2 * imap.c -- IMAP2bis/IMAP4 protocol methods
4 * Copyright 1997 by Eric S. Raymond
5 * For license terms, see the file COPYING in this directory.
12 #if defined(STDC_HEADERS)
15 #include "fetchmail.h"
20 #include <kerberosIV/des.h>
21 #include <kerberosIV/krb.h>
23 #if defined (__bsdi__)
25 #define krb_get_err_text(e) (krb_err_txt[e])
27 #if defined(__NetBSD__) || (__FreeBSD__) || defined(__linux__)
28 #define krb_get_err_text(e) (krb_err_txt[e])
32 #endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
39 #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H
40 #include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
42 #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
43 #include <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h>
45 #ifndef HAVE_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE
46 #define GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE gss_nt_service_name
54 #endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
56 #ifndef strstr /* glibc-2.1 declares this as a macro */
57 extern char *strstr(); /* needed on sysV68 R3V7.1. */
60 /* imap_version values */
61 #define IMAP2 -1 /* IMAP2 or IMAP2BIS, RFC1176 */
62 #define IMAP4 0 /* IMAP4 rev 0, RFC1730 */
63 #define IMAP4rev1 1 /* IMAP4 rev 1, RFC2060 */
65 static int count, seen, recent, unseen, deletions, imap_version, preauth;
66 static int expunged, expunge_period;
67 static flag do_idle, idling;
68 static char capabilities[MSGBUFSIZE+1];
70 int imap_ok(int sock, char *argbuf)
71 /* parse command response */
73 char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1];
80 if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
83 /* all tokens in responses are caseblind */
84 for (cp = buf; *cp; cp++)
88 /* interpret untagged status responses */
89 if (strstr(buf, "* CAPABILITY"))
90 strncpy(capabilities, buf + 12, sizeof(capabilities));
91 if (strstr(buf, "EXISTS"))
95 * Nasty kluge to handle RFC2177 IDLE. If we know we're idling
96 * we can't wait for the tag matching the IDLE; we have to tell the
97 * server the IDLE is finished by shipping back a DONE when we
98 * see an EXISTS. Only after that will a tagged response be
99 * shipped. The idling flag also gets cleared on a timeout.
101 if (stage == STAGE_IDLE)
103 /* we do our own write and report here to disable tagging */
104 SockWrite(sock, "DONE\r\n", 6);
105 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
106 report(stdout, "IMAP> DONE\n");
111 if (strstr(buf, "RECENT"))
112 recent = atoi(buf+2);
113 if (strstr(buf, "UNSEEN"))
118 * Handle both "* 42 UNSEEN" (if tha ever happens) and
119 * "* OK [UNSEEN 42] 42". Note that what this gets us is
120 * a minimum index, not a count.
123 for (cp = buf; *cp && !isdigit(*cp); cp++)
127 if (strstr(buf, "FLAGS"))
128 seen = (strstr(buf, "SEEN") != (char *)NULL);
129 if (strstr(buf, "PREAUTH"))
132 (tag[0] != '\0' && strncmp(buf, tag, strlen(tag)));
145 for (cp = buf; !isspace(*cp); cp++)
150 if (strncmp(cp, "PREAUTH", 2) == 0)
157 else if (strncmp(cp, "OK", 2) == 0)
163 else if (strncmp(cp, "BAD", 3) == 0)
165 else if (strncmp(cp, "NO", 2) == 0)
167 if (stage == STAGE_GETAUTH)
168 return(PS_AUTHFAIL); /* RFC2060, 6.2.2 */
178 static int do_otp(int sock, struct query *ctl)
182 char challenge[OPIE_CHALLENGE_MAX+1];
183 char response[OPIE_RESPONSE_MAX+1];
185 gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE X-OTP");
187 if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
190 if ((i = from64tobits(challenge, buffer)) < 0) {
191 report(stderr, _("Could not decode initial BASE64 challenge\n"));
196 to64frombits(buffer, ctl->remotename, strlen(ctl->remotename));
198 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
199 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buffer);
201 /* best not to count on the challenge code handling multiple writes */
202 strcat(buffer, "\r\n");
203 SockWrite(sock, buffer, strlen(buffer));
205 if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
208 if ((i = from64tobits(challenge, buffer)) < 0) {
209 report(stderr, _("Could not decode OTP challenge\n"));
213 rval = opiegenerator(challenge, !strcmp(ctl->password, "opie") ? "" : ctl->password, response);
214 if ((rval == -2) && !run.poll_interval) {
215 char secret[OPIE_SECRET_MAX+1];
216 fprintf(stderr, _("Secret pass phrase: "));
217 if (opiereadpass(secret, sizeof(secret), 0))
218 rval = opiegenerator(challenge, secret, response);
219 memset(secret, 0, sizeof(secret));
225 to64frombits(buffer, response, strlen(response));
227 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
228 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buffer);
229 strcat(buffer, "\r\n");
230 SockWrite(sock, buffer, strlen(buffer));
232 if (rval = gen_recv(sock, buffer, sizeof(buffer)))
235 if (strstr(buffer, "OK"))
240 #endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
245 #elif SIZEOF_SHORT == 4
247 #elif SIZEOF_LONG == 4
250 #error Cannot deduce a 32-bit-type
253 static int do_rfc1731(int sock, char *truename)
254 /* authenticate as per RFC1731 -- note 32-bit integer requirement here */
257 char buf1[4096], buf2[4096];
261 } challenge1, challenge2;
262 char srvinst[INST_SZ];
264 char srvrealm[REALM_SZ];
265 KTEXT_ST authenticator;
266 CREDENTIALS credentials;
267 char tktuser[MAX_K_NAME_SZ+1+INST_SZ+1+REALM_SZ+1];
268 char tktinst[INST_SZ];
269 char tktrealm[REALM_SZ];
271 des_key_schedule schedule;
273 gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE KERBEROS_V4");
275 /* The data encoded in the first ready response contains a random
276 * 32-bit number in network byte order. The client should respond
277 * with a Kerberos ticket and an authenticator for the principal
278 * "imap.hostname@realm", where "hostname" is the first component
279 * of the host name of the server with all letters in lower case
280 * and where "realm" is the Kerberos realm of the server. The
281 * encrypted checksum field included within the Kerberos
282 * authenticator should contain the server provided 32-bit number
283 * in network byte order.
286 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
290 len = from64tobits(challenge1.cstr, buf1);
292 report(stderr, _("could not decode initial BASE64 challenge\n"));
296 /* this patch by Dan Root <dar@thekeep.org> solves an endianess
301 *(int *)tmp = ntohl(*(int *) challenge1.cstr);
302 memcpy(challenge1.cstr, tmp, sizeof(tmp));
305 /* Client responds with a Kerberos ticket and an authenticator for
306 * the principal "imap.hostname@realm" where "hostname" is the
307 * first component of the host name of the server with all letters
308 * in lower case and where "realm" is the Kerberos realm of the
309 * server. The encrypted checksum field included within the
310 * Kerberos authenticator should contain the server-provided
311 * 32-bit number in network byte order.
314 strncpy(srvinst, truename, (sizeof srvinst)-1);
315 srvinst[(sizeof srvinst)-1] = '\0';
316 for (p = srvinst; *p; p++) {
322 strncpy(srvrealm, (char *)krb_realmofhost(srvinst), (sizeof srvrealm)-1);
323 srvrealm[(sizeof srvrealm)-1] = '\0';
324 if (p = strchr(srvinst, '.')) {
328 result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm, 0);
330 report(stderr, "krb_mq_req: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
334 result = krb_get_cred("imap", srvinst, srvrealm, &credentials);
336 report(stderr, "krb_get_cred: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
340 memcpy(session, credentials.session, sizeof session);
341 memset(&credentials, 0, sizeof credentials);
342 des_key_sched(&session, schedule);
344 result = krb_get_tf_fullname(TKT_FILE, tktuser, tktinst, tktrealm);
346 report(stderr, "krb_get_tf_fullname: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
350 if (strcmp(tktuser, user) != 0) {
352 _("principal %s in ticket does not match -u %s\n"), tktuser,
359 _("non-null instance (%s) might cause strange behavior\n"),
361 strcat(tktuser, ".");
362 strcat(tktuser, tktinst);
365 if (strcmp(tktrealm, srvrealm) != 0) {
366 strcat(tktuser, "@");
367 strcat(tktuser, tktrealm);
370 result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm,
373 report(stderr, "krb_mq_req: %s\n", krb_get_err_text(result));
377 to64frombits(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length);
378 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
379 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
381 strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
382 SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
384 /* Upon decrypting and verifying the ticket and authenticator, the
385 * server should verify that the contained checksum field equals
386 * the original server provided random 32-bit number. Should the
387 * verification be successful, the server must add one to the
388 * checksum and construct 8 octets of data, with the first four
389 * octets containing the incremented checksum in network byte
390 * order, the fifth octet containing a bit-mask specifying the
391 * protection mechanisms supported by the server, and the sixth
392 * through eighth octets containing, in network byte order, the
393 * maximum cipher-text buffer size the server is able to receive.
394 * The server must encrypt the 8 octets of data in the session key
395 * and issue that encrypted data in a second ready response. The
396 * client should consider the server authenticated if the first
397 * four octets the un-encrypted data is equal to one plus the
398 * checksum it previously sent.
401 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
404 /* The client must construct data with the first four octets
405 * containing the original server-issued checksum in network byte
406 * order, the fifth octet containing the bit-mask specifying the
407 * selected protection mechanism, the sixth through eighth octets
408 * containing in network byte order the maximum cipher-text buffer
409 * size the client is able to receive, and the following octets
410 * containing a user name string. The client must then append
411 * from one to eight octets so that the length of the data is a
412 * multiple of eight octets. The client must then PCBC encrypt the
413 * data with the session key and respond to the second ready
414 * response with the encrypted data. The server decrypts the data
415 * and verifies the contained checksum. The username field
416 * identifies the user for whom subsequent IMAP operations are to
417 * be performed; the server must verify that the principal
418 * identified in the Kerberos ticket is authorized to connect as
419 * that user. After these verifications, the authentication
420 * process is complete.
423 len = from64tobits(buf2, buf1);
425 report(stderr, _("could not decode BASE64 ready response\n"));
429 des_ecb_encrypt((des_cblock *)buf2, (des_cblock *)buf2, schedule, 0);
430 memcpy(challenge2.cstr, buf2, 4);
431 if (ntohl(challenge2.cint) != challenge1.cint + 1) {
432 report(stderr, _("challenge mismatch\n"));
436 memset(authenticator.dat, 0, sizeof authenticator.dat);
438 result = htonl(challenge1.cint);
439 memcpy(authenticator.dat, &result, sizeof result);
441 /* The protection mechanisms and their corresponding bit-masks are as
444 * 1 No protection mechanism
445 * 2 Integrity (krb_mk_safe) protection
446 * 4 Privacy (krb_mk_priv) protection
448 authenticator.dat[4] = 1;
450 len = strlen(tktuser);
451 strncpy(authenticator.dat+8, tktuser, len);
452 authenticator.length = len + 8 + 1;
453 while (authenticator.length & 7) {
454 authenticator.length++;
456 des_pcbc_encrypt((des_cblock *)authenticator.dat,
457 (des_cblock *)authenticator.dat, authenticator.length, schedule,
460 to64frombits(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length);
461 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
462 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
465 strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
466 SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
468 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
471 if (strstr(buf1, "OK")) {
478 #endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
481 #define GSSAUTH_P_NONE 1
482 #define GSSAUTH_P_INTEGRITY 2
483 #define GSSAUTH_P_PRIVACY 4
485 static int do_gssauth(int sock, char *hostname, char *username)
487 gss_buffer_desc request_buf, send_token;
488 gss_buffer_t sec_token;
489 gss_name_t target_name;
490 gss_ctx_id_t context;
494 OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat;
495 char buf1[8192], buf2[8192], server_conf_flags;
496 unsigned long buf_size;
499 /* first things first: get an imap ticket for host */
500 sprintf(buf1, "imap@%s", hostname);
501 request_buf.value = buf1;
502 request_buf.length = strlen(buf1) + 1;
503 maj_stat = gss_import_name(&min_stat, &request_buf, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE,
505 if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
506 report(stderr, _("Couldn't get service name for [%s]\n"), buf1);
509 else if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
510 maj_stat = gss_display_name(&min_stat, target_name, &request_buf,
512 report(stderr, _("Using service name [%s]\n"),request_buf.value);
513 maj_stat = gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &request_buf);
516 gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE GSSAPI");
518 /* upon receipt of the GSSAPI authentication request, server returns
519 * null data ready response. */
520 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
524 /* now start the security context initialisation loop... */
525 sec_token = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
526 context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
527 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
528 report(stdout, _("Sending credentials\n"));
530 send_token.length = 0;
531 send_token.value = NULL;
532 maj_stat = gss_init_sec_context(&min_stat,
537 GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG,
539 GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
545 if (maj_stat!=GSS_S_COMPLETE && maj_stat!=GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
546 report(stderr, _("Error exchanging credentials\n"));
547 gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
548 /* wake up server and await NO response */
549 SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
550 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
554 to64frombits(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length);
555 gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
556 strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
557 SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
558 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
559 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
560 if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
561 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
562 gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
565 request_buf.length = from64tobits(buf2, buf1 + 2);
566 request_buf.value = buf2;
567 sec_token = &request_buf;
569 } while (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
570 gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
572 /* get security flags and buffer size */
573 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
576 request_buf.length = from64tobits(buf2, buf1 + 2);
577 request_buf.value = buf2;
579 maj_stat = gss_unwrap(&min_stat, context, &request_buf, &send_token,
581 if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
582 report(stderr, _("Couldn't unwrap security level data\n"));
583 gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
586 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
587 report(stdout, _("Credential exchange complete\n"));
588 /* first octet is security levels supported. We want none, for now */
589 server_conf_flags = ((char *)send_token.value)[0];
590 if ( !(((char *)send_token.value)[0] & GSSAUTH_P_NONE) ) {
591 report(stderr, _("Server requires integrity and/or privacy\n"));
592 gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
595 ((char *)send_token.value)[0] = 0;
596 buf_size = ntohl(*((long *)send_token.value));
597 /* we don't care about buffer size if we don't wrap data */
598 gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
599 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
600 report(stdout, _("Unwrapped security level flags: %s%s%s\n"),
601 server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_NONE ? "N" : "-",
602 server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_INTEGRITY ? "I" : "-",
603 server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_PRIVACY ? "C" : "-");
604 report(stdout, _("Maximum GSS token size is %ld\n"),buf_size);
607 /* now respond in kind (hack!!!) */
608 buf_size = htonl(buf_size); /* do as they do... only matters if we do enc */
609 memcpy(buf1, &buf_size, 4);
610 buf1[0] = GSSAUTH_P_NONE;
611 strcpy(buf1+4, username); /* server decides if princ is user */
612 request_buf.length = 4 + strlen(username) + 1;
613 request_buf.value = buf1;
614 maj_stat = gss_wrap(&min_stat, context, 0, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, &request_buf,
615 &cflags, &send_token);
616 if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
617 report(stderr, _("Error creating security level request\n"));
620 to64frombits(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length);
621 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
622 report(stdout, _("Requesting authorization as %s\n"), username);
623 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n",buf1);
625 strcat(buf1, "\r\n");
626 SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
628 /* we should be done. Get status and finish up */
629 if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
631 if (strstr(buf1, "OK")) {
632 /* flush security context */
633 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
634 report(stdout, _("Releasing GSS credentials\n"));
635 maj_stat = gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat, &context, &send_token);
636 if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
637 report(stderr, _("Error releasing credentials\n"));
640 /* send_token may contain a notification to the server to flush
641 * credentials. RFC 1731 doesn't specify what to do, and since this
642 * support is only for authentication, we'll assume the server
643 * knows enough to flush its own credentials */
644 gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
652 static void hmac_md5 (unsigned char *password, size_t pass_len,
653 unsigned char *challenge, size_t chal_len,
654 unsigned char *response, size_t resp_len)
657 unsigned char ipad[64];
658 unsigned char opad[64];
659 unsigned char hash_passwd[16];
666 if (pass_len > sizeof (ipad))
669 MD5Update (&ctx, password, pass_len);
670 MD5Final (hash_passwd, &ctx);
671 password = hash_passwd; pass_len = sizeof (hash_passwd);
674 memset (ipad, 0, sizeof (ipad));
675 memset (opad, 0, sizeof (opad));
676 memcpy (ipad, password, pass_len);
677 memcpy (opad, password, pass_len);
679 for (i=0; i<64; i++) {
685 MD5Update (&ctx, ipad, sizeof (ipad));
686 MD5Update (&ctx, challenge, chal_len);
687 MD5Final (response, &ctx);
690 MD5Update (&ctx, opad, sizeof (opad));
691 MD5Update (&ctx, response, resp_len);
692 MD5Final (response, &ctx);
698 static tSmbNtlmAuthRequest request;
699 static tSmbNtlmAuthChallenge challenge;
700 static tSmbNtlmAuthResponse response;
703 * NTLM support by Grant Edwards.
705 * Handle MS-Exchange NTLM authentication method. This is the same
706 * as the NTLM auth used by Samba for SMB related services. We just
707 * encode the packets in base64 instead of sending them out via a
710 * Much source (ntlm.h, smb*.c smb*.h) was borrowed from Samba.
713 static int do_imap_ntlm(int sock, struct query *ctl)
718 gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE NTLM");
720 if ((result = gen_recv(sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
723 if (msgbuf[0] != '+')
726 buildSmbNtlmAuthRequest(&request,ctl->remotename,NULL);
728 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
729 dumpSmbNtlmAuthRequest(stdout, &request);
731 memset(msgbuf,0,sizeof msgbuf);
732 to64frombits (msgbuf, (unsigned char*)&request, SmbLength(&request));
734 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
735 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", msgbuf);
737 strcat(msgbuf,"\r\n");
738 SockWrite (sock, msgbuf, strlen (msgbuf));
740 if ((gen_recv(sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
743 len = from64tobits ((unsigned char*)&challenge, msgbuf);
745 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
746 dumpSmbNtlmAuthChallenge(stdout, &challenge);
748 buildSmbNtlmAuthResponse(&challenge, &response,ctl->remotename,ctl->password);
750 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
751 dumpSmbNtlmAuthResponse(stdout, &response);
753 memset(msgbuf,0,sizeof msgbuf);
754 to64frombits (msgbuf, (unsigned char*)&response, SmbLength(&response));
756 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
757 report(stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", msgbuf);
759 strcat(msgbuf,"\r\n");
761 SockWrite (sock, msgbuf, strlen (msgbuf));
763 if ((result = gen_recv (sock, msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf)))
766 if (strstr (msgbuf, "OK"))
773 static int do_cram_md5 (int sock, struct query *ctl)
774 /* authenticate as per RFC2195 */
778 unsigned char buf1[1024];
779 unsigned char msg_id[768];
780 unsigned char response[16];
781 unsigned char reply[1024];
783 gen_send (sock, "AUTHENTICATE CRAM-MD5");
786 * The data encoded in the first ready response contains an
787 * presumptively arbitrary string of random digits, a timestamp, and the
788 * fully-qualified primary host name of the server. The syntax of the
789 * unencoded form must correspond to that of an RFC 822 'msg-id'
790 * [RFC822] as described in [POP3].
793 if ((result = gen_recv (sock, buf1, sizeof (buf1)))) {
797 len = from64tobits (msg_id, buf1);
799 report (stderr, _("could not decode BASE64 challenge\n"));
801 } else if (len < sizeof (msg_id)) {
804 msg_id[sizeof (msg_id)-1] = 0;
806 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
807 report (stdout, "decoded as %s\n", msg_id);
810 /* The client makes note of the data and then responds with a string
811 * consisting of the user name, a space, and a 'digest'. The latter is
812 * computed by applying the keyed MD5 algorithm from [KEYED-MD5] where
813 * the key is a shared secret and the digested text is the timestamp
814 * (including angle-brackets).
817 hmac_md5 (ctl->password, strlen (ctl->password),
818 msg_id, strlen (msg_id),
819 response, sizeof (response));
822 snprintf (reply, sizeof (reply),
826 "%s %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
828 response[0], response[1], response[2], response[3],
829 response[4], response[5], response[6], response[7],
830 response[8], response[9], response[10], response[11],
831 response[12], response[13], response[14], response[15]);
833 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG) {
834 report (stdout, "replying with %s\n", reply);
837 to64frombits (buf1, reply, strlen (reply));
838 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR) {
839 report (stdout, "IMAP> %s\n", buf1);
842 /* PMDF5.2 IMAP has a bug that requires this to be a single write */
843 strcat (buf1, "\r\n");
844 SockWrite (sock, buf1, strlen (buf1));
846 if ((result = gen_recv (sock, buf1, sizeof (buf1))))
849 if (strstr (buf1, "OK")) {
856 int imap_canonicalize(char *result, char *raw, int maxlen)
857 /* encode an IMAP password as per RFC1730's quoting conventions */
862 for (i = 0; i < strlen(raw) && i < maxlen; i++)
864 if ((raw[i] == '\\') || (raw[i] == '"'))
866 result[j++] = raw[i];
873 int imap_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting)
874 /* apply for connection authorization */
878 /* probe to see if we're running IMAP4 and can use RFC822.PEEK */
879 capabilities[0] = '\0';
881 if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "CAPABILITY")) == PS_SUCCESS)
883 /* UW-IMAP server 10.173 notifies in all caps */
884 if (strstr(capabilities, "IMAP4REV1"))
886 imap_version = IMAP4rev1;
887 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
888 report(stdout, _("Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 1\n"));
892 imap_version = IMAP4;
893 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
894 report(stdout, _("Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 0\n"));
897 else if (ok == PS_ERROR)
899 imap_version = IMAP2;
900 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
901 report(stdout, _("Protocol identified as IMAP2 or IMAP2BIS\n"));
906 peek_capable = (imap_version >= IMAP4);
909 * Assumption: expunges are cheap, so we want to do them
910 * after every message unless user said otherwise.
912 if (NUM_SPECIFIED(ctl->expunge))
913 expunge_period = NUM_VALUE_OUT(ctl->expunge);
918 * If either (a) we saw a PREAUTH token in the capability response, or
919 * (b) the user specified ssh preauthentication, then we're done.
921 if (preauth || ctl->server.preauthenticate == A_SSH)
925 * Handle idling. We depend on coming through here on startup
926 * and after each timeout (including timeouts during idles).
928 if (strstr(capabilities, "IDLE") && ctl->idle)
931 if (outlevel >= O_VERBOSE)
932 report(stdout, "will idle after poll\n");
936 if ((ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP) && strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=X-OTP"))
938 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
939 report(stdout, _("OTP authentication is supported\n"));
940 if (do_otp(sock, ctl) == PS_SUCCESS)
943 #endif /* OPIE_ENABLE */
946 if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=GSSAPI"))
948 if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_GSS)
950 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
951 report(stdout, _("GSS authentication is supported\n"));
952 return do_gssauth(sock, ctl->server.truename, ctl->remotename);
955 else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_GSS)
958 _("Required GSS capability not supported by server\n"));
964 if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=KERBEROS_V4"))
966 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
967 report(stdout, _("KERBEROS_V4 authentication is supported\n"));
969 if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_K4)
971 if ((ok = do_rfc1731(sock, ctl->server.truename)))
973 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
974 report(stdout, "IMAP> *\n");
975 SockWrite(sock, "*\r\n", 3);
980 /* else fall through to ordinary AUTH=LOGIN case */
982 else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_K4)
985 _("Required KERBEROS_V4 capability not supported by server\n"));
988 #endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
990 if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=CRAM-MD5"))
992 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
993 report (stdout, _("CRAM-MD5 authentication is supported\n"));
994 if (ctl->server.protocol != P_IMAP_LOGIN)
996 if ((ok = do_cram_md5 (sock, ctl)))
998 if (outlevel >= O_MONITOR)
999 report (stdout, "IMAP> *\n");
1000 SockWrite (sock, "*\r\n", 3);
1005 else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_CRAM_MD5)
1008 _("Required CRAM-MD5 capability not supported by server\n"));
1009 return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
1013 if (strstr (capabilities, "AUTH=NTLM"))
1015 if (outlevel >= O_DEBUG)
1016 report (stdout, _("NTLM authentication is supported\n"));
1017 return do_imap_ntlm (sock, ctl);
1019 #endif /* NTLM_ENABLE */
1021 #ifdef __UNUSED__ /* The Cyrus IMAP4rev1 server chokes on this */
1022 /* this handles either AUTH=LOGIN or AUTH-LOGIN */
1023 if ((imap_version >= IMAP4rev1) && (!strstr(capabilities, "LOGIN"))) {
1025 _("Required LOGIN capability not supported by server\n"));
1028 #endif /* __UNUSED__ */
1031 /* these sizes guarantee no buffer overflow */
1032 char remotename[NAMELEN*2+1], password[PASSWORDLEN*2+1];
1034 imap_canonicalize(remotename, ctl->remotename, NAMELEN);
1035 imap_canonicalize(password, ctl->password, PASSWORDLEN);
1036 ok = gen_transact(sock, "LOGIN \"%s\" \"%s\"", remotename, password);
1045 static int internal_expunge(int sock)
1046 /* ship an expunge, resetting associated counters */
1050 if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "EXPUNGE")))
1053 expunged += deletions;
1056 #ifdef IMAP_UID /* not used */
1058 #endif /* IMAP_UID */
1063 static int imap_getrange(int sock,
1066 int *countp, int *newp, int *bytes)
1067 /* get range of messages to be fetched */
1071 /* find out how many messages are waiting */
1072 *bytes = recent = unseen = -1;
1077 * We have to have an expunge here, otherwise the re-poll will
1078 * infinite-loop picking up un-expunged messages -- unless the
1079 * expunge period is one and we've been nuking each message
1080 * just after deletion.
1083 if (deletions && expunge_period != 1)
1084 ok = internal_expunge(sock);
1089 /* this is the RFC2177-recommended timeout for an IDLE */
1090 mytimeout = 29 * 60;
1092 if (ok || gen_transact(sock, do_idle ? "IDLE" : "NOOP"))
1094 report(stderr, _("re-poll failed\n"));
1097 else if (count == -1) /* no EXISTS response to NOOP/IDLE */
1105 ok = gen_transact(sock,
1106 check_only ? "EXAMINE \"%s\"" : "SELECT \"%s\"",
1107 folder ? folder : "INBOX");
1110 report(stderr, _("mailbox selection failed\n"));
1118 * Note: because IMAP has an is_old method, this number is used
1119 * only for the "X messages (Y unseen)" notification. Accordingly
1120 * it doesn't matter much that it can be wrong (e.g. if we see an
1121 * UNSEEN response but not all messages above the first UNSEEN one
1124 if (unseen >= 0) /* optional, but better if we see it */
1125 *newp = count - unseen + 1;
1126 else if (recent >= 0) /* mandatory */
1129 *newp = -1; /* should never happen, RECENT is mandatory */
1136 static int imap_getsizes(int sock, int count, int *sizes)
1137 /* capture the sizes of all messages */
1139 char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1];
1142 * Some servers (as in, PMDF5.1-9.1 under OpenVMS 6.1)
1143 * won't accept 1:1 as valid set syntax. Some implementors
1144 * should be taken out and shot for excessive anality.
1146 * Microsoft Exchange (brain-dead piece of crap that it is)
1147 * sometimes gets its knickers in a knot about bodiless messages.
1148 * You may see responses like this:
1150 * fetchmail: IMAP> A0004 FETCH 1:9 RFC822.SIZE
1151 * fetchmail: IMAP< * 2 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 1187)
1152 * fetchmail: IMAP< * 3 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 3954)
1153 * fetchmail: IMAP< * 4 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 1944)
1154 * fetchmail: IMAP< * 5 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 2933)
1155 * fetchmail: IMAP< * 6 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 1854)
1156 * fetchmail: IMAP< * 7 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 34054)
1157 * fetchmail: IMAP< * 8 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 5561)
1158 * fetchmail: IMAP< * 9 FETCH (RFC822.SIZE 1101)
1159 * fetchmail: IMAP< A0004 NO The requested item could not be found.
1161 * This means message 1 has only headers. For kicks and grins
1162 * you can telnet in and look:
1164 * A003 NO The requested item could not be found.
1165 * A004 fetch 1 rfc822.header
1166 * A004 NO The requested item could not be found.
1168 * * 1 FETCH (BODY ("TEXT" "PLAIN" ("CHARSET" "US-ASCII") NIL NIL "7BIT" 35 3))
1169 * A006 OK FETCH completed.
1171 * To get around this, we terminate the read loop on a NO and count
1172 * on the fact that the sizes array has been preinitialized with a
1173 * known-bad size value.
1176 gen_send(sock, "FETCH 1 RFC822.SIZE", count);
1178 gen_send(sock, "FETCH 1:%d RFC822.SIZE", count);
1183 if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
1185 else if (strstr(buf, "OK") || strstr(buf, "NO"))
1187 else if (sscanf(buf, "* %d FETCH (RFC822.SIZE %d)", &num, &size) == 2)
1188 sizes[num - 1] = size;
1194 static int imap_is_old(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
1195 /* is the given message old? */
1199 /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
1202 if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "FETCH %d FLAGS", number)) != 0)
1208 static int imap_fetch_headers(int sock, struct query *ctl,int number,int *lenp)
1209 /* request headers of nth message */
1211 char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1];
1214 /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
1218 * This is blessed by RFC1176, RFC1730, RFC2060.
1219 * According to the RFCs, it should *not* set the \Seen flag.
1221 gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.HEADER", number);
1223 /* looking for FETCH response */
1227 if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
1230 (sscanf(buf+2, "%d FETCH (%*s {%d}", &num, lenp) != 2);
1238 static int imap_fetch_body(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number, int *lenp)
1239 /* request body of nth message */
1241 char buf [MSGBUFSIZE+1], *cp;
1244 /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
1248 * If we're using IMAP4, we can fetch the message without setting its
1249 * seen flag. This is good! It means that if the protocol exchange
1250 * craps out during the message, it will still be marked `unseen' on
1253 * However...*don't* do this if we're using keep to suppress deletion!
1254 * In that case, marking the seen flag is the only way to prevent the
1255 * message from being re-fetched on subsequent runs (and according
1256 * to RFC2060 p.43 this fetch should set Seen as a side effect).
1258 * According to RFC2060, and Mark Crispin the IMAP maintainer,
1259 * FETCH %d BODY[TEXT] and RFC822.TEXT are "functionally
1260 * equivalent". However, we know of at least one server that
1261 * treats them differently in the presence of MIME attachments;
1262 * the latter form downloads the attachment, the former does not.
1263 * The server is InterChange, and the fool who implemented this
1264 * misfeature ought to be strung up by his thumbs.
1266 * When I tried working around this by disable use of the 4rev1 form,
1267 * I found that doing this breaks operation with M$ Exchange.
1268 * Annoyingly enough, Exchange's refusal to cope is technically legal
1269 * under RFC2062. Trust Microsoft, the Great Enemy of interoperability
1270 * standards, to find a way to make standards compliance irritating....
1272 switch (imap_version)
1274 case IMAP4rev1: /* RFC 2060 */
1276 gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d BODY.PEEK[TEXT]", number);
1278 gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d BODY[TEXT]", number);
1281 case IMAP4: /* RFC 1730 */
1283 gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.TEXT.PEEK", number);
1285 gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.TEXT", number);
1288 default: /* RFC 1176 */
1289 gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.TEXT", number);
1293 /* looking for FETCH response */
1297 if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
1300 (!strstr(buf+4, "FETCH") || sscanf(buf+2, "%d", &num) != 1);
1306 * Try to extract a length from the FETCH response. RFC2060 requires
1307 * it to be present, but at least one IMAP server (Novell GroupWise)
1310 if ((cp = strchr(buf, '{')))
1311 *lenp = atoi(cp + 1);
1313 *lenp = -1; /* missing length part in FETCH reponse */
1318 static int imap_trail(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
1319 /* discard tail of FETCH response after reading message text */
1321 /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
1322 /* number -= expunged; */
1326 char buf[MSGBUFSIZE+1];
1329 if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
1332 /* UW IMAP returns "OK FETCH", Cyrus returns "OK Completed" */
1333 if (strstr(buf, "OK"))
1338 * Any IMAP server that fails to set Seen on a BODY[TEXT]
1339 * fetch violates RFC2060 p.43 (top). This becomes an issue
1340 * when keep is on, because seen messages aren't deleted and
1341 * get refetched on each poll. As a workaround, if keep is on
1342 * we can set the Seen flag explicitly.
1344 * This code isn't used yet because we don't know of any IMAP
1345 * servers broken in this way.
1348 if ((ok = gen_transact(sock,
1349 imap_version == IMAP4
1350 ? "STORE %d +FLAGS.SILENT (\\Seen)"
1351 : "STORE %d +FLAGS (\\Seen)",
1354 #endif /* __UNUSED__ */
1360 static int imap_delete(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
1361 /* set delete flag for given message */
1365 /* expunges change the fetch numbers */
1369 * Use SILENT if possible as a minor throughput optimization.
1370 * Note: this has been dropped from IMAP4rev1.
1372 * We set Seen because there are some IMAP servers (notably HP
1373 * OpenMail) that do message-receipt DSNs, but only when the seen
1374 * bit is set. This is the appropriate time -- we get here right
1375 * after the local SMTP response that says delivery was
1378 if ((ok = gen_transact(sock,
1379 imap_version == IMAP4
1380 ? "STORE %d +FLAGS.SILENT (\\Seen \\Deleted)"
1381 : "STORE %d +FLAGS (\\Seen \\Deleted)",
1388 * We do an expunge after expunge_period messages, rather than
1389 * just before quit, so that a line hit during a long session
1390 * won't result in lots of messages being fetched again during
1393 if (NUM_NONZERO(expunge_period) && (deletions % expunge_period) == 0)
1394 internal_expunge(sock);
1399 static int imap_logout(int sock, struct query *ctl)
1400 /* send logout command */
1402 /* if any un-expunged deletions remain, ship an expunge now */
1404 internal_expunge(sock);
1406 return(gen_transact(sock, "LOGOUT"));
1409 const static struct method imap =
1411 "IMAP", /* Internet Message Access Protocol */
1415 #else /* INET6_ENABLE */
1416 143, /* standard IMAP2bis/IMAP4 port */
1417 993, /* ssl IMAP2bis/IMAP4 port */
1418 #endif /* INET6_ENABLE */
1419 TRUE, /* this is a tagged protocol */
1420 FALSE, /* no message delimiter */
1421 imap_ok, /* parse command response */
1422 imap_canonicalize, /* deal with embedded slashes and spaces */
1423 imap_getauth, /* get authorization */
1424 imap_getrange, /* query range of messages */
1425 imap_getsizes, /* get sizes of messages (used for ESMTP SIZE option) */
1426 imap_is_old, /* no UID check */
1427 imap_fetch_headers, /* request given message headers */
1428 imap_fetch_body, /* request given message body */
1429 imap_trail, /* eat message trailer */
1430 imap_delete, /* delete the message */
1431 imap_logout, /* expunge and exit */
1432 TRUE, /* yes, we can re-poll */
1435 int doIMAP(struct query *ctl)
1436 /* retrieve messages using IMAP Version 2bis or Version 4 */
1438 return(do_protocol(ctl, &imap));
1441 /* imap.c ends here */