2 * imap.c -- IMAP2bis/IMAP4 protocol methods
4 * Copyright 1997 by Eric S. Raymond
5 * For license terms, see the file COPYING in this directory.
12 #if defined(STDC_HEADERS)
15 #include "fetchmail.h"
20 #include <kerberosIV/des.h>
21 #include <kerberosIV/krb.h>
23 #if defined (__bsdi__)
25 #define krb_get_err_text(e) (krb_err_txt[e])
27 #if defined(__NetBSD__) || (__FreeBSD__) || defined(__linux__)
28 #define krb_get_err_text(e) (krb_err_txt[e])
32 #endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
39 #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H
40 #include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
42 #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
43 #include <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h>
45 #ifndef HAVE_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE
46 #define GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE gss_nt_service_name
54 #endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
56 #ifndef strstr /* glibc-2.1 declares this as a macro */
57 extern char *strstr(); /* needed on sysV68 R3V7.1. */
60 /* imap_version values */
61 #define IMAP2 -1 /* IMAP2 or IMAP2BIS, RFC1176 */
62 #define IMAP4 0 /* IMAP4 rev 0, RFC1730 */
63 #define IMAP4rev1 1 /* IMAP4 rev 1, RFC2060 */
65 static int count, unseen, deletions, imap_version, preauth;
66 static int expunged, expunge_period, saved_timeout;
68 static char capabilities[MSGBUFSIZE+1];
69 static unsigned int *unseen_messages;
71 int imap_ok(int sock, char *argbuf)
72 /* parse command response */
74 char buf[MSGBUFSIZE+1];
80 if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
83 /* all tokens in responses are caseblind */
84 for (cp = buf; *cp; cp++)
88 /* interpret untagged status responses */
89 if (strstr(buf, "* CAPABILITY"))
90 strncpy(capabilities, buf + 12, sizeof(capabilities));
91 else if (strstr(buf, "EXISTS"))
95 * Nasty kluge to handle RFC2177 IDLE. If we know we're idling
96 * we can't wait for the tag matching the IDLE; we have to tell the
97 * server the IDLE is finished by shipping back a DONE when we
98 * see an EXISTS. Only after that will a tagged response be
99 * shipped. The idling flag also gets cleared on a timeout.
101 if (stage == STAGE_IDLE)
103 /* we do our own write and report here to disable tagging */
104 SockWrite(sock, "DONE\r\n", 6);
105 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
106 report(stdout, "IMAP> DONE\n");
108 mytimeout = saved_timeout;
112 else if (strstr(buf, "PREAUTH"))
115 (tag[0] != '\0' && strncmp(buf, tag, strlen(tag)));
128 for (cp = buf; !isspace(*cp); cp++)
133 if (strncmp(cp, "PREAUTH", 2) == 0)
140 else if (strncmp(cp, "OK", 2) == 0)
146 else if (strncmp(cp, "BAD", 3) == 0)
148 else if (strncmp(cp, "NO", 2) == 0)
150 if (stage == STAGE_GETAUTH)
151 return(PS_AUTHFAIL); /* RFC2060, 6.2.2 */
161 static int do_otp(int sock, struct query *ctl)
165 char challenge[OPIE_CHALLENGE_MAX+1];
166 char response[OPIE_RESPONSE_MAX+1];
168 gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE X-OTP");
170 if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
173 if ((i = from64tobits(challenge, buffer)) < 0) {
174 report(stderr, _("Could not decode initial BASE64 challenge\n"));
179 to64frombits(buffer, ctl->remotename, strlen(ctl->remotename));
181 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
182 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buffer);
184 /* best not to count on the challenge code handling multiple writes */
185 strcat(buffer, "\r\n");
186 SockWrite(sock, buffer, strlen(buffer));
188 if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
191 if ((i = from64tobits(challenge, buffer)) < 0) {
192 report(stderr, _("Could not decode OTP challenge\n"));
196 rval = opiegenerator(challenge, !strcmp(ctl->password, "opie") ? "" : ctl->password, response);
197 if ((rval == -2) && !run.poll_interval) {
198 char secret[OPIE_SECRET_MAX+1];
199 fprintf(stderr, _("Secret pass phrase: "));
200 if (opiereadpass(secret, sizeof(secret), 0))
201 rval = opiegenerator(challenge, secret, response);
202 memset(secret, 0, sizeof(secret));
208 to64frombits(buffer, response, strlen(response));
210 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
211 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buffer);
212 strcat(buffer, "\r\n");
213 SockWrite(sock, buffer, strlen(buffer));
215 if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
218 if (strstr(buffer, "OK"))
223 #endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
228 #elif SIZEOF_SHORT == 4
230 #elif SIZEOF_LONG == 4
233 #error Cannot deduce a 32-bit-type
236 static int do_rfc1731(int sock, char *truename)
237 /* authenticate as per RFC1731 -- note 32-bit integer requirement here */
240 char buf1[4096], buf2[4096];
244 } challenge1, challenge2;
245 char srvinst[INST_SZ];
247 char srvrealm[REALM_SZ];
248 KTEXT_ST authenticator;
249 CREDENTIALS credentials;
250 char tktuser[MAX_K_NAME_SZ+1+INST_SZ+1+REALM_SZ+1];
251 char tktinst[INST_SZ];
252 char tktrealm[REALM_SZ];
254 des_key_schedule schedule;
256 gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE KERBEROS_V4");
258 /* The data encoded in the first ready response contains a random
259 * 32-bit number in network byte order. The client should respond
260 * with a Kerberos ticket and an authenticator for the principal
261 * "imap.hostname@realm", where "hostname" is the first component
262 * of the host name of the server with all letters in lower case
263 * and where "realm" is the Kerberos realm of the server. The
264 * encrypted checksum field included within the Kerberos
265 * authenticator should contain the server provided 32-bit number
266 * in network byte order.
269 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
273 len = from64tobits(challenge1.cstr, buf1);
275 report(stderr, _("could not decode initial BASE64 challenge\n"));
279 /* this patch by Dan Root <dar@thekeep.org> solves an endianess
284 *(int *)tmp = ntohl(*(int *) challenge1.cstr);
285 memcpy(challenge1.cstr, tmp, sizeof(tmp));
288 /* Client responds with a Kerberos ticket and an authenticator for
289 * the principal "imap.hostname@realm" where "hostname" is the
290 * first component of the host name of the server with all letters
291 * in lower case and where "realm" is the Kerberos realm of the
292 * server. The encrypted checksum field included within the
293 * Kerberos authenticator should contain the server-provided
294 * 32-bit number in network byte order.
297 strncpy(srvinst, truename, (sizeof srvinst)-1);
298 srvinst[(sizeof srvinst)-1] = '\0';
299 for (p = srvinst; *p; p++) {
305 strncpy(srvrealm, (char *)krb_realmofhost(srvinst), (sizeof srvrealm)-1);
306 srvrealm[(sizeof srvrealm)-1] = '\0';
307 if (p = strchr(srvinst, '.')) {
311 result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm, 0);
313 report(stderr, "krb_mq_req: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
317 result = krb_get_cred("imap", srvinst, srvrealm, &credentials);
319 report(stderr, "krb_get_cred: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
323 memcpy(session, credentials.session, sizeof session);
324 memset(&credentials, 0, sizeof credentials);
325 des_key_sched(&session, schedule);
327 result = krb_get_tf_fullname(TKT_FILE, tktuser, tktinst, tktrealm);
329 report(stderr, "krb_get_tf_fullname: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
333 if (strcmp(tktuser, user) != 0) {
335 _("principal %s in ticket does not match -u %s\n"), tktuser,
342 _("non-null instance (%s) might cause strange behavior\n"),
344 strcat(tktuser, ".");
345 strcat(tktuser, tktinst);
348 if (strcmp(tktrealm, srvrealm) != 0) {
349 strcat(tktuser, "@");
350 strcat(tktuser, tktrealm);
353 result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm,
356 report(stderr, "krb_mq_req: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
360 to64frombits(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length);
361 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
362 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
364 strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
365 SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
367 /* Upon decrypting and verifying the ticket and authenticator, the
368 * server should verify that the contained checksum field equals
369 * the original server provided random 32-bit number. Should the
370 * verification be successful, the server must add one to the
371 * checksum and construct 8 octets of data, with the first four
372 * octets containing the incremented checksum in network byte
373 * order, the fifth octet containing a bit-mask specifying the
374 * protection mechanisms supported by the server, and the sixth
375 * through eighth octets containing, in network byte order, the
376 * maximum cipher-text buffer size the server is able to receive.
377 * The server must encrypt the 8 octets of data in the session key
378 * and issue that encrypted data in a second ready response. The
379 * client should consider the server authenticated if the first
380 * four octets the un-encrypted data is equal to one plus the
381 * checksum it previously sent.
384 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
387 /* The client must construct data with the first four octets
388 * containing the original server-issued checksum in network byte
389 * order, the fifth octet containing the bit-mask specifying the
390 * selected protection mechanism, the sixth through eighth octets
391 * containing in network byte order the maximum cipher-text buffer
392 * size the client is able to receive, and the following octets
393 * containing a user name string. The client must then append
394 * from one to eight octets so that the length of the data is a
395 * multiple of eight octets. The client must then PCBC encrypt the
396 * data with the session key and respond to the second ready
397 * response with the encrypted data. The server decrypts the data
398 * and verifies the contained checksum. The username field
399 * identifies the user for whom subsequent IMAP operations are to
400 * be performed; the server must verify that the principal
401 * identified in the Kerberos ticket is authorized to connect as
402 * that user. After these verifications, the authentication
403 * process is complete.
406 len = from64tobits(buf2, buf1);
408 report(stderr, _("could not decode BASE64 ready response\n"));
412 des_ecb_encrypt((des_cblock *)buf2, (des_cblock *)buf2, schedule, 0);
413 memcpy(challenge2.cstr, buf2, 4);
414 if (ntohl(challenge2.cint) != challenge1.cint + 1) {
415 report(stderr, _("challenge mismatch\n"));
419 memset(authenticator.dat, 0, sizeof authenticator.dat);
421 result = htonl(challenge1.cint);
422 memcpy(authenticator.dat, &result, sizeof result);
424 /* The protection mechanisms and their corresponding bit-masks are as
427 * 1 No protection mechanism
428 * 2 Integrity (krb_mk_safe) protection
429 * 4 Privacy (krb_mk_priv) protection
431 authenticator.dat[4] = 1;
433 len = strlen(tktuser);
434 strncpy(authenticator.dat+8, tktuser, len);
435 authenticator.length = len + 8 + 1;
436 while (authenticator.length & 7) {
437 authenticator.length++;
439 des_pcbc_encrypt((des_cblock *)authenticator.dat,
440 (des_cblock *)authenticator.dat, authenticator.length, schedule,
443 to64frombits(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length);
444 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
445 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
448 strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
449 SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
451 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
454 if (strstr(buf1, "OK")) {
461 #endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
464 #define GSSAUTH_P_NONE 1
465 #define GSSAUTH_P_INTEGRITY 2
466 #define GSSAUTH_P_PRIVACY 4
468 static int do_gssauth(int sock, char *hostname, char *username)
470 gss_buffer_desc request_buf, send_token;
471 gss_buffer_t sec_token;
472 gss_name_t target_name;
473 gss_ctx_id_t context;
477 OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat;
478 char buf1[8192], buf2[8192], server_conf_flags;
479 unsigned long buf_size;
482 /* first things first: get an imap ticket for host */
483 sprintf(buf1, "imap@%s", hostname);
484 request_buf.value = buf1;
485 request_buf.length = strlen(buf1) + 1;
486 maj_stat = gss_import_name(&min_stat, &request_buf, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE,
488 if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
489 report(stderr, _("Couldn't get service name for [%s]\n"), buf1);
492 else if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
493 maj_stat = gss_display_name(&min_stat, target_name, &request_buf,
495 report(stderr, _("Using service name [%s]\n"),request_buf.value);
496 maj_stat = gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &request_buf);
499 gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE GSSAPI");
501 /* upon receipt of the GSSAPI authentication request, server returns
502 * null data ready response. */
503 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
507 /* now start the security context initialisation loop... */
508 sec_token = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
509 context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
510 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
511 report(stdout, _("Sending credentials\n"));
513 send_token.length = 0;
514 send_token.value = NULL;
515 maj_stat = gss_init_sec_context(&min_stat,
520 GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG,
522 GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
528 if (maj_stat!=GSS_S_COMPLETE && maj_stat!=GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
529 report(stderr, _("Error exchanging credentials\n"));
530 gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
531 /* wake up server and await NO response */
532 SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
533 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
537 to64frombits(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length);
538 gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
539 strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
540 SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
541 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
542 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
543 if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
544 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
545 gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
548 request_buf.length = from64tobits(buf2, buf1 + 2);
549 request_buf.value = buf2;
550 sec_token = &request_buf;
552 } while (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
553 gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
555 /* get security flags and buffer size */
556 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
559 request_buf.length = from64tobits(buf2, buf1 + 2);
560 request_buf.value = buf2;
562 maj_stat = gss_unwrap(&min_stat, context, &request_buf, &send_token,
564 if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
565 report(stderr, _("Couldn't unwrap security level data\n"));
566 gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
569 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
570 report(stdout, _("Credential exchange complete\n"));
571 /* first octet is security levels supported. We want none, for now */
572 server_conf_flags = ((char *)send_token.value)[0];
573 if ( !(((char *)send_token.value)[0] & GSSAUTH_P_NONE) ) {
574 report(stderr, _("Server requires integrity and/or privacy\n"));
575 gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
578 ((char *)send_token.value)[0] = 0;
579 buf_size = ntohl(*((long *)send_token.value));
580 /* we don't care about buffer size if we don't wrap data */
581 gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
582 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
583 report(stdout, _("Unwrapped security level flags: %s%s%s\n"),
584 server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_NONE ? "N" : "-",
585 server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_INTEGRITY ? "I" : "-",
586 server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_PRIVACY ? "C" : "-");
587 report(stdout, _("Maximum GSS token size is %ld\n"),buf_size);
590 /* now respond in kind (hack!!!) */
591 buf_size = htonl(buf_size); /* do as they do... only matters if we do enc */
592 memcpy(buf1, &buf_size, 4);
593 buf1[0] = GSSAUTH_P_NONE;
594 strcpy(buf1+4, username); /* server decides if princ is user */
595 request_buf.length = 4 + strlen(username) + 1;
596 request_buf.value = buf1;
597 maj_stat = gss_wrap(&min_stat, context, 0, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, &request_buf,
598 &cflags, &send_token);
599 if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
600 report(stderr, _("Error creating security level request\n"));
603 to64frombits(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length);
604 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
605 report(stdout, _("Requesting authorization as %s\n"), username);
606 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n",buf1);
608 strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
609 SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
611 /* we should be done. Get status and finish up */
612 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
614 if (strstr(buf1, "OK")) {
615 /* flush security context */
616 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
617 report(stdout, _("Releasing GSS credentials\n"));
618 maj_stat = gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat, &context, &send_token);
619 if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
620 report(stderr, _("Error releasing credentials\n"));
623 /* send_token may contain a notification to the server to flush
624 * credentials. RFC 1731 doesn't specify what to do, and since this
625 * support is only for authentication, we'll assume the server
626 * knows enough to flush its own credentials */
627 gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
635 static void hmac_md5 (unsigned char *password, size_t pass_len,
636 unsigned char *challenge, size_t chal_len,
637 unsigned char *response, size_t resp_len)
640 unsigned char ipad[64];
641 unsigned char opad[64];
642 unsigned char hash_passwd[16];
649 if (pass_len > sizeof (ipad))
652 MD5Update (&ctx, password, pass_len);
653 MD5Final (hash_passwd, &ctx);
654 password = hash_passwd; pass_len = sizeof (hash_passwd);
657 memset (ipad, 0, sizeof (ipad));
658 memset (opad, 0, sizeof (opad));
659 memcpy (ipad, password, pass_len);
660 memcpy (opad, password, pass_len);
662 for (i=0; i<64; i++) {
668 MD5Update (&ctx, ipad, sizeof (ipad));
669 MD5Update (&ctx, challenge, chal_len);
670 MD5Final (response, &ctx);
673 MD5Update (&ctx, opad, sizeof (opad));
674 MD5Update (&ctx, response, resp_len);
675 MD5Final (response, &ctx);
681 static tSmbNtlmAuthRequest request;
682 static tSmbNtlmAuthChallenge challenge;
683 static tSmbNtlmAuthResponse response;
686 * NTLM support by Grant Edwards.
688 * Handle MS-Exchange NTLM authentication method. This is the same
689 * as the NTLM auth used by Samba for SMB related services. We just
690 * encode the packets in base64 instead of sending them out via a
693 * Much source (ntlm.h, smb*.c smb*.h) was borrowed from Samba.
696 static int do_imap_ntlm(int sock, struct query *ctl)
701 gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE NTLM");
703 if ((result = gen_recv(sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
706 if (msgbuf[0] != '+')
709 buildSmbNtlmAuthRequest(&request,ctl->remotename,NULL);
711 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
712 dumpSmbNtlmAuthRequest(stdout, &request);
714 memset(msgbuf,0,sizeof msgbuf);
715 to64frombits (msgbuf, (unsigned char*)&request, SmbLength(&request));
717 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
718 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", msgbuf);
720 strcat(msgbuf,"\r\n");
721 SockWrite (sock, msgbuf, strlen (msgbuf));
723 if ((gen_recv(sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
726 len = from64tobits ((unsigned char*)&challenge, msgbuf);
728 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
729 dumpSmbNtlmAuthChallenge(stdout, &challenge);
731 buildSmbNtlmAuthResponse(&challenge, &response,ctl->remotename,ctl->password);
733 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
734 dumpSmbNtlmAuthResponse(stdout, &response);
736 memset(msgbuf,0,sizeof msgbuf);
737 to64frombits (msgbuf, (unsigned char*)&response, SmbLength(&response));
739 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
740 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", msgbuf);
742 strcat(msgbuf,"\r\n");
744 SockWrite (sock, msgbuf, strlen (msgbuf));
746 if ((result = gen_recv (sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
749 if (strstr (msgbuf, "OK"))
756 static int do_cram_md5 (int sock, struct query *ctl)
757 /* authenticate as per RFC2195 */
761 unsigned char buf1[1024];
762 unsigned char msg_id[768];
763 unsigned char response[16];
764 unsigned char reply[1024];
766 gen_send (sock, "AUTHENTICATE CRAM-MD5");
769 * The data encoded in the first ready response contains an
770 * presumptively arbitrary string of random digits, a timestamp, and the
771 * fully-qualified primary host name of the server. The syntax of the
772 * unencoded form must correspond to that of an RFC 822 'msg-id'
773 * [RFC822] as described in [POP3].
776 if ((result = gen_recv (sock, buf1, sizeof (buf1)))) {
780 len = from64tobits (msg_id, buf1);
782 report (stderr, _("could not decode BASE64 challenge\n"));
784 } else if (len < sizeof (msg_id)) {
787 msg_id[sizeof (msg_id)-1] = 0;
789 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
790 report (stdout, "decoded as %s\n", msg_id);
793 /* The client makes note of the data and then responds with a string
794 * consisting of the user name, a space, and a 'digest'. The latter is
795 * computed by applying the keyed MD5 algorithm from [KEYED-MD5] where
796 * the key is a shared secret and the digested text is the timestamp
797 * (including angle-brackets).
800 hmac_md5 (ctl->password, strlen (ctl->password),
801 msg_id, strlen (msg_id),
802 response, sizeof (response));
805 snprintf (reply, sizeof (reply),
809 "%s %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
811 response[0], response[1], response[2], response[3],
812 response[4], response[5], response[6], response[7],
813 response[8], response[9], response[10], response[11],
814 response[12], response[13], response[14], response[15]);
816 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
817 report (stdout, "replying with %s\n", reply);
820 to64frombits (buf1, reply, strlen (reply));
821 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
822 report (stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
825 /* PMDF5.2 IMAP has a bug that requires this to be a single write */
826 strcat (buf1, "\r\n");
827 SockWrite (sock, buf1, strlen (buf1));
829 if ((result = gen_recv (sock, buf1, sizeof (buf1))))
832 if (strstr (buf1, "OK")) {
839 int imap_canonicalize(char *result, char *raw, int maxlen)
840 /* encode an IMAP password as per RFC1730's quoting conventions */
845 for (i = 0; i < strlen(raw) && i < maxlen; i++)
847 if ((raw[i] == '\\') || (raw[i] == '"'))
849 result[j++] = raw[i];
856 int imap_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting)
857 /* apply for connection authorization */
861 /* probe to see if we're running IMAP4 and can use RFC822.PEEK */
862 capabilities[0] = '\0';
864 if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "CAPABILITY")) == PS_SUCCESS)
866 /* UW-IMAP server 10.173 notifies in all caps */
867 if (strstr(capabilities, "IMAP4REV1"))
869 imap_version = IMAP4rev1;
870 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
871 report(stdout, _("Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 1\n"));
875 imap_version = IMAP4;
876 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
877 report(stdout, _("Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 0\n"));
880 else if (ok == PS_ERROR)
882 imap_version = IMAP2;
883 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
884 report(stdout, _("Protocol identified as IMAP2 or IMAP2BIS\n"));
889 peek_capable = (imap_version >= IMAP4);
892 * Assumption: expunges are cheap, so we want to do them
893 * after every message unless user said otherwise.
895 if (NUM_SPECIFIED(ctl->expunge))
896 expunge_period = NUM_VALUE_OUT(ctl->expunge);
901 * If either (a) we saw a PREAUTH token in the capability response, or
902 * (b) the user specified ssh preauthentication, then we're done.
904 if (preauth || ctl->server.preauthenticate == A_SSH)
908 * Handle idling. We depend on coming through here on startup
909 * and after each timeout (including timeouts during idles).
911 if (strstr(capabilities, "IDLE") && ctl->idle)
914 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
915 report(stdout, "will idle after poll\n");
919 if ((ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP) && strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=X-OTP"))
921 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
922 report(stdout, _("OTP authentication is supported\n"));
923 if (do_otp(sock, ctl) == PS_SUCCESS)
926 #endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
929 if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=GSSAPI"))
931 if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_GSS)
933 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
934 report(stdout, _("GSS authentication is supported\n"));
935 return do_gssauth(sock, ctl->server.truename, ctl->remotename);
938 else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_GSS)
941 _("Required GSS capability not supported by server\n"));
947 if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=KERBEROS_V4"))
949 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
950 report(stdout, _("KERBEROS_V4 authentication is supported\n"));
952 if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_K4)
954 if ((ok = do_rfc1731(sock, ctl->server.truename)))
956 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
957 report(stdout, "IMAP> *\n");
958 SockWrite(sock, "*\r\n", 3);
963 /* else fall through to ordinary AUTH=LOGIN case */
965 else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_K4)
968 _("Required KERBEROS_V4 capability not supported by server\n"));
971 #endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
973 if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=CRAM-MD5"))
975 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
976 report (stdout, _("CRAM-MD5 authentication is supported\n"));
977 if (ctl->server.protocol != P_IMAP_LOGIN)
979 if ((ok = do_cram_md5 (sock, ctl)))
981 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
982 report (stdout, "IMAP> *\n");
983 SockWrite (sock, "*\r\n", 3);
988 else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_CRAM_MD5)
991 _("Required CRAM-MD5 capability not supported by server\n"));
996 if (strstr (capabilities, "AUTH=NTLM"))
998 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
999 report (stdout, _("NTLM authentication is supported\n"));
1000 return do_imap_ntlm (sock, ctl);
1002 #endif /* NTLM_ENABLE */
1004 #ifdef __UNUSED__ /* The Cyrus IMAP4rev1 server chokes on this */
1005 /* this handles either AUTH=LOGIN or AUTH-LOGIN */
1006 if ((imap_version >= IMAP4rev1) && (!strstr(capabilities, "LOGIN"))) {
1008 _("Required LOGIN capability not supported by server\n"));
1011 #endif /* __UNUSED__ */
1014 /* these sizes guarantee no buffer overflow */
1015 char remotename[NAMELEN*2+1], password[PASSWORDLEN*2+1];
1017 imap_canonicalize(remotename, ctl->remotename, NAMELEN);
1018 imap_canonicalize(password, ctl->password, PASSWORDLEN);
1019 ok = gen_transact(sock, "LOGIN \"%s\" \"%s\"", remotename, password);
1028 static int internal_expunge(int sock)
1029 /* ship an expunge, resetting associated counters */
1033 if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "EXPUNGE")))
1036 expunged += deletions;
1037 unseen -= deletions;
1040 #ifdef IMAP_UID /* not used */
1042 #endif /* IMAP_UID */
1047 static int imap_getrange(int sock,
1050 int *countp, int *newp, int *bytes)
1051 /* get range of messages to be fetched */
1054 char buf[MSGBUFSIZE+1], *cp;
1056 /* find out how many messages are waiting */
1062 * We have to have an expunge here, otherwise the re-poll will
1063 * infinite-loop picking up un-expunged messages -- unless the
1064 * expunge period is one and we've been nuking each message
1065 * just after deletion.
1068 if (deletions && expunge_period != 1)
1069 ok = internal_expunge(sock);
1074 saved_timeout = mytimeout;
1077 if (ok || gen_transact(sock, do_idle ? "IDLE" : "NOOP"))
1079 report(stderr, _("re-poll failed\n"));
1082 else if (count == -1) /* no EXISTS response to NOOP/IDLE */
1089 ok = gen_transact(sock,
1090 check_only ? "EXAMINE \"%s\"" : "SELECT \"%s\"",
1091 folder ? folder : "INBOX");
1094 report(stderr, _("mailbox selection failed\n"));
1101 /* OK, now get a count of unseen messages and their indices */
1103 if (unseen_messages)
1104 free(unseen_messages);
1105 unseen_messages = xmalloc(count * sizeof(unsigned int));
1106 memset(unseen_messages, 0, count * sizeof(unsigned int));
1109 gen_send(sock, "SEARCH UNSEEN");
1111 ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf));
1114 report(stderr, _("search for unseen messages failed\n"));
1115 return(PS_PROTOCOL);
1117 else if ((cp = strstr(buf, "* SEARCH")))
1121 cp += 8; /* skip "* SEARCH" */
1123 while (*cp && unseen < count)
1125 /* skip whitespace */
1126 while (*cp && isspace(*cp))
1131 * Message numbers are between 1 and 2^32 inclusive,
1132 * so unsigned int is large enough.
1134 unseen_messages[unseen]=(unsigned int)strtol(cp,&ep,10);
1136 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
1138 _("%u is unseen\n"),
1139 unseen_messages[unseen]);
1147 (tag[0] != '\0' && strncmp(buf, tag, strlen(tag)));
1155 static int imap_getsizes(int sock, int count, int *sizes)
1156 /* capture the sizes of all messages */
1158 char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1];
1161 * Some servers (as in, PMDF5.1-9.1 under OpenVMS 6.1)
1162 * won't accept 1:1 as valid set syntax. Some implementors
1163 * should be taken out and shot for excessive anality.
1165 * Microsoft Exchange (brain-dead piece of crap that it is)
1166 * sometimes gets its knickers in a knot about bodiless messages.
1167 * You may see responses like this:
1169 * fetchmail: IMAP> A0004 FETCH 1:9 RFC822.SIZE
1170 * fetchmail: IMAP< * 2 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 1187)
1171 * fetchmail: IMAP< * 3 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 3954)
1172 * fetchmail: IMAP< * 4 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 1944)
1173 * fetchmail: IMAP< * 5 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 2933)
1174 * fetchmail: IMAP< * 6 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 1854)
1175 * fetchmail: IMAP< * 7 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 34054)
1176 * fetchmail: IMAP< * 8 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 5561)
1177 * fetchmail: IMAP< * 9 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 1101)
1178 * fetchmail: IMAP< A0004 NO The requested item could not be found.
1180 * This means message 1 has only headers. For kicks and grins
1181 * you can telnet in and look:
1183 * A003 NO The requested item could not be found.
1184 * A004 fetch 1 rfc822.header
1185 * A004 NO The requested item could not be found.
1187 * * 1 FETCH (BODY ("TEXT" "PLAIN" ("CHARSET" "US-ASCII") NIL NIL "7BIT" 35 3))
1188 * A006 OK FETCH completed.
1190 * To get around this, we terminate the read loop on a NO and count
1191 * on the fact that the sizes array has been preinitialized with a
1192 * known-bad size value.
1195 gen_send(sock, "FETCH 1 RFC822.SIZE", count);
1197 gen_send(sock, "FETCH 1:%d RFC822.SIZE", count);
1202 if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
1204 else if (strstr(buf, "OK") || strstr(buf, "NO"))
1206 else if (sscanf(buf, "* %d FETCH (RFC822.SIZE %d)", &num, &size) == 2)
1207 sizes[num - 1] = size;
1213 static int imap_is_old(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
1214 /* is the given message old? */
1220 * Expunges change the fetch numbers, but unseen_messages contains
1221 * indices from before any expungees were done. So neither the
1222 * argument nor the values in message_sequence need to be decremented.
1226 for (i = 0; i < unseen; i++)
1227 if (unseen_messages[i] == number)
1236 static int imap_fetch_headers(int sock, struct query *ctl,int number,int *lenp)
1237 /* request headers of nth message */
1239 char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1];
1242 /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
1246 * This is blessed by RFC1176, RFC1730, RFC2060.
1247 * According to the RFCs, it should *not* set the \Seen flag.
1249 gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.HEADER", number);
1251 /* looking for FETCH response */
1255 if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
1258 (sscanf(buf+2, "%d FETCH (%*s {%d}", &num, lenp) != 2);
1266 static int imap_fetch_body(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number, int *lenp)
1267 /* request body of nth message */
1269 char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1], *cp;
1272 /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
1276 * If we're using IMAP4, we can fetch the message without setting its
1277 * seen flag. This is good! It means that if the protocol exchange
1278 * craps out during the message, it will still be marked `unseen' on
1281 * However...*don't* do this if we're using keep to suppress deletion!
1282 * In that case, marking the seen flag is the only way to prevent the
1283 * message from being re-fetched on subsequent runs (and according
1284 * to RFC2060 p.43 this fetch should set Seen as a side effect).
1286 * According to RFC2060, and Mark Crispin the IMAP maintainer,
1287 * FETCH %d BODY[TEXT] and RFC822.TEXT are "functionally
1288 * equivalent". However, we know of at least one server that
1289 * treats them differently in the presence of MIME attachments;
1290 * the latter form downloads the attachment, the former does not.
1291 * The server is InterChange, and the fool who implemented this
1292 * misfeature ought to be strung up by his thumbs.
1294 * When I tried working around this by disable use of the 4rev1 form,
1295 * I found that doing this breaks operation with M$ Exchange.
1296 * Annoyingly enough, Exchange's refusal to cope is technically legal
1297 * under RFC2062. Trust Microsoft, the Great Enemy of interoperability
1298 * standards, to find a way to make standards compliance irritating....
1300 switch (imap_version)
1302 case IMAP4rev1: /* RFC 2060 */
1304 gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d BODY.PEEK[TEXT]", number);
1306 gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d BODY[TEXT]", number);
1309 case IMAP4: /* RFC 1730 */
1311 gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.TEXT.PEEK", number);
1313 gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.TEXT", number);
1316 default: /* RFC 1176 */
1317 gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.TEXT", number);
1321 /* looking for FETCH response */
1325 if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
1328 (!strstr(buf+4, "FETCH") || sscanf(buf+2, "%d", &num) != 1);
1334 * Try to extract a length from the FETCH response. RFC2060 requires
1335 * it to be present, but at least one IMAP server (Novell GroupWise)
1338 if ((cp = strchr(buf, '{')))
1339 *lenp = atoi(cp + 1);
1341 *lenp = -1; /* missing length part in FETCH reponse */
1346 static int imap_trail(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
1347 /* discard tail of FETCH response after reading message text */
1349 /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
1350 /* number -= expunged; */
1354 char buf[MSGBUFSIZE+1];
1357 if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
1360 /* UW IMAP returns "OK FETCH", Cyrus returns "OK Completed" */
1361 if (strstr(buf, "OK"))
1366 * Any IMAP server that fails to set Seen on a BODY[TEXT]
1367 * fetch violates RFC2060 p.43 (top). This becomes an issue
1368 * when keep is on, because seen messages aren't deleted and
1369 * get refetched on each poll. As a workaround, if keep is on
1370 * we can set the Seen flag explicitly.
1372 * This code isn't used yet because we don't know of any IMAP
1373 * servers broken in this way.
1376 if ((ok = gen_transact(sock,
1377 imap_version == IMAP4
1378 ? "STORE %d +FLAGS.SILENT (\\Seen)"
1379 : "STORE %d +FLAGS (\\Seen)",
1382 #endif /* __UNUSED__ */
1388 static int imap_delete(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
1389 /* set delete flag for given message */
1393 /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
1397 * Use SILENT if possible as a minor throughput optimization.
1398 * Note: this has been dropped from IMAP4rev1.
1400 * We set Seen because there are some IMAP servers (notably HP
1401 * OpenMail) that do message-receipt DSNs, but only when the seen
1402 * bit is set. This is the appropriate time -- we get here right
1403 * after the local SMTP response that says delivery was
1406 if ((ok = gen_transact(sock,
1407 imap_version == IMAP4
1408 ? "STORE %d +FLAGS.SILENT (\\Seen \\Deleted)"
1409 : "STORE %d +FLAGS (\\Seen \\Deleted)",
1416 * We do an expunge after expunge_period messages, rather than
1417 * just before quit, so that a line hit during a long session
1418 * won't result in lots of messages being fetched again during
1421 if (NUM_NONZERO(expunge_period) && (deletions % expunge_period) == 0)
1422 internal_expunge(sock);
1427 static int imap_logout(int sock, struct query *ctl)
1428 /* send logout command */
1430 /* if any un-expunged deletions remain, ship an expunge now */
1432 internal_expunge(sock);
1435 /* Memory clean-up */
1436 if (unseen_messages)
1437 free(unseen_messages);
1438 #endif /* USE_SEARCH */
1440 return(gen_transact(sock, "LOGOUT"));
1443 const static struct method imap =
1445 "IMAP", /* Internet Message Access Protocol */
1449 #else /* INET6_ENABLE */
1450 143, /* standard IMAP2bis/IMAP4 port */
1451 993, /* ssl IMAP2bis/IMAP4 port */
1452 #endif /* INET6_ENABLE */
1453 TRUE, /* this is a tagged protocol */
1454 FALSE, /* no message delimiter */
1455 imap_ok, /* parse command response */
1456 imap_canonicalize, /* deal with embedded slashes and spaces */
1457 imap_getauth, /* get authorization */
1458 imap_getrange, /* query range of messages */
1459 imap_getsizes, /* get sizes of messages (used for ESMTP SIZE option) */
1460 imap_is_old, /* no UID check */
1461 imap_fetch_headers, /* request given message headers */
1462 imap_fetch_body, /* request given message body */
1463 imap_trail, /* eat message trailer */
1464 imap_delete, /* delete the message */
1465 imap_logout, /* expunge and exit */
1466 TRUE, /* yes, we can re-poll */
1469 int doIMAP(struct query *ctl)
1470 /* retrieve messages using IMAP Version 2bis or Version 4 */
1472 return(do_protocol(ctl, &imap));
1475 /* imap.c ends here */