#include "md5.h"
-#if OPIE
+#if OPIE_ENABLE
#include <opie.h>
-#endif /* OPIE */
+#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
#ifndef strstr /* glibc-2.1 declares this as a macro */
extern char *strstr(); /* needed on sysV68 R3V7.1. */
}
if (strstr(buf, "FLAGS"))
seen = (strstr(buf, "SEEN") != (char *)NULL);
+ if (strstr(buf, "PREAUTH"))
+ preauth = TRUE;
} while
(tag[0] != '\0' && strncmp(buf, tag, strlen(tag)));
else if (strncmp(cp, "BAD", 3) == 0)
return(PS_ERROR);
else if (strncmp(cp, "NO", 2) == 0)
- return(PS_ERROR);
+ {
+ if (stage == STAGE_GETAUTH)
+ return(PS_AUTHFAIL); /* RFC2060, 6.2.2 */
+ else
+ return(PS_ERROR);
+ }
else
return(PS_PROTOCOL);
}
}
-#if OPIE
+#if OPIE_ENABLE
static int do_otp(int sock, struct query *ctl)
{
int i, rval;
if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buffer);
+
+ /* best not to count on the challenge code handling multiple writes */
+ strcat(buffer, "\r\n");
SockWrite(sock, buffer, strlen(buffer));
- SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
return rval;
};
if (rval)
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
to64frombits(buffer, response, strlen(response));
if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buffer);
+ strcat(buffer, "\r\n");
SockWrite(sock, buffer, strlen(buffer));
- SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
return rval;
else
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
};
-#endif /* OPIE */
+#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
#ifdef KERBEROS_V4
#if SIZEOF_INT == 4
return result;
}
- /* this patch by Dan Root <dar@thekeep.org> solves an endianess problem. */
+ len = from64tobits(challenge1.cstr, buf1);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ report(stderr, _("could not decode initial BASE64 challenge\n"));
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ }
+
+ /* this patch by Dan Root <dar@thekeep.org> solves an endianess
+ * problem. */
{
char tmp[4];
memcpy(challenge1.cstr, tmp, sizeof(tmp));
}
- len = from64tobits(challenge1.cstr, buf1);
- if (len < 0) {
- report(stderr, _("could not decode initial BASE64 challenge\n"));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
-
/* Client responds with a Kerberos ticket and an authenticator for
* the principal "imap.hostname@realm" where "hostname" is the
* first component of the host name of the server with all letters
if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
}
+ strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
- SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
/* Upon decrypting and verifying the ticket and authenticator, the
* server should verify that the contained checksum field equals
if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
}
+
+ strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
- SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
return result;
}
to64frombits(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length);
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
+ strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
- SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
}
to64frombits(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length);
if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
- report(stdout, _("Requesting authorisation as %s\n"), username);
+ report(stdout, _("Requesting authorization as %s\n"), username);
report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n",buf1);
}
+ strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
- SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
/* we should be done. Get status and finish up */
if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
MD5Final (response, &ctx);
}
+#if NTLM_ENABLE
+#include "ntlm.h"
+
+static tSmbNtlmAuthRequest request;
+static tSmbNtlmAuthChallenge challenge;
+static tSmbNtlmAuthResponse response;
+
+/*
+ * NTLM support by Grant Edwards.
+ *
+ * Handle MS-Exchange NTLM authentication method. This is the same
+ * as the NTLM auth used by Samba for SMB related services. We just
+ * encode the packets in base64 instead of sending them out via a
+ * network interface.
+ *
+ * Much source (ntlm.h, smb*.c smb*.h) was borrowed from Samba.
+ */
+
+static int do_imap_ntlm(int sock, struct query *ctl)
+{
+ char msgbuf[2048];
+ int result,len;
+
+ gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE NTLM");
+
+ if ((result = gen_recv(sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
+ return result;
+
+ if (msgbuf[0] != '+')
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+
+ buildSmbNtlmAuthRequest(&request,ctl->remotename,NULL);
+
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ dumpSmbNtlmAuthRequest(stdout, &request);
+
+ memset(msgbuf,0,sizeof msgbuf);
+ to64frombits (msgbuf, (unsigned char*)&request, SmbLength(&request));
+
+ if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
+ report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", msgbuf);
+
+ strcat(msgbuf,"\r\n");
+ SockWrite (sock, msgbuf, strlen (msgbuf));
+
+ if ((gen_recv(sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
+ return result;
+
+ len = from64tobits ((unsigned char*)&challenge, msgbuf);
+
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ dumpSmbNtlmAuthChallenge(stdout, &challenge);
+
+ buildSmbNtlmAuthResponse(&challenge, &response,ctl->remotename,ctl->password);
+
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ dumpSmbNtlmAuthResponse(stdout, &response);
+
+ memset(msgbuf,0,sizeof msgbuf);
+ to64frombits (msgbuf, (unsigned char*)&response, SmbLength(&response));
+
+ if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
+ report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", msgbuf);
+
+ strcat(msgbuf,"\r\n");
+
+ SockWrite (sock, msgbuf, strlen (msgbuf));
+
+ if ((result = gen_recv (sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
+ return result;
+
+ if (strstr (msgbuf, "OK"))
+ return PS_SUCCESS;
+ else
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+}
+#endif /* NTLM */
static int do_cram_md5 (int sock, struct query *ctl)
/* authenticate as per RFC2195 */
* [RFC822] as described in [POP3].
*/
- if (result = gen_recv (sock, buf1, sizeof (buf1))) {
+ if ((result = gen_recv (sock, buf1, sizeof (buf1)))) {
return result;
}
if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
report (stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
}
+
+ /* PMDF5.2 IMAP has a bug that requires this to be a single write */
+ strcat (buf1, "\r\n");
SockWrite (sock, buf1, strlen (buf1));
- SockWrite (sock, "\r\n", 2);
- if (result = gen_recv (sock, buf1, sizeof (buf1)))
+ if ((result = gen_recv (sock, buf1, sizeof (buf1))))
return result;
if (strstr (buf1, "OK")) {
}
}
-int imap_canonicalize(char *result, char *passwd)
+int imap_canonicalize(char *result, char *raw, int maxlen)
/* encode an IMAP password as per RFC1730's quoting conventions */
{
int i, j;
j = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < strlen(passwd); i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < strlen(raw) && i < maxlen; i++)
{
- if ((passwd[i] == '\\') || (passwd[i] == '"'))
+ if ((raw[i] == '\\') || (raw[i] == '"'))
result[j++] = '\\';
- result[j++] = passwd[i];
+ result[j++] = raw[i];
}
result[j] = '\0';
/* apply for connection authorization */
{
int ok = 0;
- char password[PASSWORDLEN*2];
/* probe to see if we're running IMAP4 and can use RFC822.PEEK */
capabilities[0] = '\0';
else
expunge_period = 1;
- if (preauth)
+ /*
+ * If either (a) we saw a PREAUTH token in the capability response, or
+ * (b) the user specified ssh preauthentication, then we're done.
+ */
+ if (preauth || ctl->server.preauthenticate == A_SSH)
return(PS_SUCCESS);
-#if OPIE
+#if OPIE_ENABLE
if ((ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP) && strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=X-OTP"))
{
if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
if (do_otp(sock, ctl) == PS_SUCCESS)
return(PS_SUCCESS);
};
-#endif /* OPIE */
+#endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
#ifdef GSSAPI
if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=GSSAPI"))
}
#endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
- if (strstr (capabilities, "AUTH=CRAM-MD5"))
+ if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=CRAM-MD5"))
{
if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
report (stdout, _("CRAM-MD5 authentication is supported\n"));
- if ((ok = do_cram_md5 (sock, ctl)))
+ if (ctl->server.protocol != P_IMAP_LOGIN)
{
- if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
- report (stdout, "IMAP> *\n");
- SockWrite (sock, "*\r\n", 3);
+ if ((ok = do_cram_md5 (sock, ctl)))
+ {
+ if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
+ report (stdout, "IMAP> *\n");
+ SockWrite (sock, "*\r\n", 3);
+ }
+ return ok;
}
- return ok;
+ }
+ else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_CRAM_MD5)
+ {
+ report(stderr,
+ _("Required CRAM-MD5 capability not supported by server\n"));
+ return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
}
+#ifdef NTLM_ENABLE
+ if (strstr (capabilities, "AUTH=NTLM"))
+ {
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report (stdout, _("NTLM authentication is supported\n"));
+ return do_imap_ntlm (sock, ctl);
+ }
+#endif /* NTLM_ENABLE */
+
#ifdef __UNUSED__ /* The Cyrus IMAP4rev1 server chokes on this */
/* this handles either AUTH=LOGIN or AUTH-LOGIN */
if ((imap_version >= IMAP4rev1) && (!strstr(capabilities, "LOGIN"))) {
};
#endif /* __UNUSED__ */
- imap_canonicalize(password, ctl->password);
- ok = gen_transact(sock, "LOGIN \"%s\" \"%s\"", ctl->remotename, password);
+ {
+ /* these sizes guarantee no buffer overflow */
+ char remotename[NAMELEN*2+1], password[PASSWORDLEN*2+1];
+
+ imap_canonicalize(remotename, ctl->remotename, NAMELEN);
+ imap_canonicalize(password, ctl->password, PASSWORDLEN);
+ ok = gen_transact(sock, "LOGIN \"%s\" \"%s\"", remotename, password);
+ }
+
if (ok)
return(ok);
number -= expunged;
/*
- * This is blessed by RFC 1176, RFC1730, RFC2060.
+ * This is blessed by RFC1176, RFC1730, RFC2060.
* According to the RFCs, it should *not* set the \Seen flag.
*/
gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.HEADER", number);
*
* However...*don't* do this if we're using keep to suppress deletion!
* In that case, marking the seen flag is the only way to prevent the
- * message from being re-fetched on subsequent runs.
+ * message from being re-fetched on subsequent runs (and according
+ * to RFC2060 p.43 this fetch should set Seen as a side effect).
*/
switch (imap_version)
{
if (num != number)
return(PS_ERROR);
- /* try to extract a length */
+ /*
+ * Try to extract a length from the FETCH response. RFC2060 requires
+ * it to be present, but at least one IMAP server (Novell GroupWise)
+ * botches this.
+ */
if ((cp = strchr(buf, '{')))
*lenp = atoi(cp + 1);
else
- *lenp = 0;
+ *lenp = -1; /* missing length part in FETCH reponse */
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
/* UW IMAP returns "OK FETCH", Cyrus returns "OK Completed" */
if (strstr(buf, "OK"))
break;
+
+#ifdef __UNUSED__
+ /*
+ * Any IMAP server that fails to set Seen on a BODY[TEXT]
+ * fetch violates RFC2060 p.43 (top). This becomes an issue
+ * when keep is on, because seen messages aren't deleted and
+ * get refetched on each poll. As a workaround, if keep is on
+ * we can set the Seen flag explicitly.
+ *
+ * This code isn't used yet because we don't know of any IMAP
+ * servers broken in this way.
+ */
+ if (ctl->keep)
+ if ((ok = gen_transact(sock,
+ imap_version == IMAP4
+ ? "STORE %d +FLAGS.SILENT (\\Seen)"
+ : "STORE %d +FLAGS (\\Seen)",
+ number)))
+ return(ok);
+#endif /* __UNUSED__ */
}
return(PS_SUCCESS);
const static struct method imap =
{
"IMAP", /* Internet Message Access Protocol */
-#if INET6
+#if INET6_ENABLE
"imap",
-#else /* INET6 */
+ "imaps",
+#else /* INET6_ENABLE */
143, /* standard IMAP2bis/IMAP4 port */
-#endif /* INET6 */
+ 993, /* ssl IMAP2bis/IMAP4 port */
+#endif /* INET6_ENABLE */
TRUE, /* this is a tagged protocol */
FALSE, /* no message delimiter */
imap_ok, /* parse command response */
imap_canonicalize, /* deal with embedded slashes and spaces */
imap_getauth, /* get authorization */
imap_getrange, /* query range of messages */
- imap_getsizes, /* get sizes of messages (used for --limit option */
+ imap_getsizes, /* get sizes of messages (used for ESMTP SIZE option) */
imap_is_old, /* no UID check */
imap_fetch_headers, /* request given message headers */
imap_fetch_body, /* request given message body */
projects / ~andy / fetchmail / blobdiff