2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
28 #include <linux/kernel.h>
29 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
30 #include <linux/errno.h>
31 #include <linux/sched.h>
32 #include <linux/security.h>
33 #include <linux/xattr.h>
34 #include <linux/capability.h>
35 #include <linux/unistd.h>
37 #include <linux/mman.h>
38 #include <linux/slab.h>
39 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
40 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
41 #include <linux/swap.h>
42 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
43 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
44 #include <linux/dcache.h>
45 #include <linux/file.h>
46 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
47 #include <linux/namei.h>
48 #include <linux/mount.h>
49 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
51 #include <linux/tty.h>
53 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
54 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
55 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
56 #include <net/netlabel.h>
57 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
58 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
59 #include <linux/atomic.h>
60 #include <linux/bitops.h>
61 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
62 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
63 #include <linux/netlink.h>
64 #include <linux/tcp.h>
65 #include <linux/udp.h>
66 #include <linux/dccp.h>
67 #include <linux/quota.h>
68 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
69 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
70 #include <linux/parser.h>
71 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
73 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
74 #include <linux/personality.h>
75 #include <linux/audit.h>
76 #include <linux/string.h>
77 #include <linux/selinux.h>
78 #include <linux/mutex.h>
79 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
80 #include <linux/syslog.h>
81 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
82 #include <linux/export.h>
83 #include <linux/msg.h>
84 #include <linux/shm.h>
96 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
98 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
100 /* SECMARK reference count */
101 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
103 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
104 int selinux_enforcing;
106 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
108 unsigned long enforcing;
109 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
110 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
113 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
116 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
117 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
119 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
121 unsigned long enabled;
122 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
123 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
126 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
128 int selinux_enabled = 1;
131 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
134 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
137 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
138 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
139 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
140 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
143 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
145 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
149 * initialise the security for the init task
151 static void cred_init_security(void)
153 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
154 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
156 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
158 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
160 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
161 cred->security = tsec;
165 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
167 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
169 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
171 tsec = cred->security;
176 * get the objective security ID of a task
178 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
183 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
189 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
191 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
193 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
198 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
200 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
202 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
203 u32 sid = current_sid();
205 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
209 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
210 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
212 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
213 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
214 isec->task_sid = sid;
215 inode->i_security = isec;
220 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
222 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
223 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
225 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
226 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
227 list_del_init(&isec->list);
228 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
230 inode->i_security = NULL;
231 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
234 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
236 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
237 u32 sid = current_sid();
239 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
244 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
245 file->f_security = fsec;
250 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
252 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
253 file->f_security = NULL;
257 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
259 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
261 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
265 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
266 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
267 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
269 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
270 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
271 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
272 sb->s_security = sbsec;
277 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
279 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
280 sb->s_security = NULL;
284 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
286 static const char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
288 "uses transition SIDs",
290 "uses genfs_contexts",
291 "not configured for labeling",
292 "uses mountpoint labeling",
295 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
297 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
299 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
308 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
311 static const match_table_t tokens = {
312 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
313 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
314 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
315 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
316 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
320 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
322 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
323 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
324 const struct cred *cred)
326 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
329 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
330 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
334 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
335 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
339 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
340 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
341 const struct cred *cred)
343 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
345 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
346 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
350 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
351 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
355 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
357 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
358 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
359 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
362 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
363 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
364 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
365 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
366 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
367 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
368 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
369 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
370 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
374 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
375 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
376 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
377 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
378 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
379 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
381 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
382 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
383 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
388 sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
390 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
391 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
392 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
394 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
395 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
396 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
398 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
399 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
400 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
401 sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
402 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
404 /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
405 if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
406 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBLABELSUPP;
408 /* Initialize the root inode. */
409 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
411 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
412 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
413 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
415 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
417 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
418 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
419 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
420 struct inode_security_struct, list);
421 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
422 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
423 inode = igrab(inode);
425 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
429 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
430 list_del_init(&isec->list);
433 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
439 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
440 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
441 * mount options, or whatever.
443 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
444 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
447 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
448 char *context = NULL;
452 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
454 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
460 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
461 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
462 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
464 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
467 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
468 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
469 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
471 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
472 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
477 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
478 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
484 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
485 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
488 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
489 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
491 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
492 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
495 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
496 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
498 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
499 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
502 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
503 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
505 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
506 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
507 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
509 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
512 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
513 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
515 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
516 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
517 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
520 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
525 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
529 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
530 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
532 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
534 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
535 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
536 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
537 (old_sid != new_sid))
540 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
541 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
543 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
544 if (mnt_flags & flag)
550 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
551 * labeling information.
553 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
554 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
556 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
558 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
559 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
560 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
561 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
562 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
563 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
564 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
565 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
566 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
568 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
570 if (!ss_initialized) {
572 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
573 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
574 server is ready to handle calls. */
578 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
579 "before the security server is initialized\n");
584 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
585 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
586 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
587 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
589 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
590 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
591 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
592 * will be used for both mounts)
594 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
599 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
600 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
601 * than once with different security options.
603 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
606 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
608 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
609 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
611 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
612 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
613 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
620 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
622 goto out_double_mount;
624 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
629 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
631 goto out_double_mount;
633 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
635 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
636 rootcontext_sid = sid;
638 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
640 goto out_double_mount;
642 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
646 defcontext_sid = sid;
648 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
650 goto out_double_mount;
652 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
661 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
662 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
663 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
664 goto out_double_mount;
669 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
670 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
672 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
673 rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
675 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
676 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
680 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
682 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
686 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
690 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
691 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
692 * the superblock context if not already set.
695 if (!fscontext_sid) {
696 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
700 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
702 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
707 if (!rootcontext_sid)
708 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
710 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
711 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
714 if (rootcontext_sid) {
715 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
720 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
721 root_isec->initialized = 1;
724 if (defcontext_sid) {
725 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
727 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
728 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
732 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
733 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
739 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
742 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
744 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
748 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
749 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
753 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
754 struct super_block *newsb)
756 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
757 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
759 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
760 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
761 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
764 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
765 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
770 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
771 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
773 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
774 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
777 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
779 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
781 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
782 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
783 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
786 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
790 if (!set_rootcontext) {
791 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
792 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
795 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
797 if (set_rootcontext) {
798 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
799 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
800 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
801 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
803 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
806 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
807 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
810 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
811 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
814 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
815 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
816 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
818 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
820 /* Standard string-based options. */
821 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
823 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
828 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
832 if (context || defcontext) {
834 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
837 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
847 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
850 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
857 case Opt_rootcontext:
860 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
863 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
871 if (context || defcontext) {
873 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
876 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
882 case Opt_labelsupport:
886 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
893 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
897 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
898 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
899 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
904 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
905 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
908 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
909 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
912 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
913 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
916 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
917 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
920 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
931 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
933 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
936 char *options = data;
937 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
939 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
944 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
946 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
951 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
954 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
958 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
959 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
964 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
967 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
968 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
972 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
974 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
977 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
979 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
980 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
983 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
987 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
993 /* we need a comma before each option */
998 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1004 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1006 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1009 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1011 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1017 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1019 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1024 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1026 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1028 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1030 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1032 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1034 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1036 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1038 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1040 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1044 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1047 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1049 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1052 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1054 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1057 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1063 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1064 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1066 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1073 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1074 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1076 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1078 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1079 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1081 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1083 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1085 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1091 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1092 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1093 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1094 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1095 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1097 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1099 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1100 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1101 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1103 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1104 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1105 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1106 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1107 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1108 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1109 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1111 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1114 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1116 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1118 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1121 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1124 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1125 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1130 char *buffer, *path;
1132 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1136 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1140 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1141 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1142 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1143 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1147 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1149 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1153 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1161 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1162 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1164 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1165 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1167 struct dentry *dentry;
1168 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1169 char *context = NULL;
1173 if (isec->initialized)
1176 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1177 if (isec->initialized)
1180 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1181 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1182 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1183 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1184 server is ready to handle calls. */
1185 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1186 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1187 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1188 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1192 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1193 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1194 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1195 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1199 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1200 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1202 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1203 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1205 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1206 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1210 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1211 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1212 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1213 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1214 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1215 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1216 * be used again by userspace.
1221 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1222 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1228 context[len] = '\0';
1229 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1231 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1234 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1235 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1242 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1248 context[len] = '\0';
1249 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1255 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1256 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1257 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1258 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1262 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1263 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1266 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1270 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1271 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1273 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1274 if (printk_ratelimit())
1275 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1276 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1277 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1279 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1280 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1281 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1284 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1292 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1293 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1295 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1296 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1297 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1299 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1300 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1301 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid,
1302 isec->sclass, NULL, &sid);
1307 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1308 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1311 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1312 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1314 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1316 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1317 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
1328 isec->initialized = 1;
1331 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1333 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1334 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1338 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1339 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1345 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1346 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1349 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1350 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1353 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1354 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1357 /* All other signals. */
1358 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1366 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1367 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1369 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1370 const struct cred *target,
1373 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1375 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1379 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1380 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1381 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1382 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1384 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1385 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1388 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1392 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1393 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1395 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1399 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1400 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1401 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1402 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1404 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1409 sid = current_sid();
1410 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1411 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1414 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1415 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1418 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1419 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1422 struct common_audit_data ad;
1423 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
1424 struct av_decision avd;
1426 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1427 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1430 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP);
1431 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
1434 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1436 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1439 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1443 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1448 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1449 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
1450 int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
1457 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1458 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1461 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1463 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1464 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1467 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1468 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1469 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1470 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1471 struct inode *inode,
1473 struct common_audit_data *adp,
1476 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1479 validate_creds(cred);
1481 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1484 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1485 isec = inode->i_security;
1487 return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp, flags);
1490 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1491 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1492 pathname if needed. */
1493 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1494 struct dentry *dentry,
1497 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1498 struct common_audit_data ad;
1499 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
1501 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1502 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1503 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
1504 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1507 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1508 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1509 pathname if needed. */
1510 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1514 struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
1515 struct common_audit_data ad;
1516 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
1518 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1520 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
1521 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1524 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1525 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1526 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1527 check a particular permission to the file.
1528 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1529 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1530 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1531 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1532 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1536 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1537 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1538 struct common_audit_data ad;
1539 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
1540 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1543 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1544 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1545 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
1547 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1548 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1556 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1559 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1565 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1566 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1567 struct dentry *dentry,
1570 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1571 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1572 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1574 struct common_audit_data ad;
1575 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
1578 dsec = dir->i_security;
1579 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1582 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1584 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1585 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1586 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
1588 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1589 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1594 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1595 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1596 &dentry->d_name, &newsid);
1601 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1605 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1606 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1607 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1610 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1611 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1612 struct task_struct *ctx)
1614 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1616 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1620 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1623 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1624 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1625 struct dentry *dentry,
1629 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1630 struct common_audit_data ad;
1631 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
1632 u32 sid = current_sid();
1636 dsec = dir->i_security;
1637 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1639 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1640 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1641 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
1644 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1645 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1660 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1665 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1669 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1670 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1671 struct inode *new_dir,
1672 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1674 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1675 struct common_audit_data ad;
1676 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
1677 u32 sid = current_sid();
1679 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1682 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1683 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1684 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1685 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1687 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1688 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
1690 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1691 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1692 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1695 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1696 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1699 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1700 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1701 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1706 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1707 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1708 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1709 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1710 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1713 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1714 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1715 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1716 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1718 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1726 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1727 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1728 struct super_block *sb,
1730 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1732 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1733 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1735 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1736 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1739 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1740 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1744 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1745 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1746 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1747 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1750 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1752 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1756 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1758 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1760 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1767 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1768 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1772 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1774 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1775 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1782 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1791 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1794 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1796 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1798 if (selinux_policycap_openperm)
1804 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1806 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
1811 rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
1815 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1816 u32 sid = current_sid();
1817 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1818 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1821 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1824 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1828 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
1832 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1835 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1836 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1840 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1844 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1847 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1848 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1849 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1850 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1854 error = cap_capset(new, old,
1855 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1859 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1863 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1864 * which was removed).
1866 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1867 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1868 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1869 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1872 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
1877 rc = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
1881 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit);
1884 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1886 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1898 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1903 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1906 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1912 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1914 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1916 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1919 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1924 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
1925 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1926 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1928 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
1929 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
1930 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1931 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
1932 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1934 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */
1935 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */
1936 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */
1937 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1938 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */
1940 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1947 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1948 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1949 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1951 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1952 * processes that allocate mappings.
1954 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1956 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1958 rc = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
1959 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
1963 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1966 /* binprm security operations */
1968 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1970 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
1971 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
1972 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1973 struct common_audit_data ad;
1974 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
1975 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1978 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
1982 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
1983 * the script interpreter */
1984 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
1987 old_tsec = current_security();
1988 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
1989 isec = inode->i_security;
1991 /* Default to the current task SID. */
1992 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
1993 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
1995 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
1996 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
1997 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
1998 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2000 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2001 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2002 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2003 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2005 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2006 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2007 SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2013 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
2014 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
2015 ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2017 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2018 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2020 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2021 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2022 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2026 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2027 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2028 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2032 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2033 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2037 /* Check for shared state */
2038 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2039 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2040 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2046 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2047 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2049 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2050 struct task_struct *tracer;
2051 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2055 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2056 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2057 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2063 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2065 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2071 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2072 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2078 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2080 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2088 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2089 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2090 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2091 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2093 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2096 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2099 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2100 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2101 struct files_struct *files)
2103 struct common_audit_data ad;
2104 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
2105 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2106 struct tty_struct *tty;
2107 struct fdtable *fdt;
2111 tty = get_current_tty();
2113 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
2114 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2115 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2117 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2118 Use path_has_perm on the tty path directly rather
2119 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2120 file may belong to another process and we are only
2121 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2122 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2123 struct tty_file_private, list);
2124 file = file_priv->file;
2125 if (path_has_perm(cred, &file->f_path, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2128 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
2131 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2135 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2137 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
2138 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
2140 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2142 unsigned long set, i;
2147 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2148 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2150 set = fdt->open_fds[j];
2153 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2154 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2159 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2161 file_to_av(file))) {
2163 fd = get_unused_fd();
2173 devnull = dentry_open(
2175 mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2177 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2184 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2189 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2192 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2196 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2198 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2200 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2201 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2204 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2205 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2208 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2209 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2211 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2212 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2214 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2215 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2216 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2218 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2219 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2220 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2221 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2222 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2224 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2225 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2227 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2229 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2230 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2231 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2232 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2234 task_unlock(current);
2235 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2240 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2243 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2245 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2246 struct itimerval itimer;
2256 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2257 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2258 * flush and unblock signals.
2260 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2261 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2263 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2265 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2266 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2267 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2268 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2269 if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
2270 __flush_signals(current);
2271 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2272 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2274 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2277 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2278 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2279 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2280 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2281 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2284 /* superblock security operations */
2286 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2288 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2291 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2293 superblock_free_security(sb);
2296 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2301 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2304 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2306 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2307 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2308 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2309 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2310 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2313 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2320 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2324 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2327 int current_size = 0;
2335 while (current_size < len) {
2345 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2347 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2348 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2349 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2355 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2363 in_save = in_end = orig;
2367 open_quote = !open_quote;
2368 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2370 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2372 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2373 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2375 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2377 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2379 } while (*in_end++);
2381 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2382 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2387 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2390 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
2391 char *secdata, **mount_options;
2392 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2394 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2400 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
2403 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
2404 secdata = alloc_secdata();
2407 rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
2409 goto out_free_secdata;
2411 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
2413 goto out_free_secdata;
2415 mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
2416 flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
2418 for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
2422 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
2424 len = strlen(mount_options[i]);
2425 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid);
2427 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
2428 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2429 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
2435 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2436 goto out_bad_option;
2439 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2440 goto out_bad_option;
2442 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
2443 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2444 root_isec = sb->s_root->d_inode->i_security;
2446 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2447 goto out_bad_option;
2450 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
2451 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2452 goto out_bad_option;
2461 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
2463 free_secdata(secdata);
2466 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
2467 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2472 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2474 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2475 struct common_audit_data ad;
2476 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
2479 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2483 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2484 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2487 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
2488 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
2489 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2490 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2493 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2495 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2496 struct common_audit_data ad;
2497 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
2499 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
2500 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
2501 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2502 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2505 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2508 unsigned long flags,
2511 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2513 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2514 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2515 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2517 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2520 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2522 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2524 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2525 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2528 /* inode security operations */
2530 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2532 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2535 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2537 inode_free_security(inode);
2540 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2541 const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
2542 void **value, size_t *len)
2544 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2545 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2546 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2547 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2549 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2551 dsec = dir->i_security;
2552 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2555 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2557 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
2558 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT))
2559 newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
2560 else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2561 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2562 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2565 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2566 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2569 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2574 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2575 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2576 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2577 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2579 isec->initialized = 1;
2582 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2586 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2593 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2605 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
2607 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2610 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2612 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2615 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2617 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2620 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2622 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2625 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
2627 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2630 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2632 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2635 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
2637 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2640 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2641 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2643 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2646 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2648 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2650 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2653 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2655 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2657 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2660 static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
2661 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
2664 struct common_audit_data ad;
2665 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
2666 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2669 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
2670 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
2673 rc = slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
2674 audited, denied, &ad, flags);
2680 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2682 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2685 unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
2686 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2688 struct av_decision avd;
2690 u32 audited, denied;
2692 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
2693 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
2695 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2699 validate_creds(cred);
2701 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
2704 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
2706 sid = cred_sid(cred);
2707 isec = inode->i_security;
2709 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
2710 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
2711 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
2713 if (likely(!audited))
2716 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, flags);
2722 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2724 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2725 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
2726 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
2728 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2729 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
2730 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
2736 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2737 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
2738 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2740 if (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE)
2743 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
2746 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2748 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2751 path.dentry = dentry;
2754 return path_has_perm(cred, &path, FILE__GETATTR);
2757 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2759 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2761 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2762 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2763 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2764 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2766 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2767 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2768 Restrict to administrator. */
2773 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2774 ordinary setattr permission. */
2775 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2778 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2779 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2781 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2782 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2783 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2784 struct common_audit_data ad;
2785 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
2786 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2789 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2790 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2792 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2793 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2796 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
2799 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
2800 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
2801 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
2803 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2804 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2808 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2809 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2810 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
2811 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2815 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
2816 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
2818 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
2819 audit_size = size - 1;
2822 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
2823 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
2824 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
2829 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2834 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2835 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2839 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2844 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2846 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2847 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2851 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2852 const void *value, size_t size,
2855 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2856 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2860 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2861 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2865 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2867 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2868 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2869 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2877 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2879 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2881 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2884 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2886 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2888 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2891 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2893 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2894 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2896 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2897 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2902 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2904 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2906 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2910 char *context = NULL;
2911 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2913 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2917 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2918 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2919 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2920 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2921 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2922 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2923 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2925 error = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2926 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2928 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2931 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2944 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2945 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2947 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2951 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2954 if (!value || !size)
2957 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2962 isec->initialized = 1;
2966 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2968 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2969 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2970 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2974 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2976 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2980 /* file security operations */
2982 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2984 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2985 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2987 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2988 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2991 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
2992 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2995 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2997 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2998 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2999 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3000 u32 sid = current_sid();
3003 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3006 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
3007 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
3008 /* No change since file_open check. */
3011 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3014 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3016 return file_alloc_security(file);
3019 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
3021 file_free_security(file);
3024 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3027 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3037 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3039 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3040 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3043 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3045 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3046 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3049 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3053 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3058 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3059 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
3062 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3063 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3066 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL);
3071 static int default_noexec;
3073 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3075 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3078 if (default_noexec &&
3079 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3081 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3082 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3083 * This has an additional check.
3085 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3091 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3092 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3094 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3095 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3098 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3099 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3101 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3108 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3109 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
3110 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3113 u32 sid = current_sid();
3116 * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
3117 * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt
3118 * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
3119 * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
3121 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3122 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3123 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3128 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3129 rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
3130 if (rc || addr_only)
3133 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3136 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3137 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3140 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3141 unsigned long reqprot,
3144 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3146 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3149 if (default_noexec &&
3150 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3152 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3153 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3154 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3155 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3156 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3157 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3158 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3159 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3161 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3162 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3163 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3164 * modified content. This typically should only
3165 * occur for text relocations.
3167 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3173 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3176 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3178 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3180 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3183 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3186 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3191 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3196 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3197 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3206 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3207 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3212 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3217 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3221 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3228 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3230 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3232 fsec = file->f_security;
3233 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3238 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3239 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3242 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3244 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3246 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3247 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3249 fsec = file->f_security;
3252 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3254 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3256 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3257 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3260 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3262 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3264 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3267 static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3269 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3270 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3272 fsec = file->f_security;
3273 isec = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_security;
3275 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3276 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3277 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3278 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3279 * struct as its SID.
3281 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3282 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3284 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3285 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3286 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3287 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3288 * new inode label or new policy.
3289 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3291 return path_has_perm(cred, &file->f_path, open_file_to_av(file));
3294 /* task security operations */
3296 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3298 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3302 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3304 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3306 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3308 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3312 cred->security = tsec;
3317 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3319 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3321 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3324 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3325 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3327 BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3328 cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3333 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3335 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3338 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3339 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3341 old_tsec = old->security;
3343 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3347 new->security = tsec;
3352 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3354 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3356 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3357 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3363 * set the security data for a kernel service
3364 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3366 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3368 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3369 u32 sid = current_sid();
3372 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3373 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3374 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3378 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3379 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3380 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3386 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3387 * objective context of the specified inode
3389 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3391 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3392 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3393 u32 sid = current_sid();
3396 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3397 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3398 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3402 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3406 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3409 struct common_audit_data ad;
3410 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
3412 sid = task_sid(current);
3414 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD);
3415 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
3416 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3418 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3419 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3422 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3424 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3427 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3429 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3432 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3434 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3437 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3439 *secid = task_sid(p);
3442 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3446 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3450 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3453 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3457 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3461 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3464 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3466 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3469 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
3470 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3472 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
3474 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3475 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3476 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3477 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3478 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3479 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3484 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3488 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
3492 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3495 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3497 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3500 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3502 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3505 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3512 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3514 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3516 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3517 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3519 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3523 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3525 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3528 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3529 struct inode *inode)
3531 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3532 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3535 isec->initialized = 1;
3538 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3539 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3540 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3542 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3543 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3545 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3546 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3550 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3551 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3554 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3555 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3559 *proto = ih->protocol;
3561 switch (ih->protocol) {
3563 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3565 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3569 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3573 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3574 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3579 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3581 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3585 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3589 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3590 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3594 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3595 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3597 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3601 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3605 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3606 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3617 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3619 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3620 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3621 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3624 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3625 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3628 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3629 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3633 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
3634 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
3637 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3638 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3639 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
3648 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3650 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3654 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3655 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3660 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3662 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3666 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3667 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3671 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3672 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3674 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3678 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3679 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3683 /* includes fragments */
3693 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
3694 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3699 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
3701 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3704 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
3705 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
3708 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3710 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3713 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
3714 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
3724 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3725 " unable to parse packet\n");
3735 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3737 * @family: protocol family
3738 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3741 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3742 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3743 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3744 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3745 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3749 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3756 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3757 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3759 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3760 if (unlikely(err)) {
3762 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3763 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3770 /* socket security operations */
3772 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
3773 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
3775 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
3776 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3780 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL,
3784 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
3786 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3787 struct common_audit_data ad;
3788 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
3789 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
3790 u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
3792 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3795 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
3796 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
3800 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3803 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3804 int protocol, int kern)
3806 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3814 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3815 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
3819 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3822 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3823 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3825 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3826 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3827 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3830 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3833 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3835 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid));
3840 isec->initialized = 1;
3843 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3844 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3845 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3846 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
3852 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3853 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3854 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3856 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3858 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3862 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND);
3867 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3868 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3869 * check the first address now.
3871 family = sk->sk_family;
3872 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3874 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3875 struct common_audit_data ad;
3876 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
3877 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
3878 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3879 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3880 unsigned short snum;
3883 if (family == PF_INET) {
3884 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3885 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3886 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3888 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3889 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3890 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3896 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3898 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3899 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3903 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
3904 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
3906 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
3907 ad.u.net->family = family;
3908 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3910 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3916 switch (sksec->sclass) {
3917 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3918 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3921 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3922 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3925 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3926 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3930 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3934 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3938 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
3939 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
3941 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
3942 ad.u.net->family = family;
3944 if (family == PF_INET)
3945 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3947 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
3949 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3950 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3958 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3960 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3961 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3964 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3969 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3971 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3972 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3973 struct common_audit_data ad;
3974 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
3975 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
3976 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3977 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3978 unsigned short snum;
3981 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3982 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3983 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3985 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3987 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3988 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3990 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3993 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3997 perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3998 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4000 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
4001 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
4003 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
4004 ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
4005 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
4010 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
4016 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
4018 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4021 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4024 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4025 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4027 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4031 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
4033 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4034 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4035 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
4036 newisec->initialized = 1;
4041 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4044 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4047 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4048 int size, int flags)
4050 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4053 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4055 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4058 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4060 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4063 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4067 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4071 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4074 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4077 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4080 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4082 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4085 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4089 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4090 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4091 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4092 struct common_audit_data ad;
4093 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
4094 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4097 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
4098 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
4100 ad.u.net->sk = other;
4102 err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4103 sksec_other->sclass,
4104 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4108 /* server child socket */
4109 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4110 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
4115 /* connecting socket */
4116 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4121 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4122 struct socket *other)
4124 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4125 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4126 struct common_audit_data ad;
4127 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
4128 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4130 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
4131 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
4133 ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
4135 return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4139 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4141 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4147 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4150 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4151 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4155 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4158 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4159 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4162 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4166 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4167 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4168 struct common_audit_data ad;
4169 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
4170 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4173 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
4174 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
4176 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4177 ad.u.net->family = family;
4178 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4182 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4183 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4189 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4192 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4197 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4200 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4201 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4202 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4203 struct common_audit_data ad;
4204 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
4205 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4210 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4213 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4214 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4217 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4218 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4219 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4220 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4221 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4222 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4224 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4225 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4226 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4229 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
4230 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
4232 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4233 ad.u.net->family = family;
4234 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4238 if (peerlbl_active) {
4241 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4244 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->skb_iif, addrp, family,
4247 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4250 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4253 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4256 if (secmark_active) {
4257 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4266 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4267 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4272 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4273 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4275 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4276 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
4277 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4278 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
4279 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
4281 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4285 if (scontext_len > len) {
4290 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4294 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4300 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4302 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4305 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4307 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4310 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4314 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4315 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4317 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4320 *secid = peer_secid;
4321 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4326 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4328 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4330 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
4334 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4335 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4336 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
4337 sk->sk_security = sksec;
4342 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4344 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4346 sk->sk_security = NULL;
4347 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
4351 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4353 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4354 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4356 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
4357 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4358 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
4360 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
4363 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4366 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4368 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4370 *secid = sksec->sid;
4374 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4376 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4377 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4379 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4380 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4381 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4382 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4385 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4386 struct request_sock *req)
4388 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4390 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4394 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4395 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4398 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4401 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4402 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4403 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4405 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4408 req->secid = newsid;
4409 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4412 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4415 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4416 const struct request_sock *req)
4418 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4420 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4421 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4422 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4423 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4424 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4425 time it will have been created and available. */
4427 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4428 * thread with access to newsksec */
4429 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4432 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4434 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4435 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4437 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4438 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4441 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4444 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
4446 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
4449 __tsec = current_security();
4452 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4455 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4457 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4460 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4462 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4465 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4468 fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
4471 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4473 u32 sid = current_sid();
4475 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4476 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4477 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4478 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4479 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4480 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4482 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
4486 static void selinux_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk)
4488 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4490 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4491 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4492 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4493 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4494 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4495 * protocols were being used */
4497 /* see the comments in selinux_tun_dev_create() about why we don't use
4498 * the sockcreate SID here */
4500 sksec->sid = current_sid();
4501 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
4504 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk)
4506 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4507 u32 sid = current_sid();
4510 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sksec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4511 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
4514 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4515 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4524 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4528 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4529 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4531 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4535 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4537 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4539 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4540 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4541 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4542 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4543 nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
4544 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4554 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
4559 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4561 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4567 struct common_audit_data ad;
4568 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
4569 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4574 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4577 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4578 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4579 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4580 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4583 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4586 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
4587 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
4589 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
4590 ad.u.net->family = family;
4591 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4594 if (peerlbl_active) {
4595 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4598 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4604 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4605 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4609 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4610 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4611 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4613 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4619 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4620 struct sk_buff *skb,
4621 const struct net_device *in,
4622 const struct net_device *out,
4623 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4625 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4628 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4629 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4630 struct sk_buff *skb,
4631 const struct net_device *in,
4632 const struct net_device *out,
4633 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4635 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4639 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4644 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4647 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4648 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4649 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4651 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4654 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4655 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4661 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4662 struct sk_buff *skb,
4663 const struct net_device *in,
4664 const struct net_device *out,
4665 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4667 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4670 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4674 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4675 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4676 struct common_audit_data ad;
4677 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
4678 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4684 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4686 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
4687 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
4689 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
4690 ad.u.net->family = family;
4691 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4694 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4695 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4696 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4697 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4699 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4700 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4705 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4711 struct common_audit_data ad;
4712 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
4713 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4718 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4719 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4720 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4721 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4722 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4723 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4725 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4726 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4727 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4728 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4729 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4730 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4731 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL)
4734 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4735 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4736 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4739 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4740 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4741 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4742 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4746 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4747 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4750 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4751 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4754 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4755 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4756 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4759 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
4760 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
4762 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
4763 ad.u.net->family = family;
4764 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4768 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4769 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4770 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4772 if (peerlbl_active) {
4776 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4778 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4779 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4780 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4782 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4784 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4785 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4786 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4792 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4793 struct sk_buff *skb,
4794 const struct net_device *in,
4795 const struct net_device *out,
4796 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4798 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4801 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4802 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4803 struct sk_buff *skb,
4804 const struct net_device *in,
4805 const struct net_device *out,
4806 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4808 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4812 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4814 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4818 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
4822 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4825 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4826 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4829 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4832 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4836 sid = task_sid(task);
4837 isec->sclass = sclass;
4839 perm->security = isec;
4844 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4846 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4847 perm->security = NULL;
4851 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4853 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4855 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4859 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4860 msg->security = msec;
4865 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4867 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4869 msg->security = NULL;
4873 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4876 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4877 struct common_audit_data ad;
4878 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
4879 u32 sid = current_sid();
4881 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4883 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
4884 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
4885 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4887 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4890 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4892 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4895 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4897 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4900 /* message queue security operations */
4901 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4903 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4904 struct common_audit_data ad;
4905 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
4906 u32 sid = current_sid();
4909 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4913 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4915 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
4916 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
4917 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4919 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4922 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4928 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4930 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4933 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4935 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4936 struct common_audit_data ad;
4937 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
4938 u32 sid = current_sid();
4940 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4942 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
4943 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
4944 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4946 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4947 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4950 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4958 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4959 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4962 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4965 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4968 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4974 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4978 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4980 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4981 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4982 struct common_audit_data ad;
4983 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
4984 u32 sid = current_sid();
4987 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4988 msec = msg->security;
4991 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4993 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4995 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4996 * message queue this message will be stored in
4998 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5004 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
5005 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
5006 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5008 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
5009 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5012 /* Can this process send the message */
5013 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5016 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
5017 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5018 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
5023 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
5024 struct task_struct *target,
5025 long type, int mode)
5027 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5028 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5029 struct common_audit_data ad;
5030 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
5031 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
5034 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5035 msec = msg->security;
5037 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
5038 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
5039 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5041 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
5042 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
5044 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
5045 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
5049 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5050 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5052 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5053 struct common_audit_data ad;
5054 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
5055 u32 sid = current_sid();
5058 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5062 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5064 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
5065 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
5066 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5068 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5071 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5077 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5079 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5082 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5084 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5085 struct common_audit_data ad;
5086 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
5087 u32 sid = current_sid();
5089 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5091 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
5092 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
5093 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5095 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5096 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5099 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5100 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5108 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5109 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5112 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5115 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5122 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5128 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5132 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5133 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5137 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5140 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5142 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5145 /* Semaphore security operations */
5146 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5148 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5149 struct common_audit_data ad;
5150 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
5151 u32 sid = current_sid();
5154 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5158 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5160 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
5161 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
5162 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5164 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5167 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5173 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5175 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5178 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5180 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5181 struct common_audit_data ad;
5182 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
5183 u32 sid = current_sid();
5185 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5187 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
5188 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
5189 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5191 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5192 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5195 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5196 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5204 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5205 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5209 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5220 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5223 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5227 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5233 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5237 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5238 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5243 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5247 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5250 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5256 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5258 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5263 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5266 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5268 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5272 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5275 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5278 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5279 char *name, char **value)
5281 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5287 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5293 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5295 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5297 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5299 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5300 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5301 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5302 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5303 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5304 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5305 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5306 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5314 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5324 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5325 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5327 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5328 struct task_struct *tracer;
5335 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5336 security attributes. */
5341 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5342 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5343 * above restriction is ever removed.
5345 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5346 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5347 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5348 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5349 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5350 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5351 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5352 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5353 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5354 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5360 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5361 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5362 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5366 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5367 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5368 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
5369 struct audit_buffer *ab;
5372 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
5373 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
5374 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
5375 audit_size = size - 1;
5378 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
5379 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
5380 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
5385 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5392 new = prepare_creds();
5396 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5397 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5398 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5399 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5400 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5401 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5402 tsec = new->security;
5403 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5404 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5405 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5406 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5407 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5408 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5411 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5412 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5413 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5414 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5419 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5421 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5422 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5427 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5428 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5429 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5433 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5434 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5437 tracer = ptrace_parent(p);
5439 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5443 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5444 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5463 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5465 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5468 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5470 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5473 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5479 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5481 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5483 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5487 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5489 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5491 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5494 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
5497 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
5506 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5507 unsigned long flags)
5509 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5510 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5512 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5516 tsec = cred->security;
5517 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5518 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5520 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5526 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5528 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5534 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5535 const struct cred *cred,
5539 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5542 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5543 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5544 appear to be created. */
5548 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5550 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5551 ksec = key->security;
5553 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5556 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5558 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5559 char *context = NULL;
5563 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5572 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5575 .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
5576 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5577 .capget = selinux_capget,
5578 .capset = selinux_capset,
5579 .capable = selinux_capable,
5580 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5581 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5582 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5583 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5585 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5587 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5588 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5589 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5590 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5592 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5593 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5594 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5595 .sb_remount = selinux_sb_remount,
5596 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5597 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5598 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5599 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5600 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5601 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5602 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5603 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5606 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5607 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5608 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5609 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5610 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5611 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5612 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5613 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5614 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5615 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5616 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5617 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5618 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5619 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5620 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5621 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5622 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5623 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5624 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5625 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5626 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5627 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5628 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5629 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5630 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5632 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5633 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5634 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5635 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5636 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5637 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5638 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5639 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5640 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5641 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5642 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5644 .file_open = selinux_file_open,
5646 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5647 .cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
5648 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5649 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5650 .cred_transfer = selinux_cred_transfer,
5651 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5652 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5653 .kernel_module_request = selinux_kernel_module_request,
5654 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5655 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5656 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5657 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5658 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5659 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5660 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5661 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5662 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5663 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5664 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5665 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5666 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5667 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5669 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5670 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5672 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5673 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5675 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5676 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5677 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5678 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5679 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5680 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5682 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5683 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5684 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5685 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5686 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5688 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5689 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5690 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5691 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5692 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5694 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5696 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5697 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5699 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5700 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5701 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5702 .inode_notifysecctx = selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
5703 .inode_setsecctx = selinux_inode_setsecctx,
5704 .inode_getsecctx = selinux_inode_getsecctx,
5706 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5707 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5709 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5710 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5711 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5712 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5713 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5714 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5715 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5716 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5717 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5718 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5719 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5720 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5721 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5722 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5723 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5724 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5725 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5726 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5727 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5728 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5729 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5730 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5731 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5732 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5733 .secmark_relabel_packet = selinux_secmark_relabel_packet,
5734 .secmark_refcount_inc = selinux_secmark_refcount_inc,
5735 .secmark_refcount_dec = selinux_secmark_refcount_dec,
5736 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5737 .tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create,
5738 .tun_dev_post_create = selinux_tun_dev_post_create,
5739 .tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach,
5741 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5742 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5743 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5744 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5745 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5746 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5747 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5748 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5749 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5750 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5751 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5755 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5756 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5757 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5758 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5762 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5763 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5764 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5765 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5769 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5771 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5772 selinux_enabled = 0;
5776 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5777 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5781 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5783 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5784 cred_init_security();
5786 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
5788 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5789 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5790 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5793 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5794 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5796 if (selinux_enforcing)
5797 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5799 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5804 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
5806 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5809 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5811 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5813 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5814 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5815 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
5818 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5819 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5820 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5822 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5824 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5826 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5827 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5829 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5830 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5833 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5834 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5836 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5837 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5840 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5841 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5843 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5844 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5848 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5850 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5852 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5853 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5855 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5856 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5859 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5860 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5862 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5863 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5869 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5873 if (!selinux_enabled)
5876 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5878 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5880 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5882 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5883 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5885 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5892 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5894 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5895 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5897 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5899 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5900 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5901 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5906 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5908 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5909 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5912 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5914 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5915 static int selinux_disabled;
5917 int selinux_disable(void)
5919 if (ss_initialized) {
5920 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5924 if (selinux_disabled) {
5925 /* Only do this once. */
5929 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5931 selinux_disabled = 1;
5932 selinux_enabled = 0;
5934 reset_security_ops();
5936 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
5939 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5940 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5942 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */