2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
28 #include <linux/kernel.h>
29 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
30 #include <linux/errno.h>
31 #include <linux/sched.h>
32 #include <linux/security.h>
33 #include <linux/xattr.h>
34 #include <linux/capability.h>
35 #include <linux/unistd.h>
37 #include <linux/mman.h>
38 #include <linux/slab.h>
39 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
40 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
41 #include <linux/swap.h>
42 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
43 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
44 #include <linux/dcache.h>
45 #include <linux/file.h>
46 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
47 #include <linux/namei.h>
48 #include <linux/mount.h>
49 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
51 #include <linux/tty.h>
53 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
54 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
55 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
56 #include <net/netlabel.h>
57 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
58 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
59 #include <linux/atomic.h>
60 #include <linux/bitops.h>
61 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
62 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
63 #include <linux/netlink.h>
64 #include <linux/tcp.h>
65 #include <linux/udp.h>
66 #include <linux/dccp.h>
67 #include <linux/quota.h>
68 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
69 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
70 #include <linux/parser.h>
71 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
73 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
74 #include <linux/personality.h>
75 #include <linux/audit.h>
76 #include <linux/string.h>
77 #include <linux/selinux.h>
78 #include <linux/mutex.h>
79 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
80 #include <linux/syslog.h>
81 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
82 #include <linux/export.h>
83 #include <linux/msg.h>
84 #include <linux/shm.h>
96 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
98 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
100 /* SECMARK reference count */
101 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
103 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
104 int selinux_enforcing;
106 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
108 unsigned long enforcing;
109 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
110 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
113 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
116 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
117 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
119 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
121 unsigned long enabled;
122 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
123 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
126 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
128 int selinux_enabled = 1;
131 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
134 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
137 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
138 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
139 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
140 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
143 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
145 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
149 * initialise the security for the init task
151 static void cred_init_security(void)
153 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
154 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
156 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
158 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
160 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
161 cred->security = tsec;
165 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
167 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
169 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
171 tsec = cred->security;
176 * get the objective security ID of a task
178 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
183 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
189 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
191 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
193 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
198 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
200 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
202 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
203 u32 sid = current_sid();
205 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
209 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
210 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
212 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
213 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
214 isec->task_sid = sid;
215 inode->i_security = isec;
220 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
222 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
223 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
225 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
226 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
227 list_del_init(&isec->list);
228 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
230 inode->i_security = NULL;
231 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
234 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
236 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
237 u32 sid = current_sid();
239 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
244 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
245 file->f_security = fsec;
250 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
252 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
253 file->f_security = NULL;
257 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
259 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
261 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
265 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
266 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
267 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
269 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
270 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
271 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
272 sb->s_security = sbsec;
277 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
279 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
280 sb->s_security = NULL;
284 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
286 static const char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
288 "uses transition SIDs",
290 "uses genfs_contexts",
291 "not configured for labeling",
292 "uses mountpoint labeling",
295 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
297 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
299 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
308 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
311 static const match_table_t tokens = {
312 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
313 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
314 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
315 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
316 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
320 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
322 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
323 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
324 const struct cred *cred)
326 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
329 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
330 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
334 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
335 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
339 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
340 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
341 const struct cred *cred)
343 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
345 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
346 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
350 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
351 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
355 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
357 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
358 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
359 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
362 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
363 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
364 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
365 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
366 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
367 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
368 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
369 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
370 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
374 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
375 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
376 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
377 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
378 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
379 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
381 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
382 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
383 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
388 sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
390 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
391 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
392 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
394 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
395 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
396 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
398 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
399 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
400 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
401 sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
402 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
404 /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
405 if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
406 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBLABELSUPP;
408 /* Initialize the root inode. */
409 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
411 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
412 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
413 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
415 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
417 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
418 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
419 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
420 struct inode_security_struct, list);
421 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
422 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
423 inode = igrab(inode);
425 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
429 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
430 list_del_init(&isec->list);
433 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
439 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
440 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
441 * mount options, or whatever.
443 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
444 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
447 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
448 char *context = NULL;
452 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
454 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
460 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
461 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
462 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
464 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
467 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
468 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
469 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
471 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
472 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
477 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
478 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
484 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
485 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
488 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
489 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
491 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
492 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
495 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
496 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
498 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
499 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
502 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
503 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
505 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
506 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
507 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
509 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
512 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
513 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
515 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
516 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
517 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
520 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
525 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
529 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
530 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
532 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
534 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
535 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
536 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
537 (old_sid != new_sid))
540 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
541 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
543 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
544 if (mnt_flags & flag)
550 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
551 * labeling information.
553 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
554 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
556 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
558 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
559 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
560 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
561 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
562 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
563 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
564 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
565 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
566 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
568 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
570 if (!ss_initialized) {
572 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
573 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
574 server is ready to handle calls. */
578 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
579 "before the security server is initialized\n");
584 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
585 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
586 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
587 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
589 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
590 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
591 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
592 * will be used for both mounts)
594 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
599 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
600 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
601 * than once with different security options.
603 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
606 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
608 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
609 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
611 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
612 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
613 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
620 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
622 goto out_double_mount;
624 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
629 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
631 goto out_double_mount;
633 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
635 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
636 rootcontext_sid = sid;
638 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
640 goto out_double_mount;
642 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
646 defcontext_sid = sid;
648 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
650 goto out_double_mount;
652 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
661 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
662 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
663 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
664 goto out_double_mount;
669 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
670 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
672 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
673 rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
675 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
676 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
680 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
682 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
686 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
690 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
691 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
692 * the superblock context if not already set.
695 if (!fscontext_sid) {
696 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
700 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
702 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
707 if (!rootcontext_sid)
708 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
710 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
711 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
714 if (rootcontext_sid) {
715 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
720 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
721 root_isec->initialized = 1;
724 if (defcontext_sid) {
725 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
727 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
728 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
732 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
733 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
739 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
742 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
744 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
748 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
749 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
753 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
754 struct super_block *newsb)
756 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
757 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
759 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
760 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
761 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
764 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
765 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
770 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
771 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
773 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
774 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
777 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
779 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
781 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
782 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
783 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
786 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
790 if (!set_rootcontext) {
791 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
792 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
795 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
797 if (set_rootcontext) {
798 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
799 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
800 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
801 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
803 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
806 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
807 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
810 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
811 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
814 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
815 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
816 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
818 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
820 /* Standard string-based options. */
821 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
823 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
828 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
832 if (context || defcontext) {
834 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
837 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
847 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
850 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
857 case Opt_rootcontext:
860 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
863 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
871 if (context || defcontext) {
873 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
876 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
882 case Opt_labelsupport:
886 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
893 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
897 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
898 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
899 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
904 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
905 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
908 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
909 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
912 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
913 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
916 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
917 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
920 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
931 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
933 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
936 char *options = data;
937 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
939 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
944 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
946 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
951 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
954 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
958 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
959 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
964 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
967 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
968 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
972 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
974 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
977 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
979 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
980 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
983 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
987 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
993 /* we need a comma before each option */
998 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1004 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1006 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1009 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1011 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1017 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1019 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1024 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1026 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1028 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1030 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1032 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1034 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1036 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1038 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1040 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1044 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1047 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1049 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1052 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1054 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1057 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1063 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1064 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1066 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1073 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1074 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1076 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1078 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1079 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1081 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1083 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1085 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1091 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1092 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1093 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1094 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1095 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1097 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1099 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1100 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1101 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1103 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1104 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1105 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1106 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1107 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1108 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1109 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1111 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1114 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1116 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1118 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1121 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1124 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1125 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1130 char *buffer, *path;
1132 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1136 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1140 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1141 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1142 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1143 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1147 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1149 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1153 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1161 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1162 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1164 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1165 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1167 struct dentry *dentry;
1168 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1169 char *context = NULL;
1173 if (isec->initialized)
1176 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1177 if (isec->initialized)
1180 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1181 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1182 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1183 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1184 server is ready to handle calls. */
1185 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1186 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1187 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1188 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1192 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1193 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1194 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1195 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1199 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1200 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1202 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1203 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1205 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1206 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1210 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1211 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1212 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1213 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1214 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1215 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1216 * be used again by userspace.
1221 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1222 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1228 context[len] = '\0';
1229 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1231 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1234 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1235 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1242 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1248 context[len] = '\0';
1249 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1255 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1256 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1257 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1258 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1262 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1263 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1266 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1270 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1271 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1273 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1274 if (printk_ratelimit())
1275 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1276 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1277 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1279 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1280 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1281 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1284 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1292 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1293 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1295 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1296 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1297 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1299 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1300 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1301 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid,
1302 isec->sclass, NULL, &sid);
1307 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1308 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1311 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1312 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1314 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1316 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1317 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
1328 isec->initialized = 1;
1331 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1333 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1334 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1338 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1339 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1345 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1346 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1349 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1350 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1353 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1354 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1357 /* All other signals. */
1358 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1366 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1367 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1369 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1370 const struct cred *target,
1373 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1375 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1379 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1380 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1381 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1382 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1384 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1385 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1388 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1392 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1393 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1395 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1399 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1400 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1401 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1402 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1404 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1409 sid = current_sid();
1410 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1411 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1414 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1415 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1418 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1419 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1422 struct common_audit_data ad;
1423 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
1424 struct av_decision avd;
1426 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1427 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1430 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1431 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
1435 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1437 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1440 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1444 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1449 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1450 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
1451 int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
1458 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1459 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1462 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1464 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1465 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1468 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1469 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1470 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1471 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1472 struct inode *inode,
1474 struct common_audit_data *adp,
1477 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1480 validate_creds(cred);
1482 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1485 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1486 isec = inode->i_security;
1488 return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp, flags);
1491 static int inode_has_perm_noadp(const struct cred *cred,
1492 struct inode *inode,
1496 struct common_audit_data ad;
1497 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
1499 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
1501 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
1502 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags);
1505 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1506 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1507 pathname if needed. */
1508 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1509 struct dentry *dentry,
1512 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1513 struct common_audit_data ad;
1514 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
1516 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
1517 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1518 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
1519 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1522 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1523 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1524 pathname if needed. */
1525 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1529 struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
1530 struct common_audit_data ad;
1531 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
1533 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
1535 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
1536 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1539 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1540 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1541 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1542 check a particular permission to the file.
1543 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1544 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1545 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1546 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1547 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1551 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1552 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1553 struct common_audit_data ad;
1554 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
1555 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1558 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
1559 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1560 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
1562 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1563 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1571 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1574 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1580 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1581 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1582 struct dentry *dentry,
1585 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1586 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1587 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1589 struct common_audit_data ad;
1590 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
1593 dsec = dir->i_security;
1594 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1597 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1599 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
1600 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1601 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
1603 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1604 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1609 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1610 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1611 &dentry->d_name, &newsid);
1616 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1620 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1621 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1622 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1625 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1626 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1627 struct task_struct *ctx)
1629 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1631 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1635 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1638 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1639 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1640 struct dentry *dentry,
1644 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1645 struct common_audit_data ad;
1646 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
1647 u32 sid = current_sid();
1651 dsec = dir->i_security;
1652 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1654 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
1655 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1656 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
1659 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1660 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1675 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1680 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1684 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1685 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1686 struct inode *new_dir,
1687 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1689 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1690 struct common_audit_data ad;
1691 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
1692 u32 sid = current_sid();
1694 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1697 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1698 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1699 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1700 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1702 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
1703 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
1705 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1706 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1707 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1710 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1711 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1714 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1715 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1716 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1721 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1722 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1723 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1724 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1725 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1728 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1729 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1730 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1731 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1733 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1741 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1742 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1743 struct super_block *sb,
1745 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1747 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1748 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1750 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1751 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1754 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1755 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1759 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1760 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1761 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1762 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1765 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1767 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1771 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1773 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1775 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1782 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1783 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1787 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1789 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1790 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1797 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1806 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1809 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1811 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1813 if (selinux_policycap_openperm)
1819 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1821 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
1826 rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
1830 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1831 u32 sid = current_sid();
1832 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1833 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1836 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1839 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1843 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
1847 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1850 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1851 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1855 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1859 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1862 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1863 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1864 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1865 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1869 error = cap_capset(new, old,
1870 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1874 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1878 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1879 * which was removed).
1881 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1882 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1883 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1884 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1887 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
1892 rc = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
1896 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit);
1899 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1901 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1913 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1918 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1921 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1927 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1929 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1931 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1934 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1939 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
1940 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1941 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1943 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
1944 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
1945 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1946 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
1947 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1949 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */
1950 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */
1951 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */
1952 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1953 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */
1955 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1962 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1963 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1964 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1966 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1967 * processes that allocate mappings.
1969 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1971 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1973 rc = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
1974 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
1978 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1981 /* binprm security operations */
1983 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1985 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
1986 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
1987 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1988 struct common_audit_data ad;
1989 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
1990 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1993 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
1997 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
1998 * the script interpreter */
1999 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2002 old_tsec = current_security();
2003 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2004 isec = inode->i_security;
2006 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2007 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2008 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2010 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2011 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2012 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2013 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2015 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2016 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2017 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2018 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2020 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2021 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2022 SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2028 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
2029 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
2030 ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2032 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2033 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2035 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2036 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2037 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2041 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2042 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2043 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2047 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2048 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2052 /* Check for shared state */
2053 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2054 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2055 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2061 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2062 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2064 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2065 struct task_struct *tracer;
2066 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2070 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2071 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2072 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2078 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2080 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2086 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2087 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2093 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2095 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2103 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2104 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2105 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2106 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2108 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2111 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2114 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2115 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2116 struct files_struct *files)
2118 struct common_audit_data ad;
2119 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
2120 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2121 struct tty_struct *tty;
2122 struct fdtable *fdt;
2126 tty = get_current_tty();
2128 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
2129 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2130 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2131 struct inode *inode;
2133 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2134 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2135 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2136 file may belong to another process and we are only
2137 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2138 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2139 struct tty_file_private, list);
2140 file = file_priv->file;
2141 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2142 if (inode_has_perm_noadp(cred, inode,
2143 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, 0)) {
2147 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
2150 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2154 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2156 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
2157 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
2159 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2161 unsigned long set, i;
2166 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2167 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2169 set = fdt->open_fds[j];
2172 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2173 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2178 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2180 file_to_av(file))) {
2182 fd = get_unused_fd();
2192 devnull = dentry_open(
2194 mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2196 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2203 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2208 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2211 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2215 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2217 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2219 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2220 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2223 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2224 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2227 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2228 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2230 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2231 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2233 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2234 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2235 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2237 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2238 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2239 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2240 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2241 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2243 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2244 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2246 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2248 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2249 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2250 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2251 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2253 task_unlock(current);
2254 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2259 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2262 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2264 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2265 struct itimerval itimer;
2275 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2276 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2277 * flush and unblock signals.
2279 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2280 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2282 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2284 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2285 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2286 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2287 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2288 if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
2289 __flush_signals(current);
2290 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2291 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2293 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2296 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2297 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2298 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2299 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2300 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2303 /* superblock security operations */
2305 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2307 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2310 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2312 superblock_free_security(sb);
2315 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2320 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2323 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2325 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2326 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2327 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2328 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2329 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2332 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2339 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2343 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2346 int current_size = 0;
2354 while (current_size < len) {
2364 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2366 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2367 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2368 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2374 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2382 in_save = in_end = orig;
2386 open_quote = !open_quote;
2387 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2389 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2391 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2392 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2394 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2396 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2398 } while (*in_end++);
2400 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2401 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2406 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2409 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
2410 char *secdata, **mount_options;
2411 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2413 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2419 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
2422 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
2423 secdata = alloc_secdata();
2426 rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
2428 goto out_free_secdata;
2430 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
2432 goto out_free_secdata;
2434 mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
2435 flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
2437 for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
2441 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
2443 len = strlen(mount_options[i]);
2444 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid);
2446 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
2447 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2448 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
2454 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2455 goto out_bad_option;
2458 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2459 goto out_bad_option;
2461 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
2462 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2463 root_isec = sb->s_root->d_inode->i_security;
2465 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2466 goto out_bad_option;
2469 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
2470 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2471 goto out_bad_option;
2480 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
2482 free_secdata(secdata);
2485 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
2486 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2491 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2493 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2494 struct common_audit_data ad;
2495 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
2498 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2502 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2503 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2506 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
2507 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
2508 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2509 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2512 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2514 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2515 struct common_audit_data ad;
2516 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
2518 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
2519 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
2520 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2521 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2524 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2527 unsigned long flags,
2530 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2532 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2533 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2534 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2536 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2539 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2541 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2543 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2544 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2547 /* inode security operations */
2549 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2551 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2554 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2556 inode_free_security(inode);
2559 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2560 const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
2561 void **value, size_t *len)
2563 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2564 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2565 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2566 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2568 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2570 dsec = dir->i_security;
2571 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2574 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2576 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
2577 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT))
2578 newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
2579 else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2580 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2581 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2584 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2585 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2588 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2593 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2594 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2595 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2596 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2598 isec->initialized = 1;
2601 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2605 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2612 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2624 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
2626 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2629 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2631 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2634 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2636 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2639 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2641 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2644 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
2646 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2649 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2651 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2654 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
2656 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2659 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2660 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2662 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2665 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2667 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2669 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2672 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2674 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2676 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2679 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2681 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2682 struct common_audit_data ad;
2683 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
2686 unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
2688 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
2689 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
2691 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2695 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
2696 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
2700 ad.selinux_audit_data->auditdeny |= FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS;
2702 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
2704 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags);
2707 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2709 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2710 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
2712 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2713 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
2714 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
2720 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2721 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
2722 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2724 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2727 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2729 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2732 path.dentry = dentry;
2735 return path_has_perm(cred, &path, FILE__GETATTR);
2738 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2740 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2742 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2743 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2744 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2745 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2747 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2748 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2749 Restrict to administrator. */
2754 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2755 ordinary setattr permission. */
2756 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2759 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2760 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2762 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2763 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2764 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2765 struct common_audit_data ad;
2766 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
2767 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2770 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2771 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2773 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2774 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2777 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
2780 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
2781 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
2782 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
2784 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2785 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2789 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2790 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2791 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2793 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2798 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2799 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2803 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2808 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2810 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2811 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2815 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2816 const void *value, size_t size,
2819 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2820 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2824 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2825 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2829 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2831 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2832 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2833 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2841 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2843 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2845 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2848 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2850 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2852 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2855 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2857 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2858 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2860 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2861 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2866 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2868 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2870 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2874 char *context = NULL;
2875 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2877 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2881 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2882 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2883 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2884 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2885 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2886 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2887 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2889 error = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2890 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2892 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2895 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2908 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2909 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2911 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2915 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2918 if (!value || !size)
2921 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2926 isec->initialized = 1;
2930 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2932 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2933 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2934 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2938 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2940 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2944 /* file security operations */
2946 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2948 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2949 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2951 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2952 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2955 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
2956 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2959 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2961 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2962 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2963 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2964 u32 sid = current_sid();
2967 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2970 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
2971 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2972 /* No change since dentry_open check. */
2975 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2978 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2980 return file_alloc_security(file);
2983 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2985 file_free_security(file);
2988 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2991 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3001 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3003 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3004 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3007 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3009 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3010 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3013 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3017 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3022 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3023 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
3026 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3027 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3030 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL);
3035 static int default_noexec;
3037 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3039 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3042 if (default_noexec &&
3043 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3045 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3046 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3047 * This has an additional check.
3049 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3055 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3056 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3058 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3059 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3062 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3063 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3065 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3072 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3073 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
3074 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3077 u32 sid = current_sid();
3080 * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
3081 * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt
3082 * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
3083 * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
3085 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3086 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3087 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3092 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3093 rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
3094 if (rc || addr_only)
3097 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3100 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3101 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3104 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3105 unsigned long reqprot,
3108 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3110 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3113 if (default_noexec &&
3114 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3116 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3117 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3118 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3119 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3120 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3121 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3122 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3123 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3125 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3126 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3127 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3128 * modified content. This typically should only
3129 * occur for text relocations.
3131 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3137 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3140 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3142 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3144 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3147 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3150 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3155 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3160 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3161 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3170 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3171 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3176 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3181 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3185 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3192 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3194 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3196 fsec = file->f_security;
3197 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3202 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3203 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3206 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3208 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3210 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3211 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3213 fsec = file->f_security;
3216 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3218 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3220 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3221 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3224 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3226 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3228 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3231 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3233 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3234 struct inode *inode;
3235 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3237 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3238 fsec = file->f_security;
3239 isec = inode->i_security;
3241 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3242 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3243 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3244 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3245 * struct as its SID.
3247 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3248 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3250 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3251 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3252 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3253 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3254 * new inode label or new policy.
3255 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3257 return inode_has_perm_noadp(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), 0);
3260 /* task security operations */
3262 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3264 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3268 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3270 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3272 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3274 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3278 cred->security = tsec;
3283 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3285 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3287 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3290 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3291 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3293 BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3294 cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3299 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3301 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3304 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3305 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3307 old_tsec = old->security;
3309 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3313 new->security = tsec;
3318 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3320 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3322 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3323 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3329 * set the security data for a kernel service
3330 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3332 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3334 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3335 u32 sid = current_sid();
3338 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3339 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3340 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3344 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3345 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3346 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3352 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3353 * objective context of the specified inode
3355 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3357 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3358 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3359 u32 sid = current_sid();
3362 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3363 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3364 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3368 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3372 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3375 struct common_audit_data ad;
3376 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
3378 sid = task_sid(current);
3380 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, KMOD);
3381 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
3382 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3384 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3385 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3388 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3390 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3393 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3395 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3398 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3400 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3403 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3405 *secid = task_sid(p);
3408 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3412 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3416 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3419 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3423 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3427 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3430 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3432 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3435 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
3436 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3438 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
3440 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3441 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3442 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3443 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3444 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3445 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3450 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3454 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
3458 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3461 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3463 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3466 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3468 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3471 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3478 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3480 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3482 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3483 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3485 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3489 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3491 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3494 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3495 struct inode *inode)
3497 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3498 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3501 isec->initialized = 1;
3504 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3505 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3506 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3508 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3509 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3511 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3512 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3516 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3517 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3520 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3521 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3525 *proto = ih->protocol;
3527 switch (ih->protocol) {
3529 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3531 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3535 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3539 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3540 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3545 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3547 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3551 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3555 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3556 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3560 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3561 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3563 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3567 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3571 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3572 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3583 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3585 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3586 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3587 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3590 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3591 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3594 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3595 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3599 ad->u.net.v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
3600 ad->u.net.v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
3603 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3604 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3605 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
3614 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3616 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3620 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3621 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3626 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3628 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3632 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3633 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3637 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3638 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3640 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3644 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3645 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3649 /* includes fragments */
3659 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
3660 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3665 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3667 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3670 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3671 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3674 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3676 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3679 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3680 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3690 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3691 " unable to parse packet\n");
3701 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3703 * @family: protocol family
3704 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3707 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3708 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3709 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3710 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3711 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3715 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3722 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3723 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3725 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3726 if (unlikely(err)) {
3728 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3729 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3736 /* socket security operations */
3738 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
3739 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
3741 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
3742 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3746 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL,
3750 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
3752 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3753 struct common_audit_data ad;
3754 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
3755 u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
3757 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3760 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3761 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
3764 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3767 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3768 int protocol, int kern)
3770 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3778 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3779 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
3783 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3786 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3787 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3789 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3790 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3791 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3794 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3797 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3799 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid));
3804 isec->initialized = 1;
3807 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3808 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3809 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3810 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
3816 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3817 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3818 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3820 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3822 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3826 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND);
3831 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3832 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3833 * check the first address now.
3835 family = sk->sk_family;
3836 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3838 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3839 struct common_audit_data ad;
3840 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
3841 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3842 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3843 unsigned short snum;
3846 if (family == PF_INET) {
3847 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3848 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3849 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3851 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3852 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3853 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3859 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3861 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3862 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3866 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3867 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
3868 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3869 ad.u.net.family = family;
3870 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3872 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3878 switch (sksec->sclass) {
3879 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3880 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3883 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3884 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3887 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3888 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3892 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3896 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3900 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3901 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
3902 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3903 ad.u.net.family = family;
3905 if (family == PF_INET)
3906 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3908 ad.u.net.v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
3910 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3911 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3919 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3921 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3922 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3925 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3930 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3932 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3933 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3934 struct common_audit_data ad;
3935 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
3936 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3937 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3938 unsigned short snum;
3941 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3942 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3943 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3945 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3947 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3948 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3950 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3953 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3957 perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3958 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3960 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3961 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
3962 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3963 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3964 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3969 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3975 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3977 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3980 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3983 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3984 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3986 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3990 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3992 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3993 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3994 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3995 newisec->initialized = 1;
4000 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4003 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4006 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4007 int size, int flags)
4009 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4012 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4014 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4017 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4019 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4022 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4026 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4030 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4033 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4036 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4039 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4041 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4044 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4048 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4049 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4050 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4051 struct common_audit_data ad;
4052 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
4055 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4056 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
4057 ad.u.net.sk = other;
4059 err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4060 sksec_other->sclass,
4061 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4065 /* server child socket */
4066 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4067 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
4072 /* connecting socket */
4073 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4078 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4079 struct socket *other)
4081 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4082 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4083 struct common_audit_data ad;
4084 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
4086 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4087 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
4088 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4090 return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4094 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4096 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4102 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4105 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4106 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4110 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4113 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4114 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4117 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4121 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4122 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4123 struct common_audit_data ad;
4124 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
4127 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4128 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
4129 ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif;
4130 ad.u.net.family = family;
4131 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4135 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4136 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4142 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4145 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4150 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4153 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4154 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4155 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4156 struct common_audit_data ad;
4157 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
4162 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4165 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4166 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4169 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4170 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4171 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4172 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4173 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4174 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4176 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4177 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4178 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4181 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4182 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
4183 ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif;
4184 ad.u.net.family = family;
4185 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4189 if (peerlbl_active) {
4192 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4195 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->skb_iif, addrp, family,
4198 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4201 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4204 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4207 if (secmark_active) {
4208 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4217 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4218 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4223 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4224 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4226 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4227 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
4228 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4229 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
4230 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
4232 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4236 if (scontext_len > len) {
4241 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4245 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4251 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4253 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4256 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4258 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4261 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4265 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4266 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4268 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4271 *secid = peer_secid;
4272 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4277 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4279 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4281 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
4285 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4286 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4287 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
4288 sk->sk_security = sksec;
4293 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4295 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4297 sk->sk_security = NULL;
4298 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
4302 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4304 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4305 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4307 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
4308 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4309 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
4311 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
4314 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4317 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4319 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4321 *secid = sksec->sid;
4325 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4327 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4328 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4330 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4331 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4332 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4333 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4336 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4337 struct request_sock *req)
4339 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4341 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4345 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4346 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4349 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4352 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4353 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4354 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4356 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4359 req->secid = newsid;
4360 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4363 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4366 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4367 const struct request_sock *req)
4369 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4371 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4372 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4373 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4374 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4375 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4376 time it will have been created and available. */
4378 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4379 * thread with access to newsksec */
4380 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4383 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4385 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4386 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4388 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4389 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4392 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4395 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
4397 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
4400 __tsec = current_security();
4403 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4406 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4408 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4411 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4413 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4416 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4419 fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
4422 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4424 u32 sid = current_sid();
4426 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4427 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4428 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4429 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4430 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4431 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4433 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
4437 static void selinux_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk)
4439 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4441 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4442 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4443 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4444 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4445 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4446 * protocols were being used */
4448 /* see the comments in selinux_tun_dev_create() about why we don't use
4449 * the sockcreate SID here */
4451 sksec->sid = current_sid();
4452 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
4455 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk)
4457 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4458 u32 sid = current_sid();
4461 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sksec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4462 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
4465 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4466 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4475 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4479 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4480 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4482 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4486 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4488 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4490 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4491 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4492 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4493 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4494 nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
4495 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4505 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
4510 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4512 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4518 struct common_audit_data ad;
4519 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
4524 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4527 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4528 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4529 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4530 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4533 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4536 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4537 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
4538 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4539 ad.u.net.family = family;
4540 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4543 if (peerlbl_active) {
4544 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4547 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4553 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4554 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4558 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4559 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4560 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4562 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4568 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4569 struct sk_buff *skb,
4570 const struct net_device *in,
4571 const struct net_device *out,
4572 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4574 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4577 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4578 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4579 struct sk_buff *skb,
4580 const struct net_device *in,
4581 const struct net_device *out,
4582 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4584 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4588 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4593 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4596 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4597 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4598 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4600 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4603 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4604 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4610 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4611 struct sk_buff *skb,
4612 const struct net_device *in,
4613 const struct net_device *out,
4614 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4616 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4619 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4623 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4624 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4625 struct common_audit_data ad;
4626 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
4632 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4634 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4635 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
4636 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4637 ad.u.net.family = family;
4638 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4641 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4642 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4643 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4644 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4646 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4647 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4652 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4658 struct common_audit_data ad;
4659 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
4664 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4665 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4666 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4667 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4668 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4669 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4671 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4672 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4673 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4674 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4675 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4676 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4677 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL)
4680 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4681 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4682 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4685 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4686 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4687 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4688 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4692 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4693 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4696 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4697 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4700 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4701 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4702 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4705 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4706 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
4707 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4708 ad.u.net.family = family;
4709 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4713 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4714 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4715 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4717 if (peerlbl_active) {
4721 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4723 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4724 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4725 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4727 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4729 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4730 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4731 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4737 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4738 struct sk_buff *skb,
4739 const struct net_device *in,
4740 const struct net_device *out,
4741 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4743 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4746 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4747 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4748 struct sk_buff *skb,
4749 const struct net_device *in,
4750 const struct net_device *out,
4751 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4753 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4757 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4759 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4763 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
4767 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4770 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4771 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4774 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4777 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4781 sid = task_sid(task);
4782 isec->sclass = sclass;
4784 perm->security = isec;
4789 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4791 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4792 perm->security = NULL;
4796 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4798 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4800 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4804 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4805 msg->security = msec;
4810 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4812 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4814 msg->security = NULL;
4818 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4821 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4822 struct common_audit_data ad;
4823 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
4824 u32 sid = current_sid();
4826 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4828 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4829 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
4830 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4832 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4835 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4837 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4840 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4842 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4845 /* message queue security operations */
4846 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4848 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4849 struct common_audit_data ad;
4850 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
4851 u32 sid = current_sid();
4854 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4858 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4860 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4861 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
4862 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4864 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4867 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4873 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4875 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4878 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4880 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4881 struct common_audit_data ad;
4882 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
4883 u32 sid = current_sid();
4885 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4887 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4888 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
4889 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4891 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4892 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4895 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4903 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4904 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4907 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4910 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4913 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4919 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4923 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4925 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4926 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4927 struct common_audit_data ad;
4928 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
4929 u32 sid = current_sid();
4932 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4933 msec = msg->security;
4936 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4938 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4940 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4941 * message queue this message will be stored in
4943 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4949 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4950 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
4951 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4953 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4954 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4957 /* Can this process send the message */
4958 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4961 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4962 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4963 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4968 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4969 struct task_struct *target,
4970 long type, int mode)
4972 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4973 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4974 struct common_audit_data ad;
4975 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
4976 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
4979 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4980 msec = msg->security;
4982 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4983 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
4984 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4986 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
4987 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4989 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
4990 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4994 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4995 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4997 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4998 struct common_audit_data ad;
4999 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
5000 u32 sid = current_sid();
5003 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5007 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5009 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5010 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
5011 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5013 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5016 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5022 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5024 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5027 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5029 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5030 struct common_audit_data ad;
5031 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
5032 u32 sid = current_sid();
5034 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5036 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5037 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
5038 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5040 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5041 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5044 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5045 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5053 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5054 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5057 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5060 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5067 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5073 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5077 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5078 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5082 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5085 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5087 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5090 /* Semaphore security operations */
5091 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5093 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5094 struct common_audit_data ad;
5095 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
5096 u32 sid = current_sid();
5099 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5103 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5105 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5106 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
5107 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5109 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5112 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5118 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5120 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5123 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5125 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5126 struct common_audit_data ad;
5127 struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
5128 u32 sid = current_sid();
5130 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5132 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5133 ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
5134 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5136 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5137 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5140 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5141 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5149 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5150 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5154 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5165 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5168 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5172 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5178 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5182 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5183 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5188 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5192 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5195 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5201 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5203 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5208 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5211 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5213 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5217 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5220 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5223 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5224 char *name, char **value)
5226 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5232 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5238 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5240 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5242 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5244 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5245 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5246 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5247 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5248 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5249 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5250 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5251 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5259 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5269 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5270 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5272 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5273 struct task_struct *tracer;
5280 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5281 security attributes. */
5286 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5287 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5288 * above restriction is ever removed.
5290 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5291 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5292 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5293 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5294 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5295 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5296 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5297 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5298 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5299 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5305 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5306 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5307 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5311 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5312 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5313 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5315 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5322 new = prepare_creds();
5326 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5327 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5328 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5329 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5330 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5331 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5332 tsec = new->security;
5333 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5334 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5335 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5336 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5337 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5338 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5341 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5342 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5343 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5344 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5349 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5351 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5352 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5357 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5358 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5359 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5363 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5364 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5367 tracer = ptrace_parent(p);
5369 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5373 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5374 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5393 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5395 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5398 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5400 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5403 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5409 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5411 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5413 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5417 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5419 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5421 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5424 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
5427 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
5436 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5437 unsigned long flags)
5439 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5440 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5442 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5446 tsec = cred->security;
5447 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5448 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5450 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5456 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5458 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5464 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5465 const struct cred *cred,
5469 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5472 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5473 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5474 appear to be created. */
5478 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5480 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5481 ksec = key->security;
5483 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5486 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5488 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5489 char *context = NULL;
5493 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5502 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5505 .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
5506 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5507 .capget = selinux_capget,
5508 .capset = selinux_capset,
5509 .capable = selinux_capable,
5510 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5511 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5512 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5513 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5515 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5517 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5518 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5519 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5520 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5522 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5523 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5524 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5525 .sb_remount = selinux_sb_remount,
5526 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5527 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5528 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5529 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5530 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5531 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5532 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5533 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5536 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5537 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5538 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5539 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5540 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5541 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5542 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5543 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5544 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5545 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5546 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5547 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5548 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5549 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5550 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5551 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5552 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5553 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5554 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5555 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5556 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5557 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5558 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5559 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5560 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5562 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5563 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5564 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5565 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5566 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5567 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5568 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5569 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5570 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5571 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5572 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5574 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5576 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5577 .cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
5578 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5579 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5580 .cred_transfer = selinux_cred_transfer,
5581 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5582 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5583 .kernel_module_request = selinux_kernel_module_request,
5584 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5585 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5586 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5587 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5588 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5589 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5590 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5591 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5592 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5593 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5594 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5595 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5596 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5597 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5599 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5600 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5602 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5603 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5605 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5606 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5607 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5608 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5609 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5610 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5612 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5613 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5614 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5615 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5616 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5618 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5619 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5620 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5621 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5622 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5624 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5626 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5627 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5629 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5630 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5631 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5632 .inode_notifysecctx = selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
5633 .inode_setsecctx = selinux_inode_setsecctx,
5634 .inode_getsecctx = selinux_inode_getsecctx,
5636 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5637 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5639 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5640 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5641 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5642 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5643 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5644 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5645 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5646 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5647 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5648 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5649 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5650 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5651 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5652 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5653 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5654 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5655 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5656 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5657 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5658 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5659 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5660 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5661 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5662 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5663 .secmark_relabel_packet = selinux_secmark_relabel_packet,
5664 .secmark_refcount_inc = selinux_secmark_refcount_inc,
5665 .secmark_refcount_dec = selinux_secmark_refcount_dec,
5666 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5667 .tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create,
5668 .tun_dev_post_create = selinux_tun_dev_post_create,
5669 .tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach,
5671 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5672 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5673 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5674 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5675 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5676 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5677 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5678 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5679 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5680 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5681 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5685 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5686 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5687 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5688 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5692 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5693 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5694 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5695 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5699 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5701 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5702 selinux_enabled = 0;
5706 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5707 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5711 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5713 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5714 cred_init_security();
5716 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
5718 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5719 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5720 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5723 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5724 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5726 if (selinux_enforcing)
5727 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5729 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5734 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
5736 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5739 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5741 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5743 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5744 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5745 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
5748 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5749 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5750 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5752 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5754 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5756 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5757 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5759 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5760 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5763 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5764 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5766 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5767 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5770 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5771 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5773 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5774 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5778 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5780 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5782 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5783 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5785 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5786 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5789 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5790 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5792 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5793 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5799 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5803 if (!selinux_enabled)
5806 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5808 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5810 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5812 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5813 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5815 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5822 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5824 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5825 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5827 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5829 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5830 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5831 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5836 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5838 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5839 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5842 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5844 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5845 static int selinux_disabled;
5847 int selinux_disable(void)
5849 if (ss_initialized) {
5850 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5854 if (selinux_disabled) {
5855 /* Only do this once. */
5859 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5861 selinux_disabled = 1;
5862 selinux_enabled = 0;
5864 reset_security_ops();
5866 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
5869 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5870 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5872 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */