#include "socket.h"
#ifdef KERBEROS_V4
+#ifdef KERBEROS_V5
+#include <kerberosIV/des.h>
+#include <kerberosIV/krb.h>
+#else
#if defined (__bsdi__)
#include <des.h>
#define krb_get_err_text(e) (krb_err_txt[e])
#endif
-#if defined (__FreeBSD__) || defined(__linux__)
+#if defined(__NetBSD__) || (__FreeBSD__) || defined(__linux__)
#define krb_get_err_text(e) (krb_err_txt[e])
#endif
#include <krb.h>
+#endif
#endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
+#include "i18n.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
+#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_H
+#include <gssapi.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H
#include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
#include <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h>
#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE
+#define GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE gss_nt_service_name
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#include "md5.h"
#if OPIE
#include <opie.h>
#define IMAP4 0 /* IMAP4 rev 0, RFC1730 */
#define IMAP4rev1 1 /* IMAP4 rev 1, RFC2060 */
-static int count, seen, recent, unseen, deletions,expunged, imap_version;
+static int count, seen, recent, unseen, deletions, imap_version, preauth;
+static int expunged, expunge_period;
static char capabilities[MSGBUFSIZE+1];
int imap_ok(int sock, char *argbuf)
while (isspace(*cp))
cp++;
- if (strncmp(cp, "OK", 2) == 0)
+ if (strncmp(cp, "PREAUTH", 2) == 0)
+ {
+ if (argbuf)
+ strcpy(argbuf, cp);
+ preauth = TRUE;
+ return(PS_SUCCESS);
+ }
+ else if (strncmp(cp, "OK", 2) == 0)
{
if (argbuf)
strcpy(argbuf, cp);
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
- else if (strncmp(cp, "BAD", 2) == 0)
+ else if (strncmp(cp, "BAD", 3) == 0)
+ return(PS_ERROR);
+ else if (strncmp(cp, "NO", 2) == 0)
return(PS_ERROR);
else
return(PS_PROTOCOL);
#if OPIE
static int do_otp(int sock, struct query *ctl)
{
- int i, rval;
- char buffer[128];
- char challenge[OPIE_CHALLENGE_MAX+1];
- char response[OPIE_RESPONSE_MAX+1];
+ int i, rval;
+ char buffer[128];
+ char challenge[OPIE_CHALLENGE_MAX+1];
+ char response[OPIE_RESPONSE_MAX+1];
- gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE X-OTP");
+ gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE X-OTP");
- if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
- return rval;
+ if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
+ return rval;
- if ((i = from64tobits(challenge, buffer)) < 0) {
- error(0, -1, "Could not decode initial BASE64 challenge");
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- };
+ if ((i = from64tobits(challenge, buffer)) < 0) {
+ report(stderr, _("Could not decode initial BASE64 challenge\n"));
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ };
- to64frombits(buffer, ctl->remotename, strlen(ctl->remotename));
+ to64frombits(buffer, ctl->remotename, strlen(ctl->remotename));
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
- error(0, 0, "IMAP> %s", buffer);
- SockWrite(sock, buffer, strlen(buffer));
- SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
+ if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
+ report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buffer);
- if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
- return rval;
+ /* best not to count on the challenge code handling multiple writes */
+ strcat(buffer, "\r\n");
+ SockWrite(sock, buffer, strlen(buffer));
- if ((i = from64tobits(challenge, buffer)) < 0) {
- error(0, -1, "Could not decode OTP challenge");
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- };
+ if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
+ return rval;
+
+ if ((i = from64tobits(challenge, buffer)) < 0) {
+ report(stderr, _("Could not decode OTP challenge\n"));
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ };
- rval = opiegenerator(challenge, !strcmp(ctl->password, "opie") ? "" : ctl->password, response);
- if ((rval == -2) && (cmd_daemon == -1)) {
- char secret[OPIE_SECRET_MAX+1];
- fprintf(stderr, "Secret pass phrase: ");
- if (opiereadpass(secret, sizeof(secret), 0))
- rval = opiegenerator(challenge, secret, response);
- memset(secret, 0, sizeof(secret));
- };
+ rval = opiegenerator(challenge, !strcmp(ctl->password, "opie") ? "" : ctl->password, response);
+ if ((rval == -2) && !run.poll_interval) {
+ char secret[OPIE_SECRET_MAX+1];
+ fprintf(stderr, _("Secret pass phrase: "));
+ if (opiereadpass(secret, sizeof(secret), 0))
+ rval = opiegenerator(challenge, secret, response);
+ memset(secret, 0, sizeof(secret));
+ };
- if (rval)
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ if (rval)
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- to64frombits(buffer, response, strlen(response));
+ to64frombits(buffer, response, strlen(response));
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
- error(0, 0, "IMAP> %s", buffer);
- SockWrite(sock, buffer, strlen(buffer));
- SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
+ if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
+ report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buffer);
+ strcat(buffer, "\r\n");
+ SockWrite(sock, buffer, strlen(buffer));
- if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
- return rval;
+ if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
+ return rval;
- if (strstr(buffer, "OK"))
- return PS_SUCCESS;
- else
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ if (strstr(buffer, "OK"))
+ return PS_SUCCESS;
+ else
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
};
#endif /* OPIE */
len = from64tobits(challenge1.cstr, buf1);
if (len < 0) {
- error(0, -1, "could not decode initial BASE64 challenge");
+ report(stderr, _("could not decode initial BASE64 challenge\n"));
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
+ /* this patch by Dan Root <dar@thekeep.org> solves an endianess
+ * problem. */
+ {
+ char tmp[4];
+
+ *(int *)tmp = ntohl(*(int *) challenge1.cstr);
+ memcpy(challenge1.cstr, tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+ }
+
/* Client responds with a Kerberos ticket and an authenticator for
* the principal "imap.hostname@realm" where "hostname" is the
* first component of the host name of the server with all letters
result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm, 0);
if (result) {
- error(0, -1, "krb_mq_req: %s", krb_get_err_text(result));
+ report(stderr, "krb_mq_req: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
result = krb_get_cred("imap", srvinst, srvrealm, &credentials);
if (result) {
- error(0, -1, "krb_get_cred: %s", krb_get_err_text(result));
+ report(stderr, "krb_get_cred: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
memcpy(session, credentials.session, sizeof session);
memset(&credentials, 0, sizeof credentials);
- des_key_sched(session, schedule);
+ des_key_sched(&session, schedule);
result = krb_get_tf_fullname(TKT_FILE, tktuser, tktinst, tktrealm);
if (result) {
- error(0, -1, "krb_get_tf_fullname: %s", krb_get_err_text(result));
+ report(stderr, "krb_get_tf_fullname: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
if (strcmp(tktuser, user) != 0) {
- error(0, -1, "principal %s in ticket does not match -u %s", tktuser,
+ report(stderr,
+ _("principal %s in ticket does not match -u %s\n"), tktuser,
user);
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
if (tktinst[0]) {
- error(0, 0, "non-null instance (%s) might cause strange behavior",
+ report(stderr,
+ _("non-null instance (%s) might cause strange behavior\n"),
tktinst);
strcat(tktuser, ".");
strcat(tktuser, tktinst);
result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm,
challenge1.cint);
if (result) {
- error(0, -1, "krb_mq_req: %s", krb_get_err_text(result));
+ report(stderr, "krb_mq_req: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
to64frombits(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length);
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE) {
- error(0, 0, "IMAP> %s", buf1);
+ if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
+ report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
}
+ strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
- SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
/* Upon decrypting and verifying the ticket and authenticator, the
* server should verify that the contained checksum field equals
len = from64tobits(buf2, buf1);
if (len < 0) {
- error(0, -1, "could not decode BASE64 ready response");
+ report(stderr, _("could not decode BASE64 ready response\n"));
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
des_ecb_encrypt((des_cblock *)buf2, (des_cblock *)buf2, schedule, 0);
memcpy(challenge2.cstr, buf2, 4);
if (ntohl(challenge2.cint) != challenge1.cint + 1) {
- error(0, -1, "challenge mismatch");
+ report(stderr, _("challenge mismatch\n"));
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
&session, 1);
to64frombits(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length);
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE) {
- error(0, 0, "IMAP> %s", buf1);
+ if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
+ report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
}
+
+ strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
- SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
return result;
sprintf(buf1, "imap@%s", hostname);
request_buf.value = buf1;
request_buf.length = strlen(buf1) + 1;
- maj_stat = gss_import_name(&min_stat, &request_buf, gss_nt_service_name,
+ maj_stat = gss_import_name(&min_stat, &request_buf, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE,
&target_name);
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
- error(0, -1, "Couldn't get service name for [%s]", buf1);
+ report(stderr, _("Couldn't get service name for [%s]\n"), buf1);
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
- else if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE) {
+ else if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
maj_stat = gss_display_name(&min_stat, target_name, &request_buf,
&mech_name);
- error(0, 0, "Using service name [%s]",request_buf.value);
+ report(stderr, _("Using service name [%s]\n"),request_buf.value);
maj_stat = gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &request_buf);
}
/* now start the security context initialisation loop... */
sec_token = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
- error(0,0,"Sending credentials");
+ if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
+ report(stdout, _("Sending credentials\n"));
do {
- maj_stat = gss_init_sec_context(&min_stat, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
- &context, target_name, NULL, 0, 0, NULL, sec_token, NULL,
- &send_token, &cflags, NULL);
+ send_token.length = 0;
+ send_token.value = NULL;
+ maj_stat = gss_init_sec_context(&min_stat,
+ GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
+ &context,
+ target_name,
+ GSS_C_NO_OID,
+ GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG,
+ 0,
+ GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
+ sec_token,
+ NULL,
+ &send_token,
+ NULL,
+ NULL);
if (maj_stat!=GSS_S_COMPLETE && maj_stat!=GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
- error(0, -1,"Error exchanging credentials");
+ report(stderr, _("Error exchanging credentials\n"));
gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
/* wake up server and await NO response */
SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
}
to64frombits(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length);
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
+ strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
- SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
- error(0,0,"IMAP> %s", buf1);
+ if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
+ report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
maj_stat = gss_unwrap(&min_stat, context, &request_buf, &send_token,
&cflags, &quality);
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
- error(0,-1,"Couldn't unwrap security level data");
+ report(stderr, _("Couldn't unwrap security level data\n"));
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
- error(0,0,"Credential exchange complete");
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, _("Credential exchange complete\n"));
/* first octet is security levels supported. We want none, for now */
server_conf_flags = ((char *)send_token.value)[0];
if ( !(((char *)send_token.value)[0] & GSSAUTH_P_NONE) ) {
- error(0,-1,"Server requires integrity and/or privacy");
+ report(stderr, _("Server requires integrity and/or privacy\n"));
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
buf_size = ntohl(*((long *)send_token.value));
/* we don't care about buffer size if we don't wrap data */
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE) {
- error(0,0,"Unwrapped security level flags: %s%s%s",
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
+ report(stdout, _("Unwrapped security level flags: %s%s%s\n"),
server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_NONE ? "N" : "-",
server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_INTEGRITY ? "I" : "-",
server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_PRIVACY ? "C" : "-");
- error(0,0,"Maximum GSS token size is %ld",buf_size);
+ report(stdout, _("Maximum GSS token size is %ld\n"),buf_size);
}
/* now respond in kind (hack!!!) */
maj_stat = gss_wrap(&min_stat, context, 0, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, &request_buf,
&cflags, &send_token);
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
- error(0,-1,"Error creating security level request");
+ report(stderr, _("Error creating security level request\n"));
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
to64frombits(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length);
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE) {
- error(0,0,"Requesting authorisation as %s", username);
- error(0,0,"IMAP> %s",buf1);
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
+ report(stdout, _("Requesting authorisation as %s\n"), username);
+ report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n",buf1);
}
+ strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
- SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
/* we should be done. Get status and finish up */
if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
return result;
if (strstr(buf1, "OK")) {
/* flush security context */
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
- error(0, 0, "Releasing GSS credentials");
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, _("Releasing GSS credentials\n"));
maj_stat = gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat, &context, &send_token);
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
- error(0, -1, "Error releasing credentials");
+ report(stderr, _("Error releasing credentials\n"));
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
/* send_token may contain a notification to the server to flush
* credentials. RFC 1731 doesn't specify what to do, and since this
* support is only for authentication, we'll assume the server
* knows enough to flush its own credentials */
+ gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
return PS_SUCCESS;
}
}
#endif /* GSSAPI */
-int imap_canonicalize(char *result, char *passwd)
+static void hmac_md5 (unsigned char *password, size_t pass_len,
+ unsigned char *challenge, size_t chal_len,
+ unsigned char *response, size_t resp_len)
+{
+ int i;
+ unsigned char ipad[64];
+ unsigned char opad[64];
+ unsigned char hash_passwd[16];
+
+ MD5_CTX ctx;
+
+ if (resp_len != 16)
+ return;
+
+ if (pass_len > sizeof (ipad))
+ {
+ MD5Init (&ctx);
+ MD5Update (&ctx, password, pass_len);
+ MD5Final (hash_passwd, &ctx);
+ password = hash_passwd; pass_len = sizeof (hash_passwd);
+ }
+
+ memset (ipad, 0, sizeof (ipad));
+ memset (opad, 0, sizeof (opad));
+ memcpy (ipad, password, pass_len);
+ memcpy (opad, password, pass_len);
+
+ for (i=0; i<64; i++) {
+ ipad[i] ^= 0x36;
+ opad[i] ^= 0x5c;
+ }
+
+ MD5Init (&ctx);
+ MD5Update (&ctx, ipad, sizeof (ipad));
+ MD5Update (&ctx, challenge, chal_len);
+ MD5Final (response, &ctx);
+
+ MD5Init (&ctx);
+ MD5Update (&ctx, opad, sizeof (opad));
+ MD5Update (&ctx, response, resp_len);
+ MD5Final (response, &ctx);
+}
+
+#if NTLM_ENABLE
+#include "ntlm.h"
+
+static tSmbNtlmAuthRequest request;
+static tSmbNtlmAuthChallenge challenge;
+static tSmbNtlmAuthResponse response;
+
+/*
+ * NTLM support by Grant Edwards.
+ *
+ * Handle MS-Exchange NTLM authentication method. This is the same
+ * as the NTLM auth used by Samba for SMB related services. We just
+ * encode the packets in base64 instead of sending them out via a
+ * network interface.
+ *
+ * Much source (ntlm.h, smb*.c smb*.h) was borrowed from Samba.
+ */
+
+static int do_imap_ntlm(int sock, struct query *ctl)
+{
+ char msgbuf[2048];
+ int result,len;
+
+ gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE NTLM");
+
+ if ((result = gen_recv(sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
+ return result;
+
+ if (msgbuf[0] != '+')
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+
+ buildSmbNtlmAuthRequest(&request,ctl->remotename,NULL);
+
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ dumpSmbNtlmAuthRequest(stdout, &request);
+
+ memset(msgbuf,0,sizeof msgbuf);
+ to64frombits (msgbuf, (unsigned char*)&request, SmbLength(&request));
+
+ if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
+ report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", msgbuf);
+
+ strcat(msgbuf,"\r\n");
+ SockWrite (sock, msgbuf, strlen (msgbuf));
+
+ if ((gen_recv(sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
+ return result;
+
+ len = from64tobits ((unsigned char*)&challenge, msgbuf);
+
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ dumpSmbNtlmAuthChallenge(stdout, &challenge);
+
+ buildSmbNtlmAuthResponse(&challenge, &response,ctl->remotename,ctl->password);
+
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ dumpSmbNtlmAuthResponse(stdout, &response);
+
+ memset(msgbuf,0,sizeof msgbuf);
+ to64frombits (msgbuf, (unsigned char*)&response, SmbLength(&response));
+
+ if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
+ report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", msgbuf);
+
+ strcat(msgbuf,"\r\n");
+
+ SockWrite (sock, msgbuf, strlen (msgbuf));
+
+ if ((result = gen_recv (sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
+ return result;
+
+ if (strstr (msgbuf, "OK"))
+ return PS_SUCCESS;
+ else
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+}
+#endif /* NTLM */
+
+static int do_cram_md5 (int sock, struct query *ctl)
+/* authenticate as per RFC2195 */
+{
+ int result;
+ int len;
+ int quot;
+ unsigned char buf1[1024];
+ unsigned char msg_id[768];
+ unsigned char response[16];
+ unsigned char reply[1024];
+
+ gen_send (sock, "AUTHENTICATE CRAM-MD5");
+
+ /* From RFC2195:
+ * The data encoded in the first ready response contains an
+ * presumptively arbitrary string of random digits, a timestamp, and the
+ * fully-qualified primary host name of the server. The syntax of the
+ * unencoded form must correspond to that of an RFC 822 'msg-id'
+ * [RFC822] as described in [POP3].
+ */
+
+ if ((result = gen_recv (sock, buf1, sizeof (buf1)))) {
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ len = from64tobits (msg_id, buf1);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ report (stderr, _("could not decode BASE64 challenge\n"));
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ } else if (len < sizeof (msg_id)) {
+ msg_id[len] = 0;
+ } else {
+ msg_id[sizeof (msg_id)-1] = 0;
+ }
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
+ report (stdout, "decoded as %s\n", msg_id);
+ }
+
+ /* The client makes note of the data and then responds with a string
+ * consisting of the user name, a space, and a 'digest'. The latter is
+ * computed by applying the keyed MD5 algorithm from [KEYED-MD5] where
+ * the key is a shared secret and the digested text is the timestamp
+ * (including angle-brackets).
+ *
+ * If the usename has a space in it, it's surrounded by string quotes
+ * before being shipped. This is not in conformance with the CRAM-MD5
+ * RFCs (which don't describe any kind of quoting and imply that the
+ * username must be a single token), but at least one server accepts
+ * it anyway (the greeting line says "InterChange IMAP4 Server v3.51.06").
+ * If this doesn't work, sending the unquoted name wouldn't have worked
+ * either, so we lost nothing.
+ */
+
+ hmac_md5 (ctl->password, strlen (ctl->password),
+ msg_id, strlen (msg_id),
+ response, sizeof (response));
+
+ quot = (int) strpbrk (ctl->remotename, " ");
+#ifdef HAVE_SNPRINTF
+ snprintf (reply, sizeof (reply),
+#else
+ sprintf(reply,
+#endif
+ "%s%s%s %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
+ quot ? "\"" : "", ctl->remotename, quot ? "\"" : "",
+ response[0], response[1], response[2], response[3],
+ response[4], response[5], response[6], response[7],
+ response[8], response[9], response[10], response[11],
+ response[12], response[13], response[14], response[15]);
+
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
+ report (stdout, "replying with %s\n", reply);
+ }
+
+ to64frombits (buf1, reply, strlen (reply));
+ if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
+ report (stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
+ }
+
+ /* PMDF5.2 IMAP has a bug that requires this to be a single write */
+ strcat (buf1, "\r\n");
+ SockWrite (sock, buf1, strlen (buf1));
+
+ if ((result = gen_recv (sock, buf1, sizeof (buf1))))
+ return result;
+
+ if (strstr (buf1, "OK")) {
+ return PS_SUCCESS;
+ } else {
+ return PS_AUTHFAIL;
+ }
+}
+
+int imap_canonicalize(char *result, char *raw, int maxlen)
/* encode an IMAP password as per RFC1730's quoting conventions */
{
int i, j;
j = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < strlen(passwd); i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < strlen(raw) && i < maxlen; i++)
{
- if ((passwd[i] == '\\') || (passwd[i] == '"'))
+ if ((raw[i] == '\\') || (raw[i] == '"'))
result[j++] = '\\';
- result[j++] = passwd[i];
+ result[j++] = raw[i];
}
result[j] = '\0';
/* apply for connection authorization */
{
int ok = 0;
- char password[PASSWORDLEN*2];
/* probe to see if we're running IMAP4 and can use RFC822.PEEK */
capabilities[0] = '\0';
if (strstr(capabilities, "IMAP4REV1"))
{
imap_version = IMAP4rev1;
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
- error(0, 0, "Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 1");
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, _("Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 1\n"));
}
else
{
imap_version = IMAP4;
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
- error(0, 0, "Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 0");
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, _("Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 0\n"));
}
}
else if (ok == PS_ERROR)
{
imap_version = IMAP2;
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
- error(0, 0, "Protocol identified as IMAP2 or IMAP2BIS");
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, _("Protocol identified as IMAP2 or IMAP2BIS\n"));
}
else
return(ok);
peek_capable = (imap_version >= IMAP4);
+ /*
+ * Assumption: expunges are cheap, so we want to do them
+ * after every message unless user said otherwise.
+ */
+ if (NUM_SPECIFIED(ctl->expunge))
+ expunge_period = NUM_VALUE_OUT(ctl->expunge);
+ else
+ expunge_period = 1;
+
+ if (preauth)
+ return(PS_SUCCESS);
+
#if OPIE
- if ((ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP) && strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=X-OTP")) {
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
- error(0, 0, "OTP authentication is supported");
- if (do_otp(sock, ctl) == PS_SUCCESS)
- return PS_SUCCESS;
+ if ((ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP) && strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=X-OTP"))
+ {
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, _("OTP authentication is supported\n"));
+ if (do_otp(sock, ctl) == PS_SUCCESS)
+ return(PS_SUCCESS);
};
#endif /* OPIE */
{
if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_GSS)
{
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
- error(0, 0, "GSS authentication is supported");
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, _("GSS authentication is supported\n"));
return do_gssauth(sock, ctl->server.truename, ctl->remotename);
}
}
else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_GSS)
{
- error(0,-1, "Required GSS capability not supported by server");
+ report(stderr,
+ _("Required GSS capability not supported by server\n"));
return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
}
#endif /* GSSAPI */
#ifdef KERBEROS_V4
if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=KERBEROS_V4"))
{
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
- error(0, 0, "KERBEROS_V4 authentication is supported");
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report(stdout, _("KERBEROS_V4 authentication is supported\n"));
if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_K4)
{
if ((ok = do_rfc1731(sock, ctl->server.truename)))
{
- if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
- error(0, 0, "IMAP> *");
+ if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
+ report(stdout, "IMAP> *\n");
SockWrite(sock, "*\r\n", 3);
}
return(ok);
}
- /* else fall through to ourdinary AUTH=LOGIN case */
+ /* else fall through to ordinary AUTH=LOGIN case */
}
else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_K4)
{
- error(0,-1, "Required KERBEROS_V4 capability not supported by server");
+ report(stderr,
+ _("Required KERBEROS_V4 capability not supported by server\n"));
return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
}
#endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
+ if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=CRAM-MD5"))
+ {
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report (stdout, _("CRAM-MD5 authentication is supported\n"));
+ if (ctl->server.protocol != P_IMAP_LOGIN)
+ {
+ if ((ok = do_cram_md5 (sock, ctl)))
+ {
+ if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
+ report (stdout, "IMAP> *\n");
+ SockWrite (sock, "*\r\n", 3);
+ }
+ return ok;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_CRAM_MD5)
+ {
+ report(stderr,
+ _("Required CRAM-MD5 capability not supported by server\n"));
+ return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
+ }
+
+#ifdef NTLM_ENABLE
+ if (strstr (capabilities, "AUTH=NTLM"))
+ {
+ if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
+ report (stdout, _("NTLM authentication is supported\n"));
+ return do_imap_ntlm (sock, ctl);
+ }
+#endif /* NTLM_ENABLE */
+
#ifdef __UNUSED__ /* The Cyrus IMAP4rev1 server chokes on this */
/* this handles either AUTH=LOGIN or AUTH-LOGIN */
if ((imap_version >= IMAP4rev1) && (!strstr(capabilities, "LOGIN"))) {
- error(0,-1, "Required LOGIN capability not supported by server");
+ report(stderr,
+ _("Required LOGIN capability not supported by server\n"));
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
};
#endif /* __UNUSED__ */
- imap_canonicalize(password, ctl->password);
- ok = gen_transact(sock, "LOGIN \"%s\" \"%s\"", ctl->remotename, password);
+ {
+ /* these sizes guarantee no buffer overflow */
+ char remotename[NAMELEN*2+1], password[PASSWORDLEN*2+1];
+
+ imap_canonicalize(remotename, ctl->remotename, NAMELEN);
+ imap_canonicalize(password, ctl->password, PASSWORDLEN);
+ ok = gen_transact(sock, "LOGIN \"%s\" \"%s\"", remotename, password);
+ }
+
if (ok)
return(ok);
int ok;
/* find out how many messages are waiting */
- *bytes, recent = unseen = -1;
+ *bytes = recent = unseen = -1;
if (pass > 1)
{
/*
* We have to have an expunge here, otherwise the re-poll will
- * infinite-loop picking up un-expunged message.
+ * infinite-loop picking up un-expunged messages -- unless the
+ * expunge period is one and we've been nuking each message
+ * just after deletion.
*/
ok = 0;
- if (deletions && ctl->expunge > 1)
+ if (deletions && expunge_period != 1)
internal_expunge(sock);
count = -1;
if (ok || gen_transact(sock, "NOOP"))
{
- error(0, 0, "re-poll failed");
+ report(stderr, _("re-poll failed\n"));
return(ok);
}
else if (count == -1) /* no EXISTS response to NOOP */
ok = gen_transact(sock, "EXAMINE %s", folder ? folder : "INBOX");
if (ok != 0)
{
- error(0, 0, "mailbox selection failed");
+ report(stderr, _("mailbox selection failed\n"));
return(ok);
}
}
if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
return(ok);
} while
- (sscanf(buf+2, "%d FETCH", &num) != 1);
+ (!strstr(buf+4, "FETCH") || sscanf(buf+2, "%d", &num) != 1);
if (num != number)
return(PS_ERROR);
- /* try to extract a length */
+ /*
+ * Try to extract a length from the FETCH response. RFC2060 requires
+ * it to be present, but at least one IMAP server (Novell GroupWise)
+ * botches this.
+ */
if ((cp = strchr(buf, '{')))
*lenp = atoi(cp + 1);
else
- *lenp = 0;
+ *lenp = -1; /* missing length part in FETCH reponse */
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
/* UW IMAP returns "OK FETCH", Cyrus returns "OK Completed" */
if (strstr(buf, "OK"))
break;
+
+#ifdef __UNUSED__
+ /*
+ * We've had a report of one POP3 server (not yet identified) that
+ * fails to set SEEN on a message fetch. This becomes an issue when
+ * keep is on, because seen messages aren't deleted and get
+ * refetched on each poll. As a workaround, if keep is on
+ * we could set the Seen flag explicitly. This code isn't used yet
+ * because we don't know of any IMAP servers broken in this way.
+ */
+ if (ctl->keep)
+ if ((ok = gen_transact(sock,
+ imap_version == IMAP4
+ ? "STORE %d +FLAGS.SILENT (\\Seen)"
+ : "STORE %d +FLAGS (\\Seen)",
+ number)))
+ return(ok);
}
+#endif /* __UNUSED__ */
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
/*
* Use SILENT if possible as a minor throughput optimization.
* Note: this has been dropped from IMAP4rev1.
+ *
+ * We set Seen because there are some IMAP servers (notably HP
+ * OpenMail) that do message-receipt DSNs, but only when the seen
+ * bit is set. This is the appropriate time -- we get here right
+ * after the local SMTP response that says delivery was
+ * successful.
*/
if ((ok = gen_transact(sock,
imap_version == IMAP4
- ? "STORE %d +FLAGS.SILENT (\\Deleted)"
- : "STORE %d +FLAGS (\\Deleted)",
+ ? "STORE %d +FLAGS.SILENT (\\Seen \\Deleted)"
+ : "STORE %d +FLAGS (\\Seen \\Deleted)",
number)))
return(ok);
else
deletions++;
/*
- * We do an expunge after ctl->expunge messages, rather than
+ * We do an expunge after expunge_period messages, rather than
* just before quit, so that a line hit during a long session
* won't result in lots of messages being fetched again during
* the next session.
*/
- if (NUM_NONZERO(ctl->expunge) && (deletions % ctl->expunge) == 0)
+ if (NUM_NONZERO(expunge_period) && (deletions % expunge_period) == 0)
internal_expunge(sock);
return(PS_SUCCESS);
static int imap_logout(int sock, struct query *ctl)
/* send logout command */
{
- /* if expunges after deletion have been suppressed, ship one now */
- if (NUM_SPECIFIED(ctl->expunge) && NUM_ZERO(ctl->expunge) && deletions)
+ /* if any un-expunged deletions remain, ship an expunge now */
+ if (deletions)
internal_expunge(sock);
return(gen_transact(sock, "LOGOUT"));
imap_canonicalize, /* deal with embedded slashes and spaces */
imap_getauth, /* get authorization */
imap_getrange, /* query range of messages */
- imap_getsizes, /* get sizes of messages (used for --limit option */
+ imap_getsizes, /* get sizes of messages (used for ESMTP SIZE option) */
imap_is_old, /* no UID check */
imap_fetch_headers, /* request given message headers */
imap_fetch_body, /* request given message body */
projects / ~andy / fetchmail / blobdiff