Merge tag 'trace-fixes-v3.13-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git...

[~andy/linux] / crypto / asymmetric_keys / x509_public_key.c

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index 6abc27f2e8a51b0a0d382a6938d818447a8bdab6..382ef0d2ff2e5e030c0068d1076155364d48f43d 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -18,59 +18,11 @@
 #include <linux/asn1_decoder.h>
 #include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
 #include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h>
-#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
 #include <crypto/hash.h>
 #include "asymmetric_keys.h"
 #include "public_key.h"
 #include "x509_parser.h"
 
-/*
- * Find a key in the given keyring by issuer and authority.
- */
-static struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(
-       struct key *keyring,
-       const char *signer, size_t signer_len,
-       const char *authority, size_t auth_len)
-{
-       key_ref_t key;
-       char *id;
-
-       /* Construct an identifier. */
-       id = kmalloc(signer_len + 2 + auth_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
-       if (!id)
-               return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-
-       memcpy(id, signer, signer_len);
-       id[signer_len + 0] = ':';
-       id[signer_len + 1] = ' ';
-       memcpy(id + signer_len + 2, authority, auth_len);
-       id[signer_len + 2 + auth_len] = 0;
-
-       pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id);
-
-       key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1),
-                            &key_type_asymmetric, id);
-       if (IS_ERR(key))
-               pr_debug("Request for module key '%s' err %ld\n",
-                        id, PTR_ERR(key));
-       kfree(id);
-
-       if (IS_ERR(key)) {
-               switch (PTR_ERR(key)) {
-                       /* Hide some search errors */
-               case -EACCES:
-               case -ENOTDIR:
-               case -EAGAIN:
-                       return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
-               default:
-                       return ERR_CAST(key);
-               }
-       }
-
-       pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, key_serial(key_ref_to_ptr(key)));
-       return key_ref_to_ptr(key);
-}
-
 /*
  * Set up the signature parameters in an X.509 certificate.  This involves
  * digesting the signed data and extracting the signature.
@@ -96,7 +48,7 @@ int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)
        /* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
         * big the hash operational data will be.
         */
-       tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo], 0, 0);
+       tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo], 0, 0);
        if (IS_ERR(tfm))
                return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm);
 
@@ -150,33 +102,6 @@ int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_check_signature);
 
-/*
- * Check the new certificate against the ones in the trust keyring.  If one of
- * those is the signing key and validates the new certificate, then mark the
- * new certificate as being trusted.
- *
- * Return 0 if the new certificate was successfully validated, 1 if we couldn't
- * find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list and an error if there
- * is a matching certificate but the signature check fails.
- */
-static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert,
-                              struct key *trust_keyring)
-{
-       const struct public_key *pk;
-       struct key *key;
-       int ret = 1;
-
-       key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
-                                         cert->issuer, strlen(cert->issuer),
-                                         cert->authority,
-                                         strlen(cert->authority));
-       if (!IS_ERR(key))  {
-               pk = key->payload.data;
-               ret = x509_check_signature(pk, cert);
-       }
-       return ret;
-}
-
 /*
  * Attempt to parse a data blob for a key as an X509 certificate.
  */
@@ -199,7 +124,7 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
            cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo >= PKEY_HASH__LAST ||
            !pkey_algo[cert->pub->pkey_algo] ||
            !pkey_algo[cert->sig.pkey_algo] ||
-           !pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo]) {
+           !hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo]) {
                ret = -ENOPKG;
                goto error_free_cert;
        }
@@ -215,7 +140,7 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
                 cert->valid_to.tm_min,  cert->valid_to.tm_sec);
        pr_devel("Cert Signature: %s + %s\n",
                 pkey_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_algo],
-                pkey_hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo]);
+                hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo]);
 
        if (!cert->fingerprint) {
                pr_warn("Cert for '%s' must have a SubjKeyId extension\n",
@@ -230,13 +155,9 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
        /* Check the signature on the key if it appears to be self-signed */
        if (!cert->authority ||
            strcmp(cert->fingerprint, cert->authority) == 0) {
-               ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert); /* self-signed */
+               ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert);
                if (ret < 0)
                        goto error_free_cert;
-       } else {
-               ret = x509_validate_trust(cert, system_trusted_keyring);
-               if (!ret)
-                       prep->trusted = 1;
        }
 
        /* Propose a description */