2 * socket.c -- socket library functions
4 * Copyright 1998 by Eric S. Raymond.
5 * For license terms, see the file COPYING in this directory.
12 #include <ctype.h> /* isspace() */
13 #include <sys/types.h>
15 #include <sys/socket.h>
17 #include <netinet/in.h>
18 #include <arpa/inet.h>
27 #include "fetchmail.h"
28 #include "getaddrinfo.h"
32 /* Defines to allow Cygwin to play nice... */
33 #define fm_close(a) close(a)
34 #define fm_write(a,b,c) write(a,b,c)
35 #define fm_peek(a,b,c) recv(a,b,c, MSG_PEEK)
38 #define fm_read(a,b,c) cygwin_read(a,b,c)
39 static ssize_t cygwin_read(int sock, void *buf, size_t count);
40 #else /* ! __CYGWIN__ */
41 #define fm_read(a,b,c) read(a,b,c)
42 #endif /* __CYGWIN__ */
44 /* We need to define h_errno only if it is not already */
46 # if !HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO
49 #endif /* ndef h_errno */
51 static char *const *parse_plugin(const char *plugin, const char *host, const char *service)
55 char *cp, *plugin_copy;
56 unsigned int plugin_copy_len;
57 unsigned int plugin_offset = 0, plugin_copy_offset = 0;
58 unsigned int i, s = 2 * sizeof(char*), host_count = 0, service_count = 0;
59 unsigned int plugin_len = strlen(plugin);
60 unsigned int host_len = strlen(host);
61 unsigned int service_len = strlen(service);
63 for (c = p = plugin; *c; c++)
64 { if (isspace((unsigned char)*c) && !isspace((unsigned char)*p))
66 if (*p == '%' && *c == 'h')
68 if (*p == '%' && *c == 'p')
73 plugin_copy_len = plugin_len + host_len * host_count + service_len * service_count;
74 plugin_copy = (char *)malloc(plugin_copy_len + 1);
77 report(stderr, GT_("fetchmail: malloc failed\n"));
81 while (plugin_copy_offset < plugin_copy_len)
82 { if ((plugin[plugin_offset] == '%') && (plugin[plugin_offset + 1] == 'h'))
83 { strcpy(plugin_copy + plugin_copy_offset, host);
85 plugin_copy_offset += host_len;
87 else if ((plugin[plugin_offset] == '%') && (plugin[plugin_offset + 1] == 'p'))
88 { strcpy(plugin_copy + plugin_copy_offset, service);
90 plugin_copy_offset += service_len;
93 { plugin_copy[plugin_copy_offset] = plugin[plugin_offset];
98 plugin_copy[plugin_copy_len] = 0;
100 argvec = (char **)malloc(s);
103 report(stderr, GT_("fetchmail: malloc failed\n"));
106 memset(argvec, 0, s);
107 for (p = cp = plugin_copy, i = 0; *cp; cp++)
108 { if ((!isspace((unsigned char)*cp)) && (cp == p ? 1 : isspace((unsigned char)*p))) {
114 for (cp = plugin_copy; *cp; cp++)
115 { if (isspace((unsigned char)*cp))
121 static int handle_plugin(const char *host,
122 const char *service, const char *plugin)
123 /* get a socket mediated through a given external command */
129 * The author of this code, Felix von Leitner <felix@convergence.de>, says:
130 * he chose socketpair() instead of pipe() because socketpair creates
131 * bidirectional sockets while allegedly some pipe() implementations don't.
133 if (socketpair(AF_UNIX,SOCK_STREAM,0,fds))
135 report(stderr, GT_("fetchmail: socketpair failed\n"));
139 if (SockTimeout(fds[0], mytimeout)) return -1;
140 if (SockTimeout(fds[1], mytimeout)) return -1;
145 report(stderr, GT_("fetchmail: fork failed\n"));
148 /* fds[1] is the parent's end; close it for proper EOF
150 (void) close(fds[1]);
151 if ( (dup2(fds[0],0) == -1) || (dup2(fds[0],1) == -1) ) {
152 report(stderr, GT_("dup2 failed\n"));
155 /* fds[0] is now connected to 0 and 1; close it */
156 (void) close(fds[0]);
157 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
158 report(stderr, GT_("running %s (host %s service %s)\n"), plugin, host, service);
159 argvec = parse_plugin(plugin,host,service);
160 execvp(*argvec, argvec);
161 report(stderr, GT_("execvp(%s) failed\n"), *argvec);
164 default: /* parent */
168 /* fds[0] is the child's end; close it for proper EOF detection */
169 (void) close(fds[0]);
173 static int setsocktimeout(int sock, int which, int timeout) {
179 rc = setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, which, &tv, sizeof(tv));
181 report(stderr, GT_("setsockopt(%d, SOL_SOCKET) failed: %s"), sock, strerror(errno));
186 /** Configure socket options such as send/receive timeout at the socket
187 * level, to avoid network-induced stalls. \return 0 for success, 1 for
190 int SockTimeout(int sock, int timeout)
194 if (setsocktimeout(sock, SO_RCVTIMEO, timeout)) err = 1;
195 if (setsocktimeout(sock, SO_SNDTIMEO, timeout)) err = 1;
199 /** Set socket to SO_KEEPALIVE. \return 0 for success. */
200 int SockKeepalive(int sock) {
202 return setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &keepalive, sizeof keepalive);
205 int UnixOpen(const char *path)
208 struct sockaddr_un ad;
209 memset(&ad, 0, sizeof(ad));
210 ad.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
211 strncpy(ad.sun_path, path, sizeof(ad.sun_path)-1);
213 sock = socket( AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0 );
220 /* Socket opened saved. Usefull if connect timeout
221 * because it can be closed.
223 mailserver_socket_temp = sock;
225 if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &ad, sizeof(ad)) < 0)
228 fm_close(sock); /* don't use SockClose, no traffic yet */
234 /* No connect timeout, then no need to set mailserver_socket_temp */
235 mailserver_socket_temp = -1;
240 int SockOpen(const char *host, const char *service,
241 const char *plugin, struct addrinfo **ai0)
243 struct addrinfo *ai, req;
246 char errbuf[8192] = "";
249 return handle_plugin(host,service,plugin);
251 memset(&req, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
252 req.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
254 req.ai_flags = AI_ADDRCONFIG;
257 i = fm_getaddrinfo(host, service, &req, ai0);
259 report(stderr, GT_("getaddrinfo(\"%s\",\"%s\") error: %s\n"),
260 host, service, gai_strerror(i));
261 if (i == EAI_SERVICE)
262 report(stderr, GT_("Try adding the --service option (see also FAQ item R12).\n"));
266 /* NOTE a Linux bug here - getaddrinfo will happily return 127.0.0.1
267 * twice if no IPv6 is configured */
269 for (ord = 0, ai = *ai0; ai; ord++, ai = ai->ai_next) {
270 char buf[256]; /* hostname */
271 char pb[256]; /* service name */
272 int gnie; /* getnameinfo result code */
274 gnie = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, buf, sizeof(buf), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST);
276 snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), GT_("unknown (%s)"), gai_strerror(gnie));
277 gnie = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, NULL, 0, pb, sizeof(pb), NI_NUMERICSERV);
279 snprintf(pb, sizeof(pb), GT_("unknown (%s)"), gai_strerror(gnie));
281 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
282 report_build(stdout, GT_("Trying to connect to %s/%s..."), buf, pb);
283 i = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
286 /* mask EAFNOSUPPORT errors, they confuse users for
287 * multihomed hosts */
288 if (errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
290 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
291 report_complete(stdout, GT_("cannot create socket: %s\n"), strerror(e));
292 snprintf(errbuf+strlen(errbuf), sizeof(errbuf)-strlen(errbuf),\
293 GT_("name %d: cannot create socket family %d type %d: %s\n"), ord, ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, strerror(e));
297 SockTimeout(i, mytimeout);
300 /* Save socket descriptor.
301 * Used to close the socket after connect timeout. */
302 mailserver_socket_temp = i;
304 if (connect(i, (struct sockaddr *) ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
307 /* additionally, suppress IPv4 network unreach errors */
308 if (e != EAFNOSUPPORT)
311 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
312 report_complete(stdout, GT_("connection failed.\n"));
313 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
314 report(stderr, GT_("connection to %s:%s [%s/%s] failed: %s.\n"), host, service, buf, pb, strerror(e));
315 snprintf(errbuf+strlen(errbuf), sizeof(errbuf)-strlen(errbuf), GT_("name %d: connection to %s:%s [%s/%s] failed: %s.\n"), ord, host, service, buf, pb, strerror(e));
320 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
321 report_complete(stdout, GT_("connected.\n"));
324 /* No connect timeout, then no need to set mailserver_socket_temp */
325 mailserver_socket_temp = -1;
330 fm_freeaddrinfo(*ai0);
334 report(stderr, GT_("Connection errors for this poll:\n%s"), errbuf);
341 int SockPrintf(int sock, const char* format, ...)
346 va_start(ap, format) ;
347 vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), format, ap);
349 return SockWrite(sock, buf, strlen(buf));
353 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
354 #include <openssl/err.h>
355 #include <openssl/pem.h>
356 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
357 #include <openssl/rand.h>
359 static SSL_CTX *_ctx[FD_SETSIZE];
360 static SSL *_ssl_context[FD_SETSIZE];
362 static SSL *SSLGetContext( int );
363 #endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
365 int SockWrite(int sock, const char *buf, int len)
375 if( NULL != ( ssl = SSLGetContext( sock ) ) )
376 n = SSL_write(ssl, buf, len);
378 #endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
379 n = fm_write(sock, buf, len);
389 int SockRead(int sock, char *buf, int len)
391 char *newline, *bp = buf;
401 * The reason for these gymnastics is that we want two things:
402 * (1) to read \n-terminated lines,
403 * (2) to return the true length of data read, even if the
404 * data coming in has embedded NULS.
407 if( NULL != ( ssl = SSLGetContext( sock ) ) ) {
409 /* OK... SSL_peek works a little different from MSG_PEEK
410 Problem is that SSL_peek can return 0 if there
411 is no data currently available. If, on the other
412 hand, we lose the socket, we also get a zero, but
413 the SSL_read then SEGFAULTS! To deal with this,
414 we'll check the error code any time we get a return
415 of zero from SSL_peek. If we have an error, we bail.
416 If we don't, we read one character in SSL_read and
417 loop. This should continue to work even if they
418 later change the behavior of SSL_peek
419 to "fix" this problem... :-( */
420 if ((n = SSL_peek(ssl, bp, len)) < 0) {
421 (void)SSL_get_error(ssl, n);
425 /* SSL_peek says no data... Does he mean no data
426 or did the connection blow up? If we got an error
428 if (0 != SSL_get_error(ssl, n)) {
431 /* We didn't get an error so read at least one
432 character at this point and loop */
434 /* Make sure newline start out NULL!
435 * We don't have a string to pass through
436 * the strchr at this point yet */
438 } else if ((newline = (char *)memchr(bp, '\n', n)) != NULL)
439 n = newline - bp + 1;
440 /* Matthias Andree: SSL_read can return 0, in that case
441 * we must call SSL_get_error to figure if there was
442 * an error or just a "no data" condition */
443 if ((n = SSL_read(ssl, bp, n)) <= 0) {
444 if ((n = SSL_get_error(ssl, n))) {
448 /* Check for case where our single character turned out to
449 * be a newline... (It wasn't going to get caught by
450 * the strchr above if it came from the hack... ). */
451 if( NULL == newline && 1 == n && '\n' == *bp ) {
452 /* Got our newline - this will break
453 out of the loop now */
458 #endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
461 if ((n = fm_peek(sock, bp, len)) <= 0)
463 if ((newline = (char *)memchr(bp, '\n', n)) != NULL)
464 n = newline - bp + 1;
465 if ((n = fm_read(sock, bp, n)) == -1)
477 int SockPeek(int sock)
478 /* peek at the next socket character without actually reading it */
487 if( NULL != ( ssl = SSLGetContext( sock ) ) ) {
488 n = SSL_peek(ssl, &ch, 1);
490 (void)SSL_get_error(ssl, n);
494 /* This code really needs to implement a "hold back"
495 * to simulate a functioning SSL_peek()... sigh...
496 * Has to be coordinated with the read code above.
497 * Next on the list todo... */
499 /* SSL_peek says 0... Does that mean no data
500 or did the connection blow up? If we got an error
502 if(0 != SSL_get_error(ssl, n)) {
506 /* Haven't seen this case actually occur, but...
507 if the problem in SockRead can occur, this should
508 be possible... Just not sure what to do here.
509 This should be a safe "punt" the "peek" but don't
510 "punt" the "session"... */
512 return 0; /* Give him a '\0' character */
516 #endif /* SSL_ENABLE */
517 n = fm_peek(sock, &ch, 1);
526 static char *_ssl_server_cname = NULL;
527 static int _check_fp;
528 static char *_check_digest;
529 static char *_server_label;
530 static int _depth0ck;
531 static int _firstrun;
532 static int _prev_err;
533 static int _verify_ok;
535 SSL *SSLGetContext( int sock )
537 if( sock < 0 || (unsigned)sock > FD_SETSIZE )
539 if( _ctx[sock] == NULL )
541 return _ssl_context[sock];
544 /* ok_return (preverify_ok) is 1 if this stage of certificate verification
545 passed, or 0 if it failed. This callback lets us display informative
546 errors, and perform additional validation (e.g. CN matches) */
547 static int SSL_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int strict )
549 #define SSLverbose (((outlevel) >= O_DEBUG) || ((outlevel) >= O_VERBOSE && (depth) == 0))
553 unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
554 char text[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 3 + 1], *tp, *te;
555 const EVP_MD *digest_tp;
556 unsigned int dsz, esz;
557 X509_NAME *subj, *issuer;
560 x509_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
561 err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
562 depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
564 subj = X509_get_subject_name(x509_cert);
565 issuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x509_cert);
567 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) {
568 if (depth == 0 && SSLverbose)
569 report(stderr, GT_("Server certificate:\n"));
574 report(stdout, GT_("Certificate chain, from root to peer, starting at depth %d:\n"), depth);
577 report(stdout, GT_("Certificate at depth %d:\n"), depth);
582 if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(issuer, NID_organizationName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
583 report(stdout, GT_("Issuer Organization: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(buf, i)));
585 if ((size_t)i >= sizeof(buf) - 1)
586 report(stdout, GT_("Warning: Issuer Organization Name too long (possibly truncated).\n"));
588 report(stdout, GT_("Unknown Organization\n"));
589 if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(issuer, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
590 report(stdout, GT_("Issuer CommonName: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(buf, i)));
592 if ((size_t)i >= sizeof(buf) - 1)
593 report(stdout, GT_("Warning: Issuer CommonName too long (possibly truncated).\n"));
595 report(stdout, GT_("Unknown Issuer CommonName\n"));
599 if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subj, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
601 report(stdout, GT_("Subject CommonName: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(buf, i)));
604 if ((size_t)i >= sizeof(buf) - 1) {
605 /* Possible truncation. In this case, this is a DNS name, so this
606 * is really bad. We do not tolerate this even in the non-strict case. */
607 report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject CommonName too long!\n"));
610 if ((size_t)i > strlen(buf)) {
611 /* Name contains embedded NUL characters, so we complain. This is likely
612 * a certificate spoofing attack. */
613 report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject CommonName contains NUL, aborting!\n"));
618 if (depth == 0) { /* peer certificate */
623 if ((i = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(subj, NID_commonName, buf, sizeof(buf))) != -1) {
624 if (_ssl_server_cname != NULL) {
626 char *p2 = _ssl_server_cname;
628 STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *gens;
630 /* RFC 2595 section 2.4: find a matching name
631 * first find a match among alternative names */
632 gens = (STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *)X509_get_ext_d2i(x509_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
635 for (j = 0, r = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); j < r; ++j) {
636 const GENERAL_NAME *gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, j);
637 if (gn->type == GEN_DNS) {
638 char *pp1 = (char *)gn->d.ia5->data;
639 char *pp2 = _ssl_server_cname;
640 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE) {
641 report(stdout, GT_("Subject Alternative Name: %s\n"), (tt = sdump(pp1, (size_t)gn->d.ia5->length)));
644 /* Name contains embedded NUL characters, so we complain. This
645 * is likely a certificate spoofing attack. */
646 if ((size_t)gn->d.ia5->length != strlen(pp1)) {
647 report(stderr, GT_("Bad certificate: Subject Alternative Name contains NUL, aborting!\n"));
648 sk_GENERAL_NAME_free(gens);
651 if (name_match(pp1, pp2)) {
656 sk_GENERAL_NAME_free(gens);
658 if (name_match(p1, p2)) {
662 if (strict || SSLverbose) {
664 GT_("Server CommonName mismatch: %s != %s\n"),
665 (tt = sdump(buf, i)), _ssl_server_cname );
670 } else if (ok_return) {
671 report(stderr, GT_("Server name not set, could not verify certificate!\n"));
672 if (strict) return (0);
675 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
676 report(stdout, GT_("Unknown Server CommonName\n"));
677 if (ok_return && strict) {
678 report(stderr, GT_("Server name not specified in certificate!\n"));
682 /* Print the finger print. Note that on errors, we might print it more than once
683 * normally; we kluge around that by using a global variable. */
684 if (_check_fp == 1) {
688 digest_tp = EVP_md5();
689 if (digest_tp == NULL) {
690 report(stderr, GT_("EVP_md5() failed!\n"));
693 if (!X509_digest(x509_cert, digest_tp, digest, &dsz)) {
694 report(stderr, GT_("Out of memory!\n"));
698 te = text + sizeof(text);
699 for (dp = 0; dp < dsz; dp++) {
700 esz = snprintf(tp, te - tp, dp > 0 ? ":%02X" : "%02X", digest[dp]);
701 if (esz >= (size_t)(te - tp)) {
702 report(stderr, GT_("Digest text buffer too small!\n"));
707 if (outlevel > O_NORMAL)
708 report(stdout, GT_("%s key fingerprint: %s\n"), _server_label, text);
709 if (_check_digest != NULL) {
710 if (strcasecmp(text, _check_digest) == 0) {
711 if (outlevel > O_NORMAL)
712 report(stdout, GT_("%s fingerprints match.\n"), _server_label);
714 report(stderr, GT_("%s fingerprints do not match!\n"), _server_label);
717 } /* if (_check_digest != NULL) */
718 } /* if (_check_fp) */
719 } /* if (depth == 0 && !_depth0ck) */
721 if (err != X509_V_OK && err != _prev_err && !(_check_fp != 0 && _check_digest && !strict)) {
724 report(stderr, GT_("Server certificate verification error: %s\n"), X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
725 /* We gave the error code, but maybe we can add some more details for debugging */
728 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
729 X509_NAME_oneline(issuer, buf, sizeof(buf));
730 buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0';
731 report(stderr, GT_("unknown issuer (first %d characters): %s\n"), (int)(sizeof(buf)-1), buf);
732 report(stderr, GT_("This error usually happens when the server provides an incomplete certificate "
733 "chain, which is nothing fetchmail could do anything about. For details, "
734 "please see the README.SSL-SERVER document that comes with fetchmail.\n"));
736 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
737 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
738 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
739 X509_NAME_oneline(subj, buf, sizeof(buf));
740 buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0';
741 report(stderr, GT_("This means that the root signing certificate (issued for %s) is not in the "
742 "trusted CA certificate locations, or that c_rehash needs to be run "
743 "on the certificate directory. For details, please "
744 "see the documentation of --sslcertpath and --sslcertfile in the manual page.\n"), buf);
751 * If not in strict checking mode (--sslcertck), override this
752 * and pretend that verification had succeeded.
754 _verify_ok &= ok_return;
760 static int SSL_nock_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx )
762 return SSL_verify_callback(ok_return, ctx, 0);
765 static int SSL_ck_verify_callback( int ok_return, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx )
767 return SSL_verify_callback(ok_return, ctx, 1);
771 /* get commonName from certificate set in file.
772 * commonName is stored in buffer namebuffer, limited with namebufferlen
774 static const char *SSLCertGetCN(const char *mycert,
775 char *namebuffer, size_t namebufferlen)
777 const char *ret = NULL;
779 X509 *x509_cert = NULL;
780 X509_NAME *certname = NULL;
782 if (namebuffer && namebufferlen > 0) {
783 namebuffer[0] = 0x00;
784 certBio = BIO_new_file(mycert,"r");
786 x509_cert = PEM_read_bio_X509(certBio,NULL,NULL,NULL);
790 certname = X509_get_subject_name(x509_cert);
792 X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(certname, NID_commonName,
793 namebuffer, namebufferlen) > 0)
795 X509_free(x509_cert);
801 /* performs initial SSL handshake over the connected socket
802 * uses SSL *ssl global variable, which is currently defined
805 int SSLOpen(int sock, char *mycert, char *mykey, const char *myproto, int certck,
806 char *cacertfile, char *certpath,
807 char *fingerprint, char *servercname, char *label, char **remotename)
809 struct stat randstat;
812 SSL_load_error_strings();
814 OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); /* see Debian Bug#576430 and manpage */
816 if (stat("/dev/random", &randstat) &&
817 stat("/dev/urandom", &randstat)) {
818 /* Neither /dev/random nor /dev/urandom are present, so add
819 entropy to the SSL PRNG a hard way. */
820 for (i = 0; i < 10000 && ! RAND_status (); ++i) {
823 gettimeofday (&tv, 0);
824 buf[0] = tv.tv_usec & 0xF;
825 buf[2] = (tv.tv_usec & 0xF0) >> 4;
826 buf[3] = (tv.tv_usec & 0xF00) >> 8;
827 buf[1] = (tv.tv_usec & 0xF000) >> 12;
828 RAND_add (buf, sizeof buf, 0.1);
832 if( sock < 0 || (unsigned)sock > FD_SETSIZE ) {
833 report(stderr, GT_("File descriptor out of range for SSL") );
837 /* Make sure a connection referring to an older context is not left */
838 _ssl_context[sock] = NULL;
840 if(!strcasecmp("ssl3",myproto)) {
841 _ctx[sock] = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv3_client_method());
842 } else if(!strcasecmp("tls1",myproto)) {
843 _ctx[sock] = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_client_method());
844 } else if (!strcasecmp("ssl23",myproto)) {
847 fprintf(stderr,GT_("Invalid SSL protocol '%s' specified, using default (SSL23).\n"), myproto);
852 _ctx[sock] = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method());
854 if(_ctx[sock] == NULL) {
855 ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
859 SSL_CTX_set_options(_ctx[sock], SSL_OP_ALL | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
862 SSL_CTX_set_verify(_ctx[sock], SSL_VERIFY_PEER, SSL_ck_verify_callback);
864 /* In this case, we do not fail if verification fails. However,
865 * we provide the callback for output and possible fingerprint
867 SSL_CTX_set_verify(_ctx[sock], SSL_VERIFY_PEER, SSL_nock_verify_callback);
870 /* Check which trusted X.509 CA certificate store(s) to load */
873 int want_default_cacerts = 0;
875 /* Load user locations if any is given */
876 if (certpath || cacertfile)
877 SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(_ctx[sock],
878 cacertfile, certpath);
880 want_default_cacerts = 1;
882 tmp = getenv("FETCHMAIL_INCLUDE_DEFAULT_X509_CA_CERTS");
883 if (want_default_cacerts || (tmp && tmp[0])) {
884 SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(_ctx[sock]);
888 _ssl_context[sock] = SSL_new(_ctx[sock]);
890 if(_ssl_context[sock] == NULL) {
891 ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
892 SSL_CTX_free(_ctx[sock]);
897 /* This static is for the verify callback */
898 _ssl_server_cname = servercname;
899 _server_label = label;
901 _check_digest = fingerprint;
907 if( mycert || mykey ) {
909 /* Ok... He has a certificate file defined, so lets declare it. If
910 * he does NOT have a separate certificate and private key file then
911 * assume that it's a combined key and certificate file.
920 if ((!*remotename || !**remotename) && SSLCertGetCN(mycert, buffer, sizeof(buffer))) {
922 *remotename = xstrdup(buffer);
924 SSL_use_certificate_file(_ssl_context[sock], mycert, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
925 SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(_ssl_context[sock], mykey, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
928 if (SSL_set_fd(_ssl_context[sock], sock) == 0
929 || SSL_connect(_ssl_context[sock]) < 1) {
930 ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
931 SSL_free( _ssl_context[sock] );
932 _ssl_context[sock] = NULL;
933 SSL_CTX_free(_ctx[sock]);
938 /* Paranoia: was the callback not called as we expected? */
940 report(stderr, GT_("Certificate/fingerprint verification was somehow skipped!\n"));
942 if (fingerprint != NULL || certck) {
943 if( NULL != SSLGetContext( sock ) ) {
944 /* Clean up the SSL stack */
945 SSL_shutdown( _ssl_context[sock] );
946 SSL_free( _ssl_context[sock] );
947 _ssl_context[sock] = NULL;
948 SSL_CTX_free(_ctx[sock]);
955 if (!certck && !fingerprint &&
956 (SSL_get_verify_result(_ssl_context[sock]) != X509_V_OK || !_verify_ok)) {
957 report(stderr, GT_("Warning: the connection is insecure, continuing anyways. (Better use --sslcertck!)\n"));
964 int SockClose(int sock)
965 /* close a socket gracefully */
968 if( NULL != SSLGetContext( sock ) ) {
969 /* Clean up the SSL stack */
970 SSL_shutdown( _ssl_context[sock] );
971 SSL_free( _ssl_context[sock] );
972 _ssl_context[sock] = NULL;
973 SSL_CTX_free(_ctx[sock]);
978 /* if there's an error closing at this point, not much we can do */
979 return(fm_close(sock)); /* this is guarded */
984 * Workaround Microsoft Winsock recv/WSARecv(..., MSG_PEEK) bug.
985 * See http://sources.redhat.com/ml/cygwin/2001-08/msg00628.html
988 static ssize_t cygwin_read(int sock, void *buf, size_t count)
990 char *bp = (char *)buf;
993 if ((n = read(sock, bp, count)) == (size_t)-1)
998 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
999 report(stdout, GT_("Cygwin socket read retry\n"));
1000 n2 = read(sock, bp + n, count - n);
1001 if (n2 == (size_t)-1 || n + n2 != count) {
1002 report(stderr, GT_("Cygwin socket read retry failed!\n"));
1009 #endif /* __CYGWIN__ */