2 * imap.c -- IMAP2bis/IMAP4 protocol methods
4 * Copyright 1997 by Eric S. Raymond
5 * For license terms, see the file COPYING in this directory.
12 #if defined(STDC_HEADERS)
15 #include "fetchmail.h"
20 #include <kerberosIV/des.h>
21 #include <kerberosIV/krb.h>
23 #if defined (__bsdi__)
25 #define krb_get_err_text(e) (krb_err_txt[e])
27 #if defined(__NetBSD__) || (__FreeBSD__) || defined(__linux__)
28 #define krb_get_err_text(e) (krb_err_txt[e])
32 #endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
39 #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H
40 #include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
42 #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
43 #include <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h>
45 #ifndef HAVE_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE
46 #define GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE gss_nt_service_name
54 #endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
56 #ifndef strstr /* glibc-2.1 declares this as a macro */
57 extern char *strstr(); /* needed on sysV68 R3V7.1. */
60 /* imap_version values */
61 #define IMAP2 -1 /* IMAP2 or IMAP2BIS, RFC1176 */
62 #define IMAP4 0 /* IMAP4 rev 0, RFC1730 */
63 #define IMAP4rev1 1 /* IMAP4 rev 1, RFC2060 */
65 static int count, seen, recent, unseen, deletions, imap_version, preauth;
66 static int expunged, expunge_period;
67 static char capabilities[MSGBUFSIZE+1];
69 int imap_ok(int sock, char *argbuf)
70 /* parse command response */
72 char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1];
79 if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
82 /* all tokens in responses are caseblind */
83 for (cp = buf; *cp; cp++)
87 /* interpret untagged status responses */
88 if (strstr(buf, "* CAPABILITY"))
89 strncpy(capabilities, buf + 12, sizeof(capabilities));
90 if (strstr(buf, "EXISTS"))
92 if (strstr(buf, "RECENT"))
94 if (strstr(buf, "UNSEEN"))
99 * Handle both "* 42 UNSEEN" (if tha ever happens) and
100 * "* OK [UNSEEN 42] 42". Note that what this gets us is
101 * a minimum index, not a count.
104 for (cp = buf; *cp && !isdigit(*cp); cp++)
108 if (strstr(buf, "FLAGS"))
109 seen = (strstr(buf, "SEEN") != (char *)NULL);
111 (tag[0] != '\0' && strncmp(buf, tag, strlen(tag)));
124 for (cp = buf; !isspace(*cp); cp++)
129 if (strncmp(cp, "PREAUTH", 2) == 0)
136 else if (strncmp(cp, "OK", 2) == 0)
142 else if (strncmp(cp, "BAD", 3) == 0)
144 else if (strncmp(cp, "NO", 2) == 0)
152 static int do_otp(int sock, struct query *ctl)
156 char challenge[OPIE_CHALLENGE_MAX+1];
157 char response[OPIE_RESPONSE_MAX+1];
159 gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE X-OTP");
161 if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
164 if ((i = from64tobits(challenge, buffer)) < 0) {
165 report(stderr, _("Could not decode initial BASE64 challenge\n"));
170 to64frombits(buffer, ctl->remotename, strlen(ctl->remotename));
172 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
173 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buffer);
175 /* best not to count on the challenge code handling multiple writes */
176 strcat(buffer, "\r\n");
177 SockWrite(sock, buffer, strlen(buffer));
179 if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
182 if ((i = from64tobits(challenge, buffer)) < 0) {
183 report(stderr, _("Could not decode OTP challenge\n"));
187 rval = opiegenerator(challenge, !strcmp(ctl->password, "opie") ? "" : ctl->password, response);
188 if ((rval == -2) && !run.poll_interval) {
189 char secret[OPIE_SECRET_MAX+1];
190 fprintf(stderr, _("Secret pass phrase: "));
191 if (opiereadpass(secret, sizeof(secret), 0))
192 rval = opiegenerator(challenge, secret, response);
193 memset(secret, 0, sizeof(secret));
199 to64frombits(buffer, response, strlen(response));
201 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
202 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buffer);
203 strcat(buffer, "\r\n");
204 SockWrite(sock, buffer, strlen(buffer));
206 if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
209 if (strstr(buffer, "OK"))
214 #endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
219 #elif SIZEOF_SHORT == 4
221 #elif SIZEOF_LONG == 4
224 #error Cannot deduce a 32-bit-type
227 static int do_rfc1731(int sock, char *truename)
228 /* authenticate as per RFC1731 -- note 32-bit integer requirement here */
231 char buf1[4096], buf2[4096];
235 } challenge1, challenge2;
236 char srvinst[INST_SZ];
238 char srvrealm[REALM_SZ];
239 KTEXT_ST authenticator;
240 CREDENTIALS credentials;
241 char tktuser[MAX_K_NAME_SZ+1+INST_SZ+1+REALM_SZ+1];
242 char tktinst[INST_SZ];
243 char tktrealm[REALM_SZ];
245 des_key_schedule schedule;
247 gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE KERBEROS_V4");
249 /* The data encoded in the first ready response contains a random
250 * 32-bit number in network byte order. The client should respond
251 * with a Kerberos ticket and an authenticator for the principal
252 * "imap.hostname@realm", where "hostname" is the first component
253 * of the host name of the server with all letters in lower case
254 * and where "realm" is the Kerberos realm of the server. The
255 * encrypted checksum field included within the Kerberos
256 * authenticator should contain the server provided 32-bit number
257 * in network byte order.
260 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
264 len = from64tobits(challenge1.cstr, buf1);
266 report(stderr, _("could not decode initial BASE64 challenge\n"));
270 /* this patch by Dan Root <dar@thekeep.org> solves an endianess
275 *(int *)tmp = ntohl(*(int *) challenge1.cstr);
276 memcpy(challenge1.cstr, tmp, sizeof(tmp));
279 /* Client responds with a Kerberos ticket and an authenticator for
280 * the principal "imap.hostname@realm" where "hostname" is the
281 * first component of the host name of the server with all letters
282 * in lower case and where "realm" is the Kerberos realm of the
283 * server. The encrypted checksum field included within the
284 * Kerberos authenticator should contain the server-provided
285 * 32-bit number in network byte order.
288 strncpy(srvinst, truename, (sizeof srvinst)-1);
289 srvinst[(sizeof srvinst)-1] = '\0';
290 for (p = srvinst; *p; p++) {
296 strncpy(srvrealm, (char *)krb_realmofhost(srvinst), (sizeof srvrealm)-1);
297 srvrealm[(sizeof srvrealm)-1] = '\0';
298 if (p = strchr(srvinst, '.')) {
302 result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm, 0);
304 report(stderr, "krb_mq_req: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
308 result = krb_get_cred("imap", srvinst, srvrealm, &credentials);
310 report(stderr, "krb_get_cred: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
314 memcpy(session, credentials.session, sizeof session);
315 memset(&credentials, 0, sizeof credentials);
316 des_key_sched(&session, schedule);
318 result = krb_get_tf_fullname(TKT_FILE, tktuser, tktinst, tktrealm);
320 report(stderr, "krb_get_tf_fullname: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
324 if (strcmp(tktuser, user) != 0) {
326 _("principal %s in ticket does not match -u %s\n"), tktuser,
333 _("non-null instance (%s) might cause strange behavior\n"),
335 strcat(tktuser, ".");
336 strcat(tktuser, tktinst);
339 if (strcmp(tktrealm, srvrealm) != 0) {
340 strcat(tktuser, "@");
341 strcat(tktuser, tktrealm);
344 result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm,
347 report(stderr, "krb_mq_req: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
351 to64frombits(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length);
352 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
353 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
355 strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
356 SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
358 /* Upon decrypting and verifying the ticket and authenticator, the
359 * server should verify that the contained checksum field equals
360 * the original server provided random 32-bit number. Should the
361 * verification be successful, the server must add one to the
362 * checksum and construct 8 octets of data, with the first four
363 * octets containing the incremented checksum in network byte
364 * order, the fifth octet containing a bit-mask specifying the
365 * protection mechanisms supported by the server, and the sixth
366 * through eighth octets containing, in network byte order, the
367 * maximum cipher-text buffer size the server is able to receive.
368 * The server must encrypt the 8 octets of data in the session key
369 * and issue that encrypted data in a second ready response. The
370 * client should consider the server authenticated if the first
371 * four octets the un-encrypted data is equal to one plus the
372 * checksum it previously sent.
375 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
378 /* The client must construct data with the first four octets
379 * containing the original server-issued checksum in network byte
380 * order, the fifth octet containing the bit-mask specifying the
381 * selected protection mechanism, the sixth through eighth octets
382 * containing in network byte order the maximum cipher-text buffer
383 * size the client is able to receive, and the following octets
384 * containing a user name string. The client must then append
385 * from one to eight octets so that the length of the data is a
386 * multiple of eight octets. The client must then PCBC encrypt the
387 * data with the session key and respond to the second ready
388 * response with the encrypted data. The server decrypts the data
389 * and verifies the contained checksum. The username field
390 * identifies the user for whom subsequent IMAP operations are to
391 * be performed; the server must verify that the principal
392 * identified in the Kerberos ticket is authorized to connect as
393 * that user. After these verifications, the authentication
394 * process is complete.
397 len = from64tobits(buf2, buf1);
399 report(stderr, _("could not decode BASE64 ready response\n"));
403 des_ecb_encrypt((des_cblock *)buf2, (des_cblock *)buf2, schedule, 0);
404 memcpy(challenge2.cstr, buf2, 4);
405 if (ntohl(challenge2.cint) != challenge1.cint + 1) {
406 report(stderr, _("challenge mismatch\n"));
410 memset(authenticator.dat, 0, sizeof authenticator.dat);
412 result = htonl(challenge1.cint);
413 memcpy(authenticator.dat, &result, sizeof result);
415 /* The protection mechanisms and their corresponding bit-masks are as
418 * 1 No protection mechanism
419 * 2 Integrity (krb_mk_safe) protection
420 * 4 Privacy (krb_mk_priv) protection
422 authenticator.dat[4] = 1;
424 len = strlen(tktuser);
425 strncpy(authenticator.dat+8, tktuser, len);
426 authenticator.length = len + 8 + 1;
427 while (authenticator.length & 7) {
428 authenticator.length++;
430 des_pcbc_encrypt((des_cblock *)authenticator.dat,
431 (des_cblock *)authenticator.dat, authenticator.length, schedule,
434 to64frombits(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length);
435 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
436 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
439 strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
440 SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
442 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
445 if (strstr(buf1, "OK")) {
452 #endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
455 #define GSSAUTH_P_NONE 1
456 #define GSSAUTH_P_INTEGRITY 2
457 #define GSSAUTH_P_PRIVACY 4
459 static int do_gssauth(int sock, char *hostname, char *username)
461 gss_buffer_desc request_buf, send_token;
462 gss_buffer_t sec_token;
463 gss_name_t target_name;
464 gss_ctx_id_t context;
468 OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat;
469 char buf1[8192], buf2[8192], server_conf_flags;
470 unsigned long buf_size;
473 /* first things first: get an imap ticket for host */
474 sprintf(buf1, "imap@%s", hostname);
475 request_buf.value = buf1;
476 request_buf.length = strlen(buf1) + 1;
477 maj_stat = gss_import_name(&min_stat, &request_buf, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE,
479 if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
480 report(stderr, _("Couldn't get service name for [%s]\n"), buf1);
483 else if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
484 maj_stat = gss_display_name(&min_stat, target_name, &request_buf,
486 report(stderr, _("Using service name [%s]\n"),request_buf.value);
487 maj_stat = gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &request_buf);
490 gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE GSSAPI");
492 /* upon receipt of the GSSAPI authentication request, server returns
493 * null data ready response. */
494 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
498 /* now start the security context initialisation loop... */
499 sec_token = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
500 context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
501 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
502 report(stdout, _("Sending credentials\n"));
504 send_token.length = 0;
505 send_token.value = NULL;
506 maj_stat = gss_init_sec_context(&min_stat,
511 GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG,
513 GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
519 if (maj_stat!=GSS_S_COMPLETE && maj_stat!=GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
520 report(stderr, _("Error exchanging credentials\n"));
521 gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
522 /* wake up server and await NO response */
523 SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
524 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
528 to64frombits(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length);
529 gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
530 strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
531 SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
532 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
533 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
534 if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
535 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
536 gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
539 request_buf.length = from64tobits(buf2, buf1 + 2);
540 request_buf.value = buf2;
541 sec_token = &request_buf;
543 } while (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
544 gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
546 /* get security flags and buffer size */
547 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
550 request_buf.length = from64tobits(buf2, buf1 + 2);
551 request_buf.value = buf2;
553 maj_stat = gss_unwrap(&min_stat, context, &request_buf, &send_token,
555 if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
556 report(stderr, _("Couldn't unwrap security level data\n"));
557 gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
560 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
561 report(stdout, _("Credential exchange complete\n"));
562 /* first octet is security levels supported. We want none, for now */
563 server_conf_flags = ((char *)send_token.value)[0];
564 if ( !(((char *)send_token.value)[0] & GSSAUTH_P_NONE) ) {
565 report(stderr, _("Server requires integrity and/or privacy\n"));
566 gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
569 ((char *)send_token.value)[0] = 0;
570 buf_size = ntohl(*((long *)send_token.value));
571 /* we don't care about buffer size if we don't wrap data */
572 gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
573 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
574 report(stdout, _("Unwrapped security level flags: %s%s%s\n"),
575 server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_NONE ? "N" : "-",
576 server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_INTEGRITY ? "I" : "-",
577 server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_PRIVACY ? "C" : "-");
578 report(stdout, _("Maximum GSS token size is %ld\n"),buf_size);
581 /* now respond in kind (hack!!!) */
582 buf_size = htonl(buf_size); /* do as they do... only matters if we do enc */
583 memcpy(buf1, &buf_size, 4);
584 buf1[0] = GSSAUTH_P_NONE;
585 strcpy(buf1+4, username); /* server decides if princ is user */
586 request_buf.length = 4 + strlen(username) + 1;
587 request_buf.value = buf1;
588 maj_stat = gss_wrap(&min_stat, context, 0, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, &request_buf,
589 &cflags, &send_token);
590 if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
591 report(stderr, _("Error creating security level request\n"));
594 to64frombits(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length);
595 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
596 report(stdout, _("Requesting authorisation as %s\n"), username);
597 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n",buf1);
599 strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
600 SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
602 /* we should be done. Get status and finish up */
603 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
605 if (strstr(buf1, "OK")) {
606 /* flush security context */
607 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
608 report(stdout, _("Releasing GSS credentials\n"));
609 maj_stat = gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat, &context, &send_token);
610 if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
611 report(stderr, _("Error releasing credentials\n"));
614 /* send_token may contain a notification to the server to flush
615 * credentials. RFC 1731 doesn't specify what to do, and since this
616 * support is only for authentication, we'll assume the server
617 * knows enough to flush its own credentials */
618 gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
626 static void hmac_md5 (unsigned char *password, size_t pass_len,
627 unsigned char *challenge, size_t chal_len,
628 unsigned char *response, size_t resp_len)
631 unsigned char ipad[64];
632 unsigned char opad[64];
633 unsigned char hash_passwd[16];
640 if (pass_len > sizeof (ipad))
643 MD5Update (&ctx, password, pass_len);
644 MD5Final (hash_passwd, &ctx);
645 password = hash_passwd; pass_len = sizeof (hash_passwd);
648 memset (ipad, 0, sizeof (ipad));
649 memset (opad, 0, sizeof (opad));
650 memcpy (ipad, password, pass_len);
651 memcpy (opad, password, pass_len);
653 for (i=0; i<64; i++) {
659 MD5Update (&ctx, ipad, sizeof (ipad));
660 MD5Update (&ctx, challenge, chal_len);
661 MD5Final (response, &ctx);
664 MD5Update (&ctx, opad, sizeof (opad));
665 MD5Update (&ctx, response, resp_len);
666 MD5Final (response, &ctx);
672 static tSmbNtlmAuthRequest request;
673 static tSmbNtlmAuthChallenge challenge;
674 static tSmbNtlmAuthResponse response;
677 * NTLM support by Grant Edwards.
679 * Handle MS-Exchange NTLM authentication method. This is the same
680 * as the NTLM auth used by Samba for SMB related services. We just
681 * encode the packets in base64 instead of sending them out via a
684 * Much source (ntlm.h, smb*.c smb*.h) was borrowed from Samba.
687 static int do_imap_ntlm(int sock, struct query *ctl)
692 gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE NTLM");
694 if ((result = gen_recv(sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
697 if (msgbuf[0] != '+')
700 buildSmbNtlmAuthRequest(&request,ctl->remotename,NULL);
702 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
703 dumpSmbNtlmAuthRequest(stdout, &request);
705 memset(msgbuf,0,sizeof msgbuf);
706 to64frombits (msgbuf, (unsigned char*)&request, SmbLength(&request));
708 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
709 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", msgbuf);
711 strcat(msgbuf,"\r\n");
712 SockWrite (sock, msgbuf, strlen (msgbuf));
714 if ((gen_recv(sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
717 len = from64tobits ((unsigned char*)&challenge, msgbuf);
719 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
720 dumpSmbNtlmAuthChallenge(stdout, &challenge);
722 buildSmbNtlmAuthResponse(&challenge, &response,ctl->remotename,ctl->password);
724 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
725 dumpSmbNtlmAuthResponse(stdout, &response);
727 memset(msgbuf,0,sizeof msgbuf);
728 to64frombits (msgbuf, (unsigned char*)&response, SmbLength(&response));
730 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
731 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", msgbuf);
733 strcat(msgbuf,"\r\n");
735 SockWrite (sock, msgbuf, strlen (msgbuf));
737 if ((result = gen_recv (sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
740 if (strstr (msgbuf, "OK"))
747 static int do_cram_md5 (int sock, struct query *ctl)
748 /* authenticate as per RFC2195 */
752 unsigned char buf1[1024];
753 unsigned char msg_id[768];
754 unsigned char response[16];
755 unsigned char reply[1024];
757 gen_send (sock, "AUTHENTICATE CRAM-MD5");
760 * The data encoded in the first ready response contains an
761 * presumptively arbitrary string of random digits, a timestamp, and the
762 * fully-qualified primary host name of the server. The syntax of the
763 * unencoded form must correspond to that of an RFC 822 'msg-id'
764 * [RFC822] as described in [POP3].
767 if ((result = gen_recv (sock, buf1, sizeof (buf1)))) {
771 len = from64tobits (msg_id, buf1);
773 report (stderr, _("could not decode BASE64 challenge\n"));
775 } else if (len < sizeof (msg_id)) {
778 msg_id[sizeof (msg_id)-1] = 0;
780 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
781 report (stdout, "decoded as %s\n", msg_id);
784 /* The client makes note of the data and then responds with a string
785 * consisting of the user name, a space, and a 'digest'. The latter is
786 * computed by applying the keyed MD5 algorithm from [KEYED-MD5] where
787 * the key is a shared secret and the digested text is the timestamp
788 * (including angle-brackets).
791 hmac_md5 (ctl->password, strlen (ctl->password),
792 msg_id, strlen (msg_id),
793 response, sizeof (response));
796 snprintf (reply, sizeof (reply),
800 "%s %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
802 response[0], response[1], response[2], response[3],
803 response[4], response[5], response[6], response[7],
804 response[8], response[9], response[10], response[11],
805 response[12], response[13], response[14], response[15]);
807 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
808 report (stdout, "replying with %s\n", reply);
811 to64frombits (buf1, reply, strlen (reply));
812 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
813 report (stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
816 /* PMDF5.2 IMAP has a bug that requires this to be a single write */
817 strcat (buf1, "\r\n");
818 SockWrite (sock, buf1, strlen (buf1));
820 if ((result = gen_recv (sock, buf1, sizeof (buf1))))
823 if (strstr (buf1, "OK")) {
830 int imap_canonicalize(char *result, char *raw, int maxlen)
831 /* encode an IMAP password as per RFC1730's quoting conventions */
836 for (i = 0; i < strlen(raw) && i < maxlen; i++)
838 if ((raw[i] == '\\') || (raw[i] == '"'))
840 result[j++] = raw[i];
847 int imap_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting)
848 /* apply for connection authorization */
852 /* probe to see if we're running IMAP4 and can use RFC822.PEEK */
853 capabilities[0] = '\0';
854 if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "CAPABILITY")) == PS_SUCCESS)
856 /* UW-IMAP server 10.173 notifies in all caps */
857 if (strstr(capabilities, "IMAP4REV1"))
859 imap_version = IMAP4rev1;
860 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
861 report(stdout, _("Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 1\n"));
865 imap_version = IMAP4;
866 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
867 report(stdout, _("Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 0\n"));
870 else if (ok == PS_ERROR)
872 imap_version = IMAP2;
873 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
874 report(stdout, _("Protocol identified as IMAP2 or IMAP2BIS\n"));
879 peek_capable = (imap_version >= IMAP4);
882 * Assumption: expunges are cheap, so we want to do them
883 * after every message unless user said otherwise.
885 if (NUM_SPECIFIED(ctl->expunge))
886 expunge_period = NUM_VALUE_OUT(ctl->expunge);
894 if ((ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP) && strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=X-OTP"))
896 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
897 report(stdout, _("OTP authentication is supported\n"));
898 if (do_otp(sock, ctl) == PS_SUCCESS)
901 #endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
904 if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=GSSAPI"))
906 if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_GSS)
908 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
909 report(stdout, _("GSS authentication is supported\n"));
910 return do_gssauth(sock, ctl->server.truename, ctl->remotename);
913 else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_GSS)
916 _("Required GSS capability not supported by server\n"));
922 if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=KERBEROS_V4"))
924 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
925 report(stdout, _("KERBEROS_V4 authentication is supported\n"));
927 if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_K4)
929 if ((ok = do_rfc1731(sock, ctl->server.truename)))
931 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
932 report(stdout, "IMAP> *\n");
933 SockWrite(sock, "*\r\n", 3);
938 /* else fall through to ordinary AUTH=LOGIN case */
940 else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_K4)
943 _("Required KERBEROS_V4 capability not supported by server\n"));
946 #endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
948 if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=CRAM-MD5"))
950 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
951 report (stdout, _("CRAM-MD5 authentication is supported\n"));
952 if (ctl->server.protocol != P_IMAP_LOGIN)
954 if ((ok = do_cram_md5 (sock, ctl)))
956 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
957 report (stdout, "IMAP> *\n");
958 SockWrite (sock, "*\r\n", 3);
963 else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_CRAM_MD5)
966 _("Required CRAM-MD5 capability not supported by server\n"));
971 if (strstr (capabilities, "AUTH=NTLM"))
973 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
974 report (stdout, _("NTLM authentication is supported\n"));
975 return do_imap_ntlm (sock, ctl);
977 #endif /* NTLM_ENABLE */
979 #ifdef __UNUSED__ /* The Cyrus IMAP4rev1 server chokes on this */
980 /* this handles either AUTH=LOGIN or AUTH-LOGIN */
981 if ((imap_version >= IMAP4rev1) && (!strstr(capabilities, "LOGIN"))) {
983 _("Required LOGIN capability not supported by server\n"));
986 #endif /* __UNUSED__ */
989 /* these sizes guarantee no buffer overflow */
990 char remotename[NAMELEN*2+1], password[PASSWORDLEN*2+1];
992 imap_canonicalize(remotename, ctl->remotename, NAMELEN);
993 imap_canonicalize(password, ctl->password, PASSWORDLEN);
994 ok = gen_transact(sock, "LOGIN \"%s\" \"%s\"", remotename, password);
1003 static int internal_expunge(int sock)
1004 /* ship an expunge, resetting associated counters */
1008 if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "EXPUNGE")))
1011 expunged += deletions;
1014 #ifdef IMAP_UID /* not used */
1016 #endif /* IMAP_UID */
1021 static int imap_getrange(int sock,
1024 int *countp, int *newp, int *bytes)
1025 /* get range of messages to be fetched */
1029 /* find out how many messages are waiting */
1030 *bytes = recent = unseen = -1;
1035 * We have to have an expunge here, otherwise the re-poll will
1036 * infinite-loop picking up un-expunged messages -- unless the
1037 * expunge period is one and we've been nuking each message
1038 * just after deletion.
1041 if (deletions && expunge_period != 1)
1042 internal_expunge(sock);
1044 if (ok || gen_transact(sock, "NOOP"))
1046 report(stderr, _("re-poll failed\n"));
1049 else if (count == -1) /* no EXISTS response to NOOP */
1058 ok = gen_transact(sock, "SELECT %s", folder ? folder : "INBOX");
1060 ok = gen_transact(sock, "EXAMINE %s", folder ? folder : "INBOX");
1063 report(stderr, _("mailbox selection failed\n"));
1071 * Note: because IMAP has an is_old method, this number is used
1072 * only for the "X messages (Y unseen)" notification. Accordingly
1073 * it doesn't matter much that it can be wrong (e.g. if we see an
1074 * UNSEEN response but not all messages above the first UNSEEN one
1077 if (unseen >= 0) /* optional, but better if we see it */
1078 *newp = count - unseen + 1;
1079 else if (recent >= 0) /* mandatory */
1082 *newp = -1; /* should never happen, RECENT is mandatory */
1089 static int imap_getsizes(int sock, int count, int *sizes)
1090 /* capture the sizes of all messages */
1092 char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1];
1095 * Some servers (as in, PMDF5.1-9.1 under OpenVMS 6.1)
1096 * won't accept 1:1 as valid set syntax. Some implementors
1097 * should be taken out and shot for excessive anality.
1100 gen_send(sock, "FETCH 1 RFC822.SIZE", count);
1102 gen_send(sock, "FETCH 1:%d RFC822.SIZE", count);
1107 if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
1109 if (strstr(buf, "OK"))
1111 else if (sscanf(buf, "* %d FETCH (RFC822.SIZE %d)", &num, &size) == 2)
1112 sizes[num - 1] = size;
1118 static int imap_is_old(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
1119 /* is the given message old? */
1123 /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
1126 if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "FETCH %d FLAGS", number)) != 0)
1132 static int imap_fetch_headers(int sock, struct query *ctl,int number,int *lenp)
1133 /* request headers of nth message */
1135 char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1];
1138 /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
1142 * This is blessed by RFC1176, RFC1730, RFC2060.
1143 * According to the RFCs, it should *not* set the \Seen flag.
1145 gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.HEADER", number);
1147 /* looking for FETCH response */
1151 if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
1154 (sscanf(buf+2, "%d FETCH (%*s {%d}", &num, lenp) != 2);
1162 static int imap_fetch_body(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number, int *lenp)
1163 /* request body of nth message */
1165 char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1], *cp;
1168 /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
1172 * If we're using IMAP4, we can fetch the message without setting its
1173 * seen flag. This is good! It means that if the protocol exchange
1174 * craps out during the message, it will still be marked `unseen' on
1177 * However...*don't* do this if we're using keep to suppress deletion!
1178 * In that case, marking the seen flag is the only way to prevent the
1179 * message from being re-fetched on subsequent runs (and according
1180 * to RFC2060 p.43 this fetch should set Seen as a side effect).
1182 switch (imap_version)
1184 case IMAP4rev1: /* RFC 2060 */
1186 gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d BODY.PEEK[TEXT]", number);
1188 gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d BODY[TEXT]", number);
1191 case IMAP4: /* RFC 1730 */
1193 gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.TEXT.PEEK", number);
1195 gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.TEXT", number);
1198 default: /* RFC 1176 */
1199 gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.TEXT", number);
1203 /* looking for FETCH response */
1207 if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
1210 (!strstr(buf+4, "FETCH") || sscanf(buf+2, "%d", &num) != 1);
1216 * Try to extract a length from the FETCH response. RFC2060 requires
1217 * it to be present, but at least one IMAP server (Novell GroupWise)
1220 if ((cp = strchr(buf, '{')))
1221 *lenp = atoi(cp + 1);
1223 *lenp = -1; /* missing length part in FETCH reponse */
1228 static int imap_trail(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
1229 /* discard tail of FETCH response after reading message text */
1231 /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
1232 /* number -= expunged; */
1236 char buf[MSGBUFSIZE+1];
1239 if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
1242 /* UW IMAP returns "OK FETCH", Cyrus returns "OK Completed" */
1243 if (strstr(buf, "OK"))
1248 * Any IMAP server that fails to set Seen on a BODY[TEXT]
1249 * fetch violates RFC2060 p.43 (top). This becomes an issue
1250 * when keep is on, because seen messages aren't deleted and
1251 * get refetched on each poll. As a workaround, if keep is on
1252 * we can set the Seen flag explicitly.
1254 * This code isn't used yet because we don't know of any IMAP
1255 * servers broken in this way.
1258 if ((ok = gen_transact(sock,
1259 imap_version == IMAP4
1260 ? "STORE %d +FLAGS.SILENT (\\Seen)"
1261 : "STORE %d +FLAGS (\\Seen)",
1264 #endif /* __UNUSED__ */
1270 static int imap_delete(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
1271 /* set delete flag for given message */
1275 /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
1279 * Use SILENT if possible as a minor throughput optimization.
1280 * Note: this has been dropped from IMAP4rev1.
1282 * We set Seen because there are some IMAP servers (notably HP
1283 * OpenMail) that do message-receipt DSNs, but only when the seen
1284 * bit is set. This is the appropriate time -- we get here right
1285 * after the local SMTP response that says delivery was
1288 if ((ok = gen_transact(sock,
1289 imap_version == IMAP4
1290 ? "STORE %d +FLAGS.SILENT (\\Seen \\Deleted)"
1291 : "STORE %d +FLAGS (\\Seen \\Deleted)",
1298 * We do an expunge after expunge_period messages, rather than
1299 * just before quit, so that a line hit during a long session
1300 * won't result in lots of messages being fetched again during
1303 if (NUM_NONZERO(expunge_period) && (deletions % expunge_period) == 0)
1304 internal_expunge(sock);
1309 static int imap_logout(int sock, struct query *ctl)
1310 /* send logout command */
1312 /* if any un-expunged deletions remain, ship an expunge now */
1314 internal_expunge(sock);
1316 return(gen_transact(sock, "LOGOUT"));
1319 const static struct method imap =
1321 "IMAP", /* Internet Message Access Protocol */
1325 #else /* INET6_ENABLE */
1326 143, /* standard IMAP2bis/IMAP4 port */
1327 993, /* ssl IMAP2bis/IMAP4 port */
1328 #endif /* INET6_ENABLE */
1329 TRUE, /* this is a tagged protocol */
1330 FALSE, /* no message delimiter */
1331 imap_ok, /* parse command response */
1332 imap_canonicalize, /* deal with embedded slashes and spaces */
1333 imap_getauth, /* get authorization */
1334 imap_getrange, /* query range of messages */
1335 imap_getsizes, /* get sizes of messages (used for ESMTP SIZE option) */
1336 imap_is_old, /* no UID check */
1337 imap_fetch_headers, /* request given message headers */
1338 imap_fetch_body, /* request given message body */
1339 imap_trail, /* eat message trailer */
1340 imap_delete, /* delete the message */
1341 imap_logout, /* expunge and exit */
1342 TRUE, /* yes, we can re-poll */
1345 int doIMAP(struct query *ctl)
1346 /* retrieve messages using IMAP Version 2bis or Version 4 */
1348 return(do_protocol(ctl, &imap));
1351 /* imap.c ends here */