2 * imap.c -- IMAP2bis/IMAP4 protocol methods
4 * Copyright 1997 by Eric S. Raymond
5 * For license terms, see the file COPYING in this directory.
12 #if defined(STDC_HEADERS)
15 #include "fetchmail.h"
20 #include <kerberosIV/des.h>
21 #include <kerberosIV/krb.h>
23 #if defined (__bsdi__)
25 #define krb_get_err_text(e) (krb_err_txt[e])
27 #if defined(__NetBSD__) || (__FreeBSD__) || defined(__linux__)
28 #define krb_get_err_text(e) (krb_err_txt[e])
32 #endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
39 #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H
40 #include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
42 #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
43 #include <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h>
45 #ifndef HAVE_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE
46 #define GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE gss_nt_service_name
56 #ifndef strstr /* glibc-2.1 declares this as a macro */
57 extern char *strstr(); /* needed on sysV68 R3V7.1. */
60 /* imap_version values */
61 #define IMAP2 -1 /* IMAP2 or IMAP2BIS, RFC1176 */
62 #define IMAP4 0 /* IMAP4 rev 0, RFC1730 */
63 #define IMAP4rev1 1 /* IMAP4 rev 1, RFC2060 */
65 static int count, seen, recent, unseen, deletions, imap_version, preauth;
66 static int expunged, expunge_period;
67 static char capabilities[MSGBUFSIZE+1];
69 int imap_ok(int sock, char *argbuf)
70 /* parse command response */
72 char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1];
79 if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
82 /* all tokens in responses are caseblind */
83 for (cp = buf; *cp; cp++)
87 /* interpret untagged status responses */
88 if (strstr(buf, "* CAPABILITY"))
89 strncpy(capabilities, buf + 12, sizeof(capabilities));
90 if (strstr(buf, "EXISTS"))
92 if (strstr(buf, "RECENT"))
94 if (strstr(buf, "UNSEEN"))
99 * Handle both "* 42 UNSEEN" (if tha ever happens) and
100 * "* OK [UNSEEN 42] 42". Note that what this gets us is
101 * a minimum index, not a count.
104 for (cp = buf; *cp && !isdigit(*cp); cp++)
108 if (strstr(buf, "FLAGS"))
109 seen = (strstr(buf, "SEEN") != (char *)NULL);
111 (tag[0] != '\0' && strncmp(buf, tag, strlen(tag)));
124 for (cp = buf; !isspace(*cp); cp++)
129 if (strncmp(cp, "PREAUTH", 2) == 0)
136 else if (strncmp(cp, "OK", 2) == 0)
142 else if (strncmp(cp, "BAD", 3) == 0)
144 else if (strncmp(cp, "NO", 2) == 0)
152 static int do_otp(int sock, struct query *ctl)
156 char challenge[OPIE_CHALLENGE_MAX+1];
157 char response[OPIE_RESPONSE_MAX+1];
159 gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE X-OTP");
161 if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
164 if ((i = from64tobits(challenge, buffer)) < 0) {
165 report(stderr, _("Could not decode initial BASE64 challenge\n"));
170 to64frombits(buffer, ctl->remotename, strlen(ctl->remotename));
172 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
173 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buffer);
175 /* best not to count on the challenge code handling multiple writes */
176 strcat(buffer, "\r\n");
177 SockWrite(sock, buffer, strlen(buffer));
179 if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
182 if ((i = from64tobits(challenge, buffer)) < 0) {
183 report(stderr, _("Could not decode OTP challenge\n"));
187 rval = opiegenerator(challenge, !strcmp(ctl->password, "opie") ? "" : ctl->password, response);
188 if ((rval == -2) && !run.poll_interval) {
189 char secret[OPIE_SECRET_MAX+1];
190 fprintf(stderr, _("Secret pass phrase: "));
191 if (opiereadpass(secret, sizeof(secret), 0))
192 rval = opiegenerator(challenge, secret, response);
193 memset(secret, 0, sizeof(secret));
199 to64frombits(buffer, response, strlen(response));
201 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
202 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buffer);
203 strcat(buffer, "\r\n");
204 SockWrite(sock, buffer, strlen(buffer));
206 if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
209 if (strstr(buffer, "OK"))
219 #elif SIZEOF_SHORT == 4
221 #elif SIZEOF_LONG == 4
224 #error Cannot deduce a 32-bit-type
227 static int do_rfc1731(int sock, char *truename)
228 /* authenticate as per RFC1731 -- note 32-bit integer requirement here */
231 char buf1[4096], buf2[4096];
235 } challenge1, challenge2;
236 char srvinst[INST_SZ];
238 char srvrealm[REALM_SZ];
239 KTEXT_ST authenticator;
240 CREDENTIALS credentials;
241 char tktuser[MAX_K_NAME_SZ+1+INST_SZ+1+REALM_SZ+1];
242 char tktinst[INST_SZ];
243 char tktrealm[REALM_SZ];
245 des_key_schedule schedule;
247 gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE KERBEROS_V4");
249 /* The data encoded in the first ready response contains a random
250 * 32-bit number in network byte order. The client should respond
251 * with a Kerberos ticket and an authenticator for the principal
252 * "imap.hostname@realm", where "hostname" is the first component
253 * of the host name of the server with all letters in lower case
254 * and where "realm" is the Kerberos realm of the server. The
255 * encrypted checksum field included within the Kerberos
256 * authenticator should contain the server provided 32-bit number
257 * in network byte order.
260 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
264 len = from64tobits(challenge1.cstr, buf1);
266 report(stderr, _("could not decode initial BASE64 challenge\n"));
270 /* this patch by Dan Root <dar@thekeep.org> solves an endianess
275 *(int *)tmp = ntohl(*(int *) challenge1.cstr);
276 memcpy(challenge1.cstr, tmp, sizeof(tmp));
279 /* Client responds with a Kerberos ticket and an authenticator for
280 * the principal "imap.hostname@realm" where "hostname" is the
281 * first component of the host name of the server with all letters
282 * in lower case and where "realm" is the Kerberos realm of the
283 * server. The encrypted checksum field included within the
284 * Kerberos authenticator should contain the server-provided
285 * 32-bit number in network byte order.
288 strncpy(srvinst, truename, (sizeof srvinst)-1);
289 srvinst[(sizeof srvinst)-1] = '\0';
290 for (p = srvinst; *p; p++) {
296 strncpy(srvrealm, (char *)krb_realmofhost(srvinst), (sizeof srvrealm)-1);
297 srvrealm[(sizeof srvrealm)-1] = '\0';
298 if (p = strchr(srvinst, '.')) {
302 result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm, 0);
304 report(stderr, "krb_mq_req: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
308 result = krb_get_cred("imap", srvinst, srvrealm, &credentials);
310 report(stderr, "krb_get_cred: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
314 memcpy(session, credentials.session, sizeof session);
315 memset(&credentials, 0, sizeof credentials);
316 des_key_sched(&session, schedule);
318 result = krb_get_tf_fullname(TKT_FILE, tktuser, tktinst, tktrealm);
320 report(stderr, "krb_get_tf_fullname: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
324 if (strcmp(tktuser, user) != 0) {
326 _("principal %s in ticket does not match -u %s\n"), tktuser,
333 _("non-null instance (%s) might cause strange behavior\n"),
335 strcat(tktuser, ".");
336 strcat(tktuser, tktinst);
339 if (strcmp(tktrealm, srvrealm) != 0) {
340 strcat(tktuser, "@");
341 strcat(tktuser, tktrealm);
344 result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm,
347 report(stderr, "krb_mq_req: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
351 to64frombits(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length);
352 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
353 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
355 strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
356 SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
358 /* Upon decrypting and verifying the ticket and authenticator, the
359 * server should verify that the contained checksum field equals
360 * the original server provided random 32-bit number. Should the
361 * verification be successful, the server must add one to the
362 * checksum and construct 8 octets of data, with the first four
363 * octets containing the incremented checksum in network byte
364 * order, the fifth octet containing a bit-mask specifying the
365 * protection mechanisms supported by the server, and the sixth
366 * through eighth octets containing, in network byte order, the
367 * maximum cipher-text buffer size the server is able to receive.
368 * The server must encrypt the 8 octets of data in the session key
369 * and issue that encrypted data in a second ready response. The
370 * client should consider the server authenticated if the first
371 * four octets the un-encrypted data is equal to one plus the
372 * checksum it previously sent.
375 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
378 /* The client must construct data with the first four octets
379 * containing the original server-issued checksum in network byte
380 * order, the fifth octet containing the bit-mask specifying the
381 * selected protection mechanism, the sixth through eighth octets
382 * containing in network byte order the maximum cipher-text buffer
383 * size the client is able to receive, and the following octets
384 * containing a user name string. The client must then append
385 * from one to eight octets so that the length of the data is a
386 * multiple of eight octets. The client must then PCBC encrypt the
387 * data with the session key and respond to the second ready
388 * response with the encrypted data. The server decrypts the data
389 * and verifies the contained checksum. The username field
390 * identifies the user for whom subsequent IMAP operations are to
391 * be performed; the server must verify that the principal
392 * identified in the Kerberos ticket is authorized to connect as
393 * that user. After these verifications, the authentication
394 * process is complete.
397 len = from64tobits(buf2, buf1);
399 report(stderr, _("could not decode BASE64 ready response\n"));
403 des_ecb_encrypt((des_cblock *)buf2, (des_cblock *)buf2, schedule, 0);
404 memcpy(challenge2.cstr, buf2, 4);
405 if (ntohl(challenge2.cint) != challenge1.cint + 1) {
406 report(stderr, _("challenge mismatch\n"));
410 memset(authenticator.dat, 0, sizeof authenticator.dat);
412 result = htonl(challenge1.cint);
413 memcpy(authenticator.dat, &result, sizeof result);
415 /* The protection mechanisms and their corresponding bit-masks are as
418 * 1 No protection mechanism
419 * 2 Integrity (krb_mk_safe) protection
420 * 4 Privacy (krb_mk_priv) protection
422 authenticator.dat[4] = 1;
424 len = strlen(tktuser);
425 strncpy(authenticator.dat+8, tktuser, len);
426 authenticator.length = len + 8 + 1;
427 while (authenticator.length & 7) {
428 authenticator.length++;
430 des_pcbc_encrypt((des_cblock *)authenticator.dat,
431 (des_cblock *)authenticator.dat, authenticator.length, schedule,
434 to64frombits(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length);
435 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
436 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
439 strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
440 SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
442 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
445 if (strstr(buf1, "OK")) {
452 #endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
455 #define GSSAUTH_P_NONE 1
456 #define GSSAUTH_P_INTEGRITY 2
457 #define GSSAUTH_P_PRIVACY 4
459 static int do_gssauth(int sock, char *hostname, char *username)
461 gss_buffer_desc request_buf, send_token;
462 gss_buffer_t sec_token;
463 gss_name_t target_name;
464 gss_ctx_id_t context;
468 OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat;
469 char buf1[8192], buf2[8192], server_conf_flags;
470 unsigned long buf_size;
473 /* first things first: get an imap ticket for host */
474 sprintf(buf1, "imap@%s", hostname);
475 request_buf.value = buf1;
476 request_buf.length = strlen(buf1) + 1;
477 maj_stat = gss_import_name(&min_stat, &request_buf, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE,
479 if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
480 report(stderr, _("Couldn't get service name for [%s]\n"), buf1);
483 else if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
484 maj_stat = gss_display_name(&min_stat, target_name, &request_buf,
486 report(stderr, _("Using service name [%s]\n"),request_buf.value);
487 maj_stat = gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &request_buf);
490 gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE GSSAPI");
492 /* upon receipt of the GSSAPI authentication request, server returns
493 * null data ready response. */
494 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
498 /* now start the security context initialisation loop... */
499 sec_token = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
500 context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
501 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
502 report(stdout, _("Sending credentials\n"));
504 send_token.length = 0;
505 send_token.value = NULL;
506 maj_stat = gss_init_sec_context(&min_stat,
511 GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG,
513 GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
519 if (maj_stat!=GSS_S_COMPLETE && maj_stat!=GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
520 report(stderr, _("Error exchanging credentials\n"));
521 gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
522 /* wake up server and await NO response */
523 SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
524 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
528 to64frombits(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length);
529 gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
530 strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
531 SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
532 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
533 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
534 if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
535 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
536 gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
539 request_buf.length = from64tobits(buf2, buf1 + 2);
540 request_buf.value = buf2;
541 sec_token = &request_buf;
543 } while (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
544 gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
546 /* get security flags and buffer size */
547 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
550 request_buf.length = from64tobits(buf2, buf1 + 2);
551 request_buf.value = buf2;
553 maj_stat = gss_unwrap(&min_stat, context, &request_buf, &send_token,
555 if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
556 report(stderr, _("Couldn't unwrap security level data\n"));
557 gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
560 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
561 report(stdout, _("Credential exchange complete\n"));
562 /* first octet is security levels supported. We want none, for now */
563 server_conf_flags = ((char *)send_token.value)[0];
564 if ( !(((char *)send_token.value)[0] & GSSAUTH_P_NONE) ) {
565 report(stderr, _("Server requires integrity and/or privacy\n"));
566 gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
569 ((char *)send_token.value)[0] = 0;
570 buf_size = ntohl(*((long *)send_token.value));
571 /* we don't care about buffer size if we don't wrap data */
572 gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
573 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
574 report(stdout, _("Unwrapped security level flags: %s%s%s\n"),
575 server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_NONE ? "N" : "-",
576 server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_INTEGRITY ? "I" : "-",
577 server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_PRIVACY ? "C" : "-");
578 report(stdout, _("Maximum GSS token size is %ld\n"),buf_size);
581 /* now respond in kind (hack!!!) */
582 buf_size = htonl(buf_size); /* do as they do... only matters if we do enc */
583 memcpy(buf1, &buf_size, 4);
584 buf1[0] = GSSAUTH_P_NONE;
585 strcpy(buf1+4, username); /* server decides if princ is user */
586 request_buf.length = 4 + strlen(username) + 1;
587 request_buf.value = buf1;
588 maj_stat = gss_wrap(&min_stat, context, 0, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, &request_buf,
589 &cflags, &send_token);
590 if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
591 report(stderr, _("Error creating security level request\n"));
594 to64frombits(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length);
595 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
596 report(stdout, _("Requesting authorisation as %s\n"), username);
597 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n",buf1);
599 strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
600 SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
602 /* we should be done. Get status and finish up */
603 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
605 if (strstr(buf1, "OK")) {
606 /* flush security context */
607 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
608 report(stdout, _("Releasing GSS credentials\n"));
609 maj_stat = gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat, &context, &send_token);
610 if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
611 report(stderr, _("Error releasing credentials\n"));
614 /* send_token may contain a notification to the server to flush
615 * credentials. RFC 1731 doesn't specify what to do, and since this
616 * support is only for authentication, we'll assume the server
617 * knows enough to flush its own credentials */
618 gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
626 static void hmac_md5 (unsigned char *password, size_t pass_len,
627 unsigned char *challenge, size_t chal_len,
628 unsigned char *response, size_t resp_len)
631 unsigned char ipad[64];
632 unsigned char opad[64];
633 unsigned char hash_passwd[16];
640 if (pass_len > sizeof (ipad))
643 MD5Update (&ctx, password, pass_len);
644 MD5Final (hash_passwd, &ctx);
645 password = hash_passwd; pass_len = sizeof (hash_passwd);
648 memset (ipad, 0, sizeof (ipad));
649 memset (opad, 0, sizeof (opad));
650 memcpy (ipad, password, pass_len);
651 memcpy (opad, password, pass_len);
653 for (i=0; i<64; i++) {
659 MD5Update (&ctx, ipad, sizeof (ipad));
660 MD5Update (&ctx, challenge, chal_len);
661 MD5Final (response, &ctx);
664 MD5Update (&ctx, opad, sizeof (opad));
665 MD5Update (&ctx, response, resp_len);
666 MD5Final (response, &ctx);
670 static int do_cram_md5 (int sock, struct query *ctl)
671 /* authenticate as per RFC2195 */
675 unsigned char buf1[1024];
676 unsigned char msg_id[768];
677 unsigned char response[16];
678 unsigned char reply[1024];
680 gen_send (sock, "AUTHENTICATE CRAM-MD5");
683 * The data encoded in the first ready response contains an
684 * presumptively arbitrary string of random digits, a timestamp, and the
685 * fully-qualified primary host name of the server. The syntax of the
686 * unencoded form must correspond to that of an RFC 822 'msg-id'
687 * [RFC822] as described in [POP3].
690 if (result = gen_recv (sock, buf1, sizeof (buf1))) {
694 len = from64tobits (msg_id, buf1);
696 report (stderr, _("could not decode BASE64 challenge\n"));
698 } else if (len < sizeof (msg_id)) {
701 msg_id[sizeof (msg_id)-1] = 0;
703 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
704 report (stdout, "decoded as %s\n", msg_id);
707 /* The client makes note of the data and then responds with a string
708 * consisting of the user name, a space, and a 'digest'. The latter is
709 * computed by applying the keyed MD5 algorithm from [KEYED-MD5] where
710 * the key is a shared secret and the digested text is the timestamp
711 * (including angle-brackets).
714 hmac_md5 (ctl->password, strlen (ctl->password),
715 msg_id, strlen (msg_id),
716 response, sizeof (response));
719 snprintf (reply, sizeof (reply),
723 "\"%s\" %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
725 response[0], response[1], response[2], response[3],
726 response[4], response[5], response[6], response[7],
727 response[8], response[9], response[10], response[11],
728 response[12], response[13], response[14], response[15]);
730 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
731 report (stdout, "replying with %s\n", reply);
734 to64frombits (buf1, reply, strlen (reply));
735 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
736 report (stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
739 /* PMDF5.2 IMAP has a bug that requires this to be a single write */
740 strcat (buf1, "\r\n");
741 SockWrite (sock, buf1, strlen (buf1));
743 if (result = gen_recv (sock, buf1, sizeof (buf1)))
746 if (strstr (buf1, "OK")) {
753 int imap_canonicalize(char *result, char *passwd)
754 /* encode an IMAP password as per RFC1730's quoting conventions */
759 for (i = 0; i < strlen(passwd); i++)
761 if ((passwd[i] == '\\') || (passwd[i] == '"'))
763 result[j++] = passwd[i];
770 int imap_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting)
771 /* apply for connection authorization */
774 char password[PASSWORDLEN*2];
776 /* probe to see if we're running IMAP4 and can use RFC822.PEEK */
777 capabilities[0] = '\0';
778 if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "CAPABILITY")) == PS_SUCCESS)
780 /* UW-IMAP server 10.173 notifies in all caps */
781 if (strstr(capabilities, "IMAP4REV1"))
783 imap_version = IMAP4rev1;
784 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
785 report(stdout, _("Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 1\n"));
789 imap_version = IMAP4;
790 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
791 report(stdout, _("Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 0\n"));
794 else if (ok == PS_ERROR)
796 imap_version = IMAP2;
797 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
798 report(stdout, _("Protocol identified as IMAP2 or IMAP2BIS\n"));
803 peek_capable = (imap_version >= IMAP4);
806 * Assumption: expunges are cheap, so we want to do them
807 * after every message unless user said otherwise.
809 if (NUM_SPECIFIED(ctl->expunge))
810 expunge_period = NUM_VALUE_OUT(ctl->expunge);
818 if ((ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP) && strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=X-OTP"))
820 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
821 report(stdout, _("OTP authentication is supported\n"));
822 if (do_otp(sock, ctl) == PS_SUCCESS)
828 if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=GSSAPI"))
830 if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_GSS)
832 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
833 report(stdout, _("GSS authentication is supported\n"));
834 return do_gssauth(sock, ctl->server.truename, ctl->remotename);
837 else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_GSS)
840 _("Required GSS capability not supported by server\n"));
846 if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=KERBEROS_V4"))
848 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
849 report(stdout, _("KERBEROS_V4 authentication is supported\n"));
851 if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_K4)
853 if ((ok = do_rfc1731(sock, ctl->server.truename)))
855 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
856 report(stdout, "IMAP> *\n");
857 SockWrite(sock, "*\r\n", 3);
862 /* else fall through to ordinary AUTH=LOGIN case */
864 else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_K4)
867 _("Required KERBEROS_V4 capability not supported by server\n"));
870 #endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
872 if (strstr (capabilities, "AUTH=CRAM-MD5"))
874 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
875 report (stdout, _("CRAM-MD5 authentication is supported\n"));
876 if ((ok = do_cram_md5 (sock, ctl)))
878 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
879 report (stdout, "IMAP> *\n");
880 SockWrite (sock, "*\r\n", 3);
885 #ifdef __UNUSED__ /* The Cyrus IMAP4rev1 server chokes on this */
886 /* this handles either AUTH=LOGIN or AUTH-LOGIN */
887 if ((imap_version >= IMAP4rev1) && (!strstr(capabilities, "LOGIN"))) {
889 _("Required LOGIN capability not supported by server\n"));
892 #endif /* __UNUSED__ */
894 imap_canonicalize(password, ctl->password);
895 ok = gen_transact(sock, "LOGIN \"%s\" \"%s\"", ctl->remotename, password);
902 static int internal_expunge(int sock)
903 /* ship an expunge, resetting associated counters */
907 if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "EXPUNGE")))
910 expunged += deletions;
913 #ifdef IMAP_UID /* not used */
915 #endif /* IMAP_UID */
920 static int imap_getrange(int sock,
923 int *countp, int *newp, int *bytes)
924 /* get range of messages to be fetched */
928 /* find out how many messages are waiting */
929 *bytes = recent = unseen = -1;
934 * We have to have an expunge here, otherwise the re-poll will
935 * infinite-loop picking up un-expunged messages -- unless the
936 * expunge period is one and we've been nuking each message
937 * just after deletion.
940 if (deletions && expunge_period != 1)
941 internal_expunge(sock);
943 if (ok || gen_transact(sock, "NOOP"))
945 report(stderr, _("re-poll failed\n"));
948 else if (count == -1) /* no EXISTS response to NOOP */
957 ok = gen_transact(sock, "SELECT %s", folder ? folder : "INBOX");
959 ok = gen_transact(sock, "EXAMINE %s", folder ? folder : "INBOX");
962 report(stderr, _("mailbox selection failed\n"));
970 * Note: because IMAP has an is_old method, this number is used
971 * only for the "X messages (Y unseen)" notification. Accordingly
972 * it doesn't matter much that it can be wrong (e.g. if we see an
973 * UNSEEN response but not all messages above the first UNSEEN one
976 if (unseen >= 0) /* optional, but better if we see it */
977 *newp = count - unseen + 1;
978 else if (recent >= 0) /* mandatory */
981 *newp = -1; /* should never happen, RECENT is mandatory */
988 static int imap_getsizes(int sock, int count, int *sizes)
989 /* capture the sizes of all messages */
991 char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1];
994 * Some servers (as in, PMDF5.1-9.1 under OpenVMS 6.1)
995 * won't accept 1:1 as valid set syntax. Some implementors
996 * should be taken out and shot for excessive anality.
999 gen_send(sock, "FETCH 1 RFC822.SIZE", count);
1001 gen_send(sock, "FETCH 1:%d RFC822.SIZE", count);
1006 if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
1008 if (strstr(buf, "OK"))
1010 else if (sscanf(buf, "* %d FETCH (RFC822.SIZE %d)", &num, &size) == 2)
1011 sizes[num - 1] = size;
1017 static int imap_is_old(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
1018 /* is the given message old? */
1022 /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
1025 if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "FETCH %d FLAGS", number)) != 0)
1031 static int imap_fetch_headers(int sock, struct query *ctl,int number,int *lenp)
1032 /* request headers of nth message */
1034 char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1];
1037 /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
1041 * This is blessed by RFC 1176, RFC1730, RFC2060.
1042 * According to the RFCs, it should *not* set the \Seen flag.
1044 gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.HEADER", number);
1046 /* looking for FETCH response */
1050 if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
1053 (sscanf(buf+2, "%d FETCH (%*s {%d}", &num, lenp) != 2);
1061 static int imap_fetch_body(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number, int *lenp)
1062 /* request body of nth message */
1064 char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1], *cp;
1067 /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
1071 * If we're using IMAP4, we can fetch the message without setting its
1072 * seen flag. This is good! It means that if the protocol exchange
1073 * craps out during the message, it will still be marked `unseen' on
1076 * However...*don't* do this if we're using keep to suppress deletion!
1077 * In that case, marking the seen flag is the only way to prevent the
1078 * message from being re-fetched on subsequent runs.
1080 switch (imap_version)
1082 case IMAP4rev1: /* RFC 2060 */
1084 gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d BODY.PEEK[TEXT]", number);
1086 gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d BODY[TEXT]", number);
1089 case IMAP4: /* RFC 1730 */
1091 gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.TEXT.PEEK", number);
1093 gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.TEXT", number);
1096 default: /* RFC 1176 */
1097 gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.TEXT", number);
1101 /* looking for FETCH response */
1105 if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
1108 (!strstr(buf+4, "FETCH") || sscanf(buf+2, "%d", &num) != 1);
1113 /* try to extract a length */
1114 if ((cp = strchr(buf, '{')))
1115 *lenp = atoi(cp + 1);
1122 static int imap_trail(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
1123 /* discard tail of FETCH response after reading message text */
1125 /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
1126 /* number -= expunged; */
1130 char buf[MSGBUFSIZE+1];
1133 if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
1136 /* UW IMAP returns "OK FETCH", Cyrus returns "OK Completed" */
1137 if (strstr(buf, "OK"))
1144 static int imap_delete(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
1145 /* set delete flag for given message */
1149 /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
1153 * Use SILENT if possible as a minor throughput optimization.
1154 * Note: this has been dropped from IMAP4rev1.
1156 * We set Seen because there are some IMAP servers (notably HP
1157 * OpenMail) that do message-receipt DSNs, but only when the seen
1158 * bit is set. This is the appropriate time -- we get here right
1159 * after the local SMTP response that says delivery was
1162 if ((ok = gen_transact(sock,
1163 imap_version == IMAP4
1164 ? "STORE %d +FLAGS.SILENT (\\Seen \\Deleted)"
1165 : "STORE %d +FLAGS (\\Seen \\Deleted)",
1172 * We do an expunge after expunge_period messages, rather than
1173 * just before quit, so that a line hit during a long session
1174 * won't result in lots of messages being fetched again during
1177 if (NUM_NONZERO(expunge_period) && (deletions % expunge_period) == 0)
1178 internal_expunge(sock);
1183 static int imap_logout(int sock, struct query *ctl)
1184 /* send logout command */
1186 /* if any un-expunged deletions remain, ship an expunge now */
1188 internal_expunge(sock);
1190 return(gen_transact(sock, "LOGOUT"));
1193 const static struct method imap =
1195 "IMAP", /* Internet Message Access Protocol */
1199 143, /* standard IMAP2bis/IMAP4 port */
1201 TRUE, /* this is a tagged protocol */
1202 FALSE, /* no message delimiter */
1203 imap_ok, /* parse command response */
1204 imap_canonicalize, /* deal with embedded slashes and spaces */
1205 imap_getauth, /* get authorization */
1206 imap_getrange, /* query range of messages */
1207 imap_getsizes, /* get sizes of messages (used for --limit option */
1208 imap_is_old, /* no UID check */
1209 imap_fetch_headers, /* request given message headers */
1210 imap_fetch_body, /* request given message body */
1211 imap_trail, /* eat message trailer */
1212 imap_delete, /* delete the message */
1213 imap_logout, /* expunge and exit */
1214 TRUE, /* yes, we can re-poll */
1217 int doIMAP(struct query *ctl)
1218 /* retrieve messages using IMAP Version 2bis or Version 4 */
1220 return(do_protocol(ctl, &imap));
1223 /* imap.c ends here */