2 * socket.c -- socket library functions
4 * Copyright 1998 by Eric S. Raymond.
5 * For license terms, see the file COPYING in this directory.
12 #include <ctype.h> /* isspace() */
13 #include <sys/types.h>
15 #include <sys/socket.h>
17 #include <netinet/in.h>
18 #include <arpa/inet.h>
27 #include "fetchmail.h"
28 #include "getaddrinfo.h"
32 /* Defines to allow Cygwin to play nice... */
33 #define fm_close(a) close(a)
34 #define fm_write(a,b,c) write(a,b,c)
35 #define fm_peek(a,b,c) recv(a,b,c, MSG_PEEK)
38 #define fm_read(a,b,c) cygwin_read(a,b,c)
39 static ssize_t cygwin_read(int sock, void *buf, size_t count);
40 #else /* ! __CYGWIN__ */
41 #define fm_read(a,b,c) read(a,b,c)
42 #endif /* __CYGWIN__ */
44 /* We need to define h_errno only if it is not already */
46 # if !HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO
49 #endif /* ndef h_errno */
51 static char *const *parse_plugin(const char *plugin, const char *host, const char *service)
55 char *cp, *plugin_copy;
56 unsigned int plugin_copy_len;
57 unsigned int plugin_offset = 0, plugin_copy_offset = 0;
58 unsigned int i, s = 2 * sizeof(char*), host_count = 0, service_count = 0;
59 unsigned int plugin_len = strlen(plugin);
60 unsigned int host_len = strlen(host);
61 unsigned int service_len = strlen(service);
63 for (c = p = plugin; *c; c++)
64 { if (isspace((unsigned char)*c) && !isspace((unsigned char)*p))
66 if (*p == '%' && *c == 'h')
68 if (*p == '%' && *c == 'p')
73 plugin_copy_len = plugin_len + host_len * host_count + service_len * service_count;
74 plugin_copy = (char *)malloc(plugin_copy_len + 1);
77 report(stderr, GT_("fetchmail: malloc failed\n"));
81 while (plugin_copy_offset < plugin_copy_len)
82 { if ((plugin[plugin_offset] == '%') && (plugin[plugin_offset + 1] == 'h'))
83 { strcpy(plugin_copy + plugin_copy_offset, host);
85 plugin_copy_offset += host_len;
87 else if ((plugin[plugin_offset] == '%') && (plugin[plugin_offset + 1] == 'p'))
88 { strcpy(plugin_copy + plugin_copy_offset, service);
90 plugin_copy_offset += service_len;
93 { plugin_copy[plugin_copy_offset] = plugin[plugin_offset];
98 plugin_copy[plugin_copy_len] = 0;
100 argvec = (char **)malloc(s);
103 report(stderr, GT_("fetchmail: malloc failed\n"));
106 memset(argvec, 0, s);
107 for (p = cp = plugin_copy, i = 0; *cp; cp++)
108 { if ((!isspace((unsigned char)*cp)) && (cp == p ? 1 : isspace((unsigned char)*p))) {
114 for (cp = plugin_copy; *cp; cp++)
115 { if (isspace((unsigned char)*cp))
121 static int handle_plugin(const char *host,
122 const char *service, const char *plugin)
123 /* get a socket mediated through a given external command */
129 * The author of this code, Felix von Leitner <felix@convergence.de>, says:
130 * he chose socketpair() instead of pipe() because socketpair creates
131 * bidirectional sockets while allegedly some pipe() implementations don't.
133 if (socketpair(AF_UNIX,SOCK_STREAM,0,fds))
135 report(stderr, GT_("fetchmail: socketpair failed\n"));
141 report(stderr, GT_("fetchmail: fork failed\n"));
144 /* fds[1] is the parent's end; close it for proper EOF
146 (void) close(fds[1]);
147 if ( (dup2(fds[0],0) == -1) || (dup2(fds[0],1) == -1) ) {
148 report(stderr, GT_("dup2 failed\n"));
151 /* fds[0] is now connected to 0 and 1; close it */
152 (void) close(fds[0]);
153 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
154 report(stderr, GT_("running %s (host %s service %s)\n"), plugin, host, service);
155 argvec = parse_plugin(plugin,host,service);
156 execvp(*argvec, argvec);
157 report(stderr, GT_("execvp(%s) failed\n"), *argvec);
160 default: /* parent */
164 /* fds[0] is the child's end; close it for proper EOF detection */
165 (void) close(fds[0]);
171 int SockCheckOpen(int fd)
172 /* poll given socket; is it selectable? */
180 FD_ZERO(&r); FD_ZERO(&w); FD_ZERO(&e);
183 tv.tv_sec = 0; tv.tv_usec = 0;
184 rt = select(fd+1, &r, &w, &e, &tv);
185 if (rt == -1 && (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR))
191 #endif /* __UNUSED__ */
193 int UnixOpen(const char *path)
196 struct sockaddr_un ad;
197 memset(&ad, 0, sizeof(ad));
198 ad.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
199 strncpy(ad.sun_path, path, sizeof(ad.sun_path)-1);
201 sock = socket( AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0 );
208 /* Socket opened saved. Usefull if connect timeout
209 * because it can be closed.
211 mailserver_socket_temp = sock;
213 if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &ad, sizeof(ad)) < 0)
216 fm_close(sock); /* don't use SockClose, no traffic yet */
222 /* No connect timeout, then no need to set mailserver_socket_temp */
223 mailserver_socket_temp = -1;
228 int SockOpen(const char *host, const char *service,
229 const char *plugin, struct addrinfo **ai0)
231 struct addrinfo *ai, req;
234 char errbuf[8192] = "";
237 return handle_plugin(host,service,plugin);
239 memset(&req, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
240 req.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
242 req.ai_flags = AI_ADDRCONFIG;
245 i = fm_getaddrinfo(host, service, &req, ai0);
247 report(stderr, GT_("getaddrinfo(\"%s\",\"%s\") error: %s\n"),
248 host, service, gai_strerror(i));
249 if (i == EAI_SERVICE)
250 report(stderr, GT_("Try adding the --service option (see also FAQ item R12).\n"));
254 /* NOTE a Linux bug here - getaddrinfo will happily return 127.0.0.1
255 * twice if no IPv6 is configured */
257 for (ord = 0, ai = *ai0; ai; ord++, ai = ai->ai_next) {
258 char buf[256]; /* hostname */
259 char pb[256]; /* service name */
260 int gnie; /* getnameinfo result code */
262 gnie = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, buf, sizeof(buf), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST);
264 snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), GT_("unknown (%s)"), gai_strerror(gnie));
265 gnie = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, NULL, 0, pb, sizeof(pb), NI_NUMERICSERV);
267 snprintf(pb, sizeof(pb), GT_("unknown (%s)"), gai_strerror(gnie));
269 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
270 report_build(stdout, GT_("Trying to connect to %s/%s..."), buf, pb);
271 i = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
274 /* mask EAFNOSUPPORT errors, they confuse users for
275 * multihomed hosts */
276 if (errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
278 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
279 report_complete(stdout, GT_("cannot create socket: %s\n"), strerror(e));
280 snprintf(errbuf+strlen(errbuf), sizeof(errbuf)-strlen(errbuf),\
281 GT_("name %d: cannot create socket family %d type %d: %s\n"), ord, ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, strerror(e));
285 /* Save socket descriptor.
286 * Used to close the socket after connect timeout. */
287 mailserver_socket_temp = i;
289 if (connect(i, (struct sockaddr *) ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
292 /* additionally, suppress IPv4 network unreach errors */
293 if (e != EAFNOSUPPORT)
296 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
297 report_complete(stdout, GT_("connection failed.\n"));
298 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
299 report(stderr, GT_("connection to %s:%s [%s/%s] failed: %s.\n"), host, service, buf, pb, strerror(e));
300 snprintf(errbuf+strlen(errbuf), sizeof(errbuf)-strlen(errbuf), GT_("name %d: connection to %s:%s [%s/%s] failed: %s.\n"), ord, host, service, buf, pb, strerror(e));
305 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
306 report_complete(stdout, GT_("connected.\n"));
309 /* No connect timeout, then no need to set mailserver_socket_temp */
310 mailserver_socket_temp = -1;
315 fm_freeaddrinfo(*ai0);
319 report(stderr, GT_("Connection errors for this poll:\n%s"), errbuf);
327 int SockPrintf(int sock, const char* format, ...)
332 va_start(ap, format) ;
333 vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), format, ap);
335 return SockWrite(sock, buf, strlen(buf));
339 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
340 #include <openssl/err.h>
341 #include <openssl/pem.h>
342 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
343 #include <openssl/rand.h>
345 static SSL_CTX *_ctx[FD_SETSIZE];
346 static SSL *_ssl_context[FD_SETSIZE];
348 static SSL *SSLGetContext( int );
349 #endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
351 int SockWrite(int sock, const char *buf, int len)
361 if( NULL != ( ssl = SSLGetContext( sock ) ) )
362 n = SSL_write(ssl, buf, len);
364 #endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
365 n = fm_write(sock, buf, len);
375 int SockRead(int sock, char *buf, int len)
377 char *newline, *bp = buf;
387 * The reason for these gymnastics is that we want two things:
388 * (1) to read \n-terminated lines,
389 * (2) to return the true length of data read, even if the
390 * data coming in has embedded NULS.
393 if( NULL != ( ssl = SSLGetContext( sock ) ) ) {
395 /* OK... SSL_peek works a little different from MSG_PEEK
396 Problem is that SSL_peek can return 0 if there
397 is no data currently available. If, on the other
398 hand, we loose the socket, we also get a zero, but
399 the SSL_read then SEGFAULTS! To deal with this,
400 we'll check the error code any time we get a return
401 of zero from SSL_peek. If we have an error, we bail.
402 If we don't, we read one character in SSL_read and
403 loop. This should continue to work even if they
404 later change the behavior of SSL_peek
405 to "fix" this problem... :-( */
406 if ((n = SSL_peek(ssl, bp, len)) < 0) {
407 (void)SSL_get_error(ssl, n);
411 /* SSL_peek says no data... Does he mean no data
412 or did the connection blow up? If we got an error
414 if (0 != SSL_get_error(ssl, n)) {
417 /* We didn't get an error so read at least one
418 character at this point and loop */
420 /* Make sure newline start out NULL!
421 * We don't have a string to pass through
422 * the strchr at this point yet */
424 } else if ((newline = (char *)memchr(bp, '\n', n)) != NULL)
425 n = newline - bp + 1;
426 /* Matthias Andree: SSL_read can return 0, in that case
427 * we must call SSL_get_error to figure if there was
428 * an error or just a "no data" condition */
429 if ((n = SSL_read(ssl, bp, n)) <= 0) {
430 if ((n = SSL_get_error(ssl, n))) {
434 /* Check for case where our single character turned out to
435 * be a newline... (It wasn't going to get caught by
436 * the strchr above if it came from the hack... ). */
437 if( NULL == newline && 1 == n && '\n' == *bp ) {
438 /* Got our newline - this will break
439 out of the loop now */
444 #endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
447 if ((n = fm_peek(sock, bp, len)) <= 0)
449 if ((newline = (char *)memchr(bp, '\n', n)) != NULL)
450 n = newline - bp + 1;
451 if ((n = fm_read(sock, bp, n)) == -1)
463 int SockPeek(int sock)
464 /* peek at the next socket character without actually reading it */
473 if( NULL != ( ssl = SSLGetContext( sock ) ) ) {
474 n = SSL_peek(ssl, &ch, 1);
476 (void)SSL_get_error(ssl, n);
480 /* This code really needs to implement a "hold back"
481 * to simulate a functioning SSL_peek()... sigh...
482 * Has to be coordinated with the read code above.
483 * Next on the list todo... */
485 /* SSL_peek says 0... Does that mean no data
486 or did the connection blow up? If we got an error
488 if(0 != SSL_get_error(ssl, n)) {
492 /* Haven't seen this case actually occur, but...
493 if the problem in SockRead can occur, this should
494 be possible... Just not sure what to do here.
495 This should be a safe "punt" the "peek" but don't
496 "punt" the "session"... */
498 return 0; /* Give him a '\0' character */
502 #endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
503 n = fm_peek(sock, &ch, 1);
512 static char *_ssl_server_cname = NULL;
513 static int _check_fp;
514 static char *_check_digest;
515 static char *_server_label;
516 static int _depth0ck;
517 static int _firstrun;
518 static int _prev_err;
519 static int _verify_ok;
521 SSL *SSLGetContext( int sock )
523 if( sock < 0 || (unsigned)sock > FD_SETSIZE )
525 if( _ctx[sock] == NULL )
527 return _ssl_context[sock];
530 /* ok_return (preverify_ok) is 1 if this stage of certificate verification
531 passed, or 0 if it failed. This callback lets us display informative
532 errors, and perform additional validation (e.g. CN matches) */
533 static int SSL_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int strict )
535 #define SSLverbose (((outlevel) >= O_DEBUG) || ((outlevel) >= O_VERBOSE && (depth) == 0))
539 unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
540 char text[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 3 + 1], *tp, *te;
541 const EVP_MD *digest_tp;
542 unsigned int dsz, esz;
543 X509_NAME *subj, *issuer;
546 x509_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
547 err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
548 depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
550 subj = X509_get_subject_name(x509_cert);
551 issuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x509_cert);
553 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) {
554 if (depth == 0 && SSLverbose)
555 report(stderr, GT_("Server certificate:\n"));
560 report(stdout, GT_("Certificate chain, from root to peer, starting at depth %d:\n"), depth);
563 report(stdout, GT_("Certificate at depth %d:\n"), depth);
568 if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(issuer, NID_organizationName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
569 report(stdout, GT_("Issuer Organization: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(buf, i)));
571 if ((size_t)i >= sizeof(buf) - 1)
572 report(stdout, GT_("Warning: Issuer Organization Name too long (possibly truncated).\n"));
574 report(stdout, GT_("Unknown Organization\n"));
575 if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(issuer, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
576 report(stdout, GT_("Issuer CommonName: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(buf, i)));
578 if ((size_t)i >= sizeof(buf) - 1)
579 report(stdout, GT_("Warning: Issuer CommonName too long (possibly truncated).\n"));
581 report(stdout, GT_("Unknown Issuer CommonName\n"));
585 if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subj, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
587 report(stdout, GT_("Subject CommonName: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(buf, i)));
590 if ((size_t)i >= sizeof(buf) - 1) {
591 /* Possible truncation. In this case, this is a DNS name, so this
592 * is really bad. We do not tolerate this even in the non-strict case. */
593 report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject CommonName too long!\n"));
596 if ((size_t)i > strlen(buf)) {
597 /* Name contains embedded NUL characters, so we complain. This is likely
598 * a certificate spoofing attack. */
599 report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject CommonName contains NUL, aborting!\n"));
604 if (depth == 0) { /* peer certificate */
609 if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subj, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
610 if (_ssl_server_cname != NULL) {
612 char *p2 = _ssl_server_cname;
614 STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gens;
616 /* RFC 2595 section 2.4: find a matching name
617 * first find a match among alternative names */
618 gens = (STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *)X509_get_ext_d2i(x509_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
621 for (j = 0, r = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); j < r; ++j) {
622 const GENERAL_NAME *gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, j);
623 if (gn->type == GEN_DNS) {
624 char *pp1 = (char *)gn->d.ia5->data;
625 char *pp2 = _ssl_server_cname;
626 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) {
627 report(stdout, GT_("Subject Alternative Name: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(pp1, (size_t)gn->d.ia5->length)));
630 /* Name contains embedded NUL characters, so we complain. This
631 * is likely a certificate spoofing attack. */
632 if ((size_t)gn->d.ia5->length != strlen(pp1)) {
633 report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject Alternative Name contains NUL, aborting!\n"));
634 sk_GENERAL_NAME_free(gens);
637 if (name_match(pp1, pp2)) {
642 sk_GENERAL_NAME_free(gens);
644 if (name_match(p1, p2)) {
648 if (strict || SSLverbose) {
650 GT_("Server CommonName mismatch: %s != %s\n"),
651 (tt = sdump(buf, i)), _ssl_server_cname );
656 } else if (ok_return) {
657 report(stderr, GT_("Server name not set, could not verify certificate!\n"));
658 if (strict) return (0);
661 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
662 report(stdout, GT_("Unknown Server CommonName\n"));
663 if (ok_return && strict) {
664 report(stderr, GT_("Server name not specified in certificate!\n"));
668 /* Print the finger print. Note that on errors, we might print it more than once
669 * normally; we kluge around that by using a global variable. */
670 if (_check_fp == 1) {
674 digest_tp = EVP_md5();
675 if (digest_tp == NULL) {
676 report(stderr, GT_("EVP_md5() failed!\n"));
679 if (!X509_digest(x509_cert, digest_tp, digest, &dsz)) {
680 report(stderr, GT_("Out of memory!\n"));
684 te = text + sizeof(text);
685 for (dp = 0; dp < dsz; dp++) {
686 esz = snprintf(tp, te - tp, dp > 0 ? ":%02X" : "%02X", digest[dp]);
687 if (esz >= (size_t)(te - tp)) {
688 report(stderr, GT_("Digest text buffer too small!\n"));
693 if (outlevel > O_NORMAL)
694 report(stdout, GT_("%s key fingerprint: %s\n"), _server_label, text);
695 if (_check_digest != NULL) {
696 if (strcasecmp(text, _check_digest) == 0) {
697 if (outlevel > O_NORMAL)
698 report(stdout, GT_("%s fingerprints match.\n"), _server_label);
700 report(stderr, GT_("%s fingerprints do not match!\n"), _server_label);
703 } /* if (_check_digest != NULL) */
704 } /* if (_check_fp) */
705 } /* if (depth == 0 && !_depth0ck) */
707 if (err != X509_V_OK && err != _prev_err && !(_check_fp != 0 && _check_digest && !strict)) {
710 report(stderr, GT_("Server certificate verification error: %s\n"), X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
711 /* We gave the error code, but maybe we can add some more details for debugging */
714 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
715 X509_NAME_oneline(issuer, buf, sizeof(buf));
716 buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0';
717 report(stderr, GT_("unknown issuer (first %d characters): %s\n"), (int)(sizeof(buf)-1), buf);
718 report(stderr, GT_("This error usually happens when the server provides an incomplete certificate "
719 "chain, which is nothing fetchmail could do anything about. For details, "
720 "please see the README.SSL-SERVER document that comes with fetchmail.\n"));
722 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
723 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
724 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
725 X509_NAME_oneline(subj, buf, sizeof(buf));
726 buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0';
727 report(stderr, GT_("This means that the root signing certificate (issued for %s) is not in the "
728 "trusted CA certificate locations, or that c_rehash needs to be run "
729 "on the certificate directory. For details, please "
730 "see the documentation of --sslcertpath and --sslcertfile in the manual page.\n"), buf);
737 * If not in strict checking mode (--sslcertck), override this
738 * and pretend that verification had succeeded.
740 _verify_ok &= ok_return;
746 static int SSL_nock_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx )
748 return SSL_verify_callback(ok_return, ctx, 0);
751 static int SSL_ck_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx )
753 return SSL_verify_callback(ok_return, ctx, 1);
757 /* get commonName from certificate set in file.
758 * commonName is stored in buffer namebuffer, limited with namebufferlen
760 static const char *SSLCertGetCN(const char *mycert,
761 char *namebuffer, size_t namebufferlen)
763 const char *ret = NULL;
765 X509 *x509_cert = NULL;
766 X509_NAME *certname = NULL;
768 if (namebuffer && namebufferlen > 0) {
769 namebuffer[0] = 0x00;
770 certBio = BIO_new_file(mycert,"r");
772 x509_cert = PEM_read_bio_X509(certBio,NULL,NULL,NULL);
776 certname = X509_get_subject_name(x509_cert);
778 X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(certname, NID_commonName,
779 namebuffer, namebufferlen) > 0)
781 X509_free(x509_cert);
787 /* performs initial SSL handshake over the connected socket
788 * uses SSL *ssl global variable, which is currently defined
791 int SSLOpen(int sock, char *mycert, char *mykey, const char *myproto, int certck,
792 char *cacertfile, char *certpath,
793 char *fingerprint, char *servercname, char *label, char **remotename)
795 struct stat randstat;
798 SSL_load_error_strings();
800 OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); /* see Debian Bug#576430 and manpage */
802 if (stat("/dev/random", &randstat) &&
803 stat("/dev/urandom", &randstat)) {
804 /* Neither /dev/random nor /dev/urandom are present, so add
805 entropy to the SSL PRNG a hard way. */
806 for (i = 0; i < 10000 && ! RAND_status (); ++i) {
809 gettimeofday (&tv, 0);
810 buf[0] = tv.tv_usec & 0xF;
811 buf[2] = (tv.tv_usec & 0xF0) >> 4;
812 buf[3] = (tv.tv_usec & 0xF00) >> 8;
813 buf[1] = (tv.tv_usec & 0xF000) >> 12;
814 RAND_add (buf, sizeof buf, 0.1);
818 if( sock < 0 || (unsigned)sock > FD_SETSIZE ) {
819 report(stderr, GT_("File descriptor out of range for SSL") );
823 /* Make sure a connection referring to an older context is not left */
824 _ssl_context[sock] = NULL;
826 if(!strcasecmp("ssl2",myproto)) {
827 _ctx[sock] = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv2_client_method());
828 } else if(!strcasecmp("ssl3",myproto)) {
829 _ctx[sock] = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv3_client_method());
830 } else if(!strcasecmp("tls1",myproto)) {
831 _ctx[sock] = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_client_method());
832 } else if (!strcasecmp("ssl23",myproto)) {
835 fprintf(stderr,GT_("Invalid SSL protocol '%s' specified, using default (SSLv23).\n"), myproto);
840 _ctx[sock] = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method());
842 if(_ctx[sock] == NULL) {
843 ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
847 SSL_CTX_set_options(_ctx[sock], SSL_OP_ALL);
850 SSL_CTX_set_verify(_ctx[sock], SSL_VERIFY_PEER, SSL_ck_verify_callback);
852 /* In this case, we do not fail if verification fails. However,
853 * we provide the callback for output and possible fingerprint
855 SSL_CTX_set_verify(_ctx[sock], SSL_VERIFY_PEER, SSL_nock_verify_callback);
858 /* Check which trusted X.509 CA certificate store(s) to load */
861 int want_default_cacerts = 0;
863 /* Load user locations if any is given */
864 if (certpath || cacertfile)
865 SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(_ctx[sock],
866 cacertfile, certpath);
868 want_default_cacerts = 1;
870 tmp = getenv("FETCHMAIL_INCLUDE_DEFAULT_X509_CA_CERTS");
871 if (want_default_cacerts || (tmp && tmp[0])) {
872 SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(_ctx[sock]);
876 _ssl_context[sock] = SSL_new(_ctx[sock]);
878 if(_ssl_context[sock] == NULL) {
879 ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
880 SSL_CTX_free(_ctx[sock]);
885 /* This static is for the verify callback */
886 _ssl_server_cname = servercname;
887 _server_label = label;
889 _check_digest = fingerprint;
895 if( mycert || mykey ) {
897 /* Ok... He has a certificate file defined, so lets declare it. If
898 * he does NOT have a separate certificate and private key file then
899 * assume that it's a combined key and certificate file.
908 if ((!*remotename || !**remotename) && SSLCertGetCN(mycert, buffer, sizeof(buffer))) {
910 *remotename = xstrdup(buffer);
912 SSL_use_certificate_file(_ssl_context[sock], mycert, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
913 SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(_ssl_context[sock], mykey, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
916 if (SSL_set_fd(_ssl_context[sock], sock) == 0
917 || SSL_connect(_ssl_context[sock]) < 1) {
918 ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
919 SSL_free( _ssl_context[sock] );
920 _ssl_context[sock] = NULL;
921 SSL_CTX_free(_ctx[sock]);
926 /* Paranoia: was the callback not called as we expected? */
928 report(stderr, GT_("Certificate/fingerprint verification was somehow skipped!\n"));
930 if (fingerprint != NULL || certck) {
931 if( NULL != SSLGetContext( sock ) ) {
932 /* Clean up the SSL stack */
933 SSL_shutdown( _ssl_context[sock] );
934 SSL_free( _ssl_context[sock] );
935 _ssl_context[sock] = NULL;
936 SSL_CTX_free(_ctx[sock]);
943 if (!certck && !fingerprint &&
944 (SSL_get_verify_result(_ssl_context[sock]) != X509_V_OK || !_verify_ok)) {
945 report(stderr, GT_("Warning: the connection is insecure, continuing anyways. (Better use --sslcertck!)\n"));
952 int SockClose(int sock)
953 /* close a socket gracefully */
956 if( NULL != SSLGetContext( sock ) ) {
957 /* Clean up the SSL stack */
958 SSL_shutdown( _ssl_context[sock] );
959 SSL_free( _ssl_context[sock] );
960 _ssl_context[sock] = NULL;
961 SSL_CTX_free(_ctx[sock]);
968 * This hangs in RedHat 6.2 after fetchmail runs for a while a
969 * FIN_WAIT2 comes up in netstat and fetchmail never returns from
970 * the recv system call. (Reported from jtnews
971 * <jtnews@bellatlantic.net>, Wed, 24 May 2000 21:26:02.)
973 * Half-close the connection first so the other end gets notified.
975 * This stops sends but allows receives (effectively, it sends a
977 if (shutdown(sock, 1) == 0) {
979 /* If there is any data still waiting in the queue, discard it.
980 * Call recv() until either it returns 0 (meaning we received a FIN)
981 * or any error occurs. This makes sure all data sent by the other
982 * side is acknowledged at the TCP level.
984 if (fm_peek(sock, &ch, 1) > 0)
985 while (fm_read(sock, &ch, 1) > 0)
988 #endif /* __UNUSED__ */
990 /* if there's an error closing at this point, not much we can do */
991 return(fm_close(sock)); /* this is guarded */
996 * Workaround Microsoft Winsock recv/WSARecv(..., MSG_PEEK) bug.
997 * See http://sources.redhat.com/ml/cygwin/2001-08/msg00628.html
1000 static ssize_t cygwin_read(int sock, void *buf, size_t count)
1005 if ((n = read(sock, bp, count)) == (size_t)-1)
1010 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
1011 report(stdout, GT_("Cygwin socket read retry\n"));
1012 n2 = read(sock, bp + n, count - n);
1013 if (n2 == (size_t)-1 || n + n2 != count) {
1014 report(stderr, GT_("Cygwin socket read retry failed!\n"));
1021 #endif /* __CYGWIN__ */
1025 * Use the chargen service to test input buffering directly.
1026 * You may have to uncomment the `chargen' service description in your
1027 * inetd.conf (and then SIGHUP inetd) for this to work. */
1030 int sock = SockOpen("localhost", "chargen", NULL);
1033 while (SockRead(sock, buf, sizeof(buf)-1))
1034 SockWrite(1, buf, strlen(buf));
1039 /* socket.c ends here */