1 declares this as a macro */
extern char *strstr(); /* needed on sysV68 R3V7.1. */
+#endif /* strstr */
/* imap_version values */
#define IMAP2 -1 /* IMAP2 or IMAP2BIS, RFC1176 */
#define IMAP4 0 /* IMAP4 rev 0, RFC1730 */
#define IMAP4rev1 1 /* IMAP4 rev 1, RFC2060 */
-static int count, seen, recent, unseen, deletions, expunged, imap_version;
+static int count, seen, recent, unseen, deletions, imap_version, preauth;
+static int expunged, expunge_period;
+static char capabilities[MSGBUFSIZE+1];
int imap_ok(int sock, char *argbuf)
/* parse command response */
{
- char buf [POPBUFSIZE+1];
+ char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1];
seen = 0;
do {
int ok;
+ char *cp;
if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
return(ok);
+ /* all tokens in responses are caseblind */
+ for (cp = buf; *cp; cp++)
+ if (islower(*cp))
+ *cp = toupper(*cp);
+
/* interpret untagged status responses */
+ if (strstr(buf, "* CAPABILITY"))
+ strncpy(capabilities, buf + 12, sizeof(capabilities));
if (strstr(buf, "EXISTS"))
count = atoi(buf+2);
if (strstr(buf, "RECENT"))
unseen = atoi(cp);
}
if (strstr(buf, "FLAGS"))
- seen = (strstr(buf, "Seen") != (char *)NULL);
+ seen = (strstr(buf, "SEEN") != (char *)NULL);
+ if (strstr(buf, "PREAUTH"))
+ preauth = TRUE;
} while
(tag[0] != '\0' && strncmp(buf, tag, strlen(tag)));
while (isspace(*cp))
cp++;
- if (strncmp(cp, "OK", 2) == 0)
+ if (strncmp(cp, "PREAUTH", 2) == 0)
+ {
+ if (argbuf)
+ strcpy(argbuf, cp);
+ preauth = TRUE;
+ return(PS_SUCCESS);
+ }
+ else if (strncmp(cp, "OK", 2) == 0)
{
if (argbuf)
strcpy(argbuf, cp);
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
- else if (strncmp(cp, "BAD", 2) == 0)
+ else if (strncmp(cp, "BAD", 3) == 0)
return(PS_ERROR);
+ else if (strncmp(cp, "NO", 2) == 0)
+ {
+ if (stage == STAGE_GETAUTH)
+ return(PS_AUTHFAIL); /* RFC2060, 6.2.2 */
+ else
+ return(PS_ERROR);
+ }
else
return(PS_PROTOCOL);
}
}
+#if OPIE_ENABLE
+static int do_otp(int sock, struct query *ctl)
+{
+ int i, rval;
+ char buffer[128];
+ char challenge[OPIE_CHALLENGE_MAX+1];
+ char response[OPIE_RESPONSE_MAX+1];
+
+ gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE X-OTP");
+
+ if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
+ return rval;
+
+ if ((i = from64tobits(challenge, buffer)) < 0) {
+ report(stderr, _("Could not decode initial BASE64 challenge\n"));
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ };
+
+
+ to64frombits(buffer, ctl->remotename, strlen(ctl->remotename));
+
+ if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
+ report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buffer);
+
+ /* best not to count on the challenge code handling multiple writes */
+ strcat(buffer, "\r\n");
+ SockWrite(sock, buffer, strlen(buffer));
+
+ if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
+ return rval;
+
+ if ((i = from64tobits(challenge, buffer)) < 0) {
+ report(stderr, _("Could not decode OTP challenge\n"));
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ };
+
+ rval = opiegenerator(challenge, !strcmp(ctl->password, "opie") ? "" : ctl->password, response);
+ if ((rval == -2) && !run.poll_interval) {
+ char secret[OPIE_SECRET_MAX+1];
+ fprintf(stderr, _("Secret pass phrase: "));
+ if (opiereadpass(secret, sizeof(secret), 0))
+ rval = opiegenerator(challenge, secret, response);
+ memset(secret, 0, sizeof(secret));
+ };
+
+ if (rval)
+ return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
+
+ to64frombits(buffer, response, strlen(response));
+
+ if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
+ report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buffer);
+ strcat(buffer, "\r\n");
+ SockWrite(sock, buffer, strlen(buffer));
+
+ if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
+ return rval;
+
+ if (strstr(buffer, "OK"))
+ return PS_SUCCESS;
+ else
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+};
+#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
+
#ifdef KERBEROS_V4
#if SIZEOF_INT == 4
typedef int int32;
#error Cannot deduce a 32-bit-type
#endif
-static int do_rfc1731(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *buf)
+static int do_rfc1731(int sock, char *truename)
/* authenticate as per RFC1731 -- note 32-bit integer requirement here */
{
int result = 0, len;
len = from64tobits(challenge1.cstr, buf1);
if (len < 0) {
- error(0, -1, "could not decode initial BASE64 challenge");
+ report(stderr, _("could not decode initial BASE64 challenge\n"));
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
+ /* this patch by Dan Root <dar@thekeep.org> solves an endianess
+ * problem. */
+ {
+ char tmp[4];
+
+ *(int *)tmp = ntohl(*(int *) challenge1.cstr);
+ memcpy(challenge1.cstr, tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+ }
+
/* Client responds with a Kerberos ticket and an authenticator for
* the principal "imap.hostname@realm" where "hostname" is the
* first component of the host name of the server with all letters
* 32-bit number in network byte order.
*/
- strncpy(srvinst, ctl->server.truename, (sizeof srvinst)-1);
+ strncpy(srvinst, truename, (sizeof srvinst)-1);
srvinst[(sizeof srvinst)-1] = '\0';
for (p = srvinst; *p; p++) {
if (isupper(*p)) {
}
}
- strncpy(srvrealm, krb_realmofhost(srvinst), (sizeof srvrealm)-1);
+ strncpy(srvrealm, (char *)krb_realmofhost(srvinst), (sizeof srvrealm)-1);
srvrealm[(sizeof srvrealm)-1] = '\0';
if (p = strchr(srvinst, '.')) {
*p = '\0';
result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm, 0);
if (result) {
- error(0, -1, "krb_mq_req: %s", krb_get_err_text(result));
+ report(stderr, "krb_mq_req: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
result = krb_get_cred("imap", srvinst, srvrealm, &credentials);
if (result) {
- error(0, -1, "krb_get_cred: %s", krb_get_err_text(result));
+ report(stderr, "krb_get_cred: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
memcpy(session, credentials.session, sizeof session);
memset(&credentials, 0, sizeof credentials);
- des_key_sched(session, schedule);
+ des_key_sched(&session, schedule);
result = krb_get_tf_fullname(TKT_FILE, tktuser, tktinst, tktrealm);
if (result) {
- error(0, -1, "krb_get_tf_fullname: %s", krb_get_err_text(result));
+ report(stderr, "krb_get_tf_fullname: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
if (strcmp(tktuser, user) != 0) {
- error(0, -1, "principal %s in ticket does not match -u %s", tktuser,
+ report(stderr,
+ _("principal %s in ticket does not match -u %s\n"), tktuser,
user);
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
if (tktinst[0]) {
- error(0, 0, "non-null instance (%s) might cause strange behavior",
+ report(stderr,
+ _("non-null instance (%s) might cause strange behavior\n"),
tktinst);
strcat(tktuser, ".");
strcat(tktuser, tktinst);
result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm,
challenge1.cint);
if (result) {
- error(0, -1, "krb_mq_req: %s", krb_get_err_text(result));
+ report(stderr, "krb_mq_req: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
to64frombits(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length);
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE) {
- error(0, 0, "IMAP> %s", buf1);
+ if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
+ report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
}
+ strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
- SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
/* Upon decrypting and verifying the ticket and authenticator, the
* server should verify that the contained checksum field equals
len = from64tobits(buf2, buf1);
if (len < 0) {
- error(0, -1, "could not decode BASE64 ready response");
+ report(stderr, _("could not decode BASE64 ready response\n"));
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
des_ecb_encrypt((des_cblock *)buf2, (des_cblock *)buf2, schedule, 0);
memcpy(challenge2.cstr, buf2, 4);
if (ntohl(challenge2.cint) != challenge1.cint + 1) {
- error(0, -1, "challenge mismatch");
+ report(stderr, _("challenge mismatch\n"));
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
&session, 1);
to64frombits(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length);
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE) {
- error(0, 0, "IMAP> %s", buf1);
+ if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
+ report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
}
+
+ strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
- SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
return result;
}
#endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
-int imap_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *buf)
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#define GSSAUTH_P_NONE 1
+#define GSSAUTH_P_INTEGRITY 2
+#define GSSAUTH_P_PRIVACY 4
+
+static int do_gssauth(int sock, char *hostname, char *username)
+{
+ gss_buffer_desc request_buf, send_token;
+ gss_buffer_t sec_token;
+ gss_name_t target_name;
+ gss_ctx_id_t context;
+ gss_OID mech_name;
+ gss_qop_t quality;
+ int cflags;
+ OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat;
+ char buf1[8192], buf2[8192], server_conf_flags;
+ unsigned long buf_size;
+ int result;
+
+ /* first things first: get an imap ticket for host */
+ sprintf(buf1, "imap@%s", hostname);
+ request_buf.value = buf1;
+ request_buf.length = strlen(buf1) + 1;
+ maj_stat = gss_import_name(&min_stat, &request_buf, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE,
+ &target_name);
+ if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ report(stderr, _("Couldn't get service name for [%s]\n"), buf1);
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ }
+ else if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
+ maj_stat = gss_display_name(&min_stat, target_name, &request_buf,
+ &mech_name);
+ report(stderr, _("Using service name [%s]\n"),request_buf.value);
+ maj_stat = gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &request_buf);
+ }
+
+ gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE GSSAPI");
+
+ /* upon receipt of the GSSAPI authentication request, server returns
+ * null data ready response. */
+ if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ /* now start the security context initialisation loop... */
+ sec_token = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
+ context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
+ report(stdout, _("Sending credentials\n"));
+ do {
+ send_token.length = 0;
+ send_token.value = NULL;
+ maj_stat = gss_init_sec_context(&min_stat,
+ GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
+ &context,
+ target_name,
+ GSS_C_NO_OID,
+ GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG,
+ 0,
+ GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
+ sec_token,
+ NULL,
+ &send_token,
+ NULL,
+ NULL);
+ if (maj_stat!=GSS_S_COMPLETE && maj_stat!=GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
+ report(stderr, _("Error exchanging credentials\n"));
+ gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
+ /* wake up server and await NO response */
+ SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
+ if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
+ return result;
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ }
+ to64frombits(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length);
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
+ strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
+ SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
+ if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
+ report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
+ if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
+ if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
+ gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
+ return result;
+ }
+ request_buf.length = from64tobits(buf2, buf1 + 2);
+ request_buf.value = buf2;
+ sec_token = &request_buf;
+ }
+ } while (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
+ gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
+
+ /* get security flags and buffer size */
+ if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
+ return result;
+ }
+ request_buf.length = from64tobits(buf2, buf1 + 2);
+ request_buf.value = buf2;
+
+ maj_stat = gss_unwrap(&min_stat, context, &request_buf, &send_token,
+ &cflags, &quality);
+ if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ report(stderr, _("Couldn't unwrap security level data\n"));
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ }
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, _("Credential exchange complete\n"));
+ /* first octet is security levels supported. We want none, for now */
+ server_conf_flags = ((char *)send_token.value)[0];
+ if ( !(((char *)send_token.value)[0] & GSSAUTH_P_NONE) ) {
+ report(stderr, _("Server requires integrity and/or privacy\n"));
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ }
+ ((char *)send_token.value)[0] = 0;
+ buf_size = ntohl(*((long *)send_token.value));
+ /* we don't care about buffer size if we don't wrap data */
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
+ report(stdout, _("Unwrapped security level flags: %s%s%s\n"),
+ server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_NONE ? "N" : "-",
+ server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_INTEGRITY ? "I" : "-",
+ server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_PRIVACY ? "C" : "-");
+ report(stdout, _("Maximum GSS token size is %ld\n"),buf_size);
+ }
+
+ /* now respond in kind (hack!!!) */
+ buf_size = htonl(buf_size); /* do as they do... only matters if we do enc */
+ memcpy(buf1, &buf_size, 4);
+ buf1[0] = GSSAUTH_P_NONE;
+ strcpy(buf1+4, username); /* server decides if princ is user */
+ request_buf.length = 4 + strlen(username) + 1;
+ request_buf.value = buf1;
+ maj_stat = gss_wrap(&min_stat, context, 0, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, &request_buf,
+ &cflags, &send_token);
+ if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ report(stderr, _("Error creating security level request\n"));
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ }
+ to64frombits(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length);
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
+ report(stdout, _("Requesting authorization as %s\n"), username);
+ report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n",buf1);
+ }
+ strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
+ SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
+
+ /* we should be done. Get status and finish up */
+ if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
+ return result;
+ if (strstr(buf1, "OK")) {
+ /* flush security context */
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, _("Releasing GSS credentials\n"));
+ maj_stat = gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat, &context, &send_token);
+ if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ report(stderr, _("Error releasing credentials\n"));
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ }
+ /* send_token may contain a notification to the server to flush
+ * credentials. RFC 1731 doesn't specify what to do, and since this
+ * support is only for authentication, we'll assume the server
+ * knows enough to flush its own credentials */
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
+ return PS_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+}
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+static void hmac_md5 (unsigned char *password, size_t pass_len,
+ unsigned char *challenge, size_t chal_len,
+ unsigned char *response, size_t resp_len)
+{
+ int i;
+ unsigned char ipad[64];
+ unsigned char opad[64];
+ unsigned char hash_passwd[16];
+
+ MD5_CTX ctx;
+
+ if (resp_len != 16)
+ return;
+
+ if (pass_len > sizeof (ipad))
+ {
+ MD5Init (&ctx);
+ MD5Update (&ctx, password, pass_len);
+ MD5Final (hash_passwd, &ctx);
+ password = hash_passwd; pass_len = sizeof (hash_passwd);
+ }
+
+ memset (ipad, 0, sizeof (ipad));
+ memset (opad, 0, sizeof (opad));
+ memcpy (ipad, password, pass_len);
+ memcpy (opad, password, pass_len);
+
+ for (i=0; i<64; i++) {
+ ipad[i] ^= 0x36;
+ opad[i] ^= 0x5c;
+ }
+
+ MD5Init (&ctx);
+ MD5Update (&ctx, ipad, sizeof (ipad));
+ MD5Update (&ctx, challenge, chal_len);
+ MD5Final (response, &ctx);
+
+ MD5Init (&ctx);
+ MD5Update (&ctx, opad, sizeof (opad));
+ MD5Update (&ctx, response, resp_len);
+ MD5Final (response, &ctx);
+}
+
+#if NTLM_ENABLE
+#include "ntlm.h"
+
+static tSmbNtlmAuthRequest request;
+static tSmbNtlmAuthChallenge challenge;
+static tSmbNtlmAuthResponse response;
+
+/*
+ * NTLM support by Grant Edwards.
+ *
+ * Handle MS-Exchange NTLM authentication method. This is the same
+ * as the NTLM auth used by Samba for SMB related services. We just
+ * encode the packets in base64 instead of sending them out via a
+ * network interface.
+ *
+ * Much source (ntlm.h, smb*.c smb*.h) was borrowed from Samba.
+ */
+
+static int do_imap_ntlm(int sock, struct query *ctl)
+{
+ char msgbuf[2048];
+ int result,len;
+
+ gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE NTLM");
+
+ if ((result = gen_recv(sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
+ return result;
+
+ if (msgbuf[0] != '+')
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+
+ buildSmbNtlmAuthRequest(&request,ctl->remotename,NULL);
+
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ dumpSmbNtlmAuthRequest(stdout, &request);
+
+ memset(msgbuf,0,sizeof msgbuf);
+ to64frombits (msgbuf, (unsigned char*)&request, SmbLength(&request));
+
+ if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
+ report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", msgbuf);
+
+ strcat(msgbuf,"\r\n");
+ SockWrite (sock, msgbuf, strlen (msgbuf));
+
+ if ((gen_recv(sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
+ return result;
+
+ len = from64tobits ((unsigned char*)&challenge, msgbuf);
+
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ dumpSmbNtlmAuthChallenge(stdout, &challenge);
+
+ buildSmbNtlmAuthResponse(&challenge, &response,ctl->remotename,ctl->password);
+
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ dumpSmbNtlmAuthResponse(stdout, &response);
+
+ memset(msgbuf,0,sizeof msgbuf);
+ to64frombits (msgbuf, (unsigned char*)&response, SmbLength(&response));
+
+ if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
+ report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", msgbuf);
+
+ strcat(msgbuf,"\r\n");
+
+ SockWrite (sock, msgbuf, strlen (msgbuf));
+
+ if ((result = gen_recv (sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
+ return result;
+
+ if (strstr (msgbuf, "OK"))
+ return PS_SUCCESS;
+ else
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+}
+#endif /* NTLM */
+
+static int do_cram_md5 (int sock, struct query *ctl)
+/* authenticate as per RFC2195 */
+{
+ int result;
+ int len;
+ unsigned char buf1[1024];
+ unsigned char msg_id[768];
+ unsigned char response[16];
+ unsigned char reply[1024];
+
+ gen_send (sock, "AUTHENTICATE CRAM-MD5");
+
+ /* From RFC2195:
+ * The data encoded in the first ready response contains an
+ * presumptively arbitrary string of random digits, a timestamp, and the
+ * fully-qualified primary host name of the server. The syntax of the
+ * unencoded form must correspond to that of an RFC 822 'msg-id'
+ * [RFC822] as described in [POP3].
+ */
+
+ if ((result = gen_recv (sock, buf1, sizeof (buf1)))) {
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ len = from64tobits (msg_id, buf1);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ report (stderr, _("could not decode BASE64 challenge\n"));
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ } else if (len < sizeof (msg_id)) {
+ msg_id[len] = 0;
+ } else {
+ msg_id[sizeof (msg_id)-1] = 0;
+ }
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
+ report (stdout, "decoded as %s\n", msg_id);
+ }
+
+ /* The client makes note of the data and then responds with a string
+ * consisting of the user name, a space, and a 'digest'. The latter is
+ * computed by applying the keyed MD5 algorithm from [KEYED-MD5] where
+ * the key is a shared secret and the digested text is the timestamp
+ * (including angle-brackets).
+ */
+
+ hmac_md5 (ctl->password, strlen (ctl->password),
+ msg_id, strlen (msg_id),
+ response, sizeof (response));
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SNPRINTF
+ snprintf (reply, sizeof (reply),
+#else
+ sprintf(reply,
+#endif
+ "%s %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
+ ctl->remotename,
+ response[0], response[1], response[2], response[3],
+ response[4], response[5], response[6], response[7],
+ response[8], response[9], response[10], response[11],
+ response[12], response[13], response[14], response[15]);
+
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
+ report (stdout, "replying with %s\n", reply);
+ }
+
+ to64frombits (buf1, reply, strlen (reply));
+ if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
+ report (stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
+ }
+
+ /* PMDF5.2 IMAP has a bug that requires this to be a single write */
+ strcat (buf1, "\r\n");
+ SockWrite (sock, buf1, strlen (buf1));
+
+ if ((result = gen_recv (sock, buf1, sizeof (buf1))))
+ return result;
+
+ if (strstr (buf1, "OK")) {
+ return PS_SUCCESS;
+ } else {
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ }
+}
+
+int imap_canonicalize(char *result, char *raw, int maxlen)
+/* encode an IMAP password as per RFC1730's quoting conventions */
+{
+ int i, j;
+
+ j = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < strlen(raw) && i < maxlen; i++)
+ {
+ if ((raw[i] == '\\') || (raw[i] == '"'))
+ result[j++] = '\\';
+ result[j++] = raw[i];
+ }
+ result[j] = '\0';
+
+ return(i);
+}
+
+int imap_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting)
/* apply for connection authorization */
{
- char rbuf [POPBUFSIZE+1];
int ok = 0;
-#ifdef KERBEROS_V4
- int kerbok = 0;
- if (ctl->server.protocol != P_IMAP_K4)
-#endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
- /* try to get authorized */
- ok = gen_transact(sock,
- "LOGIN %s \"%s\"", ctl->remotename, ctl->password);
-
- if (ok)
- return(ok);
-
- /* probe to see if we're running IMAP4 and can use RFC822.PEEK */
- gen_send(sock, "CAPABILITY");
- if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, rbuf, sizeof(rbuf))))
- return(ok);
- if (strstr(rbuf, "BAD"))
- {
- imap_version = IMAP2;
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
- error(0, 0, "Protocol identified as IMAP2 or IMAP2BIS");
- }
- /* UW-IMAP server 10.173 notifies in all caps */
- else if (strstr(rbuf, "IMAP4rev1") || strstr(rbuf, "IMAP4REV1"))
- {
- imap_version = IMAP4rev1;
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
- error(0, 0, "Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 1");
- }
- else
- {
- imap_version = IMAP4;
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
- error(0, 0, "Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 0");
- }
-
- /* eat the tail of the CAPABILITY response (if any) */
- if ((peek_capable = (imap_version >= IMAP4)))
- if ((ok = imap_ok(sock, (char *)NULL)))
- return(ok);
+ /* probe to see if we're running IMAP4 and can use RFC822.PEEK */
+ capabilities[0] = '\0';
+ if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "CAPABILITY")) == PS_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ /* UW-IMAP server 10.173 notifies in all caps */
+ if (strstr(capabilities, "IMAP4REV1"))
+ {
+ imap_version = IMAP4rev1;
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, _("Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 1\n"));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ imap_version = IMAP4;
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, _("Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 0\n"));
+ }
+ }
+ else if (ok == PS_ERROR)
+ {
+ imap_version = IMAP2;
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, _("Protocol identified as IMAP2 or IMAP2BIS\n"));
+ }
+ else
+ return(ok);
+
+ peek_capable = (imap_version >= IMAP4);
+
+ /*
+ * Assumption: expunges are cheap, so we want to do them
+ * after every message unless user said otherwise.
+ */
+ if (NUM_SPECIFIED(ctl->expunge))
+ expunge_period = NUM_VALUE_OUT(ctl->expunge);
+ else
+ expunge_period = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * If either (a) we saw a PREAUTH token in the capability response, or
+ * (b) the user specified ssh preauthentication, then we're done.
+ */
+ if (preauth || ctl->server.preauthenticate == A_SSH)
+ return(PS_SUCCESS);
+
+#if OPIE_ENABLE
+ if ((ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP) && strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=X-OTP"))
+ {
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, _("OTP authentication is supported\n"));
+ if (do_otp(sock, ctl) == PS_SUCCESS)
+ return(PS_SUCCESS);
+ };
+#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=GSSAPI"))
+ {
+ if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_GSS)
+ {
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, _("GSS authentication is supported\n"));
+ return do_gssauth(sock, ctl->server.truename, ctl->remotename);
+ }
+ }
+ else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_GSS)
+ {
+ report(stderr,
+ _("Required GSS capability not supported by server\n"));
+ return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
+ }
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
#ifdef KERBEROS_V4
- if (strstr(rbuf, "AUTH=KERBEROS_V4"))
- {
- kerbok++;
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
- error(0, 0, "KERBEROS_V4 authentication is supported");
- }
-
- /* eat OK response */
- if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, rbuf, sizeof(rbuf))))
- return(ok);
-
- if (!strstr(rbuf, "OK"))
- return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
-
- if ((imap_version >= IMAP4) && (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_K4))
- {
- if (!kerbok)
- {
- error(0, -1, "Required KERBEROS_V4 capability not supported by server");
- return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
- }
-
- if ((ok = do_rfc1731(sock, ctl, buf)))
- {
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
- error(0, 0, "IMAP> *");
- SockWrite(sock, "*\r\n", 3);
- return(ok);
- }
- }
+ if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=KERBEROS_V4"))
+ {
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, _("KERBEROS_V4 authentication is supported\n"));
+
+ if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_K4)
+ {
+ if ((ok = do_rfc1731(sock, ctl->server.truename)))
+ {
+ if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
+ report(stdout, "IMAP> *\n");
+ SockWrite(sock, "*\r\n", 3);
+ }
+
+ return(ok);
+ }
+ /* else fall through to ordinary AUTH=LOGIN case */
+ }
+ else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_K4)
+ {
+ report(stderr,
+ _("Required KERBEROS_V4 capability not supported by server\n"));
+ return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
+ }
#endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
- return(PS_SUCCESS);
+ if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=CRAM-MD5"))
+ {
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report (stdout, _("CRAM-MD5 authentication is supported\n"));
+ if (ctl->server.protocol != P_IMAP_LOGIN)
+ {
+ if ((ok = do_cram_md5 (sock, ctl)))
+ {
+ if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
+ report (stdout, "IMAP> *\n");
+ SockWrite (sock, "*\r\n", 3);
+ }
+ return ok;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_CRAM_MD5)
+ {
+ report(stderr,
+ _("Required CRAM-MD5 capability not supported by server\n"));
+ return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
+ }
+
+#ifdef NTLM_ENABLE
+ if (strstr (capabilities, "AUTH=NTLM"))
+ {
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report (stdout, _("NTLM authentication is supported\n"));
+ return do_imap_ntlm (sock, ctl);
+ }
+#endif /* NTLM_ENABLE */
+
+#ifdef __UNUSED__ /* The Cyrus IMAP4rev1 server chokes on this */
+ /* this handles either AUTH=LOGIN or AUTH-LOGIN */
+ if ((imap_version >= IMAP4rev1) && (!strstr(capabilities, "LOGIN"))) {
+ report(stderr,
+ _("Required LOGIN capability not supported by server\n"));
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ };
+#endif /* __UNUSED__ */
+
+ {
+ /* these sizes guarantee no buffer overflow */
+ char remotename[NAMELEN*2+1], password[PASSWORDLEN*2+1];
+
+ imap_canonicalize(remotename, ctl->remotename, NAMELEN);
+ imap_canonicalize(password, ctl->password, PASSWORDLEN);
+ ok = gen_transact(sock, "LOGIN \"%s\" \"%s\"", remotename, password);
+ }
+
+ if (ok)
+ return(ok);
+
+ return(PS_SUCCESS);
+}
+
+static int internal_expunge(int sock)
+/* ship an expunge, resetting associated counters */
+{
+ int ok;
+
+ if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "EXPUNGE")))
+ return(ok);
+
+ expunged += deletions;
+ deletions = 0;
+
+#ifdef IMAP_UID /* not used */
+ expunge_uids(ctl);
+#endif /* IMAP_UID */
+
+ return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
static int imap_getrange(int sock,
struct query *ctl,
const char *folder,
- int *countp, int *newp)
+ int *countp, int *newp, int *bytes)
/* get range of messages to be fetched */
{
int ok;
/* find out how many messages are waiting */
- recent = unseen = -1;
- ok = gen_transact(sock, "SELECT %s", folder ? folder : "INBOX");
- if (ok != 0)
+ *bytes = recent = unseen = -1;
+
+ if (pass > 1)
{
- error(0, 0, "mailbox selection failed");
- return(ok);
+ /*
+ * We have to have an expunge here, otherwise the re-poll will
+ * infinite-loop picking up un-expunged messages -- unless the
+ * expunge period is one and we've been nuking each message
+ * just after deletion.
+ */
+ ok = 0;
+ if (deletions && expunge_period != 1)
+ internal_expunge(sock);
+ count = -1;
+ if (ok || gen_transact(sock, "NOOP"))
+ {
+ report(stderr, _("re-poll failed\n"));
+ return(ok);
+ }
+ else if (count == -1) /* no EXISTS response to NOOP */
+ {
+ count = recent = 0;
+ unseen = -1;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (!check_only)
+ ok = gen_transact(sock, "SELECT %s", folder ? folder : "INBOX");
+ else
+ ok = gen_transact(sock, "EXAMINE %s", folder ? folder : "INBOX");
+ if (ok != 0)
+ {
+ report(stderr, _("mailbox selection failed\n"));
+ return(ok);
+ }
}
*countp = count;
else
*newp = -1; /* should never happen, RECENT is mandatory */
- expunged = deletions = 0;
+ expunged = 0;
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
static int imap_getsizes(int sock, int count, int *sizes)
/* capture the sizes of all messages */
{
- char buf [POPBUFSIZE+1];
+ char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1];
- gen_send(sock, "FETCH 1:%d RFC822.SIZE", count);
+ /*
+ * Some servers (as in, PMDF5.1-9.1 under OpenVMS 6.1)
+ * won't accept 1:1 as valid set syntax. Some implementors
+ * should be taken out and shot for excessive anality.
+ */
+ if (count == 1)
+ gen_send(sock, "FETCH 1 RFC822.SIZE", count);
+ else
+ gen_send(sock, "FETCH 1:%d RFC822.SIZE", count);
for (;;)
{
int num, size, ok;
break;
else if (sscanf(buf, "* %d FETCH (RFC822.SIZE %d)", &num, &size) == 2)
sizes[num - 1] = size;
- else
- sizes[num - 1] = -1;
}
return(PS_SUCCESS);
{
int ok;
- /* expunged change the fetch numbers */
+ /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
number -= expunged;
if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "FETCH %d FLAGS", number)) != 0)
static int imap_fetch_headers(int sock, struct query *ctl,int number,int *lenp)
/* request headers of nth message */
{
- char buf [POPBUFSIZE+1];
+ char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1];
int num;
- /* expunged change the fetch numbers */
+ /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
number -= expunged;
/*
- * This is blessed by RFC 1176, RFC1730, RFC2060.
+ * This is blessed by RFC1176, RFC1730, RFC2060.
* According to the RFCs, it should *not* set the \Seen flag.
*/
gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.HEADER", number);
static int imap_fetch_body(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number, int *lenp)
/* request body of nth message */
{
- char buf [POPBUFSIZE+1], *cp;
+ char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1], *cp;
int num;
- /* expunged change the fetch numbers */
+ /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
number -= expunged;
/*
*
* However...*don't* do this if we're using keep to suppress deletion!
* In that case, marking the seen flag is the only way to prevent the
- * message from being re-fetched on subsequent runs.
+ * message from being re-fetched on subsequent runs (and according
+ * to RFC2060 p.43 this fetch should set Seen as a side effect).
*/
switch (imap_version)
{
if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
return(ok);
} while
- (sscanf(buf+2, "%d FETCH", &num) != 1);
+ (!strstr(buf+4, "FETCH") || sscanf(buf+2, "%d", &num) != 1);
if (num != number)
return(PS_ERROR);
- /* try to extract a length */
+ /*
+ * Try to extract a length from the FETCH response. RFC2060 requires
+ * it to be present, but at least one IMAP server (Novell GroupWise)
+ * botches this.
+ */
if ((cp = strchr(buf, '{')))
*lenp = atoi(cp + 1);
else
- *lenp = 0;
+ *lenp = -1; /* missing length part in FETCH reponse */
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
static int imap_trail(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
/* discard tail of FETCH response after reading message text */
{
- /* expunged change the fetch numbers */
+ /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
/* number -= expunged; */
for (;;)
{
- char buf[POPBUFSIZE+1];
+ char buf[MSGBUFSIZE+1];
int ok;
if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
/* UW IMAP returns "OK FETCH", Cyrus returns "OK Completed" */
if (strstr(buf, "OK"))
break;
+
+#ifdef __UNUSED__
+ /*
+ * Any IMAP server that fails to set Seen on a BODY[TEXT]
+ * fetch violates RFC2060 p.43 (top). This becomes an issue
+ * when keep is on, because seen messages aren't deleted and
+ * get refetched on each poll. As a workaround, if keep is on
+ * we can set the Seen flag explicitly.
+ *
+ * This code isn't used yet because we don't know of any IMAP
+ * servers broken in this way.
+ */
+ if (ctl->keep)
+ if ((ok = gen_transact(sock,
+ imap_version == IMAP4
+ ? "STORE %d +FLAGS.SILENT (\\Seen)"
+ : "STORE %d +FLAGS (\\Seen)",
+ number)))
+ return(ok);
+#endif /* __UNUSED__ */
}
return(PS_SUCCESS);
{
int ok;
- /* expunged change the fetch numbers */
+ /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
number -= expunged;
/*
* Use SILENT if possible as a minor throughput optimization.
* Note: this has been dropped from IMAP4rev1.
+ *
+ * We set Seen because there are some IMAP servers (notably HP
+ * OpenMail) that do message-receipt DSNs, but only when the seen
+ * bit is set. This is the appropriate time -- we get here right
+ * after the local SMTP response that says delivery was
+ * successful.
*/
if ((ok = gen_transact(sock,
imap_version == IMAP4
- ? "STORE %d +FLAGS.SILENT (\\Deleted)"
- : "STORE %d +FLAGS (\\Deleted)",
+ ? "STORE %d +FLAGS.SILENT (\\Seen \\Deleted)"
+ : "STORE %d +FLAGS (\\Seen \\Deleted)",
number)))
return(ok);
+ else
+ deletions++;
/*
- * We do an expunge after ctl->expunge messages, rather than
+ * We do an expunge after expunge_period messages, rather than
* just before quit, so that a line hit during a long session
* won't result in lots of messages being fetched again during
* the next session.
*/
- if (ctl->expunge > 0 && (++deletions % ctl->expunge) == 0)
- {
- if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "EXPUNGE")))
- return(ok);
-
- expunged = deletions;;
- }
+ if (NUM_NONZERO(expunge_period) && (deletions % expunge_period) == 0)
+ internal_expunge(sock);
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
static int imap_logout(int sock, struct query *ctl)
/* send logout command */
{
- /* if expunges after deletion have been suppressed, ship one now */
- if (ctl->expunge <= 0 && deletions)
- {
- int ok;
-
- if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "EXPUNGE")))
- return(ok);
- }
+ /* if any un-expunged deletions remain, ship an expunge now */
+ if (deletions)
+ internal_expunge(sock);
return(gen_transact(sock, "LOGOUT"));
}
const static struct method imap =
{
"IMAP", /* Internet Message Access Protocol */
- 143, /* standard IMAP2bis/IMAP4 port */
+#if INET6_ENABLE
+ "imap",
+ "imaps",
+#else /* INET6_ENABLE */
+ 143, /* standard IMAP2bis/IMAP4 port */
+ 993, /* ssl IMAP2bis/IMAP4 port */
+#endif /* INET6_ENABLE */
TRUE, /* this is a tagged protocol */
FALSE, /* no message delimiter */
imap_ok, /* parse command response */
+ imap_canonicalize, /* deal with embedded slashes and spaces */
imap_getauth, /* get authorization */
imap_getrange, /* query range of messages */
- imap_getsizes, /* get sizes of messages (used for --limit option */
+ imap_getsizes, /* get sizes of messages (used for ESMTP SIZE option) */
imap_is_old, /* no UID check */
imap_fetch_headers, /* request given message headers */
imap_fetch_body, /* request given message body */
imap_trail, /* eat message trailer */
imap_delete, /* delete the message */
imap_logout, /* expunge and exit */
+ TRUE, /* yes, we can re-poll */
};
int doIMAP(struct query *ctl)
projects / ~andy / fetchmail / blobdiff