2 * imap.c -- IMAP2bis/IMAP4 protocol methods
4 * Copyright 1997 by Eric S. Raymond
5 * For license terms, see the file COPYING in this directory.
12 #if defined(STDC_HEADERS)
15 #include "fetchmail.h"
20 #include <kerberosIV/des.h>
21 #include <kerberosIV/krb.h>
23 #if defined (__bsdi__)
25 #define krb_get_err_text(e) (krb_err_txt[e])
27 #if defined(__NetBSD__) || (__FreeBSD__) || defined(__linux__)
28 #define krb_get_err_text(e) (krb_err_txt[e])
32 #endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
39 #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H
40 #include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
42 #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
43 #include <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h>
45 #ifndef HAVE_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE
46 #define GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE gss_nt_service_name
54 #endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
56 #ifndef strstr /* glibc-2.1 declares this as a macro */
57 extern char *strstr(); /* needed on sysV68 R3V7.1. */
60 /* imap_version values */
61 #define IMAP2 -1 /* IMAP2 or IMAP2BIS, RFC1176 */
62 #define IMAP4 0 /* IMAP4 rev 0, RFC1730 */
63 #define IMAP4rev1 1 /* IMAP4 rev 1, RFC2060 */
65 static int count, seen, recent, unseen, deletions, imap_version, preauth;
66 static int expunged, expunge_period;
67 static flag do_idle, idling;
68 static char capabilities[MSGBUFSIZE+1];
70 int imap_ok(int sock, char *argbuf)
71 /* parse command response */
73 char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1];
80 if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
83 /* all tokens in responses are caseblind */
84 for (cp = buf; *cp; cp++)
88 /* interpret untagged status responses */
89 if (strstr(buf, "* CAPABILITY"))
90 strncpy(capabilities, buf + 12, sizeof(capabilities));
91 if (strstr(buf, "EXISTS"))
95 * Nasty kluge to handle RFC2177 IDLE. If we know we're idling
96 * we can't wait for the tag matching the IDLE; we have to tell the
97 * server the IDLE is finished by shipping back a DONE when we
98 * see an EXISTS. Only after that will a tagged response be
99 * shipped. The idling flag also gets cleared on a timeout.
103 gen_send(sock, "DONE");
107 if (strstr(buf, "RECENT"))
108 recent = atoi(buf+2);
109 if (strstr(buf, "UNSEEN"))
114 * Handle both "* 42 UNSEEN" (if tha ever happens) and
115 * "* OK [UNSEEN 42] 42". Note that what this gets us is
116 * a minimum index, not a count.
119 for (cp = buf; *cp && !isdigit(*cp); cp++)
123 if (strstr(buf, "FLAGS"))
124 seen = (strstr(buf, "SEEN") != (char *)NULL);
125 if (strstr(buf, "PREAUTH"))
128 (tag[0] != '\0' && strncmp(buf, tag, strlen(tag)));
141 for (cp = buf; !isspace(*cp); cp++)
146 if (strncmp(cp, "PREAUTH", 2) == 0)
153 else if (strncmp(cp, "OK", 2) == 0)
159 else if (strncmp(cp, "BAD", 3) == 0)
161 else if (strncmp(cp, "NO", 2) == 0)
163 if (stage == STAGE_GETAUTH)
164 return(PS_AUTHFAIL); /* RFC2060, 6.2.2 */
174 static int do_otp(int sock, struct query *ctl)
178 char challenge[OPIE_CHALLENGE_MAX+1];
179 char response[OPIE_RESPONSE_MAX+1];
181 gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE X-OTP");
183 if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
186 if ((i = from64tobits(challenge, buffer)) < 0) {
187 report(stderr, _("Could not decode initial BASE64 challenge\n"));
192 to64frombits(buffer, ctl->remotename, strlen(ctl->remotename));
194 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
195 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buffer);
197 /* best not to count on the challenge code handling multiple writes */
198 strcat(buffer, "\r\n");
199 SockWrite(sock, buffer, strlen(buffer));
201 if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
204 if ((i = from64tobits(challenge, buffer)) < 0) {
205 report(stderr, _("Could not decode OTP challenge\n"));
209 rval = opiegenerator(challenge, !strcmp(ctl->password, "opie") ? "" : ctl->password, response);
210 if ((rval == -2) && !run.poll_interval) {
211 char secret[OPIE_SECRET_MAX+1];
212 fprintf(stderr, _("Secret pass phrase: "));
213 if (opiereadpass(secret, sizeof(secret), 0))
214 rval = opiegenerator(challenge, secret, response);
215 memset(secret, 0, sizeof(secret));
221 to64frombits(buffer, response, strlen(response));
223 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
224 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buffer);
225 strcat(buffer, "\r\n");
226 SockWrite(sock, buffer, strlen(buffer));
228 if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
231 if (strstr(buffer, "OK"))
236 #endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
241 #elif SIZEOF_SHORT == 4
243 #elif SIZEOF_LONG == 4
246 #error Cannot deduce a 32-bit-type
249 static int do_rfc1731(int sock, char *truename)
250 /* authenticate as per RFC1731 -- note 32-bit integer requirement here */
253 char buf1[4096], buf2[4096];
257 } challenge1, challenge2;
258 char srvinst[INST_SZ];
260 char srvrealm[REALM_SZ];
261 KTEXT_ST authenticator;
262 CREDENTIALS credentials;
263 char tktuser[MAX_K_NAME_SZ+1+INST_SZ+1+REALM_SZ+1];
264 char tktinst[INST_SZ];
265 char tktrealm[REALM_SZ];
267 des_key_schedule schedule;
269 gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE KERBEROS_V4");
271 /* The data encoded in the first ready response contains a random
272 * 32-bit number in network byte order. The client should respond
273 * with a Kerberos ticket and an authenticator for the principal
274 * "imap.hostname@realm", where "hostname" is the first component
275 * of the host name of the server with all letters in lower case
276 * and where "realm" is the Kerberos realm of the server. The
277 * encrypted checksum field included within the Kerberos
278 * authenticator should contain the server provided 32-bit number
279 * in network byte order.
282 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
286 len = from64tobits(challenge1.cstr, buf1);
288 report(stderr, _("could not decode initial BASE64 challenge\n"));
292 /* this patch by Dan Root <dar@thekeep.org> solves an endianess
297 *(int *)tmp = ntohl(*(int *) challenge1.cstr);
298 memcpy(challenge1.cstr, tmp, sizeof(tmp));
301 /* Client responds with a Kerberos ticket and an authenticator for
302 * the principal "imap.hostname@realm" where "hostname" is the
303 * first component of the host name of the server with all letters
304 * in lower case and where "realm" is the Kerberos realm of the
305 * server. The encrypted checksum field included within the
306 * Kerberos authenticator should contain the server-provided
307 * 32-bit number in network byte order.
310 strncpy(srvinst, truename, (sizeof srvinst)-1);
311 srvinst[(sizeof srvinst)-1] = '\0';
312 for (p = srvinst; *p; p++) {
318 strncpy(srvrealm, (char *)krb_realmofhost(srvinst), (sizeof srvrealm)-1);
319 srvrealm[(sizeof srvrealm)-1] = '\0';
320 if (p = strchr(srvinst, '.')) {
324 result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm, 0);
326 report(stderr, "krb_mq_req: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
330 result = krb_get_cred("imap", srvinst, srvrealm, &credentials);
332 report(stderr, "krb_get_cred: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
336 memcpy(session, credentials.session, sizeof session);
337 memset(&credentials, 0, sizeof credentials);
338 des_key_sched(&session, schedule);
340 result = krb_get_tf_fullname(TKT_FILE, tktuser, tktinst, tktrealm);
342 report(stderr, "krb_get_tf_fullname: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
346 if (strcmp(tktuser, user) != 0) {
348 _("principal %s in ticket does not match -u %s\n"), tktuser,
355 _("non-null instance (%s) might cause strange behavior\n"),
357 strcat(tktuser, ".");
358 strcat(tktuser, tktinst);
361 if (strcmp(tktrealm, srvrealm) != 0) {
362 strcat(tktuser, "@");
363 strcat(tktuser, tktrealm);
366 result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm,
369 report(stderr, "krb_mq_req: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
373 to64frombits(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length);
374 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
375 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
377 strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
378 SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
380 /* Upon decrypting and verifying the ticket and authenticator, the
381 * server should verify that the contained checksum field equals
382 * the original server provided random 32-bit number. Should the
383 * verification be successful, the server must add one to the
384 * checksum and construct 8 octets of data, with the first four
385 * octets containing the incremented checksum in network byte
386 * order, the fifth octet containing a bit-mask specifying the
387 * protection mechanisms supported by the server, and the sixth
388 * through eighth octets containing, in network byte order, the
389 * maximum cipher-text buffer size the server is able to receive.
390 * The server must encrypt the 8 octets of data in the session key
391 * and issue that encrypted data in a second ready response. The
392 * client should consider the server authenticated if the first
393 * four octets the un-encrypted data is equal to one plus the
394 * checksum it previously sent.
397 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
400 /* The client must construct data with the first four octets
401 * containing the original server-issued checksum in network byte
402 * order, the fifth octet containing the bit-mask specifying the
403 * selected protection mechanism, the sixth through eighth octets
404 * containing in network byte order the maximum cipher-text buffer
405 * size the client is able to receive, and the following octets
406 * containing a user name string. The client must then append
407 * from one to eight octets so that the length of the data is a
408 * multiple of eight octets. The client must then PCBC encrypt the
409 * data with the session key and respond to the second ready
410 * response with the encrypted data. The server decrypts the data
411 * and verifies the contained checksum. The username field
412 * identifies the user for whom subsequent IMAP operations are to
413 * be performed; the server must verify that the principal
414 * identified in the Kerberos ticket is authorized to connect as
415 * that user. After these verifications, the authentication
416 * process is complete.
419 len = from64tobits(buf2, buf1);
421 report(stderr, _("could not decode BASE64 ready response\n"));
425 des_ecb_encrypt((des_cblock *)buf2, (des_cblock *)buf2, schedule, 0);
426 memcpy(challenge2.cstr, buf2, 4);
427 if (ntohl(challenge2.cint) != challenge1.cint + 1) {
428 report(stderr, _("challenge mismatch\n"));
432 memset(authenticator.dat, 0, sizeof authenticator.dat);
434 result = htonl(challenge1.cint);
435 memcpy(authenticator.dat, &result, sizeof result);
437 /* The protection mechanisms and their corresponding bit-masks are as
440 * 1 No protection mechanism
441 * 2 Integrity (krb_mk_safe) protection
442 * 4 Privacy (krb_mk_priv) protection
444 authenticator.dat[4] = 1;
446 len = strlen(tktuser);
447 strncpy(authenticator.dat+8, tktuser, len);
448 authenticator.length = len + 8 + 1;
449 while (authenticator.length & 7) {
450 authenticator.length++;
452 des_pcbc_encrypt((des_cblock *)authenticator.dat,
453 (des_cblock *)authenticator.dat, authenticator.length, schedule,
456 to64frombits(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length);
457 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
458 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
461 strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
462 SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
464 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
467 if (strstr(buf1, "OK")) {
474 #endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
477 #define GSSAUTH_P_NONE 1
478 #define GSSAUTH_P_INTEGRITY 2
479 #define GSSAUTH_P_PRIVACY 4
481 static int do_gssauth(int sock, char *hostname, char *username)
483 gss_buffer_desc request_buf, send_token;
484 gss_buffer_t sec_token;
485 gss_name_t target_name;
486 gss_ctx_id_t context;
490 OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat;
491 char buf1[8192], buf2[8192], server_conf_flags;
492 unsigned long buf_size;
495 /* first things first: get an imap ticket for host */
496 sprintf(buf1, "imap@%s", hostname);
497 request_buf.value = buf1;
498 request_buf.length = strlen(buf1) + 1;
499 maj_stat = gss_import_name(&min_stat, &request_buf, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE,
501 if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
502 report(stderr, _("Couldn't get service name for [%s]\n"), buf1);
505 else if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
506 maj_stat = gss_display_name(&min_stat, target_name, &request_buf,
508 report(stderr, _("Using service name [%s]\n"),request_buf.value);
509 maj_stat = gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &request_buf);
512 gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE GSSAPI");
514 /* upon receipt of the GSSAPI authentication request, server returns
515 * null data ready response. */
516 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
520 /* now start the security context initialisation loop... */
521 sec_token = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
522 context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
523 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
524 report(stdout, _("Sending credentials\n"));
526 send_token.length = 0;
527 send_token.value = NULL;
528 maj_stat = gss_init_sec_context(&min_stat,
533 GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG,
535 GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
541 if (maj_stat!=GSS_S_COMPLETE && maj_stat!=GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
542 report(stderr, _("Error exchanging credentials\n"));
543 gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
544 /* wake up server and await NO response */
545 SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
546 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
550 to64frombits(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length);
551 gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
552 strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
553 SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
554 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
555 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
556 if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
557 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
558 gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
561 request_buf.length = from64tobits(buf2, buf1 + 2);
562 request_buf.value = buf2;
563 sec_token = &request_buf;
565 } while (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
566 gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
568 /* get security flags and buffer size */
569 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
572 request_buf.length = from64tobits(buf2, buf1 + 2);
573 request_buf.value = buf2;
575 maj_stat = gss_unwrap(&min_stat, context, &request_buf, &send_token,
577 if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
578 report(stderr, _("Couldn't unwrap security level data\n"));
579 gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
582 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
583 report(stdout, _("Credential exchange complete\n"));
584 /* first octet is security levels supported. We want none, for now */
585 server_conf_flags = ((char *)send_token.value)[0];
586 if ( !(((char *)send_token.value)[0] & GSSAUTH_P_NONE) ) {
587 report(stderr, _("Server requires integrity and/or privacy\n"));
588 gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
591 ((char *)send_token.value)[0] = 0;
592 buf_size = ntohl(*((long *)send_token.value));
593 /* we don't care about buffer size if we don't wrap data */
594 gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
595 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
596 report(stdout, _("Unwrapped security level flags: %s%s%s\n"),
597 server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_NONE ? "N" : "-",
598 server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_INTEGRITY ? "I" : "-",
599 server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_PRIVACY ? "C" : "-");
600 report(stdout, _("Maximum GSS token size is %ld\n"),buf_size);
603 /* now respond in kind (hack!!!) */
604 buf_size = htonl(buf_size); /* do as they do... only matters if we do enc */
605 memcpy(buf1, &buf_size, 4);
606 buf1[0] = GSSAUTH_P_NONE;
607 strcpy(buf1+4, username); /* server decides if princ is user */
608 request_buf.length = 4 + strlen(username) + 1;
609 request_buf.value = buf1;
610 maj_stat = gss_wrap(&min_stat, context, 0, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, &request_buf,
611 &cflags, &send_token);
612 if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
613 report(stderr, _("Error creating security level request\n"));
616 to64frombits(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length);
617 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
618 report(stdout, _("Requesting authorization as %s\n"), username);
619 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n",buf1);
621 strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
622 SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
624 /* we should be done. Get status and finish up */
625 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
627 if (strstr(buf1, "OK")) {
628 /* flush security context */
629 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
630 report(stdout, _("Releasing GSS credentials\n"));
631 maj_stat = gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat, &context, &send_token);
632 if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
633 report(stderr, _("Error releasing credentials\n"));
636 /* send_token may contain a notification to the server to flush
637 * credentials. RFC 1731 doesn't specify what to do, and since this
638 * support is only for authentication, we'll assume the server
639 * knows enough to flush its own credentials */
640 gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
648 static void hmac_md5 (unsigned char *password, size_t pass_len,
649 unsigned char *challenge, size_t chal_len,
650 unsigned char *response, size_t resp_len)
653 unsigned char ipad[64];
654 unsigned char opad[64];
655 unsigned char hash_passwd[16];
662 if (pass_len > sizeof (ipad))
665 MD5Update (&ctx, password, pass_len);
666 MD5Final (hash_passwd, &ctx);
667 password = hash_passwd; pass_len = sizeof (hash_passwd);
670 memset (ipad, 0, sizeof (ipad));
671 memset (opad, 0, sizeof (opad));
672 memcpy (ipad, password, pass_len);
673 memcpy (opad, password, pass_len);
675 for (i=0; i<64; i++) {
681 MD5Update (&ctx, ipad, sizeof (ipad));
682 MD5Update (&ctx, challenge, chal_len);
683 MD5Final (response, &ctx);
686 MD5Update (&ctx, opad, sizeof (opad));
687 MD5Update (&ctx, response, resp_len);
688 MD5Final (response, &ctx);
694 static tSmbNtlmAuthRequest request;
695 static tSmbNtlmAuthChallenge challenge;
696 static tSmbNtlmAuthResponse response;
699 * NTLM support by Grant Edwards.
701 * Handle MS-Exchange NTLM authentication method. This is the same
702 * as the NTLM auth used by Samba for SMB related services. We just
703 * encode the packets in base64 instead of sending them out via a
706 * Much source (ntlm.h, smb*.c smb*.h) was borrowed from Samba.
709 static int do_imap_ntlm(int sock, struct query *ctl)
714 gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE NTLM");
716 if ((result = gen_recv(sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
719 if (msgbuf[0] != '+')
722 buildSmbNtlmAuthRequest(&request,ctl->remotename,NULL);
724 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
725 dumpSmbNtlmAuthRequest(stdout, &request);
727 memset(msgbuf,0,sizeof msgbuf);
728 to64frombits (msgbuf, (unsigned char*)&request, SmbLength(&request));
730 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
731 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", msgbuf);
733 strcat(msgbuf,"\r\n");
734 SockWrite (sock, msgbuf, strlen (msgbuf));
736 if ((gen_recv(sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
739 len = from64tobits ((unsigned char*)&challenge, msgbuf);
741 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
742 dumpSmbNtlmAuthChallenge(stdout, &challenge);
744 buildSmbNtlmAuthResponse(&challenge, &response,ctl->remotename,ctl->password);
746 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
747 dumpSmbNtlmAuthResponse(stdout, &response);
749 memset(msgbuf,0,sizeof msgbuf);
750 to64frombits (msgbuf, (unsigned char*)&response, SmbLength(&response));
752 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
753 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", msgbuf);
755 strcat(msgbuf,"\r\n");
757 SockWrite (sock, msgbuf, strlen (msgbuf));
759 if ((result = gen_recv (sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
762 if (strstr (msgbuf, "OK"))
769 static int do_cram_md5 (int sock, struct query *ctl)
770 /* authenticate as per RFC2195 */
774 unsigned char buf1[1024];
775 unsigned char msg_id[768];
776 unsigned char response[16];
777 unsigned char reply[1024];
779 gen_send (sock, "AUTHENTICATE CRAM-MD5");
782 * The data encoded in the first ready response contains an
783 * presumptively arbitrary string of random digits, a timestamp, and the
784 * fully-qualified primary host name of the server. The syntax of the
785 * unencoded form must correspond to that of an RFC 822 'msg-id'
786 * [RFC822] as described in [POP3].
789 if ((result = gen_recv (sock, buf1, sizeof (buf1)))) {
793 len = from64tobits (msg_id, buf1);
795 report (stderr, _("could not decode BASE64 challenge\n"));
797 } else if (len < sizeof (msg_id)) {
800 msg_id[sizeof (msg_id)-1] = 0;
802 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
803 report (stdout, "decoded as %s\n", msg_id);
806 /* The client makes note of the data and then responds with a string
807 * consisting of the user name, a space, and a 'digest'. The latter is
808 * computed by applying the keyed MD5 algorithm from [KEYED-MD5] where
809 * the key is a shared secret and the digested text is the timestamp
810 * (including angle-brackets).
813 hmac_md5 (ctl->password, strlen (ctl->password),
814 msg_id, strlen (msg_id),
815 response, sizeof (response));
818 snprintf (reply, sizeof (reply),
822 "%s %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
824 response[0], response[1], response[2], response[3],
825 response[4], response[5], response[6], response[7],
826 response[8], response[9], response[10], response[11],
827 response[12], response[13], response[14], response[15]);
829 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
830 report (stdout, "replying with %s\n", reply);
833 to64frombits (buf1, reply, strlen (reply));
834 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
835 report (stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
838 /* PMDF5.2 IMAP has a bug that requires this to be a single write */
839 strcat (buf1, "\r\n");
840 SockWrite (sock, buf1, strlen (buf1));
842 if ((result = gen_recv (sock, buf1, sizeof (buf1))))
845 if (strstr (buf1, "OK")) {
852 int imap_canonicalize(char *result, char *raw, int maxlen)
853 /* encode an IMAP password as per RFC1730's quoting conventions */
858 for (i = 0; i < strlen(raw) && i < maxlen; i++)
860 if ((raw[i] == '\\') || (raw[i] == '"'))
862 result[j++] = raw[i];
869 int imap_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting)
870 /* apply for connection authorization */
874 /* probe to see if we're running IMAP4 and can use RFC822.PEEK */
875 capabilities[0] = '\0';
877 if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "CAPABILITY")) == PS_SUCCESS)
879 /* UW-IMAP server 10.173 notifies in all caps */
880 if (strstr(capabilities, "IMAP4REV1"))
882 imap_version = IMAP4rev1;
883 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
884 report(stdout, _("Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 1\n"));
888 imap_version = IMAP4;
889 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
890 report(stdout, _("Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 0\n"));
893 else if (ok == PS_ERROR)
895 imap_version = IMAP2;
896 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
897 report(stdout, _("Protocol identified as IMAP2 or IMAP2BIS\n"));
902 peek_capable = (imap_version >= IMAP4);
905 * Assumption: expunges are cheap, so we want to do them
906 * after every message unless user said otherwise.
908 if (NUM_SPECIFIED(ctl->expunge))
909 expunge_period = NUM_VALUE_OUT(ctl->expunge);
914 * If either (a) we saw a PREAUTH token in the capability response, or
915 * (b) the user specified ssh preauthentication, then we're done.
917 if (preauth || ctl->server.preauthenticate == A_SSH)
921 * Handle idling. We depend on coming through here on startup
922 * and after each timeout (including timeouts during idles).
925 if (strstr(capabilities, "IDLE") && ctl->idle)
928 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
929 report(stdout, "will idle after poll\n");
933 if ((ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP) && strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=X-OTP"))
935 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
936 report(stdout, _("OTP authentication is supported\n"));
937 if (do_otp(sock, ctl) == PS_SUCCESS)
940 #endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
943 if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=GSSAPI"))
945 if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_GSS)
947 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
948 report(stdout, _("GSS authentication is supported\n"));
949 return do_gssauth(sock, ctl->server.truename, ctl->remotename);
952 else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_GSS)
955 _("Required GSS capability not supported by server\n"));
961 if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=KERBEROS_V4"))
963 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
964 report(stdout, _("KERBEROS_V4 authentication is supported\n"));
966 if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_K4)
968 if ((ok = do_rfc1731(sock, ctl->server.truename)))
970 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
971 report(stdout, "IMAP> *\n");
972 SockWrite(sock, "*\r\n", 3);
977 /* else fall through to ordinary AUTH=LOGIN case */
979 else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_K4)
982 _("Required KERBEROS_V4 capability not supported by server\n"));
985 #endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
987 if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=CRAM-MD5"))
989 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
990 report (stdout, _("CRAM-MD5 authentication is supported\n"));
991 if (ctl->server.protocol != P_IMAP_LOGIN)
993 if ((ok = do_cram_md5 (sock, ctl)))
995 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
996 report (stdout, "IMAP> *\n");
997 SockWrite (sock, "*\r\n", 3);
1002 else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_CRAM_MD5)
1005 _("Required CRAM-MD5 capability not supported by server\n"));
1006 return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
1010 if (strstr (capabilities, "AUTH=NTLM"))
1012 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
1013 report (stdout, _("NTLM authentication is supported\n"));
1014 return do_imap_ntlm (sock, ctl);
1016 #endif /* NTLM_ENABLE */
1018 #ifdef __UNUSED__ /* The Cyrus IMAP4rev1 server chokes on this */
1019 /* this handles either AUTH=LOGIN or AUTH-LOGIN */
1020 if ((imap_version >= IMAP4rev1) && (!strstr(capabilities, "LOGIN"))) {
1022 _("Required LOGIN capability not supported by server\n"));
1025 #endif /* __UNUSED__ */
1028 /* these sizes guarantee no buffer overflow */
1029 char remotename[NAMELEN*2+1], password[PASSWORDLEN*2+1];
1031 imap_canonicalize(remotename, ctl->remotename, NAMELEN);
1032 imap_canonicalize(password, ctl->password, PASSWORDLEN);
1033 ok = gen_transact(sock, "LOGIN \"%s\" \"%s\"", remotename, password);
1042 static int internal_expunge(int sock)
1043 /* ship an expunge, resetting associated counters */
1047 if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "EXPUNGE")))
1050 expunged += deletions;
1053 #ifdef IMAP_UID /* not used */
1055 #endif /* IMAP_UID */
1060 static int imap_getrange(int sock,
1063 int *countp, int *newp, int *bytes)
1064 /* get range of messages to be fetched */
1068 /* find out how many messages are waiting */
1069 *bytes = recent = unseen = -1;
1074 * We have to have an expunge here, otherwise the re-poll will
1075 * infinite-loop picking up un-expunged messages -- unless the
1076 * expunge period is one and we've been nuking each message
1077 * just after deletion.
1080 if (deletions && expunge_period != 1)
1081 ok = internal_expunge(sock);
1084 if (ok || gen_transact(sock, do_idle ? "IDLE" : "NOOP"))
1086 report(stderr, _("re-poll failed\n"));
1089 else if (count == -1) /* no EXISTS response to NOOP/IDLE */
1097 ok = gen_transact(sock,
1098 check_only ? "EXAMINE \"%s\"" : "SELECT \"%s\"",
1099 folder ? folder : "INBOX");
1102 report(stderr, _("mailbox selection failed\n"));
1110 * Note: because IMAP has an is_old method, this number is used
1111 * only for the "X messages (Y unseen)" notification. Accordingly
1112 * it doesn't matter much that it can be wrong (e.g. if we see an
1113 * UNSEEN response but not all messages above the first UNSEEN one
1116 if (unseen >= 0) /* optional, but better if we see it */
1117 *newp = count - unseen + 1;
1118 else if (recent >= 0) /* mandatory */
1121 *newp = -1; /* should never happen, RECENT is mandatory */
1128 static int imap_getsizes(int sock, int count, int *sizes)
1129 /* capture the sizes of all messages */
1131 char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1];
1134 * Some servers (as in, PMDF5.1-9.1 under OpenVMS 6.1)
1135 * won't accept 1:1 as valid set syntax. Some implementors
1136 * should be taken out and shot for excessive anality.
1138 * Microsoft Exchange (brain-dead piece of crap that it is)
1139 * sometimes gets its knickers in a knot about bodiless messages.
1140 * You may see responses like this:
1142 * fetchmail: IMAP> A0004 FETCH 1:9 RFC822.SIZE
1143 * fetchmail: IMAP< * 2 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 1187)
1144 * fetchmail: IMAP< * 3 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 3954)
1145 * fetchmail: IMAP< * 4 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 1944)
1146 * fetchmail: IMAP< * 5 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 2933)
1147 * fetchmail: IMAP< * 6 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 1854)
1148 * fetchmail: IMAP< * 7 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 34054)
1149 * fetchmail: IMAP< * 8 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 5561)
1150 * fetchmail: IMAP< * 9 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 1101)
1151 * fetchmail: IMAP< A0004 NO The requested item could not be found.
1153 * This means message 1 has only headers. For kicks and grins
1154 * you can telnet in and look:
1156 * A003 NO The requested item could not be found.
1157 * A004 fetch 1 rfc822.header
1158 * A004 NO The requested item could not be found.
1160 * * 1 FETCH (BODY ("TEXT" "PLAIN" ("CHARSET" "US-ASCII") NIL NIL "7BIT" 35 3))
1161 * A006 OK FETCH completed.
1163 * To get around this, we terminate the read loop on a NO and count
1164 * on the fact that the sizes array has been preinitialized with a
1165 * known-bad size value.
1168 gen_send(sock, "FETCH 1 RFC822.SIZE", count);
1170 gen_send(sock, "FETCH 1:%d RFC822.SIZE", count);
1175 if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
1177 else if (strstr(buf, "OK") || strstr(buf, "NO"))
1179 else if (sscanf(buf, "* %d FETCH (RFC822.SIZE %d)", &num, &size) == 2)
1180 sizes[num - 1] = size;
1186 static int imap_is_old(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
1187 /* is the given message old? */
1191 /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
1194 if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "FETCH %d FLAGS", number)) != 0)
1200 static int imap_fetch_headers(int sock, struct query *ctl,int number,int *lenp)
1201 /* request headers of nth message */
1203 char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1];
1206 /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
1210 * This is blessed by RFC1176, RFC1730, RFC2060.
1211 * According to the RFCs, it should *not* set the \Seen flag.
1213 gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.HEADER", number);
1215 /* looking for FETCH response */
1219 if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
1222 (sscanf(buf+2, "%d FETCH (%*s {%d}", &num, lenp) != 2);
1230 static int imap_fetch_body(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number, int *lenp)
1231 /* request body of nth message */
1233 char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1], *cp;
1236 /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
1240 * If we're using IMAP4, we can fetch the message without setting its
1241 * seen flag. This is good! It means that if the protocol exchange
1242 * craps out during the message, it will still be marked `unseen' on
1245 * However...*don't* do this if we're using keep to suppress deletion!
1246 * In that case, marking the seen flag is the only way to prevent the
1247 * message from being re-fetched on subsequent runs (and according
1248 * to RFC2060 p.43 this fetch should set Seen as a side effect).
1250 switch (imap_version)
1252 case IMAP4rev1: /* RFC 2060 */
1254 gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d BODY.PEEK[TEXT]", number);
1256 gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d BODY[TEXT]", number);
1259 case IMAP4: /* RFC 1730 */
1261 gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.TEXT.PEEK", number);
1263 gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.TEXT", number);
1266 default: /* RFC 1176 */
1267 gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.TEXT", number);
1271 /* looking for FETCH response */
1275 if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
1278 (!strstr(buf+4, "FETCH") || sscanf(buf+2, "%d", &num) != 1);
1284 * Try to extract a length from the FETCH response. RFC2060 requires
1285 * it to be present, but at least one IMAP server (Novell GroupWise)
1288 if ((cp = strchr(buf, '{')))
1289 *lenp = atoi(cp + 1);
1291 *lenp = -1; /* missing length part in FETCH reponse */
1296 static int imap_trail(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
1297 /* discard tail of FETCH response after reading message text */
1299 /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
1300 /* number -= expunged; */
1304 char buf[MSGBUFSIZE+1];
1307 if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
1310 /* UW IMAP returns "OK FETCH", Cyrus returns "OK Completed" */
1311 if (strstr(buf, "OK"))
1316 * Any IMAP server that fails to set Seen on a BODY[TEXT]
1317 * fetch violates RFC2060 p.43 (top). This becomes an issue
1318 * when keep is on, because seen messages aren't deleted and
1319 * get refetched on each poll. As a workaround, if keep is on
1320 * we can set the Seen flag explicitly.
1322 * This code isn't used yet because we don't know of any IMAP
1323 * servers broken in this way.
1326 if ((ok = gen_transact(sock,
1327 imap_version == IMAP4
1328 ? "STORE %d +FLAGS.SILENT (\\Seen)"
1329 : "STORE %d +FLAGS (\\Seen)",
1332 #endif /* __UNUSED__ */
1338 static int imap_delete(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
1339 /* set delete flag for given message */
1343 /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
1347 * Use SILENT if possible as a minor throughput optimization.
1348 * Note: this has been dropped from IMAP4rev1.
1350 * We set Seen because there are some IMAP servers (notably HP
1351 * OpenMail) that do message-receipt DSNs, but only when the seen
1352 * bit is set. This is the appropriate time -- we get here right
1353 * after the local SMTP response that says delivery was
1356 if ((ok = gen_transact(sock,
1357 imap_version == IMAP4
1358 ? "STORE %d +FLAGS.SILENT (\\Seen \\Deleted)"
1359 : "STORE %d +FLAGS (\\Seen \\Deleted)",
1366 * We do an expunge after expunge_period messages, rather than
1367 * just before quit, so that a line hit during a long session
1368 * won't result in lots of messages being fetched again during
1371 if (NUM_NONZERO(expunge_period) && (deletions % expunge_period) == 0)
1372 internal_expunge(sock);
1377 static int imap_logout(int sock, struct query *ctl)
1378 /* send logout command */
1380 /* if any un-expunged deletions remain, ship an expunge now */
1382 internal_expunge(sock);
1384 return(gen_transact(sock, "LOGOUT"));
1387 const static struct method imap =
1389 "IMAP", /* Internet Message Access Protocol */
1393 #else /* INET6_ENABLE */
1394 143, /* standard IMAP2bis/IMAP4 port */
1395 993, /* ssl IMAP2bis/IMAP4 port */
1396 #endif /* INET6_ENABLE */
1397 TRUE, /* this is a tagged protocol */
1398 FALSE, /* no message delimiter */
1399 imap_ok, /* parse command response */
1400 imap_canonicalize, /* deal with embedded slashes and spaces */
1401 imap_getauth, /* get authorization */
1402 imap_getrange, /* query range of messages */
1403 imap_getsizes, /* get sizes of messages (used for ESMTP SIZE option) */
1404 imap_is_old, /* no UID check */
1405 imap_fetch_headers, /* request given message headers */
1406 imap_fetch_body, /* request given message body */
1407 imap_trail, /* eat message trailer */
1408 imap_delete, /* delete the message */
1409 imap_logout, /* expunge and exit */
1410 TRUE, /* yes, we can re-poll */
1413 int doIMAP(struct query *ctl)
1414 /* retrieve messages using IMAP Version 2bis or Version 4 */
1416 return(do_protocol(ctl, &imap));
1419 /* imap.c ends here */