-#if OPIE
-static int do_otp(int sock, struct query *ctl)
-{
- int i, rval;
- char buffer[128];
- char challenge[OPIE_CHALLENGE_MAX+1];
- char response[OPIE_RESPONSE_MAX+1];
-
- gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE X-OTP");
-
- if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
- return rval;
-
- if ((i = from64tobits(challenge, buffer)) < 0) {
- report(stderr, _("Could not decode initial BASE64 challenge\n"));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- };
-
-
- to64frombits(buffer, ctl->remotename, strlen(ctl->remotename));
-
- if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
- report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buffer);
-
- /* best not to count on the challenge code handling multiple writes */
- strcat(buffer, "\r\n");
- SockWrite(sock, buffer, strlen(buffer));
-
- if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
- return rval;
-
- if ((i = from64tobits(challenge, buffer)) < 0) {
- report(stderr, _("Could not decode OTP challenge\n"));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- };
-
- rval = opiegenerator(challenge, !strcmp(ctl->password, "opie") ? "" : ctl->password, response);
- if ((rval == -2) && !run.poll_interval) {
- char secret[OPIE_SECRET_MAX+1];
- fprintf(stderr, _("Secret pass phrase: "));
- if (opiereadpass(secret, sizeof(secret), 0))
- rval = opiegenerator(challenge, secret, response);
- memset(secret, 0, sizeof(secret));
- };
-
- if (rval)
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
-
- to64frombits(buffer, response, strlen(response));
-
- if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
- report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buffer);
- strcat(buffer, "\r\n");
- SockWrite(sock, buffer, strlen(buffer));
-
- if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
- return rval;
-
- if (strstr(buffer, "OK"))
- return PS_SUCCESS;
- else
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
-};
-#endif /* OPIE */
-
-#ifdef KERBEROS_V4
-#if SIZEOF_INT == 4
-typedef int int32;
-#elif SIZEOF_SHORT == 4
-typedef short int32;
-#elif SIZEOF_LONG == 4
-typedef long int32;
-#else
-#error Cannot deduce a 32-bit-type
-#endif
-
-static int do_rfc1731(int sock, char *truename)
-/* authenticate as per RFC1731 -- note 32-bit integer requirement here */
-{
- int result = 0, len;
- char buf1[4096], buf2[4096];
- union {
- int32 cint;
- char cstr[4];
- } challenge1, challenge2;
- char srvinst[INST_SZ];
- char *p;
- char srvrealm[REALM_SZ];
- KTEXT_ST authenticator;
- CREDENTIALS credentials;
- char tktuser[MAX_K_NAME_SZ+1+INST_SZ+1+REALM_SZ+1];
- char tktinst[INST_SZ];
- char tktrealm[REALM_SZ];
- des_cblock session;
- des_key_schedule schedule;
-
- gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE KERBEROS_V4");
-
- /* The data encoded in the first ready response contains a random
- * 32-bit number in network byte order. The client should respond
- * with a Kerberos ticket and an authenticator for the principal
- * "imap.hostname@realm", where "hostname" is the first component
- * of the host name of the server with all letters in lower case
- * and where "realm" is the Kerberos realm of the server. The
- * encrypted checksum field included within the Kerberos
- * authenticator should contain the server provided 32-bit number
- * in network byte order.
- */
-
- if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
- return result;
- }
-
- len = from64tobits(challenge1.cstr, buf1);
- if (len < 0) {
- report(stderr, _("could not decode initial BASE64 challenge\n"));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
-
- /* this patch by Dan Root <dar@thekeep.org> solves an endianess
- * problem. */
- {
- char tmp[4];
-
- *(int *)tmp = ntohl(*(int *) challenge1.cstr);
- memcpy(challenge1.cstr, tmp, sizeof(tmp));
- }
-
- /* Client responds with a Kerberos ticket and an authenticator for
- * the principal "imap.hostname@realm" where "hostname" is the
- * first component of the host name of the server with all letters
- * in lower case and where "realm" is the Kerberos realm of the
- * server. The encrypted checksum field included within the
- * Kerberos authenticator should contain the server-provided
- * 32-bit number in network byte order.
- */
-
- strncpy(srvinst, truename, (sizeof srvinst)-1);
- srvinst[(sizeof srvinst)-1] = '\0';
- for (p = srvinst; *p; p++) {
- if (isupper(*p)) {
- *p = tolower(*p);
- }
- }
-
- strncpy(srvrealm, (char *)krb_realmofhost(srvinst), (sizeof srvrealm)-1);
- srvrealm[(sizeof srvrealm)-1] = '\0';
- if (p = strchr(srvinst, '.')) {
- *p = '\0';
- }
-
- result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm, 0);
- if (result) {
- report(stderr, "krb_mq_req: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
-
- result = krb_get_cred("imap", srvinst, srvrealm, &credentials);
- if (result) {
- report(stderr, "krb_get_cred: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
-
- memcpy(session, credentials.session, sizeof session);
- memset(&credentials, 0, sizeof credentials);
- des_key_sched(&session, schedule);
-
- result = krb_get_tf_fullname(TKT_FILE, tktuser, tktinst, tktrealm);
- if (result) {
- report(stderr, "krb_get_tf_fullname: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
-
- if (strcmp(tktuser, user) != 0) {
- report(stderr,
- _("principal %s in ticket does not match -u %s\n"), tktuser,
- user);
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
-
- if (tktinst[0]) {
- report(stderr,
- _("non-null instance (%s) might cause strange behavior\n"),
- tktinst);
- strcat(tktuser, ".");
- strcat(tktuser, tktinst);
- }
-
- if (strcmp(tktrealm, srvrealm) != 0) {
- strcat(tktuser, "@");
- strcat(tktuser, tktrealm);
- }
-
- result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm,
- challenge1.cint);
- if (result) {
- report(stderr, "krb_mq_req: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
-
- to64frombits(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length);
- if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
- report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
- }
- strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
- SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
-
- /* Upon decrypting and verifying the ticket and authenticator, the
- * server should verify that the contained checksum field equals
- * the original server provided random 32-bit number. Should the
- * verification be successful, the server must add one to the
- * checksum and construct 8 octets of data, with the first four
- * octets containing the incremented checksum in network byte
- * order, the fifth octet containing a bit-mask specifying the
- * protection mechanisms supported by the server, and the sixth
- * through eighth octets containing, in network byte order, the
- * maximum cipher-text buffer size the server is able to receive.
- * The server must encrypt the 8 octets of data in the session key
- * and issue that encrypted data in a second ready response. The
- * client should consider the server authenticated if the first
- * four octets the un-encrypted data is equal to one plus the
- * checksum it previously sent.
- */
-
- if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
- return result;
-
- /* The client must construct data with the first four octets
- * containing the original server-issued checksum in network byte
- * order, the fifth octet containing the bit-mask specifying the
- * selected protection mechanism, the sixth through eighth octets
- * containing in network byte order the maximum cipher-text buffer
- * size the client is able to receive, and the following octets
- * containing a user name string. The client must then append
- * from one to eight octets so that the length of the data is a
- * multiple of eight octets. The client must then PCBC encrypt the
- * data with the session key and respond to the second ready
- * response with the encrypted data. The server decrypts the data
- * and verifies the contained checksum. The username field
- * identifies the user for whom subsequent IMAP operations are to
- * be performed; the server must verify that the principal
- * identified in the Kerberos ticket is authorized to connect as
- * that user. After these verifications, the authentication
- * process is complete.
- */
-
- len = from64tobits(buf2, buf1);
- if (len < 0) {
- report(stderr, _("could not decode BASE64 ready response\n"));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
-
- des_ecb_encrypt((des_cblock *)buf2, (des_cblock *)buf2, schedule, 0);
- memcpy(challenge2.cstr, buf2, 4);
- if (ntohl(challenge2.cint) != challenge1.cint + 1) {
- report(stderr, _("challenge mismatch\n"));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
-
- memset(authenticator.dat, 0, sizeof authenticator.dat);
-
- result = htonl(challenge1.cint);
- memcpy(authenticator.dat, &result, sizeof result);
-
- /* The protection mechanisms and their corresponding bit-masks are as
- * follows:
- *
- * 1 No protection mechanism
- * 2 Integrity (krb_mk_safe) protection
- * 4 Privacy (krb_mk_priv) protection
- */
- authenticator.dat[4] = 1;
-
- len = strlen(tktuser);
- strncpy(authenticator.dat+8, tktuser, len);
- authenticator.length = len + 8 + 1;
- while (authenticator.length & 7) {
- authenticator.length++;
- }
- des_pcbc_encrypt((des_cblock *)authenticator.dat,
- (des_cblock *)authenticator.dat, authenticator.length, schedule,
- &session, 1);
-
- to64frombits(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length);
- if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
- report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
- }
-
- strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
- SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
-
- if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
- return result;
-
- if (strstr(buf1, "OK")) {
- return PS_SUCCESS;
- }
- else {
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
-}
-#endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
-
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#define GSSAUTH_P_NONE 1
-#define GSSAUTH_P_INTEGRITY 2
-#define GSSAUTH_P_PRIVACY 4
-
-static int do_gssauth(int sock, char *hostname, char *username)
-{
- gss_buffer_desc request_buf, send_token;
- gss_buffer_t sec_token;
- gss_name_t target_name;
- gss_ctx_id_t context;
- gss_OID mech_name;
- gss_qop_t quality;
- int cflags;
- OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat;
- char buf1[8192], buf2[8192], server_conf_flags;
- unsigned long buf_size;
- int result;
-
- /* first things first: get an imap ticket for host */
- sprintf(buf1, "imap@%s", hostname);
- request_buf.value = buf1;
- request_buf.length = strlen(buf1) + 1;
- maj_stat = gss_import_name(&min_stat, &request_buf, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE,
- &target_name);
- if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
- report(stderr, _("Couldn't get service name for [%s]\n"), buf1);
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
- else if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
- maj_stat = gss_display_name(&min_stat, target_name, &request_buf,
- &mech_name);
- report(stderr, _("Using service name [%s]\n"),request_buf.value);
- maj_stat = gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &request_buf);
- }
-
- gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE GSSAPI");
-
- /* upon receipt of the GSSAPI authentication request, server returns
- * null data ready response. */
- if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
- return result;
- }
-
- /* now start the security context initialisation loop... */
- sec_token = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
- context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
- if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
- report(stdout, _("Sending credentials\n"));
- do {
- send_token.length = 0;
- send_token.value = NULL;
- maj_stat = gss_init_sec_context(&min_stat,
- GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
- &context,
- target_name,
- GSS_C_NO_OID,
- GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG,
- 0,
- GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
- sec_token,
- NULL,
- &send_token,
- NULL,
- NULL);
- if (maj_stat!=GSS_S_COMPLETE && maj_stat!=GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
- report(stderr, _("Error exchanging credentials\n"));
- gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
- /* wake up server and await NO response */
- SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
- if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
- return result;
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
- to64frombits(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length);
- gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
- strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
- SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
- if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
- report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
- if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
- if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
- gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
- return result;
- }
- request_buf.length = from64tobits(buf2, buf1 + 2);
- request_buf.value = buf2;
- sec_token = &request_buf;
- }
- } while (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
- gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
-
- /* get security flags and buffer size */
- if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
- return result;
- }
- request_buf.length = from64tobits(buf2, buf1 + 2);
- request_buf.value = buf2;
-
- maj_stat = gss_unwrap(&min_stat, context, &request_buf, &send_token,
- &cflags, &quality);
- if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
- report(stderr, _("Couldn't unwrap security level data\n"));
- gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
- if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
- report(stdout, _("Credential exchange complete\n"));
- /* first octet is security levels supported. We want none, for now */
- server_conf_flags = ((char *)send_token.value)[0];
- if ( !(((char *)send_token.value)[0] & GSSAUTH_P_NONE) ) {
- report(stderr, _("Server requires integrity and/or privacy\n"));
- gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
- ((char *)send_token.value)[0] = 0;
- buf_size = ntohl(*((long *)send_token.value));
- /* we don't care about buffer size if we don't wrap data */
- gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
- if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
- report(stdout, _("Unwrapped security level flags: %s%s%s\n"),
- server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_NONE ? "N" : "-",
- server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_INTEGRITY ? "I" : "-",
- server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_PRIVACY ? "C" : "-");
- report(stdout, _("Maximum GSS token size is %ld\n"),buf_size);
- }
-
- /* now respond in kind (hack!!!) */
- buf_size = htonl(buf_size); /* do as they do... only matters if we do enc */
- memcpy(buf1, &buf_size, 4);
- buf1[0] = GSSAUTH_P_NONE;
- strcpy(buf1+4, username); /* server decides if princ is user */
- request_buf.length = 4 + strlen(username) + 1;
- request_buf.value = buf1;
- maj_stat = gss_wrap(&min_stat, context, 0, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, &request_buf,
- &cflags, &send_token);
- if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
- report(stderr, _("Error creating security level request\n"));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
- to64frombits(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length);
- if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
- report(stdout, _("Requesting authorisation as %s\n"), username);
- report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n",buf1);
- }
- strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
- SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
-
- /* we should be done. Get status and finish up */
- if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
- return result;
- if (strstr(buf1, "OK")) {
- /* flush security context */
- if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
- report(stdout, _("Releasing GSS credentials\n"));
- maj_stat = gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat, &context, &send_token);
- if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
- report(stderr, _("Error releasing credentials\n"));
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
- }
- /* send_token may contain a notification to the server to flush
- * credentials. RFC 1731 doesn't specify what to do, and since this
- * support is only for authentication, we'll assume the server
- * knows enough to flush its own credentials */
- gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
- return PS_SUCCESS;
- }
-
- return PS_AUTHFAIL;
-}
-#endif /* GSSAPI */
-
-static void hmac_md5 (unsigned char *password, size_t pass_len,
- unsigned char *challenge, size_t chal_len,
- unsigned char *response, size_t resp_len)
-{
- int i;
- unsigned char ipad[64];
- unsigned char opad[64];
- unsigned char hash_passwd[16];
-
- MD5_CTX ctx;
-
- if (resp_len != 16)
- return;
-
- if (pass_len > sizeof (ipad))
- {
- MD5Init (&ctx);
- MD5Update (&ctx, password, pass_len);
- MD5Final (hash_passwd, &ctx);
- password = hash_passwd; pass_len = sizeof (hash_passwd);
- }
-
- memset (ipad, 0, sizeof (ipad));
- memset (opad, 0, sizeof (opad));
- memcpy (ipad, password, pass_len);
- memcpy (opad, password, pass_len);
-
- for (i=0; i<64; i++) {
- ipad[i] ^= 0x36;
- opad[i] ^= 0x5c;
- }
-
- MD5Init (&ctx);
- MD5Update (&ctx, ipad, sizeof (ipad));
- MD5Update (&ctx, challenge, chal_len);
- MD5Final (response, &ctx);
-
- MD5Init (&ctx);
- MD5Update (&ctx, opad, sizeof (opad));
- MD5Update (&ctx, response, resp_len);
- MD5Final (response, &ctx);
-}
-