2 * imap.c -- IMAP2bis/IMAP4 protocol methods
4 * Copyright 1997 by Eric S. Raymond
5 * For license terms, see the file COPYING in this directory.
12 #if defined(STDC_HEADERS)
15 #include "fetchmail.h"
20 #include <kerberosIV/des.h>
21 #include <kerberosIV/krb.h>
23 #if defined (__bsdi__)
25 #define krb_get_err_text(e) (krb_err_txt[e])
27 #if defined(__NetBSD__) || (__FreeBSD__) || defined(__linux__)
28 #define krb_get_err_text(e) (krb_err_txt[e])
32 #endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
39 #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H
40 #include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
42 #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
43 #include <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h>
45 #ifndef HAVE_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE
46 #define GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE gss_nt_service_name
54 #endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
56 #ifndef strstr /* glibc-2.1 declares this as a macro */
57 extern char *strstr(); /* needed on sysV68 R3V7.1. */
60 /* imap_version values */
61 #define IMAP2 -1 /* IMAP2 or IMAP2BIS, RFC1176 */
62 #define IMAP4 0 /* IMAP4 rev 0, RFC1730 */
63 #define IMAP4rev1 1 /* IMAP4 rev 1, RFC2060 */
65 static int count, seen, recent, unseen, deletions, imap_version, preauth;
66 static int expunged, expunge_period;
67 static char capabilities[MSGBUFSIZE+1];
69 int imap_ok(int sock, char *argbuf)
70 /* parse command response */
72 char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1];
79 if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
82 /* all tokens in responses are caseblind */
83 for (cp = buf; *cp; cp++)
87 /* interpret untagged status responses */
88 if (strstr(buf, "* CAPABILITY"))
89 strncpy(capabilities, buf + 12, sizeof(capabilities));
90 if (strstr(buf, "EXISTS"))
92 if (strstr(buf, "RECENT"))
94 if (strstr(buf, "UNSEEN"))
99 * Handle both "* 42 UNSEEN" (if tha ever happens) and
100 * "* OK [UNSEEN 42] 42". Note that what this gets us is
101 * a minimum index, not a count.
104 for (cp = buf; *cp && !isdigit(*cp); cp++)
108 if (strstr(buf, "FLAGS"))
109 seen = (strstr(buf, "SEEN") != (char *)NULL);
110 if (strstr(buf, "PREAUTH"))
113 (tag[0] != '\0' && strncmp(buf, tag, strlen(tag)));
126 for (cp = buf; !isspace(*cp); cp++)
131 if (strncmp(cp, "PREAUTH", 2) == 0)
138 else if (strncmp(cp, "OK", 2) == 0)
144 else if (strncmp(cp, "BAD", 3) == 0)
146 else if (strncmp(cp, "NO", 2) == 0)
148 if (stage == STAGE_GETAUTH)
149 return(PS_AUTHFAIL); /* RFC2060, 6.2.2 */
159 static int do_otp(int sock, struct query *ctl)
163 char challenge[OPIE_CHALLENGE_MAX+1];
164 char response[OPIE_RESPONSE_MAX+1];
166 gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE X-OTP");
168 if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
171 if ((i = from64tobits(challenge, buffer)) < 0) {
172 report(stderr, _("Could not decode initial BASE64 challenge\n"));
177 to64frombits(buffer, ctl->remotename, strlen(ctl->remotename));
179 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
180 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buffer);
182 /* best not to count on the challenge code handling multiple writes */
183 strcat(buffer, "\r\n");
184 SockWrite(sock, buffer, strlen(buffer));
186 if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
189 if ((i = from64tobits(challenge, buffer)) < 0) {
190 report(stderr, _("Could not decode OTP challenge\n"));
194 rval = opiegenerator(challenge, !strcmp(ctl->password, "opie") ? "" : ctl->password, response);
195 if ((rval == -2) && !run.poll_interval) {
196 char secret[OPIE_SECRET_MAX+1];
197 fprintf(stderr, _("Secret pass phrase: "));
198 if (opiereadpass(secret, sizeof(secret), 0))
199 rval = opiegenerator(challenge, secret, response);
200 memset(secret, 0, sizeof(secret));
206 to64frombits(buffer, response, strlen(response));
208 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
209 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buffer);
210 strcat(buffer, "\r\n");
211 SockWrite(sock, buffer, strlen(buffer));
213 if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
216 if (strstr(buffer, "OK"))
221 #endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
226 #elif SIZEOF_SHORT == 4
228 #elif SIZEOF_LONG == 4
231 #error Cannot deduce a 32-bit-type
234 static int do_rfc1731(int sock, char *truename)
235 /* authenticate as per RFC1731 -- note 32-bit integer requirement here */
238 char buf1[4096], buf2[4096];
242 } challenge1, challenge2;
243 char srvinst[INST_SZ];
245 char srvrealm[REALM_SZ];
246 KTEXT_ST authenticator;
247 CREDENTIALS credentials;
248 char tktuser[MAX_K_NAME_SZ+1+INST_SZ+1+REALM_SZ+1];
249 char tktinst[INST_SZ];
250 char tktrealm[REALM_SZ];
252 des_key_schedule schedule;
254 gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE KERBEROS_V4");
256 /* The data encoded in the first ready response contains a random
257 * 32-bit number in network byte order. The client should respond
258 * with a Kerberos ticket and an authenticator for the principal
259 * "imap.hostname@realm", where "hostname" is the first component
260 * of the host name of the server with all letters in lower case
261 * and where "realm" is the Kerberos realm of the server. The
262 * encrypted checksum field included within the Kerberos
263 * authenticator should contain the server provided 32-bit number
264 * in network byte order.
267 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
271 len = from64tobits(challenge1.cstr, buf1);
273 report(stderr, _("could not decode initial BASE64 challenge\n"));
277 /* this patch by Dan Root <dar@thekeep.org> solves an endianess
282 *(int *)tmp = ntohl(*(int *) challenge1.cstr);
283 memcpy(challenge1.cstr, tmp, sizeof(tmp));
286 /* Client responds with a Kerberos ticket and an authenticator for
287 * the principal "imap.hostname@realm" where "hostname" is the
288 * first component of the host name of the server with all letters
289 * in lower case and where "realm" is the Kerberos realm of the
290 * server. The encrypted checksum field included within the
291 * Kerberos authenticator should contain the server-provided
292 * 32-bit number in network byte order.
295 strncpy(srvinst, truename, (sizeof srvinst)-1);
296 srvinst[(sizeof srvinst)-1] = '\0';
297 for (p = srvinst; *p; p++) {
303 strncpy(srvrealm, (char *)krb_realmofhost(srvinst), (sizeof srvrealm)-1);
304 srvrealm[(sizeof srvrealm)-1] = '\0';
305 if (p = strchr(srvinst, '.')) {
309 result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm, 0);
311 report(stderr, "krb_mq_req: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
315 result = krb_get_cred("imap", srvinst, srvrealm, &credentials);
317 report(stderr, "krb_get_cred: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
321 memcpy(session, credentials.session, sizeof session);
322 memset(&credentials, 0, sizeof credentials);
323 des_key_sched(&session, schedule);
325 result = krb_get_tf_fullname(TKT_FILE, tktuser, tktinst, tktrealm);
327 report(stderr, "krb_get_tf_fullname: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
331 if (strcmp(tktuser, user) != 0) {
333 _("principal %s in ticket does not match -u %s\n"), tktuser,
340 _("non-null instance (%s) might cause strange behavior\n"),
342 strcat(tktuser, ".");
343 strcat(tktuser, tktinst);
346 if (strcmp(tktrealm, srvrealm) != 0) {
347 strcat(tktuser, "@");
348 strcat(tktuser, tktrealm);
351 result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm,
354 report(stderr, "krb_mq_req: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
358 to64frombits(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length);
359 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
360 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
362 strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
363 SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
365 /* Upon decrypting and verifying the ticket and authenticator, the
366 * server should verify that the contained checksum field equals
367 * the original server provided random 32-bit number. Should the
368 * verification be successful, the server must add one to the
369 * checksum and construct 8 octets of data, with the first four
370 * octets containing the incremented checksum in network byte
371 * order, the fifth octet containing a bit-mask specifying the
372 * protection mechanisms supported by the server, and the sixth
373 * through eighth octets containing, in network byte order, the
374 * maximum cipher-text buffer size the server is able to receive.
375 * The server must encrypt the 8 octets of data in the session key
376 * and issue that encrypted data in a second ready response. The
377 * client should consider the server authenticated if the first
378 * four octets the un-encrypted data is equal to one plus the
379 * checksum it previously sent.
382 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
385 /* The client must construct data with the first four octets
386 * containing the original server-issued checksum in network byte
387 * order, the fifth octet containing the bit-mask specifying the
388 * selected protection mechanism, the sixth through eighth octets
389 * containing in network byte order the maximum cipher-text buffer
390 * size the client is able to receive, and the following octets
391 * containing a user name string. The client must then append
392 * from one to eight octets so that the length of the data is a
393 * multiple of eight octets. The client must then PCBC encrypt the
394 * data with the session key and respond to the second ready
395 * response with the encrypted data. The server decrypts the data
396 * and verifies the contained checksum. The username field
397 * identifies the user for whom subsequent IMAP operations are to
398 * be performed; the server must verify that the principal
399 * identified in the Kerberos ticket is authorized to connect as
400 * that user. After these verifications, the authentication
401 * process is complete.
404 len = from64tobits(buf2, buf1);
406 report(stderr, _("could not decode BASE64 ready response\n"));
410 des_ecb_encrypt((des_cblock *)buf2, (des_cblock *)buf2, schedule, 0);
411 memcpy(challenge2.cstr, buf2, 4);
412 if (ntohl(challenge2.cint) != challenge1.cint + 1) {
413 report(stderr, _("challenge mismatch\n"));
417 memset(authenticator.dat, 0, sizeof authenticator.dat);
419 result = htonl(challenge1.cint);
420 memcpy(authenticator.dat, &result, sizeof result);
422 /* The protection mechanisms and their corresponding bit-masks are as
425 * 1 No protection mechanism
426 * 2 Integrity (krb_mk_safe) protection
427 * 4 Privacy (krb_mk_priv) protection
429 authenticator.dat[4] = 1;
431 len = strlen(tktuser);
432 strncpy(authenticator.dat+8, tktuser, len);
433 authenticator.length = len + 8 + 1;
434 while (authenticator.length & 7) {
435 authenticator.length++;
437 des_pcbc_encrypt((des_cblock *)authenticator.dat,
438 (des_cblock *)authenticator.dat, authenticator.length, schedule,
441 to64frombits(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length);
442 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
443 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
446 strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
447 SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
449 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
452 if (strstr(buf1, "OK")) {
459 #endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
462 #define GSSAUTH_P_NONE 1
463 #define GSSAUTH_P_INTEGRITY 2
464 #define GSSAUTH_P_PRIVACY 4
466 static int do_gssauth(int sock, char *hostname, char *username)
468 gss_buffer_desc request_buf, send_token;
469 gss_buffer_t sec_token;
470 gss_name_t target_name;
471 gss_ctx_id_t context;
475 OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat;
476 char buf1[8192], buf2[8192], server_conf_flags;
477 unsigned long buf_size;
480 /* first things first: get an imap ticket for host */
481 sprintf(buf1, "imap@%s", hostname);
482 request_buf.value = buf1;
483 request_buf.length = strlen(buf1) + 1;
484 maj_stat = gss_import_name(&min_stat, &request_buf, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE,
486 if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
487 report(stderr, _("Couldn't get service name for [%s]\n"), buf1);
490 else if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
491 maj_stat = gss_display_name(&min_stat, target_name, &request_buf,
493 report(stderr, _("Using service name [%s]\n"),request_buf.value);
494 maj_stat = gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &request_buf);
497 gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE GSSAPI");
499 /* upon receipt of the GSSAPI authentication request, server returns
500 * null data ready response. */
501 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
505 /* now start the security context initialisation loop... */
506 sec_token = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
507 context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
508 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
509 report(stdout, _("Sending credentials\n"));
511 send_token.length = 0;
512 send_token.value = NULL;
513 maj_stat = gss_init_sec_context(&min_stat,
518 GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG,
520 GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
526 if (maj_stat!=GSS_S_COMPLETE && maj_stat!=GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
527 report(stderr, _("Error exchanging credentials\n"));
528 gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
529 /* wake up server and await NO response */
530 SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
531 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
535 to64frombits(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length);
536 gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
537 strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
538 SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
539 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
540 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
541 if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
542 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
543 gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
546 request_buf.length = from64tobits(buf2, buf1 + 2);
547 request_buf.value = buf2;
548 sec_token = &request_buf;
550 } while (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
551 gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
553 /* get security flags and buffer size */
554 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
557 request_buf.length = from64tobits(buf2, buf1 + 2);
558 request_buf.value = buf2;
560 maj_stat = gss_unwrap(&min_stat, context, &request_buf, &send_token,
562 if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
563 report(stderr, _("Couldn't unwrap security level data\n"));
564 gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
567 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
568 report(stdout, _("Credential exchange complete\n"));
569 /* first octet is security levels supported. We want none, for now */
570 server_conf_flags = ((char *)send_token.value)[0];
571 if ( !(((char *)send_token.value)[0] & GSSAUTH_P_NONE) ) {
572 report(stderr, _("Server requires integrity and/or privacy\n"));
573 gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
576 ((char *)send_token.value)[0] = 0;
577 buf_size = ntohl(*((long *)send_token.value));
578 /* we don't care about buffer size if we don't wrap data */
579 gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
580 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
581 report(stdout, _("Unwrapped security level flags: %s%s%s\n"),
582 server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_NONE ? "N" : "-",
583 server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_INTEGRITY ? "I" : "-",
584 server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_PRIVACY ? "C" : "-");
585 report(stdout, _("Maximum GSS token size is %ld\n"),buf_size);
588 /* now respond in kind (hack!!!) */
589 buf_size = htonl(buf_size); /* do as they do... only matters if we do enc */
590 memcpy(buf1, &buf_size, 4);
591 buf1[0] = GSSAUTH_P_NONE;
592 strcpy(buf1+4, username); /* server decides if princ is user */
593 request_buf.length = 4 + strlen(username) + 1;
594 request_buf.value = buf1;
595 maj_stat = gss_wrap(&min_stat, context, 0, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, &request_buf,
596 &cflags, &send_token);
597 if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
598 report(stderr, _("Error creating security level request\n"));
601 to64frombits(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length);
602 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
603 report(stdout, _("Requesting authorization as %s\n"), username);
604 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n",buf1);
606 strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
607 SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
609 /* we should be done. Get status and finish up */
610 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
612 if (strstr(buf1, "OK")) {
613 /* flush security context */
614 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
615 report(stdout, _("Releasing GSS credentials\n"));
616 maj_stat = gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat, &context, &send_token);
617 if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
618 report(stderr, _("Error releasing credentials\n"));
621 /* send_token may contain a notification to the server to flush
622 * credentials. RFC 1731 doesn't specify what to do, and since this
623 * support is only for authentication, we'll assume the server
624 * knows enough to flush its own credentials */
625 gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
633 static void hmac_md5 (unsigned char *password, size_t pass_len,
634 unsigned char *challenge, size_t chal_len,
635 unsigned char *response, size_t resp_len)
638 unsigned char ipad[64];
639 unsigned char opad[64];
640 unsigned char hash_passwd[16];
647 if (pass_len > sizeof (ipad))
650 MD5Update (&ctx, password, pass_len);
651 MD5Final (hash_passwd, &ctx);
652 password = hash_passwd; pass_len = sizeof (hash_passwd);
655 memset (ipad, 0, sizeof (ipad));
656 memset (opad, 0, sizeof (opad));
657 memcpy (ipad, password, pass_len);
658 memcpy (opad, password, pass_len);
660 for (i=0; i<64; i++) {
666 MD5Update (&ctx, ipad, sizeof (ipad));
667 MD5Update (&ctx, challenge, chal_len);
668 MD5Final (response, &ctx);
671 MD5Update (&ctx, opad, sizeof (opad));
672 MD5Update (&ctx, response, resp_len);
673 MD5Final (response, &ctx);
679 static tSmbNtlmAuthRequest request;
680 static tSmbNtlmAuthChallenge challenge;
681 static tSmbNtlmAuthResponse response;
684 * NTLM support by Grant Edwards.
686 * Handle MS-Exchange NTLM authentication method. This is the same
687 * as the NTLM auth used by Samba for SMB related services. We just
688 * encode the packets in base64 instead of sending them out via a
691 * Much source (ntlm.h, smb*.c smb*.h) was borrowed from Samba.
694 static int do_imap_ntlm(int sock, struct query *ctl)
699 gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE NTLM");
701 if ((result = gen_recv(sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
704 if (msgbuf[0] != '+')
707 buildSmbNtlmAuthRequest(&request,ctl->remotename,NULL);
709 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
710 dumpSmbNtlmAuthRequest(stdout, &request);
712 memset(msgbuf,0,sizeof msgbuf);
713 to64frombits (msgbuf, (unsigned char*)&request, SmbLength(&request));
715 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
716 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", msgbuf);
718 strcat(msgbuf,"\r\n");
719 SockWrite (sock, msgbuf, strlen (msgbuf));
721 if ((gen_recv(sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
724 len = from64tobits ((unsigned char*)&challenge, msgbuf);
726 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
727 dumpSmbNtlmAuthChallenge(stdout, &challenge);
729 buildSmbNtlmAuthResponse(&challenge, &response,ctl->remotename,ctl->password);
731 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
732 dumpSmbNtlmAuthResponse(stdout, &response);
734 memset(msgbuf,0,sizeof msgbuf);
735 to64frombits (msgbuf, (unsigned char*)&response, SmbLength(&response));
737 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
738 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", msgbuf);
740 strcat(msgbuf,"\r\n");
742 SockWrite (sock, msgbuf, strlen (msgbuf));
744 if ((result = gen_recv (sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
747 if (strstr (msgbuf, "OK"))
754 static int do_cram_md5 (int sock, struct query *ctl)
755 /* authenticate as per RFC2195 */
759 unsigned char buf1[1024];
760 unsigned char msg_id[768];
761 unsigned char response[16];
762 unsigned char reply[1024];
764 gen_send (sock, "AUTHENTICATE CRAM-MD5");
767 * The data encoded in the first ready response contains an
768 * presumptively arbitrary string of random digits, a timestamp, and the
769 * fully-qualified primary host name of the server. The syntax of the
770 * unencoded form must correspond to that of an RFC 822 'msg-id'
771 * [RFC822] as described in [POP3].
774 if ((result = gen_recv (sock, buf1, sizeof (buf1)))) {
778 len = from64tobits (msg_id, buf1);
780 report (stderr, _("could not decode BASE64 challenge\n"));
782 } else if (len < sizeof (msg_id)) {
785 msg_id[sizeof (msg_id)-1] = 0;
787 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
788 report (stdout, "decoded as %s\n", msg_id);
791 /* The client makes note of the data and then responds with a string
792 * consisting of the user name, a space, and a 'digest'. The latter is
793 * computed by applying the keyed MD5 algorithm from [KEYED-MD5] where
794 * the key is a shared secret and the digested text is the timestamp
795 * (including angle-brackets).
798 hmac_md5 (ctl->password, strlen (ctl->password),
799 msg_id, strlen (msg_id),
800 response, sizeof (response));
803 snprintf (reply, sizeof (reply),
807 "%s %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
809 response[0], response[1], response[2], response[3],
810 response[4], response[5], response[6], response[7],
811 response[8], response[9], response[10], response[11],
812 response[12], response[13], response[14], response[15]);
814 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
815 report (stdout, "replying with %s\n", reply);
818 to64frombits (buf1, reply, strlen (reply));
819 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
820 report (stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
823 /* PMDF5.2 IMAP has a bug that requires this to be a single write */
824 strcat (buf1, "\r\n");
825 SockWrite (sock, buf1, strlen (buf1));
827 if ((result = gen_recv (sock, buf1, sizeof (buf1))))
830 if (strstr (buf1, "OK")) {
837 int imap_canonicalize(char *result, char *raw, int maxlen)
838 /* encode an IMAP password as per RFC1730's quoting conventions */
843 for (i = 0; i < strlen(raw) && i < maxlen; i++)
845 if ((raw[i] == '\\') || (raw[i] == '"'))
847 result[j++] = raw[i];
854 int imap_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting)
855 /* apply for connection authorization */
859 /* probe to see if we're running IMAP4 and can use RFC822.PEEK */
860 capabilities[0] = '\0';
861 if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "CAPABILITY")) == PS_SUCCESS)
863 /* UW-IMAP server 10.173 notifies in all caps */
864 if (strstr(capabilities, "IMAP4REV1"))
866 imap_version = IMAP4rev1;
867 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
868 report(stdout, _("Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 1\n"));
872 imap_version = IMAP4;
873 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
874 report(stdout, _("Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 0\n"));
877 else if (ok == PS_ERROR)
879 imap_version = IMAP2;
880 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
881 report(stdout, _("Protocol identified as IMAP2 or IMAP2BIS\n"));
886 peek_capable = (imap_version >= IMAP4);
889 * Assumption: expunges are cheap, so we want to do them
890 * after every message unless user said otherwise.
892 if (NUM_SPECIFIED(ctl->expunge))
893 expunge_period = NUM_VALUE_OUT(ctl->expunge);
898 * If either (a) we saw a PREAUTH token in the capability response, or
899 * (b) the user specified ssh preauthentication, then we're done.
901 if (preauth || ctl->server.preauthenticate == A_SSH)
905 if ((ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP) && strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=X-OTP"))
907 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
908 report(stdout, _("OTP authentication is supported\n"));
909 if (do_otp(sock, ctl) == PS_SUCCESS)
912 #endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
915 if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=GSSAPI"))
917 if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_GSS)
919 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
920 report(stdout, _("GSS authentication is supported\n"));
921 return do_gssauth(sock, ctl->server.truename, ctl->remotename);
924 else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_GSS)
927 _("Required GSS capability not supported by server\n"));
933 if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=KERBEROS_V4"))
935 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
936 report(stdout, _("KERBEROS_V4 authentication is supported\n"));
938 if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_K4)
940 if ((ok = do_rfc1731(sock, ctl->server.truename)))
942 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
943 report(stdout, "IMAP> *\n");
944 SockWrite(sock, "*\r\n", 3);
949 /* else fall through to ordinary AUTH=LOGIN case */
951 else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_K4)
954 _("Required KERBEROS_V4 capability not supported by server\n"));
957 #endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
959 if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=CRAM-MD5"))
961 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
962 report (stdout, _("CRAM-MD5 authentication is supported\n"));
963 if (ctl->server.protocol != P_IMAP_LOGIN)
965 if ((ok = do_cram_md5 (sock, ctl)))
967 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
968 report (stdout, "IMAP> *\n");
969 SockWrite (sock, "*\r\n", 3);
974 else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_CRAM_MD5)
977 _("Required CRAM-MD5 capability not supported by server\n"));
982 if (strstr (capabilities, "AUTH=NTLM"))
984 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
985 report (stdout, _("NTLM authentication is supported\n"));
986 return do_imap_ntlm (sock, ctl);
988 #endif /* NTLM_ENABLE */
990 #ifdef __UNUSED__ /* The Cyrus IMAP4rev1 server chokes on this */
991 /* this handles either AUTH=LOGIN or AUTH-LOGIN */
992 if ((imap_version >= IMAP4rev1) && (!strstr(capabilities, "LOGIN"))) {
994 _("Required LOGIN capability not supported by server\n"));
997 #endif /* __UNUSED__ */
1000 /* these sizes guarantee no buffer overflow */
1001 char remotename[NAMELEN*2+1], password[PASSWORDLEN*2+1];
1003 imap_canonicalize(remotename, ctl->remotename, NAMELEN);
1004 imap_canonicalize(password, ctl->password, PASSWORDLEN);
1005 ok = gen_transact(sock, "LOGIN \"%s\" \"%s\"", remotename, password);
1014 static int internal_expunge(int sock)
1015 /* ship an expunge, resetting associated counters */
1019 if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "EXPUNGE")))
1022 expunged += deletions;
1025 #ifdef IMAP_UID /* not used */
1027 #endif /* IMAP_UID */
1032 static int imap_getrange(int sock,
1035 int *countp, int *newp, int *bytes)
1036 /* get range of messages to be fetched */
1040 /* find out how many messages are waiting */
1041 *bytes = recent = unseen = -1;
1046 * We have to have an expunge here, otherwise the re-poll will
1047 * infinite-loop picking up un-expunged messages -- unless the
1048 * expunge period is one and we've been nuking each message
1049 * just after deletion.
1052 if (deletions && expunge_period != 1)
1053 internal_expunge(sock);
1055 if (ok || gen_transact(sock, "NOOP"))
1057 report(stderr, _("re-poll failed\n"));
1060 else if (count == -1) /* no EXISTS response to NOOP */
1068 ok = gen_transact(sock,
1069 check_only ? "EXAMINE \"%s\"" : "SELECT \"%s\"",
1070 folder ? folder : "INBOX");
1073 report(stderr, _("mailbox selection failed\n"));
1081 * Note: because IMAP has an is_old method, this number is used
1082 * only for the "X messages (Y unseen)" notification. Accordingly
1083 * it doesn't matter much that it can be wrong (e.g. if we see an
1084 * UNSEEN response but not all messages above the first UNSEEN one
1087 if (unseen >= 0) /* optional, but better if we see it */
1088 *newp = count - unseen + 1;
1089 else if (recent >= 0) /* mandatory */
1092 *newp = -1; /* should never happen, RECENT is mandatory */
1099 static int imap_getsizes(int sock, int count, int *sizes)
1100 /* capture the sizes of all messages */
1102 char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1];
1105 * Some servers (as in, PMDF5.1-9.1 under OpenVMS 6.1)
1106 * won't accept 1:1 as valid set syntax. Some implementors
1107 * should be taken out and shot for excessive anality.
1109 * Microsoft Exchange (brain-dead piece of crap that it is)
1110 * sometimes gets its knickers in a knot about bodiless messages.
1111 * You may see responses like this:
1113 * fetchmail: IMAP> A0004 FETCH 1:9 RFC822.SIZE
1114 * fetchmail: IMAP< * 2 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 1187)
1115 * fetchmail: IMAP< * 3 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 3954)
1116 * fetchmail: IMAP< * 4 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 1944)
1117 * fetchmail: IMAP< * 5 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 2933)
1118 * fetchmail: IMAP< * 6 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 1854)
1119 * fetchmail: IMAP< * 7 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 34054)
1120 * fetchmail: IMAP< * 8 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 5561)
1121 * fetchmail: IMAP< * 9 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 1101)
1122 * fetchmail: IMAP< A0004 NO The requested item could not be found.
1124 * This means message 1 has only headers. For kicks and grins
1125 * you can telnet in and look:
1127 * A003 NO The requested item could not be found.
1128 * A004 fetch 1 rfc822.header
1129 * A004 NO The requested item could not be found.
1131 * * 1 FETCH (BODY ("TEXT" "PLAIN" ("CHARSET" "US-ASCII") NIL NIL "7BIT" 35 3))
1132 * A006 OK FETCH completed.
1134 * To get around this, we terminate the read loop on a NO and count
1135 * on the fact that the sizes array has been preinitialized with a
1136 * known-bad size value.
1139 gen_send(sock, "FETCH 1 RFC822.SIZE", count);
1141 gen_send(sock, "FETCH 1:%d RFC822.SIZE", count);
1146 if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
1148 else if (strstr(buf, "OK") || strstr(buf, "NO"))
1150 else if (sscanf(buf, "* %d FETCH (RFC822.SIZE %d)", &num, &size) == 2)
1151 sizes[num - 1] = size;
1157 static int imap_is_old(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
1158 /* is the given message old? */
1162 /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
1165 if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "FETCH %d FLAGS", number)) != 0)
1171 static int imap_fetch_headers(int sock, struct query *ctl,int number,int *lenp)
1172 /* request headers of nth message */
1174 char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1];
1177 /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
1181 * This is blessed by RFC1176, RFC1730, RFC2060.
1182 * According to the RFCs, it should *not* set the \Seen flag.
1184 gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.HEADER", number);
1186 /* looking for FETCH response */
1190 if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
1193 (sscanf(buf+2, "%d FETCH (%*s {%d}", &num, lenp) != 2);
1201 static int imap_fetch_body(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number, int *lenp)
1202 /* request body of nth message */
1204 char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1], *cp;
1207 /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
1211 * If we're using IMAP4, we can fetch the message without setting its
1212 * seen flag. This is good! It means that if the protocol exchange
1213 * craps out during the message, it will still be marked `unseen' on
1216 * However...*don't* do this if we're using keep to suppress deletion!
1217 * In that case, marking the seen flag is the only way to prevent the
1218 * message from being re-fetched on subsequent runs (and according
1219 * to RFC2060 p.43 this fetch should set Seen as a side effect).
1221 switch (imap_version)
1223 case IMAP4rev1: /* RFC 2060 */
1225 gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d BODY.PEEK[TEXT]", number);
1227 gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d BODY[TEXT]", number);
1230 case IMAP4: /* RFC 1730 */
1232 gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.TEXT.PEEK", number);
1234 gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.TEXT", number);
1237 default: /* RFC 1176 */
1238 gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.TEXT", number);
1242 /* looking for FETCH response */
1246 if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
1249 (!strstr(buf+4, "FETCH") || sscanf(buf+2, "%d", &num) != 1);
1255 * Try to extract a length from the FETCH response. RFC2060 requires
1256 * it to be present, but at least one IMAP server (Novell GroupWise)
1259 if ((cp = strchr(buf, '{')))
1260 *lenp = atoi(cp + 1);
1262 *lenp = -1; /* missing length part in FETCH reponse */
1267 static int imap_trail(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
1268 /* discard tail of FETCH response after reading message text */
1270 /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
1271 /* number -= expunged; */
1275 char buf[MSGBUFSIZE+1];
1278 if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
1281 /* UW IMAP returns "OK FETCH", Cyrus returns "OK Completed" */
1282 if (strstr(buf, "OK"))
1287 * Any IMAP server that fails to set Seen on a BODY[TEXT]
1288 * fetch violates RFC2060 p.43 (top). This becomes an issue
1289 * when keep is on, because seen messages aren't deleted and
1290 * get refetched on each poll. As a workaround, if keep is on
1291 * we can set the Seen flag explicitly.
1293 * This code isn't used yet because we don't know of any IMAP
1294 * servers broken in this way.
1297 if ((ok = gen_transact(sock,
1298 imap_version == IMAP4
1299 ? "STORE %d +FLAGS.SILENT (\\Seen)"
1300 : "STORE %d +FLAGS (\\Seen)",
1303 #endif /* __UNUSED__ */
1309 static int imap_delete(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
1310 /* set delete flag for given message */
1314 /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
1318 * Use SILENT if possible as a minor throughput optimization.
1319 * Note: this has been dropped from IMAP4rev1.
1321 * We set Seen because there are some IMAP servers (notably HP
1322 * OpenMail) that do message-receipt DSNs, but only when the seen
1323 * bit is set. This is the appropriate time -- we get here right
1324 * after the local SMTP response that says delivery was
1327 if ((ok = gen_transact(sock,
1328 imap_version == IMAP4
1329 ? "STORE %d +FLAGS.SILENT (\\Seen \\Deleted)"
1330 : "STORE %d +FLAGS (\\Seen \\Deleted)",
1337 * We do an expunge after expunge_period messages, rather than
1338 * just before quit, so that a line hit during a long session
1339 * won't result in lots of messages being fetched again during
1342 if (NUM_NONZERO(expunge_period) && (deletions % expunge_period) == 0)
1343 internal_expunge(sock);
1348 static int imap_logout(int sock, struct query *ctl)
1349 /* send logout command */
1351 /* if any un-expunged deletions remain, ship an expunge now */
1353 internal_expunge(sock);
1355 return(gen_transact(sock, "LOGOUT"));
1358 const static struct method imap =
1360 "IMAP", /* Internet Message Access Protocol */
1364 #else /* INET6_ENABLE */
1365 143, /* standard IMAP2bis/IMAP4 port */
1366 993, /* ssl IMAP2bis/IMAP4 port */
1367 #endif /* INET6_ENABLE */
1368 TRUE, /* this is a tagged protocol */
1369 FALSE, /* no message delimiter */
1370 imap_ok, /* parse command response */
1371 imap_canonicalize, /* deal with embedded slashes and spaces */
1372 imap_getauth, /* get authorization */
1373 imap_getrange, /* query range of messages */
1374 imap_getsizes, /* get sizes of messages (used for ESMTP SIZE option) */
1375 imap_is_old, /* no UID check */
1376 imap_fetch_headers, /* request given message headers */
1377 imap_fetch_body, /* request given message body */
1378 imap_trail, /* eat message trailer */
1379 imap_delete, /* delete the message */
1380 imap_logout, /* expunge and exit */
1381 TRUE, /* yes, we can re-poll */
1384 int doIMAP(struct query *ctl)
1385 /* retrieve messages using IMAP Version 2bis or Version 4 */
1387 return(do_protocol(ctl, &imap));
1390 /* imap.c ends here */